Spain in the European Union: the first twenty-five years (1986-2011) by Almunia, Joaquín et al.
Joaquín Roy and María Lorca-Susino 
(editors)
Jean Monnet Chair, University of Miami
 Miami-Florida European Union Center of Excellence
Joaquín Almunia
Enrique Barón
Cristina Blanco Sío-López 
Carmen González Enríquez
Francesc Granell
Haruko Hosoda
Imtiaz Hussain
María Lorca-Susino
Luis Moreno
Ramón Mullerat
Vicente Palacio
Sonia Piedrafi ta
Charles Powell
Joaquín Roy
Sebastián Royo
José Ignacio Torreblanca 
Blanca Vilà 
Alfonso Camiñas-Muiña
(Assistant Editor) 
“Spain is the problem. Europe is the solution”. In this fashion Ortega y Gasset 
once dramatized the need to “Europeanize” Spain. The results over the first 
twenty five years of EU membership have been truly impressive. When Spain 
became a member of the EC, some of the best and brightest of Spain’s govern-
mental cadres and universities joined the expanded European institutions, taking 
on positions of responsibility. The most prominent chaired the European Court of 
Justice (Gil-Carlos Rodríguez Iglesias) and the Parliament (Enrique Barón, José-
María Gil Robles, and Josep Borrell), holding key positions in the Commission, 
and filling the newly created position of High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (Javier Solana).
   Spain, in sum, “was not different”, contrary to what old-fashion tourist 
publicity for the country used to say. It was a European country like any other 
that was returning to its natural home after a long exile.
    Spain, in turn, received considerable benefits from EU membership 
through funds for regional investment policies, agriculture and rural develop-
ment, and the modernisation of national infrastructure. From an index of 60 
percent of the European average in 1986, today Spain’s income per head is 
in the range of 105 percent, with some regions surpassing 125 percent. From 
being a country that was a net receiver from the EU budget, Spain  today is a net 
contributor.
  Reflecting this development, the present volume examines different di-
mensions of the deepening relationship between Spain and the rest of Europe 
through membership of the EU (its history, and its impact on policy development 
on economic growth and on relations with third countries). 
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Spain's Membership in the EU: 
Assessment of a Success Story 
 
 
 
Joaquín Almunia 
Vice President of the European Commission 
 
On 1 January 1986, Spain —together with Portugal— officially became a mem-
ber of the European Communities (EC). Now, twenty-five years later, and in the 
framework of the Seminar “25 years of Spain’s membership in the European 
Union (1986-2011)” organized by the University of Miami, this is an appropriate 
and timely occasion to reflect on what the accession has meant for Spain and the 
European Union.For Spain, joining the EU has translated into an unprecedented 
boost of modernization and progress. I am sure the vast majority of Spaniards 
would agree with me, that this was one of the most significant and wisest deci-
sions that have been taken during our 35-year old democracy.José Ortega y Gas-
set was completely right when, in 1910, he concluded that "Spain is the problem 
and Europe the solution". His very famous sentence adequately summarizes what 
Europe has meant for Spain.  
  The European Union has strongly contributed to provide Spain with the 
brightest period in its history of the last two centuries. The EU may not be —and 
is probably not— the only responsible factor, but it has played a major role in 
achieving a long period of peace, progress and stability. It is not only political 
stability we are talking about, but also prosperity and social and economic dyna-
mism, which have finally managed to bring Spain closer to the core of Europe. 
Spain has not only benefited from the positive influence of the European values, 
rules and institutions; it has also become a key player in the EU and has provided 
the Union with invaluable assets. Not only has Spain brought Latin America and 
the Southern Mediterranean closer to Europe, but it has also pushed for some key 
initiatives such as European Citizenship, a stronger cohesion policy, the estab-
lishment of a true "Space for Liberty, Security and Justice" and the European 
Voluntary Service. Spanish politicians such as Felipe González and Javier Sola-
na, both awarded with the prestigious Charlemagne Price, have made major con-
tributions to the European integration process. One of the most obvious achieve-
ments in these twenty-five years of shared history with the EU has been political. 
Spain's peaceful transition to democracy is both admired and envied. Joining the 
EU was the last and final step forward towards the definitive consolidation of the 
Spanish democracy.  2                                                                                                        Almunia 
 
  It is difficult to underestimate the importance joining the EU has had for 
Spain and it is not hard to imagine that without it the country would not have 
achieved the dramatic and impressive transformation it has undergone in the last 
twenty-five years. The European Union is of course much more than a Common 
Market, it is a political project which aims to provide its Member States with 
peace and stability, while bringing them around a number of core values such as 
Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law. What distinguishes the EU from 
other international organizations is the fact that the Union's most appealing asset 
is not economical but rather lies in its principles and values. As such, the EU has 
managed to go further than any other integration process and has overtaken its 
initial economic aim in order to turn it into a political one that, while preserving 
each country's national sovereignty, helps to preserve certain values which are an 
integral part of Europe's history and identity. 
  During these past twenty-five years, Spain has contributed significantly 
to these ideas and has stood out as one of the strongest advocates of European 
integration. It has played a dynamic, driving and committed role in the dual pro-
cess of enlarging and strengthening the European project.This wide support for 
the European project —which was patently clear with the 76% of favorable votes 
that the draft Constitutional Treaty obtained in its Spanish referendum before it 
failed in the subsequent votes of France and the Netherlands— is also probably 
related to the good economic times that Spain has undergone since its accession 
to the EU.  
  Spain has had for most of the last twenty-five years one of the most dy-
namic European economies and has undergone a rapid and swift real conver-
gence in nominal and real terms which has raised the Spanish GDP per inhabitant 
from 70% in 1985 to 103% of the EU average in 2009. This process has also had 
an important angle from the point of view of financial solidarity. During the last 
twenty-five years, Spain has received more than €90 billion in net transfers from 
the EU budget. For a country that did not benefit from the Marshall Plan, these 
transfers, which have been crucial to sustain agricultural and structural actions, 
translate in practical terms what a European community means.Additionally, this 
convergence process has also taken place outside our borders, as Spain is the 
country that receives and sends the highest number of exchange students. This 
project, better known as the Erasmus program, has provided aids for mobility to 
more than two million university students during the 23 years of its existence. As 
a result, the Erasmus program has placed itself as one of the most successful EU-
programs, and Spain has shown its commitment to it. 
  These last three years have nevertheless been somehow different and 
difficult due to the severe global economic and financial crisis. In Europe, we 
have witnessed the financial rescue of Greece and Ireland and an acute deteriora-
tion of public finances. However, as it usually happens in Europe, and as Jean 
Monnet said already thirty five years ago years ago, we have used the financial 
crisis to undertake the reforms our economies so badly need. In particular, signif-Spain’s Membership                                                                                    3 
 
icant progress has been achieved regarding economic governance which should 
strengthen our Monetary and Economic Union and our common currency. Not 
only has the Stability and Growth Pact been reformed in order to achieve a higher 
macro-economic coordination among Member States, but we have also agreed on 
the setting-up of two key instruments aimed at providing temporary liquidity to 
Member States in order to guarantee the sustainability of their debts: the Europe-
an Financial Stabilization Mechanism and the European Financial Stability Facil-
ity. Furthermore, from 2013 onwards, and in order to provide markets with the 
certainty they need, these two instruments will be replaced by a permanent one, 
the European Stability Mechanism. The establishment of this Mechanism, which 
will entail a limited reform of the Lisbon Treaty, confirms once again Monnet's 
belief in opportunity amidst the crisis. 
  In this respect, Europe must take advantage of this opportunity to 
strengthen its foundations and to, once again, fuel up the political will that has 
turned European integration into the fascinating project it is now. In this sense, 
the story of the Spanish success provides us with clear-cut evidence of the added 
value of the European project; an added value which must be preserved and fur-
ther developed in order to repeat the successful stories and to achieve a sustaina-
ble  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Spain’s Contributions in the European Parliament 
 
 
 
 
Enrique Barón Crespo 
 
President of the European Parliament (1989-1992) 
 
 
Democracy has been the guiding principle of the European Union since its crea-
tion. In a note written on September 5, 1943 in Algiers, then a French colony, 
Jean Monnet stated that “the objectives to be attained are the establishment of a 
democratic regime in Europe and the economic and political organization of a 
‘European entity’ ”.  At that time, dictatorship was the prevailing form of gov-
ernment in most of the 27 member countries of the current EU, with the excep-
tion of the United Kingdom and two neutrals, Ireland and Sweden. As president 
of the High Authority of the European Community for Coal and Steel, predeces-
sor of the European Commission, Monnet stated at the first meeting of the As-
semblée Commune in 1952: “the big European revolution of our time [...] aims to 
replace on our continent national rivalries by the peoples’ union in freedom and 
diversity”.  The outcome of that revolution is that democracy first became rooted 
in Germany and Italy, later in Greece, Portugal and Spain, and now in Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and 
Cyprus.  
Today, democracy is a young and vibrant political driving force, alt-
hough it was launched in Athens more than 2,500 years ago. Pericles, the great 
statesman of his time, said that “our constitution is called a democracy because 
power is in the hands, not of a minority, but of the whole people”.  Since 1989, 
the year of the collapse of the Berlin wall and of the democratic upsurge world-
wide (Tiananmen in China, the end of apartheid in South Africa, Chile and Nica-
ragua in Latin-America), democracy has become an attainable aspiration, and not 
just a privilege of developed capitalist countries. Most of the young people who 
are now demonstrating in the Arabic countries have probably not heard of Peri-
cles. They know, however, that they are fed up with corrupt autocrats, and desire 
to live in democracy instead of following the fanatical theocracy preached by Al 
Qaeda. 
The democratic challenge has become an essential part of globalization. 
In this perspective, the Iberian case offers interesting insights.  Spain and Portu-
gal were the first modern empires in search of globalization.  Ferdinand Magel-6                                                                                                            Barón 
 
lan, a Portuguese sailor, and Juan Sebastian Elcano, a Spanish Basque, were 
among the first explorers of the New World.Afterwards, as Paul Preston rightly 
says, Spain experienced a history of decline, of international humiliation, culmi-
nating in the final loss of the empire at the hands of the U.S. in 1898, and of in-
tense domestic strife [...] It is hardly surprising that the Spaniards and Portuguese 
have embraced the European idea with such enthusiasm. 
My generation grew up in an environment of intense right-wing national-
ism and a disdainful view of “decadent” western democracy.  In spite of this, 
General Franco applied for an association with the Common Market, as it was 
then popularly called, in 1962.  This non-sequitur showed that the Common Mar-
ket was not only about the economy. We had mixed feelings about our ability to 
overcome a long period of isolation and of how to consolidate democracy.  Nev-
ertheless, we saw “Spain as the problem and Europe as the solution”, in the 
words of Ortega y Gasset.  Throughout our transition, the active participation in 
the affairs of our continent was an important part of the Spanish constitutional 
consensus.  We approved Article 93 of the Constitution, which enshrined the 
primacy of European law over Spanish law. The central government of the day 
began negotiations with the European Community. It was an exciting and rather 
turbulent time.  
In 1982 the attempted coup d’état was considered “a Spanish internal 
matter” by U.S. Secretary of State General Alexander Haig.  His statement re-
flected the pessimistic view that prevailed within the American administration, 
which was dominated by what the German-American historian Fritz Stern called 
in his dialogue with Chancellor Schmidt “Henry’s strong skepticism of Iberian 
transitions”, referring to Kissinger’s view, similar to his maitre à penser, Prince 
von Metternich.  In fact, the attempted coup helped strengthen our will to join the 
European Community and to secure our membership in NATO by way of a ref-
erendum. We also ended a long lasting love-hate relationship with the United 
States. In December 1995, the new Transatlantic Agenda between the European 
Union and the U. S. was signed in Madrid by President Clinton and Prime Minis-
ter Gonzalez.  
On this silver anniversary of Spain’s accession to the European Union, 
the prevailing view is that it has been a success story. In fact, the last twenty-five 
years have been considered the best years of Spanish history. It has represented 
for the nation the equivalent of a well-managed European Marshall Plan that has 
unleashed the strong potential of Spanish society and economy.  The bipartisan 
consensus has been essential to this success, and Spain has contributed in a pro-
active and constructive way to further the progress of European integration.   
To answer the question about Spain’s contribution, let me say the follow-
ing. From the perspective of European Parliament, it is not an easy question to 
answer. The Parliament is not organized by nationality. Members of Parliament 
form groups according to their political affinities. Political groups are comprised 
of members elected in at least one-quarter of the member states. The minimum Spain’s Contributions                                                                                  7 
 
number of members required to form a political group is 25.  This means that 
participation in the decision-making process of the European Union on the basis 
of national interest is not to be found in the Parliament, but is confined to the 
Council of Ministers.  This is an approach which is not easily understood in 
Spain.  In a debate in the Congreso de los Diputados, it is accepted as normal 
behavior that members of Parliament can form groups or speak on behalf of their 
own autonomous region. Studies comparing voting behavior on roll-call votes in 
the U.S. House of Representatives and the European Parliament show a similar 
level of discipline along political group lines. Nevertheless, there are some typi-
cal features of Spanish presence in the European Parliament.  The first feature is 
its concentration in the big political groups -particularly the European People’s 
Party and the European Social Democratic Party- where a parliamentary culture 
prevails.  This adds weight to the Spanish members in the debates, the law-
making process and the budgetary decisions.   The second feature is the high 
level of attendance and discipline that has made the Spaniards look like the 
“Southern Prussians”.  It is no wonder that there have been three Spanish Presi-
dents of Parliament.  
On policies, the Spanish strategic line has been to support all those that com-
pose or coincide with the mainstream of the European general interest. In doing 
so, Spaniards have decisively contributed to shape this same interest.  Its major 
milestones are to be found in the following domains:    
  The substantial development of structural policies (regional, social and 
cohesion funds) with the doubling of their budgetary appropriations in 
1987 and 1993. This was the outcome of the aspirations of the Delors 
Commission, the Spanish-German agreement in the Council of Ministers, 
and the active support of Parliament itself. It included the first push to-
ward reform of the Common Agricultural Policy with the polemic rein-
forcement of assistance given to olive oil and other products which make 
up Spanish interests. 
  The continuous support for strengthening the external dimension of Eu-
ropean policies, including defense.  
  The strengthening of Latin America as a partner within the network of 
International Relations of the European Union.  The first steps were the 
active support of civil society and in favor of the plebiscite in Chile, and 
the San Jose Process in Central America which, in a way, was the first 
European involvement for peace in the U.S. area of influence.  
  After the fall of the Berlin wall, support was immediately offered to 
German reunification. Chancellor Kohl has stated on record that the 
same night of that momentous event, he received the unconditional polit-
ical and diplomatic support of two leaders, President Bush and Prime 
Minister González.  As president of the European Parliament I had the 
honor of addressing President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl two 
weeks later. A temporary Parliamentary Commission was created to 8                                                                                                            Barón 
 
work actively with the Bundestag in order to incorporate Eastern Ger-
mans as full citizens of the Federal Republic and the European Union. 
This positive approach was extended to the two successive enlargement 
rounds.  
  With active Spanish contributions, the European Parliament launched the 
process of consolidating Europe as a parliamentary democracy, with a 
short list of goals that included the following: participation in the investi-
ture of the president of the European Commission, legislative co-decision 
and European citizenship. This point was one of the main items for 
which Prime Minister Gonzalez arduously worked within the European 
Council. 
  There was a pro-active policy of support and advancement of the reform 
process of the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and the Constitutional Treaty, which was opened by Prime Minis-
ter Aznar as President of the European Council.  Moreover, under the 
Rodriguez Zapatero Government, Spain was the first country to approve 
by referendum the Constitutional Treaty and carried out a very active 
policy of support in favor of its ratification. After the referendums in 
France, the Netherlands and Ireland, which brought the Constitutional 
Treaty to an end, the role of Spaniards in the European Parliament and in 
the Intergovernmental Conference has been constantly positive. This has 
also led to the Treaty of Lisbon and its implementation. 
  Spain was amongst the first group of countries that created the euro.  In 
the wake of the current financial and economic crisis, Spain has been af-
fected but has strived to come up with a common political answer. The 
strengthening of the Economic Union is currently the most important 
Spanish priority.  
In addition, during the last quarter-century, both Spain and its members of Par-
liament have been able to maintain a bipartisan consensus on European policies 
regarding all major decisions.  For Spanish society, membership of the European 
Union has been both a driving force and a mainstay of modernization.  
Today, the open question is whether this positive approach will maintain 
its momentum in the future.  A cynical belief is that once a member state be-
comes a net contributor to the European budget, it will lose its enthusiasm. I do 
not share this view. The European Union is a work in progress.  In fact, democra-
cy is by definition a work in progress as well. It can always be improved and 
criticized.  Dictatorships may seem perfect, but only while they last.  One basic 
feature of democracies is that they do not rely on the character of a Duce, a Füh-
rer, a Caudillo or a Rais, but on a solid institutional framework.   
Fortunately, for our younger generations, Europe is their best asset in a 
globalized world in which they can build their dreams and their future.  The best 
piece of advice we can give them and the young people in Arabic countries, Latin 
America, China or Africa is the aphorism of Amiel, often quoted by Jean Mon-Spain’s Contributions                                                                                  9 
 
net: “Each man begins the world afresh. Only institutions grow wiser; they store 
up the collective experience; and, from this experience and wisdom, men subject 
to the same laws will gradually find not that their natures change, but that their 
behavior does”. To promote the values of democracy and its instrumental frame-
work is an essential part of the mission of the European Union as demonstrated in 
the Treaty of Lisbon. Neither Spain nor the Spaniards will fail to accompany the 
Union in meeting this challenge. 
 
 
  
  
 
 
The Other Special Anniversary: 
The European Union Center of Excellence 
and the Jean Monnet Chair 
(2001-2011) 
 
Joaquín Roy and María Lorca-Susino 
 
University of Miami 
 
 
The present volume is the culmination of a decade of accomplishment carried out 
within a fruitful partnership. In August 2008, the European Commission, the 
executive branch of the European Union (EU), granted financial support (about 
$450,000) for a further 3-year cycle (2008-2011) of the European Union Center 
of Excellence (EUCE), a partnership formed in 2001 by the University of Miami 
(UM) and Florida International University (FIU). This was the third consecutive 
cycle of the Miami center. The first cycle ran from 2001 to 2004 and the second 
from 2004 until 2008. The total award over a ten-year period has been over 
$1,320,000 in contributions from the EU budget. 
 
The current U.S. list of EU Centers is comprised of: 
 
1.  University of California, Berkeley 
2.  University of Colorado at Boulder 
3.  Florida International University and the University of Miami 
4.  Georgia Tech 
5.  University of Michigan 
6.  University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill  
7.  University of Pittsburgh 
8.  University of Texas at Austin 
9.  University of Washington (Seattle) 
10. University of Wisconsin 
11. Washington, DC, Consortium (American University, George Mason 
University, George Washington University, Georgetown University, The 
Johns Hopkins University)  
 
  Simultaneously with the grant of 2001, the University of Miami was 
awarded a Jean Monnet Chair, one of the first five in the United States 
(Columbia, Boston, American University, George Mason University), when the 
program was opened to the rest of the world. Since its establishment, the Chair 12                                                                                Roy and Lorca-Susino 
 
has received $210,300 in grants. The total of grants directly awarded to UM is 
approximately $870,000. In the same year of 2001, the University of Miami was 
given the honor of receiving an EU Fellow, a high level EU staff member of the 
EU institutions who resides for a year or semester in different third-country 
universities.  
 
The University of Miami is therefore included in a select list of 14 Universities in 
three continents: 
 
1.  Harvard 
2.  Yale 
3.  Tufts  
4.  Texas 
5.  North Carolina/Duke 
6.  Univ. of Southern California 
7.  U. Washington, Seattle 
8.  George Mason 
9.  Berkeley 
10.  Pittsburgh 
11.  New York U 
12.  European University , Florence 
13.  Singapore 
14.  Miami 
 
This “hat trick” of awards (Center, Chair, Fellow) has made the University of 
Miami one of only a handful of institutions in the Western Hemisphere that has 
simultaneously three honors as a clear sign of confidence on the part of the EU. 
All our available energy has been dedicated to maintaining this triple honor. 
  
The funding and other support, enriched by matching funds and student 
fellowships, has permitted the University of Miami to carry out: 
 
  the consolidation of 4 courses on the EU at INS, 
  the enrichment of other courses in the schools of Business and Law,  
  the offering of dozens of lectures, conferences and symposia on campus 
  a series of outreach activities in the wider Miami community and in 
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  the organization of panels and seminars in international scholarly 
associations (ISA, EUSA, LASA, CES). 
  lectures and symposia held in two continents, in 15 countries 
  the publication of  10 edited volumes and 450 papers/chapters 
  The completion of 10 Ph. D. dissertations. 
  Regular media impact in two languages in both continents 
 
As far as the University of Miami is concerned, the background to this 
decade of accomplishments can be traced back to the accession of Spain and 
Portugal to the European Community. In the late 1980s and early 1990s the 
European Parliament and the Commission engaged in the reinforcement of 
European relations with Latin America. Spain played a central role in promoting 
this expansion of the EU’s external action. The University of Miami was 
fortunate then to receive the confidence of high representatives and officials of 
the European Union in supporting academic projects and consultancy 
assignments in the Caribbean and Central America. The time had come for the 
consolidation of several scattered activities and courses dedicated to the 
European Union, in general, and Spain, in particular. The past decade was 
preceded by the previous efforts developed in the context of the School of 
International Studies and the North-South Center, now inherited by the 
Department of International Studies. 
The activities and research of the EU Center and Jean Monnet Chair have 
been dedicated to the understanding of standard topics and new developments in 
the evolution of the European Union (enlargement, constitutional processes, the 
projection of the EU model in the world, etc.). Special attention has been given to 
EU relations with Latin America, and the role of Spain in that process. 
“Spain is the problem. Europe is the solution”. In this fashion Ortega y 
Gasset once dramatized the need to “Europeanize” Spain. The results over the 
first twenty five years of EU membership have been truly impressive. When 
Spain became a member of the EC, some of the best and brightest of Spain’s 
governmental cadres and universities joined the expanding European institutions, 
taking on positions of responsibility. The most prominent chaired the European 
Court of Justice and the Parliament, holding key positions in the Commission, 
and filling the newly-created position of High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. 
Spain in sum “was not different”, contrary to what old-fashioned tourist 
publicity for the country used to say. It was a European country, much like any 
other, that was returning to its natural home after a long exile. Spain, in turn, 14                                                                                Roy and Lorca-Susino 
 
received considerable benefits from EU membership through funds for regional 
investment policies, agriculture and rural development, and the modernisation of 
national infrastructure. From an index of 60 percent of the European average in 
1986, today Spain’s income per head is in the range of 105 percent, with some 
regions surpassing 125 percent. From being a country that was a net receiver 
from the EU budget, Spain today is a net contributor. 
Reflecting this development, the present volume examines different 
dimensions of the deepening relationship between Spain and the rest of Europe 
through membership of the EU (its history, and its impact on policy development 
on economic growth and on relations with third countries).  
This volume intends to contribute to the understanding of Spain’s 
membership of the EU examined from a variety of angles and theoretical 
approaches. The chapters are the updates of the papers presented at a conference 
held at the University of Miami on February 25, 2011 under the sponsorship of 
the Miami European Center. The volume opens with a preface Vice President of 
the European Commission Joaquín Almunia, in which he reflects on what 
accession, has meant for both Spain and the European Union. An essay by former 
President of the European Parliament, Enrique Barón, follows on from this in 
which he shares his experiences of Spain’s contribution in the Parliament. He 
reminds us that democracy has been the guiding principle of the EU since its 
creation but he also warns that democracy is, by definition, work-in-progress, and 
that the EU has demonstrated in the Treaty of Lisbon that it is committed to 
develop further, and promote, the values of democracy and the necessary 
institutional frameworks. 
The first section of the book introduces the reader to a historical review 
of the Spain's long road to Europe; the Spanish role in the European integration 
process; the Spanish mediation role in relations between the EU and Latin 
America. In the first chapter, Charles Powell provides an account of Spain’s 
evolving relationship with the European Community from the early pre-accession 
stages to the moment of accession in 1986. He concludes that Spain’s accession 
to the European Community was the logical culmination of a process of socio-
economic and political convergence and transformation. The second paper, by 
Cristina Blanco Sío-López, focuses on the historical evolution of both the 
discourse and the implementation of Spain’s assumed task of seeking to link the 
two continents of Europe and Latin America. Sío-López concludes that there is a 
need for more consistency between, respectively, EU and Spanish policy 
regarding Latin America. However, the paper stresses the importance of Spain’s 
mediating role in this field as a factor that led to its deeper involvement in the 
EU’s foreign policy.  
This section of the book concludes with the contribution of Sonia 
Piedrafita. Her work seeks to explain how Spain's and Portugal’s respective 
decisions to apply for membership of the European Communities (EC) was partly 
driven by the need to overcome their authoritarian past and consolidate their The Other Special Anniversary                                                                  15 
  
democratic systems whole promoting modernization. She concludes that this 
membership has helped both countries to enjoy the benefits of stable 
democracies, to achieve social and economic prosperity and to facilitate a return 
to the global political system. 
The second section of the book opens with analysis provided by Ramón 
Mullerat which emphasizes that a unified Europe needs a unified law. His paper 
explains how Spain has implemented European legislation, offering at the same 
time an overview of the community legal system. In this context, he explains the 
meaning and significance of the concept of the Acquis Communautaire, the EU 
sources of law and their implementation, and concludes with a detailed analysis 
of changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty.  Blanca Vilà-Costa contributes to 
this explanation by presenting an innovative study on the legal added value of 
European membership in the case of Spain. She explains that the 
“Europeanization” of Spain has produced three main results: the modernization 
of the country, economic development and social welfare and the mobility of 
persons and companies. Based on this, she explains that the added value of this 
process has included the possibility for Spain to participate actively in European 
policy and legislative development and in that way to open new areas of action at 
the European level of benefit to Spain. The fourth paper offers an analysis of 
immigration policies in the southern frontier of the EU using Spain as a case 
study. This section concludes with the contribution of Luis Moreno on Spain’s 
membership of the EU and the European social model. He explains that the 
Spanish welfare state is a mix of corporatist Continental, liberal Anglo-Saxon, 
and social-democratic Nordic variances of welfare capitalism. 
The third section deals with the economic aspects of Spanish 
membership and commitment to the EU. This section begins by presenting a 
paper by Sebastián Royo that summarizes the challenges that Portugal and Spain 
had to overcome in order to introduce economic reforms and qualify for EU 
membership. Francesc Granell contributes to this debate with a paper in which he 
explains how the Spanish authorities have managed the economy since 
1986.María Lorca-Susino concludes this section by analyzing the economic cycle 
and the unemployment rate in Spain and the challenge presented by an apparent 
brain drain in the country. 
The final section provides the reader with an explanation of the external 
dimension of Spanish membership of the EU. It begins with the ideas of José 
Ignacio Torreblanca who discusses the need for, and possible implication of, a 
democratic audit of Spain’s foreign policy.  Haruko Hosoda explains how the 
United States has understood the impact of Spain's membership of the EEC and 
NATO. She concludes that the United States was in favor of Spain being part of 
NATO. Although Spanish accession to the EEC was expected to negatively affect 
the United States in the short term from the economic point of view, the 
accession to the EEC was seen as, in the long run, making Spanish withdrawal 
from NATO less likely. This section follows with a paper by Vicente Palacio who 16                                                                                Roy and Lorca-Susino 
 
reviews the Spanish role in shaping the EU vision for the Americas. His thesis is 
that Spain has contributed to the development of a European foreign policy, 
particularly in Latin America, due to the Hispanic heritage, which has also served 
as a bridge for deepening the relations with the United States. The final 
contribution in this section is provided by Imtiaz Hussain whose study expresses 
the view that, just as Spain sought to look “beyond the nation state” in the 
immediate post-Franco years, its search “beyond the region” (European Union) 
today better connects its history to its national aspirations without having to 
sacrifice its European-ness.  
Joaquín Roy provides the closing remarks to this volume. His essay 
reviews the background, context and impact of particularly novel aspects of the 
new treaty governing the EU, as well as several milestones in Spain’s experience 
of the European process. It ends with a description of the exercise to re-organize 
the rotating presidency in the first semester of 2010, just in time to commemorate 
the signing of the accession documents.  
The people who in this past decade have contributed to the development 
of the EU Center are too numerous to be recognized individually. The previous 
publications have mentioned their role in each stage. In the first place, distinction 
should be awarded to the representatives and officials of the European 
Parliament, Council and Commission who have supported the EU Center. 
Rephrasing what Jean Monnet once said: all is possible with the work of people, 
but nothing is lasting without the role of institutions. These supporters know 
individually how much this enterprise owes them. They made a worthwhile but 
risky investment in backing our initial ideas and proposals. We could not have let 
them down. We trust that they feel they have been rewarded. An exception to 
anonymity should be made recognizing the skilful assistance provided by Ronald 
Hall, EU Commission fellow at the University of Miami, for the final 
development of this volume.    
The same gratitude should be extended to a select group of staff and 
administration members at the University of Miami and Florida International 
University who encouraged us to continue in this task. We trust that they, too, 
should feel satisfied with the results, and we look forward to their on-going 
support. We would also like to recognize the outstanding service provided by the 
Computer Technical Support of the University of Miami.  
Any academic activity would not be possible without the irreplaceable 
role of the students. Most especially, sincere recognition needs to be given to the 
doctoral students who have placed a career bet on entering a minority field in the 
realm of international studies. Some of these students have supported the 
operations of the Center and Chair with postdoctoral duties that have enriched the 
record of both entities, and providing a lasting legacy. Our thanks are owed to 
Aimee Kanner, Roberto Domínguez, Wendy Grenade and Astrid Boening. The 
future of the Center and Chair depend on their academic success. The EU as a 
whole needs them and the work that they have to offer both now and in the The Other Special Anniversary                                                                  17 
  
future. The worlds of policy and academics in the United States will benefit from 
their insights, their teaching and their advice. 
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Abstract 
 
This text seeks to provide a nuanced account of Spain's evolving relationship 
with the European Community from the early stages of European integration to 
accession in 1986. In doing so, it will explore the dilemmas facing an authoritari-
an regime that struggled to adapt to a hostile European political environment 
while seeking to benefit from the consequences of unprecedented economic 
growth and prosperity on the continent. In turn, this will allow us to examine the 
EC's efforts to develop a consistent policy towards a dictatorship that was almost 
universally detested by European democratic opinion but nevertheless tolerated 
(and occasionally courted) by member states competing for access to an increas-
ingly attractive market. This paper also seeks to show that the relatively tough 
line taken by the EC with the Franco regime was to have a lasting impact on 
Spanish public opinion, which tended to identify "Europe" with democratic val-
ues and practices. This partly explains the political importance that was attributed 
to EC membership during Spain's transition to democracy, and accounts for the 
widespread support for accession which accompanied a protracted and often frus-
trating negotiation process (1977-1985), which is examined in some detail. 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper seeks to provide an account of Spain’s evolving relationship with the 
European Community from the early stages of the European integration process 
to the moment of accession in 1986. In doing so, it will dwell at some length on 
the dilemmas facing an authoritarian regime that struggled to adapt to a hostile 
European political environment while seeking to benefit from the consequences 
of unprecedented economic growth and prosperity on the continent. In turn, this 
will allow us to examine the EC’s efforts to develop a consistent policy towards a 
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ion but nevertheless tolerated (and occasionally courted) by member state gov-
ernments competing for access to an increasingly attractive market. In this re-
gard, the EC’s relations with the Franco regime constitute an interesting case 
study in the dilemmas of democratic conditionality as experienced by an interna-
tional organisation that had not yet had the opportunity to develop a coherent 
policy of democracy promotion.  
  As we shall see, the relatively tough line taken by the EC in dealing with 
a non-democratic regime such as Franco’s was to a have a lasting impact on 
Spanish public opinion, and in particular on public perceptions of the nature of 
the European integration project as a whole. This partly explains the enormous 
political significance that was attached to EC membership during Spain’s transi-
tion to democracy in the wake of Franco’s death, which is examined here in some 
detail. Indeed there is reason to believe that a majority of Spaniards continued to 
support the goal of EC membership throughout a lengthy and often frustrating 
negotiating process (1977-85) precisely because of the political significance it 
had acquired over the years. This probably also partly explains the relative ease 
with which successive governments were able to carry out painful structural re-
forms that were generally justified in terms of the need to prepare the Spanish 
economy for EC membership. 
 
1. From World War to Cold War 
 
Given the origins and founding objectives of the European integration project, 
relations between General Franco’s Spain and the institutions that initially em-
bodied it could scarcely have been easy or friendly. The European Communities 
that gradually emerged in the mid-twentieth century were conceived to overcome 
the circumstances and consequences of the inter-war period, and the Spanish 
regime –which had received considerable military and political backing from the 
Axis powers during the Civil War (1936-39), and had later tentatively offered 
Hitler its support- was seen by many as a left-over from an era that had otherwise 
happily been put to rest. Franco’s Spain paid a high price for this ‘original sin’, 
and alongside Finland, it was to be the only Western European country excluded 
from the Marshall Plan and, by extension, from the organisations that emerged on 
the back of United States reconstruction policy on the continent, most notably the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), set up in 1948. Evi-
dently, a regime such as Franco’s was equally incompatible with the Council of 
Europe, the intergovernmental but eminently political European organisation 
founded in 1949. Indeed in August 1950 the Council’s Assembly became the first 
European institution to explicitly make democratization a precondition of mem-
bership, when it expressed the hope that “in the near future the Spanish people 
may be able to hold free elections and set up a constitutional regime, whose 
members will be eligible to serve as representatives in this Assembly”. Finally, 
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alliance with Britain, Spain was also barred from the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganisation, the major Western defensive alliance launched in 1949. It is im-
portant to note that the exclusion of Franco’s Spain from the early stages of Eu-
ropean integration, which initially developed under the auspices of the United 
States, occurred at the instigation of the major European democracies, which 
thereby condemned it to extreme dependence on Washington (Powell, 1995, pp. 
16-20). 
  While uncompromising in their political hostility to the Spanish dictatorship, 
the Western powers were generally more sanguine when it came to trade rela-
tions. Thus, as early as 1948, the United States, Great Britain and France (which 
reopened its border that year) were already the largest buyers of Spanish exports, 
particularly agricultural produce, restoring the status quo that had existed prior to 
the Civil War. This is attributable to both the strength of commercial ties devel-
oped over many decades, and to the belief, widely shared in Western Europe, that 
an economic blockade would be more harmful to Spain’s population than to the 
regime it sought to punish. This position was perhaps best expressed by the 
French Foreign Affairs Minister, Georges Bidault, during a debate in the French 
National Assembly concerning the ‘Spanish question’, when he argued that “il 
n’y a pas d’oranges fascistes; il n’y a que des oranges” (Martínez, 1989). It was 
thus that, despite their lack of sympathy for the Franco regime, throughout the 
1950s the Western European democracies gradually strengthened their commer-
cial and economic ties with Spain. 
    In view of the political hostility of Spain’s major European trading part-
ners, Franco sought the country’s diplomatic reinsertion in the new post-war 
international order via Washington. By late 1946, the Pentagon’s strategists were 
already seeking to convince the State Department that Spain could be very useful 
to the United States in the event of another international conflict. This interest 
only increased in the wake of the Berlin Blockade of 1948, and was confirmed by 
the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. With growing support from the US, in 
November 1950 the United Nations withdrew the sanctions it had imposed on 
Franco in 1946 (with France and Great Britain abstaining), which paved the way 
both for the return of ambassadors to Madrid and for Spanish membership of the 
World Health Organisation (1951), UNESCO (1952), the International Labour 
Organisation (1953) and finally the UN itself (1955). This bilateral rapproche-
ment between Spain and the US, which took the shape of sizeable loans and gov-
ernment aid from 1950 onwards, eventually resulted in the signing of the decisive 
September 1953 agreements, whereby Madrid granted Washington the use of 
four air and naval bases on Spanish soil in return for substantial military and 
economic assistance. 
    Although the economic benefits of the agreement were modest by Mar-
shall Plan standards, its political and geo-strategic value was undeniable, for it 
anchored Spain firmly in the Western camp. It was thus that, less than a decade 
after the end of a World War in which Franco had taken sides with the defeated 24                                                                                                        Powell 
 
powers, the United States and the Cold War enabled Spain to begin to escape the 
isolation to which it had seemed condemned. However, the 1953 agreement also 
had somewhat perverse consequences for Spain’s relations with Europe, since the 
latter was able to benefit from its contribution to Western defense (however 
modest this may have been) without having to offer anything in return. In other 
words, despite being an eminently European power, Spain joined the Western 
alliance via the United States, as if its geography and previous history had noth-
ing in common with that of its neighbors. Ironically, however, due mainly to the 
authoritarian nature of the Franco regime, this did not translate into particularly 
close political or social ties with the US either. In short, this paradoxical situation 
fostered feelings of isolation and exclusion from the Western European sphere to 
which Spain had traditionally belonged, a sentiment whose importance must be 
kept in mind when analyzing Spanish society’s overwhelmingly pro-European 
stance in the post-Franco era. 
 
2. The Franco Regime and the Early Stages of European Integration,  
1951-62 
 
For the reasons outlined above, Spain was not invited to participate in the early 
stages of the European integration process (Moreno, 1998). The creation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 barely had any economic 
impact because these industries were still relatively underdeveloped in Spain. By 
contrast, Madrid was allowed to take part in preliminary talks concerning the 
creation of a European agricultural market (or ‘Green Pool’) in 1953, but the 
project was later taken over by the OEEC, forcing the government to negotiate 
entry into this body’s agricultural committee, something it did not achieve until 
1955, by which time the project had collapsed. More importantly, Spain was later 
excluded from the negotiations leading to the signing of the Treaties of Rome in 
1957, which resulted in the birth of EURATOM and the European Economic 
Community. However, given that at the time the Six only purchased 30 per cent 
of Spain’s exports and provided 23 per cent of its imports, the regime initially 
believed it could afford to remain aloof.  
In Spain the year 1957 is generally associated not with the Rome Trea-
ties, but with the appointment of a new government dominated by ‘technocratic 
modernizers’, who initiated a far-reaching transformation of the country’s econ-
omy policy. Both events, however, were closely related. If the regime decided to 
abandon its policy of economic self-sufficiency (autarky) it was out of fear that it 
was leading to an economic disaster of unthinkable social and political conse-
quences, an outcome that would inevitably be attributed to its failure to develop 
closer ties with the major European economies. More specifically, Spain’s exclu-
sion from the OEEC had prevented it from benefiting from the European Pay-
ments Union, set up in 1950, thereby perpetuating the peseta’s non-
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eign currency earned via exports. Indeed the new government’s Stabilization and 
Liberalization Plan of 1959 would not have succeeded had Spain not finally 
joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (1958), and later the 
OEEC itself (1959), whose experts and funds helped design and finance it. In 
short, the Plan accelerated the process of Spain’s Westernisation which dated 
back to the 1953 agreements with Washington, though in this case the measures 
implemented would result in a growing Europeanization of the Spanish economy 
which, in the medium and long term, resulted in weaker commercial ties with the 
United States.  
Though initially greeted with considerable scepticism, if not hostility, the 
birth of the Community and the fear of being permanently excluded from the 
major continental markets induced the Madrid government to improve its bilat-
eral relations with the leading member states. The regime was particularly suc-
cessful in the case of France, as evidenced by the signing of a major trade treaty 
in 1957 and Paris’s decision to lift restrictions on arms sales in 1958, as well as 
by the joint commemoration of the three-hundredth anniversary of the Treaty of 
the Pyrenees in 1959. What was more, Spanish Foreign Minister Fernando 
Castiella developed a good working relationship with his counterpart Maurice 
Couve de Murville and even General Charles de Gaulle himself. Spain seemed 
well placed to take advantage of a Gaullist “Europe des patries” led by France, in 
which the absence of strong supranational institutions would grant leading mem-
ber states a considerable say in judging future membership applications. In paral-
lel, Madrid also made every effort to win the trust of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, which was then actively seeking to reassert its national sovereignty. A 
major obstacle standing in the way of closer bilateral relations was overcome in 
1958, when agreement was reached cancelling economic claims dating back to 
the Civil War. Castiella visited Bonn in 1959, and Finance Minister Ludwig Er-
hard, the so-called father of the German economic miracle, returned the visit in 
May 1961. The Franco regime was less successful in its efforts to ingratiate itself 
with Italy and the Benelux countries, however, which remained consistently hos-
tile to closer ties with Spain. 
The birth of the Community in 1957 led to an interesting debate within 
the Spanish administration regarding the nature and future evolution of the Euro-
pean project, and the political and economic challenges it might pose for an au-
thoritarian regime such as Franco’s. The preamble to the Rome Treaty mentioned 
the need to “preserve and strengthen peace and liberty” amongst the EC’s goals, 
but this was not seen as an insurmountable obstacle to membership. Although 
article 237 stated that “any European state may apply to become a member of the 
Community”, however, the decision to accept new members required not only 
the unanimous support of all governments, but also the approval of national par-
liaments. The debate was further complicated when seven other European states, 
led by Britain, came together to launch the European Free Trade Association 
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amongst Spain’s major trading partners (with the significant exception of Brit-
ain), but its political philosophy seemed incompatible with Francoism. In con-
trast, the EFTA was thought to be less demanding politically (as evidenced by the 
presence of the Portuguese dictatorship amongst its founder members), but it was 
also less appealing in economic terms, even though Britain accounted for sixteen 
per cent of Spain’s exports, as opposed to Germany’s fifteen and France’s nine 
per cent. Like Britain, Spain had initially hoped that the rivalry between the Six 
and the Seven would eventually result in a large free trade area organised around 
the former OEEC, thus sparing it the need to choose between them. However, 
EFTA lost all of its appeal in Spain when Britain put an end to this debate by 
applying for EC membership in August 1961, with Ireland, Denmark and Nor-
way in its wake. Furthermore, Madrid had reason to fear that the Community’s 
incipient Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which began to take shape in early 
1962, would have crippling consequences for Spanish fruit and vegetable exports 
to the Six. The signing of an association agreement with Greece in July 1961, as 
well as the opening of talks with other Mediterranean countries, only served to 
confirm the suspicion that Spain had no option but to follow suit. 
Franco and his alter ego, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, were always 
highly suspicious of the EC, and feared that any attempt to establish closer rela-
tions with Brussels would make them increasingly vulnerable to external political 
pressure. With considerably difficulty, however, the technocrats who had de-
signed the Stabilization Plan convinced them that the time had come to abandon 
their wait-and-see tactics. In doing so, they were greatly encouraged by expres-
sions of French and German support, and not without reason: in November 1961, 
after meeting Foreign Minister Castiella, De Gaulle had gone so far as to praise 
“the attitude of Franco and the Spanish regime as a factor for stability and social 
peace in the world and especially in Europe”. This diplomatic support from 
France (and also Germany) partly explains why Madrid underestimated the im-
portance of a debate held in the European Parliamentary Assembly in January 
1962, to examine a report compiled by the German social democrat Willy 
Birkelbach, a former political prisoner under the Nazis, who had been appointed 
rapporteur  of a working group on association and membership applications. 
Drafted with Spain very much in mind, it argued that “states whose governments 
do not have democratic legitimacy and whose peoples do not participate in the 
decisions of the government, neither directly nor indirectly by freely-elected rep-
resentatives, cannot expect to be admitted in the circle of peoples who form the 
European Communities”, and concluded that “the guaranteed existence of a 
democratic form of state, in the sense of a free political order, is a condition for 
membership”. In the knowledge that the Assembly’s approval was not necessary 
for membership agreements, the Spanish government went ahead regardless, 
formally requesting “the opening of negotiations to examine the possibility of 
establishing an association with the Community capable of leading in time to a 
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application cited Spain’s “European vocation”, its geographical position and 
territorial contiguity with the EC, and its programme of economic reform. By 
way of reply, on 20 February Birkelbach formally enquired of the Council of 
Ministers and the Commission whether they believed it necessary to consider a 
request from “a regime whose political philosophy and economic practices are in 
complete opposition to the conceptions and structures of the European communi-
ties”. His question attracted considerable attention, not least because it was the 
first time the Council had ever been faced with a direct oral question from a 
member of the Parliamentary Assembly (Thomas, 2006, pp. 1197-1201). 
Admittedly, the Birkelbach report had referred to full membership status, and not 
the type of association agreement contemplated in article 238 of the Rome Treaty 
and sought by Spain. Furthermore, as the Greek case appeared to demonstrate, 
association agreements could accommodate different modalities of relationship 
with the EC. With the benefit of hindsight, however, it would seem that the Span-
ish government made a major tactical mistake by not requesting a more modest 
commercial agreement, as its own Ministry of Commerce had recommended. The 
application for associate status provoked a remarkable reaction from the Franco 
regime’s many enemies in Europe, who mobilised via political parties, trade un-
ions, and the media, in an unprecedented effort to stymie what might otherwise 
have been an unspectacular diplomatic overture. Although Communist and So-
cialist activists were particularly vocal in their condemnation, Liberals and Chris-
tian Democrats also played a prominent role. Most surprisingly, perhaps, non-
state actors proved most effective in voicing their concern. In June 1962, over 
one hundred Spanish opposition leaders, both exiled and resident in Spain, con-
vened at Munich under the auspices of the IV Congress of the European Move-
ment, and came to the conclusion that “integration of any country with Europe, 
whether in the form of full membership or of association, requires democratic 
institutions”, and produced a catalogue of prerequisites for Spanish membership 
largely borrowed from the European Convention on Human Rights. The Franco 
regime’s more enlightened spokesmen had argued that associate status would 
accelerate the country’s political evolution, but opposition groups countered that 
this would deprive it of any incentive to abandon authoritarianism. 
True to form, the Franco regime shot itself in the foot by overreacting 
wildly to these events: on returning from Munich, dissidents residing in Spain 
were forced to choose between exile and confinement, provoking further expres-
sions of protest from numerous European national parliaments, political parties, 
trade unions and EC officials. In light of this reaction, and in spite of considera-
ble official French and German sympathy for the Spanish application, at the in-
sistence of the Benelux countries, most notably Belgium, the Council of Minis-
ters decided to reply with a mere acusé de reception. To a very large extent, the 
Community was saved in October 1962 by the Commission’s decision to put all 
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this allowed Madrid to pin blame for the failure of its application on the EC’s 
internal decision-making crisis. 
Ironically, it was the regime’s application for associate status that 
prompted leading European political actors to seek to make explicit what had 
hitherto been left intentionally vague. The Birkelbach report thus represents an 
early expression of democratic conditionality, which had the additional value of 
providing the Parliamentary Assembly with a pretext to monitor future political 
developments in Spain. One author has gone so far as to argue that this episode 
reveals that the constitutionalization of the EC, defined as the embedding of 
democratic and human rights principles in its treaties and jurisprudence, did not 
start with the drafting of a treaty or the crafting of a court opinion regarding the 
proper exercise of authority within the new community’s borders, but with a 
political struggle to set the rules by which the EC would respond to applications 
for membership (Thomas, 2006, 1190-1191). In Spain itself, the general public 
gradually became aware of the existence of a veto that would only be lifted once 
the country finally moved towards democracy. As a result, Spain’s internal de-
mocratization and its membership of the EC increasingly came to be perceived as 
part and parcel of the same process. 
 
3. Coming to Terms with Rejection, 1962-75 
 
In view of the EC’s prolonged silence, in January 1964 Foreign Minister 
Castiella approached Brussels once more, though without explicitly alluding to 
the goal of associate membership. This finally enabled the EC to reply in June of 
that year, with a rather modest agreement to examine the economic problems 
posed for Spain by European integration with a view to finding possible solu-
tions. Though widely regarded as the regime’s strongest ally in Europe, De 
Gaulle once again disrupted Madrid’s plans by provoking the ‘empty chair’ cri-
sis, finally solved in January 1966 thanks to the so-called ‘Luxemburg Compro-
mise’. Once these obstacles were overcome, in July 1967 Brussels offered Spain 
a mere preferential agreement on commercial trade (as envisaged in article 113 of 
the Rome Treaty), a politically neutral formula which gained support in the 
Community following the military coup in Greece that same year, which led to 
the first suspension of an association agreement for political reasons.  
In the 1960s, relations with the EC became increasingly important to 
Spain owing to the European dimension of the three factors that most affected its 
economy, namely foreign investment, tourism and emigration. In the wake of 
stabilization, European capital gradually began to perform the role previously 
played by US investments. Similarly, by 1967 over 80 per cent of tourists visiting 
Spain originated in the Six. Finally, most of Spain’s emigrant workers, whose 
remittances increased sharply in value, chose EC countries as their destination. 
Furthermore, rapid economic growth in the 1960s failed to eradicate fundamental 
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which was the structure of foreign trade. Although exports grew rapidly during 
the 1960s and early 1970s, imports advanced even faster, resulting in a steadily 
worsening trade deficit. Additionally, the mix of Spain’s trade exchanges gave it 
a tenuous position in world markets: many of Spain’s big export industries, such 
as steel, textiles and automobiles, faced growing foreign competition as well as 
stagnating demand. For all these reasons, Madrid hoped closer relations with 
Brussels would grant it a greater say in decisions that greatly affected the Spanish 
economy (Powell, 1995, p 23; Smith, 1998). 
Although the political status of the Preferential Agreement finally signed 
with Madrid in June 1970 was arguably more modest than that of the association 
agreements with Morocco and Tunisia, in economic terms it was to prove highly 
favourable to Spanish interests. The agreement envisaged a significant reduction 
in tariffs by the EC which greatly boosted Spanish industrial exports to the Six, 
while the Spanish side was allowed to implement more modest reductions, there-
by preventing a massive influx of imports which might have plunged the domes-
tic market into turmoil. As a result, while in 1970 some 46 per cent of Spanish 
exports went to Community markets, by 1985 the figure had risen to 52 per cent. 
However, some authors have regretted that the 25 per cent average tariff reduc-
tion for industrial goods (as opposed to the EC’s 63 per cent) was too cautious, 
with the result that Spanish industry –particularly sectors such as shipbuilding- 
remained over-protected from external competition.  
The favourable impact of the Preferential Agreement was significantly 
undermined by British accession to the EC in January 1973. Until then, Spain 
had been able to export up to 25 per cent of its agricultural produce to Britain 
without restriction, but EC membership brought with it new tariff barriers. The 
signing of a complementary protocol in January 1973 mitigated the impact of 
enlargement somewhat, but in return Brussels urged Spain to lower its industrial 
tariffs faster than initially planned, leading to an unsatisfactory stalemate. By this 
stage, however, growing popular opposition to the regime was seriously impair-
ing its ability to negotiate with the EC and its member states. In December 1970, 
the death sentences meted out to three ETA activists by a military court –though 
later commuted by Franco- sparked protests throughout Europe, leading the 
Commission to warn Madrid of the possible consequences for its relations with 
the EC. In December 1973, the sentencing of ten trade union leaders to 162 years 
in prison provoked a similar response. The assassination of Prime Minister Carre-
ro Blanco by ETA that same month triggered a fresh wave of repression, which 
eventually led to the sentencing and execution of five activists in September 
1975, only months before the dictator’s death. The regime’s refusal to commute 
the sentences on this occasion resulted in the worst crisis in the history of Span-
ish-EC relations: all nine member states (save Ireland) withdrew their ambassa-
dors in protest, and the European Assembly and the Commission successfully 
demanded that the Council freeze ongoing negotiations to adapt the 1970 Prefer-
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With the benefit of hindsight, it may be argued that the EC’s strategy to-
wards the Franco regime was generally successful. Had it granted Spain associate 
status, the regime would have claimed it had been fully accepted by the Western 
democracies, and authoritarianism would have been strengthened as a result. On 
the other hand, Spain’s indiscriminate exclusion from the European markets 
would have punished Spanish society at large, and not just the dictatorship. In 
effect, the Preferential Agreement allowed Brussels to steer a middle course, 
which had the virtue of contributing to the so-called Spanish economic miracle 
(in 1959-74 Spain grew faster than any other country in the OECD, save Japan), 
while at the same time preparing its economy for full EC membership in the not-
too-distant future. 
At a political level, the EC’s decision to keep Franco at arm’s length also 
proved far-sighted. By depriving Spain of the real (and imagined) benefits of full 
integration in a rapidly-developing Community, the EC’s veto helped to under-
mine the ruling authoritarian coalition, elements of which began to regard the 
regime’s continued existence as a hindrance to their present and future prosperi-
ty. Additionally, the veto enforced by Brussels, together with the growing pros-
perity and stability of member states in the 1960s, helped to enhance the appeal 
of parliamentary democracy as practised in Europe in the eyes of Spanish elites 
and public opinion at large. More specifically, the EC came to be seen as the 
embodiment of European values, most notably liberal democracy, and as an anti-
dote to the regime’s authoritarianism. It thus came to be widely accepted that 
democratization would be incomplete unless it was formally sanctioned not only 
by the major European states, but by the EC institutions as well (Powell, 1996). 
Finally, both before and during the transition to democracy proper, the 
prospect of EC membership provided guarantees and reassurances to those who 
faced a post-authoritarian future with apprehension. As one author has observed, 
membership could be expected to guarantee the free movement of capital, the 
freedom to travel and work abroad, and most importantly, legal protection 
against arbitrary confiscation of property. As a result, those sectors of the Span-
ish population who feared that Franco’s death might lead to a violent overturning 
of the established socio-economic order came to regard the EC as an external 
wall of containment against possible revolutionary excesses. Indeed the same 
author has gone so far as to argue that, if such external guarantees had existed in 
the 1930s, those apprehensive about the consequences of democratization would 
have been far less inclined to take up arms against the II Republic (Whitehead, 
1986). 
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4. Spain and the EC, from Dictatorship to Democracy  
 
Franco’s death on 20 November 1975 was greeted with a combination of relief 
and hope by the EC. In his coronation speech two days later, King Juan Carlos 
proclaimed Spain’s commitment to full integration in Europe’s major institutions, 
a goal subsequently reaffirmed by prime minister Carlos Arias Navarro. By so 
doing, they effectively invited the EC (and the Council of Europe) to monitor 
internal developments closely, and to pass judgement as to when and how the 
political requisites for membership should be met. 
  Largely in an attempt to strengthen the king’s standing at home, the EC 
Council of Ministers agreed to resume talks with Madrid in early 1976, before 
the new government had provided significant evidence of its democratizing in-
tentions. This prompted a major debate on Spain in the Parliamentary Assembly, 
in the course of which Socialist and Communist MEPs dismissed Arias Navar-
ro’s programme as a half-hearted liberalization of the existing political system. A 
tour of the nine EC capitals by Foreign Minister José María de Areilza, a com-
mitted liberal who lacked genuine authority, failed to convince his hosts of the 
government’s ability to carry out far-reaching reforms. Relations soured further 
in April, following the arrest of political leaders who had met to announce the 
creation of a unified opposition platform, prompting a formal protest from EC 
heads of government which greatly embarrassed the young king. A month later 
the Parliamentary Assembly adopted a text by its rapporteur on Spain, Maurice 
Faure, which once again linked Spanish membership of the EC to progress on the 
road to democracy. Faure specifically condemned Arias Navarro’s plans for a 
bicameral Cortes, in which a democratically elected Congress would co-exist 
with a ‘corporatist’ Senate, on the grounds that such an arrangement “would not 
measure up to the democratic standards we in the countries of Western Europe 
set for ourselves”. Significantly, he also objected to the government’s attempts to 
exclude communists from the first elections, arguing that “the legal existence of 
communist parties is a characteristic common to our Western democracies”, and 
consequently a requisite for Spanish accession to the EC. Although the king’s 
decision to dismiss Arias Navarro and replace him with Adolfo Suárez in July 
1976 was largely the consequence of his failure to provide effective leadership at 
home, mounting European pressure in favour of democratization also played a 
significant role. 
Suárez’s appointment led to an immediate improvement in Spain’s polit-
ical relations with the EC. After discussing his programme with government and 
opposition representatives in Madrid, Faure agreed to give him the benefit of the 
doubt, and in December 1976 he returned to Spain to express the Parliamentary 
Assembly’s satisfaction at the success of the referendum on the decisive Law on 
Political Reform, which paved the way for free elections in June 1977. Before 
these took place, in April MEPs reacted to the legalization of the Communist 
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ez’s performance thus far. Finally, in July the Parliamentary Assembly greeted 
Spain’s first free elections since 1936 with a resolution expressing the “political 
will to see Spain occupy its place in the European Community as soon as possi-
ble”, in view of which the second Suárez government immediately submitted its 
application. That autumn, the prime minister embarked on his first –and last- tour 
of the nine EC capitals, in the course of which it became apparent that, in spite of 
having met the political requisites laid down by Brussels, the road to full mem-
bership would be a difficult one. Nevertheless, this external endorsement of 
Spanish democratization by the EC was extremely important in the eyes of do-
mestic political actors and the public at large. 
Membership of the EC was thus sought for essentially political motives. 
Given the widely-shared perception that there was a strong causal link between 
the establishment of a democratic political system and accession to the EC, only 
the latter’s recognition could render the new parliamentary monarchy fully legit-
imate in the eyes of most Spaniards. Furthermore, the consolidation of the new 
democracy could best be underpinned by EC membership, which would some-
how prevent Spain from sliding back into authoritarianism. It is interesting to 
note, in this regard, that the symbolic importance attached to EC membership 
appears to have been considerably greater in Spain than in Portugal or Greece, 
the other two southern European countries undergoing democratization at the 
time. This has been attributed to the fact that, while Spain was totally excluded 
from European institutions during the post-war years on account of Franco’s 
‘original sin’, alluded to earlier, Portugal was allowed to join both NATO and 
EFTA, while Greece, which was a member of both the Alliance and the Council 
of Europe, also enjoyed a closer relationship with the EC on account of its asso-
ciation agreement of 1962. Furthermore, the accommodating attitude of some 
European states towards the Greek military dictatorship established in 1967 ap-
pears to have undermined the EC’s prestige in the eyes of many Greeks. This 
may partly explain why in Spain the goal of EC accession enjoyed the unwaver-
ing support of all major political parties, including the communists, while in 
Greece and Portugal it failed to attract the unanimous support of either their par-
liaments or their people (Powell, 2000). 
Three additional motives for seeking accession deserve mention here. 
Above all, EC membership was seen by many as the best means of overcoming 
decades –perhaps centuries- of social, political and economic backwardness. Of 
course the notion that only closer ties to Europe could lift Spain from its state of 
prostrate insignificance was hardly new: in the aftermath of the Spanish-
American War of 1898, in which Spain had lost its remaining major colonies 
(Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines), a new generation of intellectuals and 
politicians had come to precisely this conclusion, and in 1910 the philosopher 
José Ortega y Gasset had gone so far as to declare that ‘Spain is the problem, and 
Europe the solution’. What is remarkable is not so much the fact that this diagno-
sis rang as true in the 1970s as it had over sixty years earlier, but rather that it The Long Road to Europe                                                                        33 
 
was specifically relevant to Spain’s integration in a Community based on the 
notion that member states’ interests could best be advanced (and protected) by 
pooling their sovereignty. In short, the idea that a combination of ‘less Spain’ and 
‘more Europe’ would enable the country to overcome many of its long-standing 
structural problems sat comfortably with the goal of integration in a supranation-
al entity. This partly explains why Spaniards would later remain enthusiastic 
supporters of the process of European integration: ‘deepening’ could hardly be 
regarded as a threat by those anxious to overcome an unhappy past in a Commu-
nity which appeared to embody the promise of a better future. 
Secondly, EC membership was widely perceived as a means of overcom-
ing decades of international isolation and irrelevance. In this sense, accession has 
been described as a cure for the collective inferiority complex nurtured by Span-
iards for generations, which cannot be attributed exclusively to the feelings of 
rejection accumulated during the Franco era (Jover, 1986). Though Francoism 
did nothing to dispel them, doubts as to Spain’s European identity in other parts 
of the continent long predated the Civil War and the dictatorship. As one author 
has argued, Spain was on the outer limits of the concept of Europe held by most 
Europeans who had considered themselves such for some time (Mesa, 1988). 
This would explain, for example, why King Juan Carlos felt the need to use his 
coronation speech to solemnly remind the world that “the idea of Europe would 
be incomplete without reference to the presence of Spain and without considera-
tion for the activities of my predecessors. Europe must take Spain into account, 
because we Spaniards are European”. In spite of the above, it is nevertheless true 
that most Spaniards attributed the duration and intensity of Spain’s international 
isolation primarily to the Franco’s regime, which is why many associated democ-
racy not just with Europe, but with a more dignified international status overall 
(Álvarez, 1996).  
Finally, EC membership was also attractive in the 1970s because it was 
widely believed it would help defuse mounting centre-periphery tensions. During 
the transition to democracy, peripheral nationalists (in Catalonia and the Basque 
Country particularly), paid lip service to the notion that remaining within Spain 
would be less unpalatable if it proved compatible with accession to the EC. Im-
plicitly, the hope was that by devolving competences ‘downwards’ to the regions 
and ‘upwards’ to Brussels, the Spanish state would gradually wither away, ena-
bling the former to establish closer direct links with EC institutions. Though the-
se assumptions turned out to be largely unfounded, they certainly proved useful 
during membership negotiations, ensuring the support of the major nationalist 
parties for the central government’s efforts (Quintanilla, 2001). 
In addition to these essentially political motives, there were of course very pow-
erful economic arguments in favour of Spain’s application. As already men-
tioned, the Spanish economy had experienced very significant development in 
1959-74, but the engines of growth (emigrants’ remittances, tourism, foreign 
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1973 international oil crisis. Furthermore, Spain’s industrialization model, based 
on protectionism, tariff barriers and considerable state intervention, had become 
out-dated. Experts thus increasingly saw EC membership as a means by which to 
modernize the Spanish economy by exposing it to much-needed open market 
discipline (Closa & Heywood, 2004, p. 14). 
However, it was the asymmetric nature of its commercial relations with 
EC member states that added a special sense of urgency to the Spanish applica-
tion. In 1977, 48 per cent of its exports were bought by EC member states (57 per 
cent of agricultural produce, including 80 per cent of fruits and vegetables), while 
30 per cent of its imports came from the Nine (including 39 per cent of its indus-
trial goods). Isolation from Europe made no economic sense, and the cost of non-
membership would greatly outweigh the cost of adapting to integration. The fact 
that some nine hundred thousand Spaniards were then earning a living in EC 
countries was a secondary, though by no means insignificant, consideration. Fi-
nally, the Spanish government feared that any delay in lodging its application for 
membership would allow Brussels to concentrate on Greece and Portugal –who 
had submitted theirs in June 1975 and March 1977, respectively- thereby giving 
the EC an excuse to delay consideration of Spain’s case until these had been re-
solved. Despite the reticence of many member states, with considerable French 
assistance Greece later succeeded in distancing itself from the two Iberian candi-
dates, joining the EC in 1981 (Bassols, 1995).  
Madrid’s application was received with a mixture of joy and apprehen-
sion by the Nine. Like those of Greece and Portugal, Spain’s request reflected the 
progress of democracy in Europe, as well as a gratifying recognition of the EC’s 
growing prestige. However, unlike the other two southern European applications, 
it caused serious concern on account of the size and structure of the Spanish 
economy. More specifically, the Commission and a number of European capitals 
were alarmed by the competitiveness of some of Spain’s agricultural products, 
the size of its fishing fleet, the possible future mobility of its workforce and the 
relative poverty of some of its regions.
1 
In a nutshell, these accession negotiations can be described as the process 
whereby EC industrial goods were granted access to the Spanish market in ex-
change for Spanish agricultural products gaining access to those of the Nine. In 
Spain itself, the difficulties encountered have generally been attributed to French 
(and to a lesser extent, Italian) opposition, which certainly contrasted with the 
more constructive attitude of Germany and even Britain. However, it should be 
remembered that the opening of negotiations came at the worst possible moment. 
In 1979, Europe plunged into the second economic crisis of the decade, when it 
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olive oil production. Furthermore, Spain’s fishing fleet totalled 70 per cent of the fleet of the Nine; 
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was still reeling from the effects of the first. Furthermore, serious disagreement 
over the structure of the EC budget, the future of the CAP and the so-called ‘Brit-
ish Rebate’ resulted in an almost unprecedented internal paralysis. 
The first phase of the negotiations opened with Spain’s application on 28 
July 1977, to which the Commission responded with a favourable opinion in 
November 1978. (In February of that year Suárez had made one of his closest 
political allies, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, minister responsible for relations with the 
EC). Following its approval by the Council of Ministers and the European Par-
liament, formal negotiations started in February 1979. France, however, immedi-
ately instigated a variety of delaying tactics, such as the request that the Commis-
sion provide a ‘vue d’ensemble’ before allowing negotiations to get underway. 
Despite their public support, other member states, ostensibly scandalised by 
France’s attitude, chose to hide comfortably behind Paris’s position, artfully con-
cealing their own misgivings. Alarmed by France’s attitude, in November 1979 
Suárez travelled to Paris to meet President Valery Giscard d’Estaing and Prime 
Minister Raymond Barre, but to little avail (Crespo, 2000). 
Spanish fears were confirmed in June 1980, when the French president 
publicly announced that the Iberian enlargement (but not Greek accession) would 
have to wait until the consequences of British membership had been fully digest-
ed. Although in Spain this position was initially attributed to the upcoming presi-
dential elections scheduled for May 1981, and the need to woe voters in southern 
France, it was in fact strongly reminiscent of De Gaulle’s stance towards Britain 
and the CAP in the 1960s, in the sense that the ultimate goal was to modify the 
internal rules of the game in France’s favour before the next enlargement de-
prived it of the ability to do so. This was largely confirmed by the fact that the 
socialist François Mitterrand, after duly defeating Giscard d’Estaing in the presi-
dential election, was soon pursuing a very similar policy to that of his conserva-
tive predecessor. This became evident in June 1982 during his first official visit 
to Spain, when he demanded that the Commission draft a new ‘inventory’ of the 
problems posed by enlargement. In short, negotiations reached a stalemate be-
cause France insisted on reforming the financing of the CAP before enlargement 
so as to prevent Spain’s accession from harming its interests, while Germany 
initially refused to increase its overall contribution to the EC budget in order to 
make this possible. To make matters worse, this European impasse coincided 
with a deep political crisis in Spain itself, which led to Suárez’s resignation as 
prime minister and leader of his party in January 1981, and the subsequent coup 
attempt in February, both of which further undermined Madrid’s bargaining posi-
tion. Nevertheless, Spaniards were pleased by the Commission’s formal condem-
nation of the coup, and the European Parliament’s call for acceleration in acces-
sion negotiations. By that stage, the idea that EC membership would help to un-
derpin democratic consolidation was widely adhered to both in Spain and abroad. 
Lack of progress in the negotiations encouraged domestic actors to air 
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cultural products did not have a viable alternative to EC markets, industrialists 
feared that the government would seek a favourable trade-off at their expense. 
Though generally supportive of EC membership, the Confederación Española de 
Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE), Spain’s leading business association, 
feared that the elimination of industrial tariffs would open them up to devastating 
competition from more efficient European firms, and therefore advocated a very 
long (ten-year) transition period. Later, in 1982, it was particularly outspoken in 
its criticism of the government for having agreed to introduce value added tax 
from the moment of accession, as the Commission had requested. More general-
ly, CEOE leaders feared that, due to their domestic political difficulties, Suárez 
(and later Calvo Sotelo) would accept highly unfavourable terms in a desperate 
attempt to conclude negotiations at any cost. While this criticism may have un-
dermined the standing of both prime ministers in the eyes of some voters, para-
doxically, it probably strengthened the bargaining position of Spanish negotiators 
as well (Closa & Heywood, 2004, p. 21; Jones, 2000). 
Throughout his time in office, Suárez, who spoke neither English nor 
French, showed little interest in Community affairs, and only visited Brussels 
once, in November 1977.Though he remained committed to the goal of EC 
membership throughout his premiership, the fact that progress in the negotiations 
was at best unspectacular partly explains his aloofness. It is also interesting to 
note that he was careful never to link EC and NATO membership, probably be-
cause he always harboured doubts about the latter, which was also far more con-
troversial. Suárez had initially feared that serious disagreement over foreign poli-
cy might jeopardise the badly-needed domestic consensus successfully forged 
during the constituent process. Once the new Constitution had been adopted in 
December 1978, however, the major left-wing parties, which remained strong 
supporters of EC membership, became increasingly vocal in their opposition to 
NATO. 
Suárez’s successor, Calvo Sotelo, held a slightly different view of 
Spain’s role in the world, and in his inaugural speech of February 1981 he prom-
ised to develop a “European, democratic and Western” foreign policy. Calvo 
Sotelo was strongly committed to the Atlantic alliance, and saw no contradiction 
between Spain’s future presence in NATO and its willingness to play a more 
active international role. Seen in this light, Spain’s application for NATO mem-
bership in December 1981 (which had been endorsed by Parliament in October) 
was partly designed to strengthen its appeal in the eyes of other signatories of the 
Washington Treaty who also belonged to the EC, by proving Spain’s commit-
ment to the defence of the West. In other words, for Calvo Sotelo, EC and NATO 
membership were not only perfectly compatible, but mutually reinforcing (Calvo 
Sotelo, 1990). 
The application for NATO membership, ratified in May 1982, unleashed consid-
erable political turmoil, making serene and informed debate on Spanish foreign 
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on the on-going negations with the EC was hardly ever raised in public. Never-
theless, some critics did argue that NATO membership would make Spain a less 
attractive candidate in the eyes of the EC, on the somewhat bizarre grounds that a 
country so clearly aligned with Washington would have fewer chances of acting 
as a ‘bridge’ between Europe and Latin America.  
 
5. Negotiating in Earnest 
 
The landslide victory won by Felipe González’s socialist party (PSOE) in the 
October 1982 elections provided the new government with a strong popular 
mandate, such as Suárez had never enjoyed. For both political and economic 
reasons, EC membership was González’s foreign policy priority.
2 Intellectually, 
the new prime minister’s outlook was strongly influenced by the so-called ‘Gen-
eration of 1914’, and in particular Ortega y Gasset, who as early as 1909 had 
urged the PSOE to be the “party that will make Spain European”. For González, 
membership of the Community had considerable symbolic value, since it repre-
sented a chance not only to overcome the international isolation of the Franco 
period, but also what Ortega had called Spain’s ‘Tibetization’, in other words, its 
exclusion from the European cultural mainstream.  
From an economic viewpoint, if anything EC membership seemed more 
urgent in 1982 than it had in 1977. Partly due to the uncertainty generated by the 
transition to democracy, Spain’s economic performance during the intervening 
years had been poor: whereas most other European nations had rebounded from 
the from the 1973 oil shock by 1976, Spain never fully adjusted. The result was 
an increase in unemployment and inflation, and a sharp decline in foreign in-
vestment. Furthermore, in order to prepare the economy for EC membership, the 
government faced the task of reforming an outmoded small-scale agricultural 
sector, an ill-adapted financial system hobbled by undercapitalized banks and 
securities markets, and an industrial sector handicapped by inefficient state-run 
firms. Although the economic measures introduced proved socially painful- with 
unemployment rising from 15.6 per cent in 1982 to 21.1 per cent in 1985- the 
government’s popularity allowed it to ride the storm without great discomfort. 
The prospect of membership thus became both a pretext and a catalyst for the 
modernization and opening-up the economy to the outside world, as well as for 
adapting an outdated state bureaucracy to the new needs and demands of Spanish 
society (Powell, 2001). 
                                                 
2 Inevitably, lack of progress in negotiations hurt the EC’s popularity somewhat. In April 1980, 58 
per cent of Spaniards had espoused favourable views on membership, 13 were divided and only 
five per cent were against. By October 1982, those in favour had dropped to 48 per cent, uncertain-
ty had increased to 24 per cent, and rejection rose slightly to seven per cent. However, In Portugal 
during this period those with favourable views of EC membership never exceeded 25 per cent of 
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In the process leading to EC/EU membership, what is truly decisive is 
not so much the bilateral negotiations between Brussels and the candidate coun-
try, but rather the discussions between existing member states, who have to reach 
an agreement first regarding the cost of enlargement, and the ensuing burden-
sharing. (Indeed a candidate country does not have a great deal to negotiate, other 
than the rate at which it complies with the rules of the club that it plans to join, 
namely the acquis communautaire). Increasingly aware that, in the Spanish case, 
this agreement would essentially require a prior understanding between France 
and Germany, González and his government focused their efforts on furthering 
bilateral ties with Paris and Bonn. This decision also made good economic sense, 
since these two countries were also Spain’s major trading partners: by 1984, they 
accounted for 54.3 per cent of Spanish imports (25.7 per cent from France and 
29.6 per cent from Germany) and 50 per cent of exports (with 30.6 per cent going 
to France and 19.5 per cent to Germany). Furthermore, between them they pro-
vided a quarter of all foreign direct investment. 
Initially, Mitterrand did not seem very willing to make concessions to 
González, despite their ideological affinity. In line with his predecessor’s ap-
proach, in December 1982 he announced that the reform of the CAP and a solu-
tion to the British contribution to the EC budget should precede enlargement. 
Consequently, Madrid sought the complicity of the German Chancellor, the 
Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl, who was whole-heartedly in favour of en-
largement for political, economic and geo-strategic reasons. In May 1983, Gon-
zález duly visited Kohl to offer him his unconditional support for the deployment 
of Pershing missiles on German soil in the face of stiff opposition from his col-
leagues in the German Social Democratic party (SPD), and in blatant contradic-
tion with his own electoral programme, which had demanded the removal of all 
medium-range missiles from Europe. This gesture partly explains why Kohl 
spoke out so forcefully at the Stuttgart European Council held in June, explicitly 
linking the successful outcome of the budget crisis to Spanish and Portuguese 
accession. From then on it became clear that, as far as Bonn was concerned, 
France would not obtain the increase in Community funds needed to overhaul the 
CAP, from which it benefited more than any other member state, until after the 
Iberian enlargement had taken place.
3 
However, Germany’s support did not immediately overcome French re-
sistance, and King Juan Carlos and González visited Paris in November and De-
cember 1983, respectively, in a desperate attempt to make Mitterrand reconsider. 
According to González’s Foreign Minister, Fernando Morán, when finally forced 
to choose between taking responsibility for Spain’s exclusion and playing a lead-
ing role in its accession, which would also shift the EC’s centre of gravity south-
                                                 
3Understandably, Kohl’s stance improved Germany’s already very favourable standing in the eyes 
of most Spaniards. In the 1980s, no other European country was more widely admired, while 
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wards, the French president finally conceded that the latter option was undoubt-
edly preferable (Morán, 1990). However, the point of no return was not reached 
until the Fontainebleau European Council of June 1984, where agreement was 
finally reached on the British rebate and the reform of the CAP, enabling Mitter-
rand to announce the accession of Spain and Portugal on 1 January 1986. Along 
the way, Madrid also agreed to lift the blockade of Gibraltar, imposed by the 
Franco regime in 1969, in response to British demands (Tsoukalis, 1981). 
In late 1984 the Spanish government succeeded in getting Brussels to ac-
cept a six-year transitory period for industrial products, rather than the three 
years initially proposed by the Commission, but in early 1985 there were still 
disputes over some crucial areas, including agriculture, fisheries, social affairs, 
the Canary Islands and relations with Portugal. Under Italy’s presidency of the 
EC, in March 1985 a seven-year transitory period was also agreed for agricultural 
products in general, with extensions of up to ten years for the most competitive 
Spanish products. Shortly afterwards, Madrid agreed to a very stiff fifteen-year 
transition period for full access to EC fishing waters, paving the way for the sign-
ing of the Treaty and the Act of Accession to the European Economic Communi-
ty on 12 June 1985.  
Although both trade unions and business associations expressed reserva-
tions, Spaniards generally regarded the outcome of this eight-year long negotia-
tion as satisfactory.
4 This was partly because EC membership brought with it a 
swift economic recovery, and by the end of González’s first term in mid-1986 
Spain was poised for rapid growth. Many experts nevertheless believed that 
Brussels had imposed “a punishing treaty of accession”, but Madrid never re-
quested a formal renegotiation (Harrison, 1992). Instead, González followed the 
advice of Margaret Thatcher, who had told him in 1983 that it was wiser to join 
the club as soon as possible and then fight to improve accession conditions from 
within rather than antagonise other members states by obstinately seeking an 
ideal membership deal from the outset.
5 This strategy later enabled Spain to con-
siderably reduce the transitional periods for agriculture and fisheries, the free 
movement of workers, and the elimination of the external tariff (Elorza). 
The outcome of negotiations was also broadly satisfactory at an institu-
tional level. Spain was offered either ten Council votes and one commissioner, or 
eight votes and two commissioners; the fact that it chose the latter surely reflects 
the importance traditionally attributed to the Commission by Spanish officials. In 
                                                 
4According to a November 1986 poll, 52 per cent believed EC membership was a good thing, 21 
per cent thought it was neither good nor bad, and only 9 per cent had negative feelings about acces-
sion. (Moral, 1989, p. 46). 
5 González has admitted that Margaret Thatcher taught him “a lesson [he would] never forget”, 
when she told him: “I would like you to know that there are two negotiations. You are in the midst 
of one now, but once you are sitting at the Council table, you will have to start another, and you 
will have to renegotiate everything that is causing you trouble now. This is my advice to you, be-
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addition, it obtained sixty out of 518 members of the European Parliament, and 
one of the thirteen judges in the Court of Justice. Considering that in 1985 
Spain’s population represented 12 per cent of that of the EC-12, and that its share 
of the cake in GDP terms was a mere 6.5 per cent, the fact that, on average, its 
institutional weighting was around 11 per cent constituted a significant diplomat-
ic achievement.
6 
Although some of the leading players in these events have been curiously 
reluctant to admit it, there is no doubt that membership of the EC was closely 
linked to Spain’s continued presence in NATO. González had gone to the polls in 
1982 with the promise that he would call a referendum to withdraw Spain from 
the Alliance, on the grounds that Calvo Sotelo’s application for membership had 
been rushed through in the face of widespread popular opposition to NATO, 
which many Spaniards regarded as a mere instrument of US foreign and security 
policy. Once in office, however, it soon dawned on him that withdrawal would 
damage his country’s standing in Europe and beyond, but he was reluctant to go 
back on his electoral promise. The only solution was to call a referendum after 
having convinced public opinion of the benefits of continued membership. EC 
officials and diplomats representing the nine member states which also belonged 
to NATO were of course careful not to publicly demand that Spain remain in the 
Alliance as a prerequisite for accession, in the knowledge that this would have 
led to accusations of blackmail. The linkage between continued NATO member-
ship and future accession to the EC was indeed extremely subtle; as the president 
of the Commission, Gaston Thorn, put it, they were “intertwined”. In their con-
tacts with these nine member states, Spanish negotiators hinted that accession to 
the EC would help win a referendum on continued membership of NATO; for 
their part, some of their interlocutors promised to be more accommodating in the 
accession negotiations if they were offered guarantees as to Spain’s future con-
tribution to the Alliance.
7 Ultimately, the best evidence of a link between both 
issues is the fact that González did not risk calling the NATO referendum until 
October 1984, once talks with the EC had been unblocked, and did not hold it 
until March 1986, when Spain was already a member.
8 At all events, it is more 
than a little ironic that the lack of popular support for continued membership of 
                                                 
6On the whole, Spaniards were satisfied with the outcome of negotiations. According to a Novem-
ber 1986 poll, 52 per cent believed EC membership was a good thing, 21 per cent thought it was 
neither good nor bad, and only 9 per cent had negative feelings about accession. (Moral, 1989, p. 
46). 
7 According to the Spanish Ambassador in Rome, “the fact that we already belonged to the Atlantic 
security system and the president’s promise that we would stay there helped secure membership of 
the European Community for Spain, as I frequently observed during my diplomatic endeavours”. 
(Esteban, 1994). 
8 In spite of having delivered on EC membership, the government won a very narrow victory, with 
only 52 per cent voting in favour of remaining in NATO, and 40 per cent against. The Long Road to Europe                                                                        41 
 
NATO should have been one of the Spanish government’s strongest cards in its 
EC accession negotiations.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
To a large extent, Spain’s accession to the European Community may be seen as 
the logical culmination of the slow process of socio-economic and political con-
vergence which had begun some years previously. At a socio-economic level, the 
turning point was probably the Stabilization Plan of 1959, while in the political 
arena it was Franco’s death in 1975 that marked the point of no return. However, 
this should not lead us to underestimate the difficulties encountered on the long 
road to Europe. In particular, it is often forgotten that, after advancing rapidly up 
to 1974, Spain’s economic convergence with the EC deteriorated during acces-
sion negotiations on account of the uncertainty associated with the transition to 
democracy, a wages shock, and two oil crises; as a result, while in 1977 per capi-
ta GDP was 78.7 per cent of the EC-12 average, by 1985 it had declined to 71.8 
per cent. No other candidate for membership of the EC has ever experienced a 
setback of this magnitude. 
Membership of the EC heralded the beginning of a radical transformation 
of the Spanish economy (Martín, 1998; Montes, 1993; Viñals, 1996). When 
Spain joined the European market it was forced to remove tariffs and contingent 
protection completely over seven years (with very few exceptions), which was a 
considerable effort for an economy that was still quite closed, and whose effec-
tive protection rate vis-à-vis the exterior was still 25 per cent in 1985 (three times 
higher than the average of its EC partners). To illustrate the magnitude of the 
change, one only has to recall that, while in 1975 total Spanish imports and ex-
ports accounted for 27 per cent of GDP, in 1985 the figure was 36 per cent, and 
after a decade of membership in the EC, it had risen to 61 per cent by 1995, a 
level comparable to that of the more advanced European economies. This in turn 
reflected the fact that EC membership brought with it a sharp increase in the pro-
portion of trade conducted with other member states: between 1986 and 1997 
exports of goods to EC markets increased from 63 to 69 per cent, while imports 
rose from 54 to 67 per cent of the total. In the process, Germany replaced the US 
as Spain’s leading supplier of industrial products, while predominantly Latin 
American and US agricultural imports were gradually replaced by French pro-
duce. In short, Germany and France were not only the key political players in 
Spain’s accession negotiations, but also its major economic beneficiaries. Both 
factors partly explain Spain’s subsequent tendency to align with the Franco-
German axis on most matters relating to the EC’s development (Powell, 2003). 
For the historical reasons discussed above, the goal of EC membership 
was always widely shared by the Spanish public. At the time it was sometimes 
argued that this unanimity had both positive and negative consequences. Without 
it, it is unlikely that González would have been able to justify the ambitious in-42                                                                                                        Powell 
 
dustrial restructuring programme implemented during his first term (1982-86) on 
the grounds that it was a prerequisite for EC membership. At the time, hardly 
anyone doubted that the latter would bring with it greater economic stability and 
prosperity, a promise fully borne out by events. However, it was also sometimes 
argued that the political significance attached to membership by virtually all sec-
tors of Spanish society weakened the government’s bargaining position, leaving 
it little room for manoeuvre during negotiations. Whether or not this was actually 
the case, on balance strong and continued support for accession in the face of 
considerable adversity must surely be included amongst the factors that ultimate-
ly account for Spain’s subsequent ability to make such a remarkable success of 
EC membership. 
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Abstract 
 
As Spain held its fourth Presidency of the Council of the European Union and 
just a few months from the 25
th anniversary of the country's accession, the Centre 
Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe (CVCE)
1, a research center under the 
aegis of the Luxembourg Ministry of Research, launched its research and innova-
tion project on 'Spain and the European integration process' (www.ena.lu) at the 
Spanish Diplomatic School in May 2010. The originality of the project lies both 
in the research process – based on the compilation and classification of docu-
ments on this theme coming from archives from all over Europe, on the devel-
opment of online collaborative research platforms and on the production and 
dissemination of results by means of information and communication technolo-
gies. Its research results and materials are compiled in a corpus of documents 
which includes a range of sources as well as a series of historical accounts that 
represent an oral memory of Spain's participation in the process of European 
cooperation and integration. Certain other academic, educational and communi-
cation activities will also serve to add value to the research results. Last but not 
least, this ambitious project is being progressively enriched with scientific con-
tributions coming from prestigious research centers, foundations and higher edu-
cation institutions specialized in the field of European Integration Studies (the
                                                 
1The CVCE, from now onwards.Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe (Virtual Resource 
Centre for Knowledge about Europe — CVCE) uses the very latest in information and communica-
tion technologies to provide a unique point of reference for creating and disseminating valuable 
content on the history of European integration. The work of the CVCE is based on a comprehensive 
approach that covers a wide range of disciplines with the aim of promoting and making the most of 
Europe's heritage. The CVCE, particularly through its “European NAvigator” (ENA) website 
(www.ena.lu), is developing a service that makes available and promotes Europe's heritage for the 
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Complutense University of Madrid, the European Academy of Yuste Foundation, 
etc.). 
A specific section within this project, which remains under construction, 
focuses on the theme of the historical evolution of the discourse and implementa-
tion of Spain’s mediating role between the European Union and Latin America. 
The project as a whole, and also this part is of it is notably based on the analysis 
of the accounts provided by Spanish actors who hold or have held key positions 
and decision-making power, regarding such process of mediation. It includes 
Manuel Marín González, José María Gil-Robles y Gil-Delgado, Marcelino Oreja 
Aguirre, Jordi Pujol i Soley, Carlos María Bru Purón, etc. In addition, this oral 
history contribution is complemented by an in-depth examination of newly-
released primary sources coming from mutually complementary yet disperse 
archives such as the Archives of the Council of the European Union and of the 
European Commission in Brussels, the Archives of the Council of Europe in 
Strasbourg, the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence, the Euro-
pean Parliament Information Office in Madrid, the European Commission Repre-
sentation in Madrid, the General Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Cooperation (AGMAEC) in Madrid, the Documentation Centre and Library of 
the State Secretariat for European Union in Madrid, the Archives of the Congress 
of Deputies in Madrid and the General Archive of the Administration (AGA) in 
Alcalá de Henares, with a view to elucidate the actual correspondence between 
rhetoric and applied compromise in Spain’s mediating role between these two 
fundamental world regions. 
 
The CVCE Research Project ‘Spain and the European Integration Process’ 
 
The project, ‘Spain and the European integration process’, looks at the historical 
relationship between Spain and Europe in a broad sense, taking into account the 
relations of Spain’s various institutional, socio-economic and cultural players 
with the European Communities — today the European Union (EU)
1 — and their 
interactions with other European organizations, presented chronologically from 
the end of the Second World War to the present day. The project is essentially the 
study of a reciprocal exchange; it focuses, firstly, on Spain’s contribution to the 
European integration process in terms of ideas, principles and initiatives, and, 
secondly, on the impact of the European integration process on Spain, with re-
gard to the development of its political culture, the reactions to various proposals 
and decisions, and the social repercussions of this integration process for Europe-
an citizens. 
One of the main objectives of the project is the publication of a digital re-
search corpus on Spain and the European integration process in our “European  
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Navigator” digital library (ENA), including freely accessible relevant, varied and 
often previously unpublished documentation, in several languages and from a 
wide range of archives, as well as sources created by our research team. The “Eu-
ropean Navigator” (ENA) provides high quality research and educational materi-
al on the history of European integration on a single website: www.ena.lu ENA is 
a multilingual, multisource and multimedia digital library that contains more than 
16,000 documents on the historical and institutional development of a united 
Europe from 1945 to the present day. In this digital library, students, teachers, 
researchers, and anyone interested in the European integration process can find 
original material such as photos, audio and video clips, press articles and car-
toons, together with explanatory synopses, tables and interactive maps and dia-
grams. The material included in ENA's vast and varied documentary resources is 
selected, created, processed and validated by a multidisciplinary team of special-
ists on European integration. ENA comprises a section on ‘Historical Events' 
from 1945 to the present day, a section on ‘European Organizations', a number of 
exclusive interviews and a section entitled ‘Research and  Teaching' which pro-
vides a wide range of tips on how to use ENA as a teaching tool. ENA's content 
is under constant development. New material is regularly added to the documen-
tary resources to cover all the different aspects of the European integration pro-
cess and to ensure that as many areas as possible — ideological, geographical 
and linguistic — are represented. Some units are currently being developed and 
so contain only a limited number of documents which will be expanded as re-
search into those particular subject areas progresses. The production of “Europe-
an Navigator” (ENA) is carried out in keeping with intellectual property rights 
and, in particular, the copyright of works that form part of the knowledge base. 
The Legal Affairs Department of the CVCE is responsible, among other things, 
for copyright management. It takes the necessary steps to define the protected 
nature of the works and to seek out the legal claimant/s of the various documents 
selected by the researchers, in order to obtain the authorization needed for the 
reproduction and dissemination thereof. Once the rights have been obtained – 
including, in some occasions the signature of special agreements with the con-
sulted archives – and the acknowledgements added, the document is eligible for 
reproduction and dissemination. 
Since it was established, the CVCE has developed an oral history project 
based on a collection of historical accounts relating to Europe’s heritage which 
reveal the wealth of historical, political, social and cultural interactions in the 
European integration process. In connection with this initiative, several Spanish 
figures generously agreed to share their memories and thoughts on the history of 
the relationship between Spain and Europe, and in so doing, greatly enhanced the 
academic value of this project. This oral history collection is complemented with 
a wide range of sources to be found in our documentary collection, which com-
bines official sources with documents from Spanish and international archives, 
including: institutional texts, academic contributions, graphs and statistics, press 48                                                                                                       Blanco 
 
articles, photographs, cartoons, videos, interactive maps and diagrams, and a 
selected bibliography. Documentary research was conducted in several European 
countries for this project, often making it possible to re-establish links and corre-
lations between documents kept in geographically distant locations. The research 
focused on sources that represent the various aspects of historical analysis on as 
many levels as possible, offering opposing and complementary viewpoints and 
encompassing all the document types enumerated above.  
It is, in conclusion, a project under constant development whose results 
will be progressively disseminated. In addition, it is due to include a series of 
academic activities and communication events for a wide range of audiences. The 
project’s launch, which coincided with the fourth Spanish Presidency of the 
Council of the EU, laid the foundations for fruitful cooperation with academic, 
cultural and research institutions that are keen to contribute to the creation and 
diffusion of sources on Spain’s role in the European integration process and the 
interactive and dynamic nature of Europe’s common history. Having explained 
the subject matter, I will now present the methodology before continuing with the 
examination of the sources informing us about the historical evolution of the 
discourse and implementation concerning Spain’s mediating role between the EU 
and Latin America, which constitutes one of the main sub-sections and research 
interests of this project. 
 
Methodology and Approach 
 
The chosen methodology for the examination of this specific topic is Discourse 
Analysis, but in a way that is limited to that which Alfred Schutz denominated 
the “level of relevance” (Schutz in Weiss and Wodak 2003, 5-6). Taking dis-
course as language in action, this methodology tries to unveil the underlying 
intentions of those who influence thought, and who, by means of prescriptive 
communication, give legitimation to concepts and in that way determine what is 
publicly regarded as true. The main use I will make of this methodology will 
consist of the concept of relevance. I will precisely look for relevant manifesta-
tions of voluntary statements regarding a self-assumed Spanish role as mediator 
between the EU and Latin America in the institutional documents compiled for 
this project and in the interviews conducted to shed light on this particular issue. 
In order to do this, I will make use of the following principles of Discourse Anal-
ysis, which maintain that discourse is not pure content, but “a window to 
someone's mental or social world” (Cameron 2001, 43). Hence, this approach 
could be useful to discern the priorities and objectives of the political actors in-
volved in the consolidation of the image of Spain in such mediating role. In fact, 
it is not any one instance but “the repetition of the same pattern in a systematic 
way, in many instances and occasions that naturalizes a particular view of reali-
ty” (Wilkinson 1995, 157) and therefore, it will be necessary to consult different 
kinds of primary sources (as described in the project presentation) to verify to Spain in the Process                                                                                   49 
 
what extent Spain’s “mediator” discourse is presented with a relevant frequency. 
From this point of view, the examination of relevant self-explanatory examples 
of text and conversation to interpret a regular pattern is a direct commitment of 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)
2 and that is why I have decided to use this 
branch of Discourse Analysis for this specific case study. CDA’s basic argument, 
elaborated by Ian Hutchby and Robin Wooffitt, narrows down to the statement 
that “it is not the case that designers of a guideline are simply imparting infor-
mation to a passive recipient when they communicate, but they are actively con-
structing their accounts for a certain kind of recipient in a particular situation” 
(Hutchby and Wooffitt 1998, 19). In particular, the chosen interpretational pro-
cedure is based on the formula of analyzing contents and recurring themes in the 
documentation with a view to explaining patterns and reflecting upon the mean-
ing of the precise choices in the way of delivering political messages regarding 
this subject. Furthermore, we should take into account that we are dealing with a 
special kind of discourse, that is, institutional discourse, which is always a goal 
oriented one which paves the way for the generation of an expected acceptance. 
In this way, it consolidates the monopoly of legitimate discourse in the sphere of 
public communication in representative democracies
3. 
As a point of departure for the examination of this topic, it would be en-
lightening to allude to Altamira’s provoking premise, which warns about the 
vague nature of Spain’s historical relation with Latin America, stating that “im-
agining fraternities without substance is as rhetoric as spending time calling for 
practical realities, without implementing any of them” (Altamira 1917, 73). Such 
idea also applies to this case study and constitutes the main question that this 
project sub-section attempts to respond: Is the self-assumed and largely diffused 
Spanish mediating role between the EU and Latin America another manifestation 
of this sentiment of “fraternities without substance” or has there been a really 
fruitful implementation of this apparently special relationship? 
 
The Meaning of Latin America for Spain’s European Expectations during 
Franco’s Regime 
 
The main guidelines of the regime’s authorities regarding Spain’s relation with 
Latin America correspond to the idea that “even when we accentuate Spanish 
political interests in the sub-continent, we do not even think for a moment about 
not focusing on European issues; if we discovered America it was precisely be-
cause we “are” in Europe and, in our opinion, the more we consolidate our pres-
                                                 
2CDA from now onwards 
3 For a deeper analysis of the implications of institutional discourse, please, refer to Delcourt, B. 
(2003) Droit et Souveranités. Analyse critique du discourse européen sur la Yugoslavie. Brussels: 
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ence in Europe, the stronger will be our position in the New World”
4.  Hence, 
there was already a perception of interdependence between two realities, a view 
which would only be increased as relations evolve. Nonetheless, this notion of 
interdependence between a European and Latin American axis in Spanish foreign 
relations was combined with a sense of reticence and jealousy regarding other 
European countries’ growing contacts with Latin American regional organiza-
tions.  That was the case with different European initiatives – mainly coming 
from Italy and France – to establish closer ties with Latin American countries 
through the Organization of American States. The regime’s authorities comment-
ed, in a similar vein, that “our fear is based on the fact that, as we can observe in 
the current context, some European nations, other than Spain, could get ahead of 
Spain in terms of presence and action in the Organization of American States"
5. 
From another standpoint, Carlos María Bru Purón – participant in the 
Fourth Congress of the European Movement, held in Munich in 1962; former 
Socialist member of the European Parliament and current President of the Span-
ish Federal Council of the European Movement (CFEME) – conceptualized the 
meaning that Latin America held for Spanish pro-Europeans during Franco’s 
regime by referring to the so-called “Latin American alternative solution”
6, pro-
posed during the so-called period of autarchy. He mentions the fact that, when 
discussing Spain’s possible international partnerships within the Spanish Associ-
ation of European Cooperation (AECE) it was precisely the Latin American 
scholars and professors residing in Spain, who exclaimed that “economically, 
Spain’s main international partnership must be with Europe, since this is the 
main space in which commercial activities take place and it is also Spain’s main 
direct source of import-export exchanges”
7.  From that moment on –  Carlos Bru 
explains –  the regime allowed the creation of some, merely cultural, associations 
to study the so-called “European phenomenon”, among which the Spanish Asso-
ciation of European Cooperation, in which different Latin American scholars 
benefiting from some limited grant programs took active part in its discussions. 
In the end, this association ended up turning into a center for a more clandestine 
political reflection upon Spain’s European vocation. In this sense, we could con-
                                                 
4 Transcripción de un informe del Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale sobre las relacio-
nes de España e Italia con América (28 de noviembre de 1958). Fuente: España. Ministerio de 
Cultura. Archivo General de la Administración, caja 54/16621. Copyright: Ministerio de Cultura 
URL: 
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5 Ibid. 
6 Personal interview with Carlos María Bru Purón, participant in the Fourth Congress of the Euro-
pean Movement, held in Munich in 1962; former member of the European Parliament and current 
President of the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement (CFEME), conducted on the 
13
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Interviews Section in the CVCE’s digital library “European Navigator” (ENA) at www.ena.lu 
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sider that the role of Latin American scholars in Spain has a stronger influence in 
the trend towards the strengthening of the links between Spain and Europe than 
in demanding the uniting Europe’s attention on the sub-continent through the 
Spanish diplomatic filter. This trend corresponds, evidently, to the obvious dis-
tance of the incipient European institutions with the Spanish authoritarian regime 
and will be relatively reverted from the transition to democracy onwards. 
Alternatively, José María Gil-Robles y Gil-Delgado – former President 
of the European Parliament and current President of the Jean Monnet Foundation 
for Europe in Lausanne – recalls the Christian Democracy World Congress, 
which took place in Lima in 1964 and in which a European figure of the caliber 
of Leo Tindenmans had an active participation. Gil-Robles defines this moment 
as a period of great hope for Latin America, a moment in which “it seemed pos-
sible that Latin America could follow Europe’s path by forming communities 
like the Comunidad Andina, which could emulate Europe’s progressive unity, 
something that was an old vocation of the Christian Democratic Organization in 
Latin America”
8. He also states that, during this period, Tindemans was also a 
symbolic reference in Latin America, whose ideas constituted a model to follow 
for an eventual integration of the sub-continent
9. Hence, Latin America was also 
regarded, at this time as the experimental space for an extension of the integra-
tion dynamics taking part in the old continent. However, during that period it 
seemed that the regional integration feasibility study was being first tested in the 
metropolis and then encouraged in the sub-continent, which shows a reversal of 
former colonial patterns and aims at transforming regional integration into a 
source of independence and stability far from an overwhelming American con-
trol.  
 
Spain’s Self-Assumed Mediating Role between the European Communities 
and Latin America since the Transition to Democracy 
 
It is commonly assumed that Spain only became a kind of advocate for Latin 
America within the European Communities since accession; nonetheless, we 
should take into account that even before Spain’s accession, there was an already 
existing framework for economic, political and institutional relations between the 
European Communities and Latin America. However, this framework did not 
translate into a fruitful implementation of political and economic projects in the 
sub-continent or even in a European prioritization of the external relations with 
this world region. In this sense, we could argue that Spain’s accession did have 
an impact, at least at the apparent level of the attention towards this heterogene-
                                                 
8 Personal interview conducted with José Marìa Gil-Robles y Gil-Delgado – former President of the 
European Parliament and current President of the Jean Monnet Foundation for Europe in Lausanne 
– on the 9
th of March 2010. For the complete recording of the audiovisual interview, please, refer to 
the Interviews Section in the CVCE’s digital library “European Navigator” (ENA) at www.ena.lu 
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ous group of countries on behalf of the Communities. In any case, we continue to 
observe a lack of real content in this mediated relationship beyond theoretically 
positive declarations of intentions. If is it true that since accession negotiations, 
Spain tried to raise Latin-America’s status at the level of the former colonies of 
the founding member states, it was unfortunately not possible to formalize this 
intention other than in the annex declarations to the Accession Treaty (Muñiz de 
Urquiza 1989, 41).  
However, it is clear that the effort made by Spain, manifested especially 
when the accession negotiations took off during the transition to democracy, 
should be tempered by an evident self-interest in taking advantage of potential 
and even more privileged economic opportunities through an apparent incarna-
tion of a European common interest. Hence, in this case, the sought-after media-
tion is just an instrument for gaining closer access to a more fruitful exploitation 
of Latin American resources. In this sense, the Spanish Declaration before the 
CEE about Latin America, stated that “the Spanish Delegation considers that its 
accession to the European Communities should translate into an increase of the 
economic and commercial relations, as well as in the cooperation, at all levels, of 
the European Communities and Latin America. The Spanish Delegation under-
stands that this purpose should be formalized in the Accession Treaty and in a 
common Declaration of Intentions which expresses the will of the enlarged 
Community in the extension and strengthening of relations with Latin Ameri-
ca”
10. This document also refers to the “singularity of Spain’s relations with the 
peoples of Latin America, relations that Spain wishes to keep and consolidate in 
any possible extent. (…) The close ties between Spain and Latin America derive 
from profound links which, based on historical, cultural and linguistic reasons, 
relate the peoples of Spain and those of Latin America. These links have progres-
sively materialized in a more intense economic cooperation and investment rela-
tions. The Spanish government considers especially important the development 
of close contacts as a form of positive contribution to the relation between Latin 
America and the European Communities to the benefit of both parties. Already 
since the post-war period, the economic and commercial exchanges between 
Latin America and Spain transformed these countries into important providers of 
raw materials and agro-alimentary products for the Spanish market. After the 
opening of the Spanish market in the 1960s and 1970s, these trends were consol-
idated. This produced a remarkable diversification in the influx of foreign direct 
investment in Latin America, implemented by Spanish institutions and compa-
nies in these countries, which contributed to the development of the Latin Ameri-
can economies. On the other hand, the degree of development of Spanish indus-
                                                 
10Declaración española ante la CEE sobre Iberoamérica (23 de marzo de 1981). España. Ministe-
rio de Cultura. Archivo General de la Administración, caja 66/05143. Copyright: Ministerio de 
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try and technology, well-adapted to the needs of many Latin American econo-
mies, has made their markets increasingly receptive to Spanish products. As a 
result, we conclude the existence of traditional synergies which have established 
a growing interdependence between the economies of both sides, thus strengthen-
ing, at the same time their growth potentiality”
11.  
This closer approach represented a win-win situation for both parties un-
der the guise of something which can be seen again in the second part of the doc-
ument, where the Spanish Delegation maintains that “on the other hand, the fi-
nancial institutions of the European Communities should undertake an important 
financial and collaborative effort to the Spanish projects regarding cooperation 
for development in Latin America. At the same time, this would open a wide 
range of possibilities for the entry in these projects of the financial institutions of 
different member states which support direct investment in third countries. In this 
way, Community’s cooperation for development would enlarge its scope to pro-
jects of interest for Latin American economies”
12. In fact, the argument of the 
pre-eminence of Spanish cooperation for the promotion of Latin America has 
always been central to demonstrating the solidarity interest of Spain in Latin 
America, enhanced by the new possibilities related to its accession to the Euro-
pean Communities. But, as we could observe in the above declarations, this im-
proved access to funds and networks that Spain is enjoying is primarily oriented 
to the financial benefit that the new European dimension can offer to already 
existing Spanish development projects in the region. From a different perspec-
tive, this attitude was also used to conceal certain inner difficulties in Spain’s 
foreign policy towards Latin America by using the European Communities visit-
ing card as cover while not without renouncing its policy lines.  
In any case, it was not until 1987, with the so-called Cheysson Memo-
randum – based on the Conclusions of the Hague European Council of June 1987 
– that, due to the accession of Spain and Portugal, the European Communities 
formalized a compromise for the deepening and, somehow, a relative prioritiza-
tion of their relations with Latin America (Muñiz de Urquiza 1989, 42).During 
this period, the European Communities aimed particularly at reinforcing this 
relation through the encouragement of the formation of regional organizations in 
the sub-continent which could serve as equivalent interlocutors for the Communi-
ties. This support to regional integration organizations is, nevertheless, paradoxi-
cal, if we take into account that such organizations have been demanded to have 
a single voice in the international arena while, in the EU, such single voice seems 
an insurmountable endeavor, despite the good intentions of the current Lisbon 
Treaty and the creation of the post of High Representative. In fact, the heteroge-
neous character of the different Latin American countries makes especially diffi-
cult the consolidation of such regional organizations (despite the efforts of the 
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Pacto Andino, Mercosur, etc.), an effort that is not demanded to the ACP coun-
tries, which were, unlike Latin America, always a priority in the external rela-
tions of the European Communities due to their close ties with the European 
Communities founding member states as former colonies. It is surprising, in this 
sense, that the Communities justify their difficulties in the international dialogue 
with Latin America on the basis of the absence or laxity of such regional organi-
zations while, at the same time it is not offering the knowledge or the means to 
structure this dialogue and to help build or consolidate this type of regional or-
ganization. It is also remarkable that, even after Spain’s accession, the European 
Communities have continued with the scheme of offering nothing more than “no 
preferential relations” to Latin America, as they do with non-associated third 
countries. From this viewpoint, we could affirm that Spain’s self-assumed medi-
ating role in this context, even if clearly biased towards strategic and primarily 
national interests, had a positive impact in attracting a bit more attention, political 
compromise and financial opportunities to the region. In this sense, it results in a 
worthy operation also for Latin America, even if the benefits are to be evaluated 
in the long run and are featured by a sense of fragmentation in their frequency 
and extension. 
As soon as Spain became a member of the European Communities, two 
Spanish Commissioners, Abel Matutes and Manuel Marín took up office. Manuel 
Marín González – former Vice-President of the European Commission and cur-
rent President of the Iberdrola Foundation – has also been, during the 1990s, 
Commissioner for Cooperation and Development and thus explained that, “tradi-
tionally Asia and Latin America were marginal in the work structure of the EU 
cooperation policies. What the Spanish first did, in this sense, was to ask for a 
separation of both realities and budget lines, that is, we tried to give a differenti-
ated personality to Latin America”
13.  In fact, from 1995 onwards, a series of 
initiatives was launched, such as the Summit for the Strategic Association be-
tween the European Union and Latin America illustrating, in Marín’s words, the 
doctrine of “open regionalism, following that situation we had during three or 
four years in which we thought that the world had really changed: information 
society, a situation of economic expansion…and then Latin America started to 
position itself as an emergent continent. In this context, we launched several ini-
tiatives, some successful ones, like the Treaty of Free Trade with Mexico and the 
Agreement with Chile and then the Agreement with Mercosur, but this could not 
work due to the fundamental differences between Argentina and Brazil. And we 
also gave a lot of impulse to cooperation politics but we could not do more...”
14. 
Regarding the issue of regional integration in Latin America, Marín indicates that 
                                                 
13 Personal interview with Manuel Marín González, former Vice-President of the European Com-
mission and current President of the Iberdrola Foundation, conducted on the 13
th of April 2010. For 
the complete recording of the audiovisual interview, please, refer to the Interviews Section in the 
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it is necessary to take into account that there are several “Latin Americas”, which 
should be integrated by regional spaces, implementing the aforementioned doc-
trine of “open regionalism”, according to which, regional spaces should be de-
limitated across the world to facilitate cooperation by emulating the image of the 
European Union. In that way, the schemed to be followed was, according to the 
EU “an open and participative regionalism, favorable to free trade, free circula-
tion of persons and goods, of the information society, etc. that could fundament 
the generation of multilateral agreements which could contribute to more stability 
on a global level”
15. But this scheme could not work because “Mercosur stopped 
working at the institutional level, because the Asunción Treaty was not applied 
and because they created the Law Court (…) but its decisions were delegated to 
the OMC (particularly a panel of the OMC in Geneva), that is, a negotiation ex-
ternal to this regional integration process which was given the role to decide on 
setting controversies within Mercosur. And that was equivalent to recognizing 
that your customs union could not work, because, by definition, your customs 
union does not need an external mediation but one coming from your own insti-
tution. From that moment onwards, MERCOSUR started to be not really man-
aged by its Commercial Commission but by the interests of four national admin-
istrations”
16. In addition, concerning the Organization of American States (OAE), 
and focusing now on the fruits of this self-assumed Spanish mediation, Marín 
explains that some of the most successful actions in that sense were the demining 
operations in the post-wars of El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, despite 
many and very delicate negotiations between the EU and the OAE. 
In the case of this particular key actor in the process
17, we can observe a 
very interesting phenomenon constituted by the blurring and assimilation of 
Spanish and European positions towards Latin America by historical figures with 
successive decision-making power in both dimensions. In these cases, the given 
actors tend towards the convergence of interests between Spain and the EU and 
thus towards the formulation of a more coordinated approach with regards to this 
region, a tendency which is intensified from the 1990s onwards, even if we will 
observe some discontinuities in this itinerary . 
On the other hand, during his time as President of the European Parlia-
ment, José María Gil-Robles proposed a supranational method of integration in 
the sub-continent based on the integration of non-governmental organizations, as 
well as the establishment of a privileged partnership between the European Par-
liament and different national Parliaments in Latin America. When asked about 
these proposals, he affirmed that when they were launched “there was still a per-
spective for the successful development of Mercosur and the consolidation of the 
Comunidad Andina and it seemed also possible to develop a closer and more 
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integrated relationship with Central America. The idea was to have regional inte-
gration processes in different parts of Latin America with a view to advancing 
towards a total integration, but we had to start by these regional integrations. 
Nowadays, it seems that only the Comunidad Centroamericana is still solid and, 
in this sense, it will be possible to reach a special agreement between the EU and 
Central America but, in general, we must be conscious of the fact that we have 
all gone backwards concerning these regional integration projects”
18. 
Regarding the particular idea of a Spanish mediating role between the 
EU and Latin America, Gil-Robles has affirmed that “when Spain acceded to the 
European Communities, it was easier to talk more directly with Latin America 
and organize bilateral relations in a more credible manner, that is, Spain could 
forget the rhetoric of the empire and of the common language and the common 
culture and add, besides considerable economic contributions, an example of 
political transition and of incorporation to a supranational community which is 
exemplary for Latin America and that has given us very important possibilities of 
expansion, economically and culturally, in Latin America. In fact, for Spain – we 
are going to call things by its right name – this was one of the most successful 
businesses implied by incorporation into the EU. The problem is that this enter-
prise is tied to a complex network of interactions between a diversity of actors. 
And this is also related to the need, for Spain, to have clear its own project, that 
is, Spain cannot develop with Latin America a project that is different to the en-
semble of the EU, because then it would not have any weight. Spain has to situ-
ate herself within EU foreign policy guidelines where Spain has an influence in 
the determination of such guidelines regarding Latin America and, of course, the 
Spanish representatives have had a great influence in the European Parliament 
and the European Council of Ministers, but we have to act in a unitary way in 
accordance with EU guidelines”
19.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This need for consistency between EU and Spanish policy regarding Latin Amer-
ica corresponds both with a pragmatic viewpoint in which a double agenda is less 
effective and minimizes the impact in terms of image, real political cooperation, 
economic benefits and the cultural identity of Spain in the region. Thus, we could 
argue that the EU provides a context to foster a traditional Spanish diplomatic 
line based on real (and rather dynamic) cultural and linguistic exchanges, as well 
as on the phenomenon of Latin American migration in Spain, which serves as a 
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the European Parliament and current President of the Jean Monnet Foundation for Europe in Lau-
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recent source for impulse to these relations. In sum, Spain’s mediating role is an 
instrument for a deeper involvement in the EU’s foreign policy by claiming a 
special relationship; at the same time that it brings more funding, means and at-
tention to an already established priority that is slowly modifying the EU’s global 
role. In this sense, we could state that the EU’s progressive implication in Latin 
America, following a rationally coherent Spanish pragmatism – also related to its 
public international image – is changing even the way in which the EU is per-
ceived in the world, hopefully evolving from a development aid perspective to 
one based on mutual cooperation on more equal basis going beyond the vague-
ness of “summit diplomacy” and inner EU agenda hindrances, either from a 
deepening or widening perspective (Soriano 2008, 2). In this sense, we should 
also explore how not only Spain, but also Latin America, is being Europeanized 
in this process and how the EU is gaining an especially useful knowledge on 
regional relations, stabilization of democracies, further relations with the U.S., 
international communication and so on through its progressive prioritization of 
relations with Latin America, which actually lacked before. 
In order to conclude, we could allude to our initial question concerning 
the possible nature of Spain’s mediating role between the EU and Latin America 
as a “fraternity without substance”. Very much on the contrary, we find evidence 
which shows that Spain “gained weight within the EU by means of its capacity to 
approach it to Latin America” (Freres 2005, 1) and multiplied its cooperation for 
development resources without any special budget effort. On the other hand, also 
Latin America benefited from this pragmatic mediation in terms of its political 
rapprochement to the EU, the increase of economic and commercial projects 
coming from the EU, the intensification of EU’s development aid, as well as 
more concrete actions like the opening of a Latin American credit line at the Eu-
ropean Investment Bank, the inclusion of the Dominican Republic in the ACP 
group, the inclusion in the EU’s social cohesion plans (Plan Educación para 
Todos as part of the EU’s Fast Track Initiative) and the implementation of specif-
ic programs related to equal opportunities, strengthening of democratic govern-
ance, inclusion in environmental programs and support to indigenous populations 
(Freres 2005, 5). From a more general perspective, such trend has helped Latin 
America to become actively involved in European foreign policy priorities in an 
increasingly multi-polar world, which imply the projection of a particular model 
of development based on the hopeful principles of solidarity, equality, open 
competition, sustainability and participative democracy. We could, therefore, and 
rather paradoxically, define this mediating role as an initially pragmatic one-
sided objective progressively transformed into a multilateral benefit.  
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Abstract 
 
Spain and Portugal have usually shown high levels of support to the EU, the in-
tegration and the enlargement process. Their citizens have a good image of the 
EU and trust its institutions. This contribution will examine the connection be-
tween the attitude of citizens and political elites in these two member states dur-
ing the last twenty five years and their singular understanding of EU membership 
according to their own experience. The research outcome has been published in 
several books and scientific journals. 
 
Introduction 
 
Behind Spain’s and Portugal’s decision to apply for membership to the European 
Communities (EC) was the determination to overcome their authoritarian past 
once for all, consolidate their democratic system and modernize the country. This 
perspective was shared by an overwhelming majority of the political and eco-
nomic elites and the society. As the result of membership, both countries have 
enjoyed the most stable democratic period in their history, achieved social and 
economic prosperity, and successfully returned to world politics. All these have 
contributed to preserve public support to the integration process and EU institu-
tions and policies, with pro-European attitudes being dominant in both countries. 
However, the recent economic and financial crisis can put in jeopardy these de-
velopments.  
  Public support for a political community, organization or specific policy 
can stem both from its good performance and effectiveness to solve citizens’ 
problems and maximize their welfare, and from its capacity to promote collective 
values and comply with certain principles. Easton (1965; 1975) distinguished two 
dimensions in citizens’ support for a political system. The specific support re-
flects the way they value the performance of the political community, the regime 
or the public authorities, whereas the diffuse support shows the endorsement of 62                                                                                                   Piedrafita 
 
its values and principles, rather than the assessment of specific decisions or out-
comes. Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) applied a similar conceptualization of 
public support to the study of the European integration, distinguishing between 
the utilitarian dimension, based on some perceived and relatively concrete inter-
est, and the affective dimension, which shows a diffuse and perhaps emotional 
response to some of the vague ideals embodied in the notion of European unity 
(1970: 40).
1 
  Likewise, individuals and national governments in the EU can back or 
reject a decision or policy depending on its tangible consequences or following 
criteria of appropriateness. Following logic of the consequences, they would sup-
port the political action because of the expected net benefits. Following a logic of 
appropriateness, they would consider the roles and norms to be applied accord-
ing to a particular identity (March and Olsen 1998: 951). Drawing from this con-
ceptualization, in the support for EU enlargement we can also distinguish be-
tween an instrumental and an identitarian dimension. In the first case, support 
would derive from expectations to pursue specific goals and maximize particular 
interests. In the second case, support would respond to the will to promote the 
principles and values that justify the policy and to conform to collective expecta-
tions. 
  This chapter will examine the evolution of Spain’s and Portugal’s sup-
port to EU integration and enlargement during these twenty-five years of mem-
bership and analyze to which extent the underlying factors are interest- or identi-
ty-based. Is their support based on particular interests and perceived benefits? To 
which extent does it respond to their particular understanding of EU member-
ship? Section 1 will analyze the ‘European’ elements of the national identity of 
both countries, which share much in common. Section 2 will show the evolution 
and main features of Spain’s and Portugal’s support to the EU integration and 
institutions. Section 3 will explain why political elites and citizens in the Iberian 
member states tend to be pro-enlargement. The thesis of this chapter is that both 
countries, due to their past and present experience, share a similar understanding 
of EU membership in which lies much of their support to EU integration and 
enlargement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1Although the authors do not clearly establish any evident connection with the Eastonian modes of 
support, in the empirical literature the concepts of utilitarian and affective have come to be consid-
ered as synonymous with the Eastonian concepts of specific and diffuse and used in an inter-
changeable way (Chierici 2005, 4). Spain and Portugal’s Understanding                                                        63 
 
Spain and Portugal’s Understanding of EU Membership 
 
In order to examine practical applications of the collective identity, DiMaggio 
(1997: 275) distinguishes between the supra-individual and the individual di-
mensions. Whereas the former is the shared representation of the community, the 
second refers to the particular way in which each individual in a group interprets 
the collective identity, that is, the collective elements of the individual identities. 
Member states interpret in a different way EU collective identity according to 
their particular historic experience and cultural background. In the case of Spain 
and Portugal, the individual identities of both countries share some common ‘Eu-
ropean’ elements, which make that citizens and political elites approach the EU 
integration and enlargement in a characteristic way.  
  The first element in common is that both countries had a similar historic 
background and deemed accession to the European Communities (EC) as a polit-
ical goal to overcome their past and get a better future. After a short republican 
experience in the early 1930’s, right wing dictatorships were established in Por-
tugal and Spain. Both countries remained neutral in the World War II and were 
isolated from the regional integration dynamics thereafter, although Portugal was 
a founding member of NATO, OECD and the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA). Since 1970, Spain enjoyed a preferential tariff agreement with the ECC, 
and Portugal a free-trade agreement, since 1973. Only one year later, a bloodless 
left-wing military coup in Lisbon, known as the Carnation Revolution, ousted the 
authoritarian regime and a military-civilian provisional administration took the 
charge of leading the way to democracy. In 1975, General Franco died in Madrid 
and his successor, King Juan Carlos II, also opted to embark Spain on the path of 
reform. Immediately after the celebration of the first legislative elections in 1976 
in Portugal and in 1977 in Spain, the new elected governments submitted the 
membership applications to the European Communities. In both countries, ‘Eu-
rope’ was widely considered as the alternative to the totalitarian, impoverished 
and isolated political systems that both countries had for half a century. The de-
mocratization and modernization of the country, as well as the restitution of their 
role in world politics, was contingent on joining the EC. Therefore, it was a polit-
ical decision shared by most citizens and main political parties, who had not fully 
grasped the full economic consequences of the integration (Royo 2005: 4). Un-
doubtedly, the overwhelming will to join the EC and the subsequent need to meet 
the democratic criteria would contribute to fade reactionary claims in the years 
after.  
  On 19 May 1978, the European Commission delivered a favorable opin-
ion to start negotiations with Portugal, and on 29 November with Spain, which 
the Council endorsed some months later. For the EC, the decision to enlarge was 
also primarily political. Given its commitment to stability and democracy in the 
continent, the EC had the obligation to give a positive answer to Spain and Por-
tugal to acknowledge major changes that had taken place in these countries, avert 64                                                                                                   Piedrafita 
 
a setback in the reform process, and contribute to prosperity and stability in the 
Mediterranean border (Bassols 1995; Álvarez-Miranda 1996). Indeed, there were 
not few objections and fears. In comparison to previous rounds, Southern en-
largement posed some challenges due to the overrepresentation of the agriculture 
sector in the applicant countries, their low per capita income –which would in-
crease regional disparities within the Community-, and their still weak public 
administrations to adopt and apply an acquis which had been increasingly ex-
panded to policy areas such as agriculture, social and environmental policy 
(Nugent 2004).Additionally, several member states felt their economic interests 
were directly threatened by certain products from these countries, being of spe-
cial concern the weight of the Spanish economy.  
  Indeed, accession negotiations, starting on 17 October 1978 and 5 Febru-
ary 1979 respectively, turned long and difficult (Bassols 1995; Costa Pinto and 
Texeira 2002). Imports of Spanish and Portuguese agricultural products such as 
wine, fruit and vegetables and olive oil posed a serious competitive threat to 
French and Italian businesses, at the same time as the Community feared a major 
increase in spending under the common agricultural policy (CAP). There were 
also concerns about the textile sector in Portugal, the steel and coal industries and 
the big size of the fishing fleet in Spain, and the likely outflow of migrants to old 
member states after accession. The adoption of a Community-wide common 
organization of the markets in fruit and vegetables and olive oil, an agreement to 
control the wine production, long transitional periods in the sensitive areas, im-
port quotas and other measures, all paved the way for the signature of the acces-
sion treaties in Lisbon and Madrid on 12 June 1985. The Spanish political elites 
had the final impression after negotiations that accession was not the award to 
good performance in democratic terms, but a confusing story about political, 
economic and even electoral interests (Bassols 1995: 3). Portugal and Spain 
joined the European Communities on 1 January 1986, and the Single European 
Act (17 February 1986) set up the structural policy to help them to adapt their 
structures to cope with competition in the single market and to strengthen eco-
nomic and social cohesion in the enlarged Community.  
  The second element in common is that, after becoming full members, 
both countries would continue to deem Europe as the best channel to promote 
their national interests, so that further integration and the reinforcement of their 
role within the Community became central for their governments. They were 
especially concerned about improving their reputation as a ‘good member’ of the 
‘selected club’ they had just joined, and bringing their countries to the core of the 
organization. They were not only ‘peripheral on the map’, but also in economic 
and political terms. They wanted to demonstrate that they could fulfill their du-
ties as EU members up to expectations and adopted a very pro-European stance 
in all the matters (Piedrafita 2010; Schukkink and Niemann 2010). Belonging to 
the core of the organization and strongly supporting EU integration would also 
give these otherwise peripheral countries more credibility and potential in EU Spain and Portugal’s Understanding                                                        65 
 
negotiations. Moreover, the national interest would be better promoted from the 
EU (e.g. boosting relations with the former colonies and Mediterranean rim 
countries) or through further integration (e.g. achieving social and economic 
convergence or fighting terrorism).
2 The solution to the national problems con-
tinued to lie in ‘more-Europe’. The close connection of the EU with the political, 
social and economic developments in both countries made the pro-European 
discourse dominant in domestic politics, with whatsoever dissident voices being 
severely criticized and reprimanded. 
  Both countries were very supportive of the idea of a political and eco-
nomic union in the early 1990’s, joined the Schengen area in 1995, and pushed 
for the reinforcement of the EU foreign policy and the co-decision procedure in 
the 1996/1997 reform. For their governments then, it became top priority to meet 
the convergence criteria to access the third stage of the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) in 1999. Actually, Spain and Portugal managed to be among the 
eleven founding member states. Likewise, their governments were very support-
ive of the steps for further integration envisaged in the European Constitution and 
mostly endorsed by the Lisbon Treaty. According to a 2007 IntUne study, politi-
cal and economic elites in Portugal and Spain showed among the highest degree 
of attachment to the European Union.
3 Portugal ranked first in the percentage of 
political elites feeling attached or very attached to Europe (96%), whereas Spain 
ranked fifth with also a very high rate (91.5%). Economic elites in both countries 
showed the highest level of attachment to Europe after Poland, 95% and 92% 
respectively (Jerez-Mir and Vázquez 2009: 7). Elites’ support to increase EU 
supranational power in Spain was also higher than in any other member state. 
77.4% of the political elites and 69.1% of the economic elites agreed that the 
European Commission should become the government of the EU, and 92.5% and 
80% respectively believed that the powers of the European Parliament should be 
strengthened. In Portugal, these rates were high but slightly lower, whereas more 
respondents thought that member states should remain the main actors in EU 
policy-making (Jerez-Mir and Vázquez 2009: 25).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 See for instance Elorza (1997) and Royo and Manuel (2003). 
3The interviews were conducted in 2007 to members of the low chambers and presidents of corpo-
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Chart 1.- Political and economic elites’ preferences for power-sharing                   
 
 
 
 
 
Source: data from Jerez-Mir and Vázquez (2009)         
  The third element in common is that, with membership, Europe would 
become synonymous with solidarity and progress. Unfavorable accession terms 
were eventually removed and competitive disadvantages in the Single Market 
were balanced with increasing solidarity from the EU, which would contribute 
notably to the transformation of the socio-economic structures of both countries. 
Portugal and Spain were, together with Greece and Ireland, the main beneficiar-
ies of the structural and cohesion funds before the 2004 enlargement, and net 
recipients from EU budget.
4 This financial solidarity enabled both countries to 
improve their infrastructure and competitiveness, to achieve high rates of eco-
nomic growth and to increase their convergence with the EU per capita income 
(Chislett 2004).
5 Notwithstanding, the recent financial and economic crisis has 
jeopardized the positive results achieved so far, especially in Portugal, where the 
effects had been more modest and the crisis broke out much earlier.
6 As chart 2 
shows, from 1989 to 1993 Spain was the main beneficiary of EU financial inter-
vention in absolute terms, followed by Italy and Portugal, the latter ranking first 
when taking into account the gross domestic product of each country. Moreover, 
in the following financial period going from 1994 to 1999, Spain more than dou-
                                                 
4Structural policy was reinforced by the Treaty of Maastricht, which also created the cohesion 
funds to, in principle, help Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland to meet the convergence criteria for 
the EMU. 
5 Both countries reached historic highs in the IMD international competitiveness index in 2000, 
ranking 25 and 28 respectively. However, in the 2010 IMD index Spain ranked 36 and Portugal 37. 
6 Whereas the Portuguese economy started to slow down in 2001, Spain would not start noticing 
the crisis until 2007. 
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bled its receipts in both relative and absolute terms, and Portugal also increased 
its allocation, remaining the member state getting more funds as share of total 
GDP. In chart 3, we can observe how EU funds to Spain started to fall as from 
2004 as the result of both enlargement and a good economic performance, 
whereas in Portugal they remained at pre-enlargement levels. 
Chart 2.- EU structural intervention  
 ECU millions (national average)                                    % GDP 
 
 
 
Source: data from First Report from the Commission on Economic and Social Cohesion, 
Table 24.
7 
Chart 3. -Operating budgetary balance: expenditures  
 ECU/EUR millions                                                        % GDP 
 
 
 
 Source: data from EU Budget Financial Report, 2006 and 2008.
8 
  
                                                 
7European Commission, ‘First Report from the Commission on Economic and Social Cohesion’, 
COM (96) 542 final/2, 08.4.1997 
8European Commission, EU Budget 2006 Financial Report. Luxembourg: Office for Official Pub-
lications of the European Communities, 2007. European Commission, EU Budget 2008 Financial 
Report Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009. 
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Life conditions have improved in both countries during their twenty-five years of 
membership in the EU; however, socio-economic progress has been more sub-
stantial in Spain. For instance, in the Human Development Index, which consists 
of three indicators related to health, education and living standards respectively, 
Spain has moved from 0.704 in 1985 to 0.863 in 2010, coming up to the 20 posi-
tion in the world ranking, whereas Portugal has improved from 0.657 in 1985 to 
0.795 in 2010, moving up to the 40 place.
9 Indeed, citizens’ satisfaction with the 
life they lead has improved steadily in Spain reaching the EU average, whereas in 
Portugal it has decreased for the last fifteen years.  
Chart 4.- Citizens’ satisfaction with life they lead (net values)
10 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: data from Eurobarometers 
 
Strong Support for EU Integration 
 
Whereas some authors have stressed the importance of historical and socio-
political factors to explain extensive public support to the EU in some member 
states (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993), others have associated it with the percep-
tion of individual and collective economic benefits (Anderson and Reichert 
1995). The case of Spain and Portugal shows in which ways both types of factors 
are important.The success of their democratic transitions, the modernization of 
                                                 
9In the HDI, the indicator Health is measured as life expectancy at birth, Education as mean years 
of schooling and expected years of schooling, and Living standards as the GNI per capita. Yearly 
data can be found at the website of the United Nations Development Programme 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ 
10 Satisfaction with life has been calculated as the difference between the rate of citizens that feel 
fairly or very satisfied with the life they lead and the rate of respondents that say to feel fairly or 
very unsatisfied. 
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their countries, the economic development and the restoration of their interna-
tional role all have been traditionally associated to EU membership by Spanish 
and Portuguese political elites, which together with their clearly pro-European 
discourse and attitudes have contributed to preserve the strong support the EU 
already enjoyed among their citizens. However, to which extent does this support 
respond to interest- or identity-based factors? Did both countries experience a 
similar evolution? Is the economic crisis having the same impact in both? 
  Support for EU integration can respond to some perceived and relatively 
concrete interest (utilitarian) or to the endorsement of the values and principles 
in which it is founded (affective). Although different scholars have measured in a 
different way utilitarian (specific) and affective (general) support to the EU, for 
the purpose of this study utilitarian support will be operationalized as the per-
centage of respondents in the Eurobarometer surveys from 1986 to 2011 that 
think that their country has benefited from membership to the EU (Single Mar-
ket, etc.), whereas affective (diffuse) support will be measured as the percentage 
of respondents that think that this membership is, generally speaking, a good 
thing. Two general remarks can be made regarding the overall evolution of both 
indicators in the EU. Before the elaboration and ratification of the Treaty of 
Maastricht, the level of affective support to the EU in member states reached as 
average values over 60%, with the level of utilitarian support remaining below. 
The economic crisis and the debate about the democratic deficit in the EU 
brought both rates to decline in the years after. In June 1995, only 38% of citi-
zens (33% in Spain and 35% in Portugal) felt fairly or very satisfied about the 
democratic functioning of the EU, whereas 48% felt unsatisfied (55% in Spain 
and 46% in Portugal).
11 After 1996, the level of affective support stabilized be-
tween 50-55%, being progressively surpassed by the level of utilitarian support. 
This trend could speak for the change from a permissive consensus to a con-
straining dissensus in EU policy making (Closa and Piedrafita 2011; Hooghe and 
Marks 2008). Some of these features can also be observed in the evolution of the 
indicators in Spain and Portugal, though with some peculiarities.  
 
 
 
                                                 
11Data from Eurobarometer 42, Spring 1995. In 2000, 56% of EU citizens felt satisfied (75% in 
Spain and 50% in Portugal) whereas only 38% felt unsatisfied (23% in Spain and 45% in Portugal). 
In 2009, 54% felt satisfied (59% in Spain and 48% in Portugal), and 32% felt unsatisfied (30% in 
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Chart 5. - Spain and Portugal’s support to the European Union 
 
 
 
 
Source: data from Eurobarometers 
  In the years after accession, Spain’s affective support was above 60% 
and close to the EU average, although the utilitarian support was extremely low, 
with less than 20% of Spaniards perceiving the benefits from their country’s 
membership to the EC. Initial support was thus basically affective, a diffuse and 
emotional reaction to the values that Europe represented, rather than utilitarian; 
membership was valued for political reasons rather than for specific economic 
benefits (Barbé 1999: 20). Support in Spain plummeted, with the EU average, as 
from 1991. Social discontent after the Treaty of Maastricht was further aggravat-
ed in this country by a severe economic crisis with high unemployment rates, 
increasing commercial deficits with the EC coinciding with long transitional 
periods still in force, and tensions in domestic politics due to some corruption 
cases. After 1997, support to the EU soared, and as from 1999, coinciding with 
an impressive economic development and the implementation of the EMU, the 
utilitarian support started to reach similar values to the affective support. In May 
2007, more than 70% of the respondents believed that Spain had benefited from 
being a member of the EU and that, generally speaking, membership was a good 
thing. The recent economic crisis and growing tensions in domestic politics had 
an impact on both indicators, which went below 60%. However, they still remain 
above EU average, which together with the significance of the affective dimen-
sion in Spain’s support to the EU integration, lead one to think that this might be 
a slight temporary downturn. Indeed, support for the EMU and the Euro was still 
above 60% in 2010, and the level of European identification remained high, as it 
is explained below.  
  In Portugal, right after the accession negotiations only 37% of the citi-
zens believed that their country had benefited from being a member of the EC. 
However, this trend was reversed immediately, with the utilitarian support peak-
ing up to 82% in the early 1990’s. During the next ten years, the utilitarian sup-
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port in Portugal was around 20 percentage points higher than the EU average, 
and even exceeded the level of affective support in that country, which in any 
case reached values similar to those in Spain. The economic slowdown initiated 
in 2002 was a turning point in this trend, and both rates started to decline with 
ups and downs.  In 2010, only 54% of the Portuguese citizens thought their coun-
try had benefited from being a member of the EU and just 43% believed mem-
bership was a good thing in general (even below 57% and 49% EU average). 
Therefore, the impact of the economic crisis on the level of support to the EU has 
been higher than in Spain, probably because the utilitarian dimension is more 
significant in Portugal. This can respond to the fact that the national identity is 
more prominent in this country (as also noted in the analysis of the attitudes of 
the political and economic elites in the previous section). Whereas in Spain, peo-
ple that see themselves as both Spanish and European in the near future clearly 
outnumber those that only see themselves as Spanish (especially as from 1998), 
the number of citizens that see themselves as only Portuguese has traditionally 
outnumbered those that see themselves as both Portuguese and European (alt-
hough this tendency is changing recently). 
 
Chart 6.- European identification
12 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: data from Eurobarometers 
  Traditionally, Portugal’s and especially Spain’s support for the Euro had 
been very high. Even before implementation of the third stage of the EMU 
(1999), Spanish citizens that were ‘very much for’ or ‘somehow for’ a common 
                                                 
12 The level of European identification has been operationalized as the difference between the 
percentage of citizens that see themselves as ‘national’ and European at the same time, and those 
that only see themselves as ‘national’. 
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European currency outnumbered those ‘somehow against’ and ‘very much 
against’ in 42 percentage points, 27 in Portugal and 16 in the EU (chart 7).  This 
shows the strength of pro-integration perspectives in both countries, especially in 
Spain. From 2001 to 2003, support for the EMU and the Euro outnumbered re-
jection in 49 percentage points in Spain, 39 in Portugal and 29 in the EU, which 
reflected the perception of the actual benefits by the citizens. The recent financial 
and economic crisis has had a negative impact on public endorsement of the 
EMU, especially in Portugal. Nevertheless, according to the last Eurobarometer, 
83% of the Spanish and 72% of the Portuguese citizens believe that the EU 
should take a stronger role in the regulation of the financial markets, and most of 
respondents in these countries consider the EU the best able to take effective 
actions against the effects of the financial and economic crisis (EB-74, autumn 
2010).  
Chart 7.- Net support for the EMU and the Euro
13 
 
 
 
 
Source: data from Eurobarometers 
  It seems logical that Portuguese and Spanish citizens’ support for the 
EMU declined after the delicate situation they had to go through facing bail-outs 
and aggressive deficit cuts that were directly associated with belonging to the 
Eurozone. However, the negative effect of the crisis might be going beyond. In 
recent years, citizens’ trust in the EU and its institutions, which had traditionally 
                                                 
13Net support for each year has been calculated as the difference between the percentage of re-
spondents ‘very much for’ or ‘somehow for’ a common European currency and those ‘somehow 
against’ and ‘very much against’ for the years before 1999, and as the difference between the per-
centage of respondents ‘for’ and those ‘against’ the European Monetary Union with one single 
currency for the years after. Net support for each period corresponds to the mean of the values for 
those years. 
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been well above EU average and even about their trust in their own national insti-
tutions, has plummeted (together with trust in their national governments). In 
2010, it reached a historic low in both countries, with only 43% of Spanish and 
45% of the Portuguese citizens (42% EU average) tending to trust the EU.
14 Oth-
er indicators of pro-integrationist attitudes have also suffered in recent years. For 
instance, public preferences for a stronger European Parliament and the so-called 
Eurodynamometer, which had been traditionally high in both countries, have 
declined considerably.
15 Although it is still early to confirm whether this trend is 
going to persist, it should not go unnoticed.  
Chart 8.- Trust in the EU, the national parliament and government.  
 
 
 
 
Source: data from Eurobarometers 
  Spain and Portugal share a similar understanding of EU membership in 
which lies much of their support to EU integration. Identification of EU member-
ship with the break with the past, democracy, modernization, prosperity and soli-
darity, together with the prominence of pro-European attitudes in domestic poli-
cies, fuelled a strong support for the EU integration over the time in both coun-
tries. The affective dimension of this support has been traditionally significant, 
although in Portugal it has plummeted in recent years. The utilitarian dimension 
was from the beginning quite relevant in Portugal, whereas in Spain gained sig-
nificance as from 1996. In Spain, there is a higher identification with Europe, 
while the national sentiment is more patent in Portugal, which might explain 
                                                 
14 Specific trust in the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Minis-
ters also declined in 2010 in both countries. 
15The Eurodynamometer reflects citizens’ preferences regarding the speed of the integration pro-
cess. 
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stronger support for the Euro and the Constitution in the former.
16 Nevertheless, 
indicators about pro-integrationist attitudes have been generally high in both 
countries, also trust in the EU and its institutions.
17 However, in the wake of the 
recent economic crisis both support and trust have declined, especially in Portu-
gal.  
Support for Enlargement despite the Costs 
It is not only as the result of ‘deepening’ but also ‘widening’ that the EU under-
goes substantial changes and constructs itself. Member states (and the EU as a 
whole) might endorse the accession of a third country for the net benefits that it 
can bring about and/or because it is to promote certain values or principles. Like 
further integration, enlargement enjoys wide support among citizens and political 
elites in Portugal and Spain, which is closely connected to their particular under-
standing of EU membership. To which extent does this support respond to inter-
est- or identity-based factors? Did Spain and Portugal take a similar stance in 
Eastern enlargement? Can we observe similar attitudes regarding future enlarge-
ments? 
  We can distinguish between the instrumental and the identitarian dimen-
sion in support for EU enlargement. In the first case, support derives from expec-
tations to pursue specific goals and maximize particular interests. In the second, 
it stems from conformity with the principles and values that justify the policy 
according to one’s identity and/or from the will to conform to collective expecta-
tions. Some authors have explained the position of member states in Eastern en-
largement on the basis of their economic and geopolitical interests (Moravcsik 
and Vachudova 2003; Schimmelfennig 2003), whereas other have underlined the 
role played by common identities, collective values and norms (Piedrafita 2006, 
Riddervold and Sjursen 2006, Zavorowski 2006). The fact is that the open char-
acter of the EU project, its foundational principle to bring closer the peoples of 
Europe, its commitment with peace and democracy in the continent, and the his-
toric responsibility towards the Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs), all contributed to push enlargement ahead even though the costs and 
challenges could exceed the benefits (Sedelmeier 2005; O’Brennan 2006).  
  Spain and Portugal were two peripheral states that would not benefit 
much from enlargement but that, nevertheless, supported the process. In this sup-
port, the identitarian dimension was more significant than the instrumental di-
mension. Neither Portugal nor Spain would extensively benefit from trade crea-
tion with the CEECs as the result of enlargement, since they barely had relations 
                                                 
16 Support for the Constitution was 72% in Spain and 61% in Portugal, according to the Euroba-
rometer 62 (Autumn 2004). 
17Spain has stood out in support for the Euro, a EU government or a Constitution for Europe, 
whereas Portugal has ranked higher in other indicators such as the Eurodynamometer or the prefer-
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with these countries and were located quite far away. Moreover, they risked trade 
diversion effects, that is, their exports to EU markets could be replaced by prod-
ucts coming from the new member states due to their comparative advantages. 
These also would attract direct foreign investment previously arriving to the Ibe-
rian countries, and which had been essential to finance their economic develop-
ment (Martín et al 2002; Turión and Velázquez 2004; Crespo et al 2004). The 
other financing source, the EU funds, was also at stake. The new member states 
would become the main beneficiaries of the structural and cohesion funds, with 
especially Spain reducing its receipts and probably becoming a net contributor 
(Martín and Sanz 2003; Sanz 2005). On top of that, the Iberian member states 
feared to become more peripheral in a Union whose core was moving to the 
Northeast, and to lose their capacity to promote EU external action on Latin 
America and the Mediterranean rim countries. 
  Nevertheless, Portugal and Spain supported Eastern enlargement for the 
principles and values in which the policy was justified, which had a special reso-
nance in these two countries due to their particular experience and understanding 
of EU membership. Europe represented for the Iberian countries the exit gate 
from their authoritarian past and the key to consolidate their new democracies; 
now they could not deny the same right to the CEECs. Membership had exten-
sively contributed to the economic modernization and development of both coun-
tries; now, they could not deprive the CEECs from receiving that solidarity. Both 
the Portuguese and the Spanish governments had joined the EC with the clear 
purpose to bring their countries to the core of the organization displaying a very 
pro-European discourse; now, they could not oppose such a fundamental project 
about what the European Union was and would become (Piedrafita 2010; Schuk-
kink and Niemann 2010).
18  ‘The Spanish government wanted to show its pro-
Europeanism, not only because we were newcomers and had to gain credibility, 
but also because we were true Europhile. We always considered Europe as the 
solution to our national problems, and we could not deny the same perspective to 
the Central and Eastern European countries.’
19 ‘EU member states felt guilty for 
the recent past of the Central and Eastern European countries, for abandoning 
them, and responsible for their future. We had to avoid another Yalta and en-
largement seemed to be the best solution. It was a historic decision that Spain 
could not oppose because we had benefited extraordinarily from Europe to con-
solidate our prosperity and our future, we were the newcomers, and we were 
constantly showing off our pro-Europeanism.’
20‘In general, Spain could not op-
pose any enlargement. We were the new member of a ‘selected club’. Now, that 
there were others knocking at the door, we could not keep it closed. As newcom-
                                                 
18 For the interviews with the Portuguese policy-makers sustaining this argument, see the work of 
Schukkink and Niemann (2010). 
19Leading Spanish Socialist MEP, interview with author, 29 November 2005. 
20High-level diplomat in Spain’s Secretariat of State for the European Union and the Spanish 
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ers, we were very concerned about the image that the other partners had about us. 
We had to gain credibility and demonstrate we were a good partner, and we were 
very pro-European.  In the particular case of Eastern enlargement, there was a 
strong impact of our historical memory, our own experience, the great empathy 
we felt towards those countries.’
21 ‘We had to support these countries. We had 
suffered the same in our own skin! We would have never denied them the soli-
darity that we had received.’
22 
  However, this support was not that straightforward from the beginning. 
During the negotiations of the association agreements with the CEECs (1990-
1991), both the Portuguese and the Spanish governments objected the inclusion 
of a membership clause in the treaties. They believed it was still too early and 
risky to speculate about the scope of the political events taking place in the 
CEECs, and they contended it was essential to ‘deepen’ the Community before 
any ‘widening’. However, the risk of a setback in the reform process and grow-
ing conflict in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, on the one hand, and the 
ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht and the launch of enlargement talks with 
the EFTA countries on the other, began to put into question the appropriateness 
of staving off a clear endorsement of Eastern enlargement (Piedrafita 2010). It 
was in the 1993 Copenhagen European Council that the Twelve finally gave their 
welcome to those associated countries willing to join the EU provided that they 
met some economic and political criteria.  
  The initial objections about the timing led some argue that the Spanish 
and Portuguese government had to accept the agreement because they were ‘rhe-
torically trapped’ (Schimmelfennig 2003). However, interviews with the main 
policy-makers have confirmed that, if before they felt to have legitimate claims 
to postpone the agreement, in the new context they did not. After enlarging to the 
‘rich countries’ and concluding the ‘deepening’ process, and in view of the social 
unrest in Eastern Europe, the decision could not be delayed any longer. Indeed, 
the Portuguese and the Spanish governments continued legitimizing the decision 
afterwards in Identitarianterms. Eastern enlargement was about reconciling Eu-
rope, the great reunification, the key for security and stability in the whole conti-
nent. It was a moral and historical challenge rather than economic or financial 
(Piedrafita 2006; Schukkink and Niemann 2010).  Moreover, the Iberian gov-
ernments facilitated the 1997 Luxembourg European Council agreement to start 
the negotiations with a group of candidates, favored the later inclusion of the 
other applicants, and contributed to the progress of the accession negotiations 
with a cooperative attitude during the talks and in particular with their two presi-
dencies of the Council (Piedrafita 2010; Schukkink and Niemann 2010). This all 
                                                 
21High-level diplomat in Spain’s Secretariat of State for the European Union, interview with author, 
19 May 2006 
22Top Official at the Secretariat of State for the European Union, interview with author, 5 April 
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speak for the significance of the identitarian dimension on Spain’s and Portugal’s 
support for enlargement. Nevertheless, there was also an instrumental dimension 
in both governments’ strategy to take advantage of the situation to advance their 
priorities in other policy areas and to achieve their goals for the necessary institu-
tional reform and the future of the structural policy.
23 
  Despite the instrumentality perceived during the negotiations, the identi-
tarian dimension of support to enlargement prevails. Actually, in the case of Tur-
key, where the expected costs are especially high and there is not a favorable 
political climate which could bring pressure on reluctant member states, both the 
Spanish and the Portuguese governments have consistently shown their support 
for the enlargement. According to the above mentioned IntUne study, Portugal 
and Spain are among the member states with the lowest percentage of the politi-
cal elites (25.3% and 23.7% respectively) thinking that Turkey might constitute a 
threat for the cohesion of the EU (Jerez-Mir and Vázquez 2009: 19). Concern is 
naturally higher among economic elites, but still lower than in most other mem-
ber states. Political and economic elites in both countries think that enlargement 
to include other applicant countries would neither be a threat to EU cohesion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 During the 1990’s, EU relations with Latin America and Mediterranean rim countries were sub-
stantially strengthened. In negotiations of the Treaty of Nice, the Spanish government refused to 
accept any agreement that would not give a Spain an increase of the votes in the Council higher 
than any increase for the other large member states; whereas the Portuguese government was 
against measures to correct increasing overrepresentation of the smaller member states. Additional-
ly, both countries (together with Greece) accepted that cohesion policy be switched to qualified-
majority voting only after the adoption of the multi-annual financial perspectives applicable as 
from 1 January 2007.  In the framework of the accession negotiations during the 2001 Swedish 
Presidency, the Spanish government also tried to force a commitment to consider the impact of the 
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Table 1 - Perception of enlargement as a threat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Jerez-Mir and Vázquez (2009, 19) 
  Likewise, the pro-enlargement attitude is dominant among the general 
public. Even during the negotiations themselves, with the public debate rife with 
heated discussions for the loss of structural funds, the Spanish citizens ‘for’ the 
EU to include new members outnumbered those ‘against’ in 43 percentage 
points, 27 in Portugal. Net support for the accession of Croatia is also high, espe-
cially in Spain (chart 9). In the case of Turkey and Albania, while Europeans ‘not 
in favor’ clearly ‘outnumber those ‘in favor’, both in Portugal and Spain net sup-
port is positive. In April 2008, 55% of Europeans were not in favor of enlarge-
ment to Turkey, whereas in Spain the majority (48%) was in favor, 42% in Por-
tugal. This is another indicator of the significance of the identitarian dimension in 
support for enlargement, especially in Spain. As a matter of fact, Portuguese and 
Spanish citizens tend to play down the costs of enlargement more than EU aver-
age (chart 10). An overwhelming majority also agrees that the more countries are 
in the EU, the more peace and security will be guaranteed in Europe. Finally, 
whereas most Europeans do not think that the EU should help financially the 
applicants, in Spain and especially in Portugal most of the respondents tend to 
agree. 
 
 
Political elites Economic elites Political elites Economic elites
Great Britain 14,30% 38,10% 6,10% 14,30%
Italy 18,30% 38,10% 22,10% 43,90%
Spain 23,70% 35,20% 13,00% 25,90%
Portugal  25,30% 40,00% 19,00% 35,10%
Czech Republic 33,80% 47,60% 15,60% 31,70%
Germany 34,20% 51,20% 36,80% 42,90%
Lithuania  46,80% 65,00% 23,10% 23,10%
Poland 46,80% 34,10% 12,00% 12,20%
Bulgaria 47,40% 62,50% 27,30% 26,20%
Denmark 49,20% 61,50% 38,50% 38,20%
Austria 49,40% 42,40% 30,30% 12,10%
Slovakia 57,50% 55,00% 12,80% 10,00%
Estonia 57,70% 51,30% 29,00% 33,30%
Hungary 58,20% 68,30% 32,40% 31,40%
France 58,40% 61,00% 57,40% 69,80%
Belgium 63,80% 50,00% 60,80% 50,00%
Enlargement                     
to include Turkey                 
is a threat
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Chart 9 - Net support for EU enlargement
24 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometers 
Chart 10 - Approach to enlargement 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24For 2001-2004, net support for each year has been calculated as the difference between the per-
centage of respondents that are ‘for’ and those ‘against’ the EU enlarging to include new members; 
the chart shows the mean for May 2001, November 2001, January 2003, November 2003 and April 
2004.For Turkey, Croatia and Albania, annual net support has been calculated as the difference 
between the percentage of those in ‘favor of enlargement’ to each country and those ‘not in favor’ 
in January 1996, November 1999, November 2001, June 2005 and April 2008; the chart shows the 
mean. 
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Source: data from Eurobarometer May 2002. 
Conclusion 
 
Strong public support for EU enlargement in Portugal and especially in Spain is 
explained to a great extent on the basis of their own experience and their 
particular understanding of EU membership rather than on specific interests. The 
identitarian dimension of support for enlargement is also very significant among 
the polical elites. The Iberian governments supported Eastern enlargement 
despite the costs because of their understanding of Europe as a guarantor of 
stability and democracy, the similarities with their own experience, and their will 
to demonstrate their pro-Europeanism. Governments in both countries have also 
shown their support to the enlargement to Turkey. 
  Likewise, Portugal’s and Spain’s understanding of EU membership as 
the key to break with their past, consolidate their democracies, modernise the 
country, increase prosperity and regain their role in world politics, has 
contributed to maintain a high level of support and trust in the EU among their 
citizens and nurtured very pro-European attitudes during these twenty-five years 
of membership. However, the recent economic and financial crisis is changing 
this picture and might spark a change of the way they understand their 
membership to the EU. The effect is clearer in Portugal, where a weaker 
European identification and a stronger utilitarian dimension of support to the EU 
combine with a more limited socio-economic progress in previous years and a 
more relevant impact of the crisis in recent times. 
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I. Preface 
 
The construction of Europe began with the building of a common market. Then, 
it expanded its objectives in order to address the new problems arising from its 
own success. Fifty years later, a worrying imbalance can be observed. Economic 
integration has gone so far as to achieve the merging of national currencies and 
the holding of a simple passport, while the integration of Europe’s peoples and 
citizens is still in its infancy. 
A unified Europe needs a unified law. From the beginning of the EC/EU 
there has been an intense debate whether the EU should remain a large market or 
should become something much more intense. In the second case, the EU needs 
to have a single territory, a single currency and passport, an internal market with-
out borders and also a single law. St. Matthew (Matthew, 12, 25) said that “no 
kingdom can be at war with itself without being laid waste; no city or household 
that is at war with itself can stand him”. 
To have and apply a single law: As the European Commission’s Strategic Objec-
tives declared:  
Failure to apply European legislation on the ground damages the effec-
tiveness of Union policy and undermines the trust on which the Union depends. 
The perception that “we stick to the rules but other don’t”, wherever it occurs, is 
deeply damaging to a sense of European solidarity ... Prompt and adequate trans-
position and vigorous pursuit of infringements are critical to the credibility of 
European legislation and the effectiveness of policies. (Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, 2005: 5). 
 
II. An Overview on Community Law 
 
Community law is the law enacted by the EU institutions, which is integrated in 
the legal systems of the Member States (MS) and is applied to the jurisdictional 
organs. Community law benefits from the fragrances of the laws of all European 
peoples and constitutes an insuperable instrument for the harmonization of the 88                                                                                                     Mullerat 
 
law in the world through the convergence of the two main legal systems of com-
mon law and civil law. 
 
III. The Acquis Communautaire 
 
The term acquis communautaire (Community acquired) refers to the total body of 
EU law created and accumulated in the EU thus far. All European countries that 
wish to apply for membership of the EU must justify that they have integrated the 
acquis communautaire within their legal system. That is why candidates general-
ly start introducing the necessary changes progressively as soon as they submit 
their membership application. During the process of the enlargement of the Eu-
ropean Union, the acquis was divided into 31 chapters for the purpose of negotia-
tion between the EU and the candidate MS for the fifth enlargement. 
 
 
IV. EU Sources of Law 
 
A. Primary or Origin Legislation 
 
a. Treaties 
The Treaties are considered to be the "constitution" of the European Union. They 
imposed binding obligations on the signatory states particularly with regard to 
the supremacy of the Treaties and enacted European Community legislation over 
national laws. The Treaties form part of the national law of each member state. 
 
i. Founding Treaties and Amending Treaties 
  European Coal and Steel Community, Paris 1951 
  European Economic Community, Rome 1957 
  European Atomic Energy Community, Rome 1957 
  Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission (Merger 
Treaty), Brussels 1965 
  Single European Act, Luxembourg 1986 
  Treaty on European Union, Maastricht 1992 
  Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997 
  Treaty of Lisbon, 2000, which entered into action a few days after its ap-
proval by the Czech Supreme Court. 
ii. Treaties of Accession 
  Treaties of adhesion Denmark, Ireland and UK, which entered into action 
1-1-1973. 
  Second enlargement: Greece, 1-1-81 
  Third enlargement: Spain and Portugal, 1-1-86 How Spain Implements EU Law                                                               89 
 
  Fourth enlargement: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus, 1-5-04. 
  Fifth enlargement: Romania and Bulgaria, 1-1-07. 
 
iii. Bilateral agreements 
  Agreements between the EC and the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group countries (ACP countries) (Lomé Conventions). 
  Other agreements between the EC and third countries, e.g. the Agree-
ment on the European Economic Area. 
 
b. Other documents 
  At the Agenda 2000, the Commission's detailed the strategy for strength-
ening growth, competitiveness and employment and widening the Euro-
pean Union in the early years of the 21st century. 
 
B. Secondary or Derivative Legislation 
 
  Major policy-making legislation issued by the Council itself or in con-
junction with the European Parliament begins with a Commission pro-
posal which is submitted to the Council. The European Parliament is 
consulted, as may be the Economic and Social Committee, and both in-
stitutions can issue opinions on the proposals. The Commission also is-
sues legislation in its own right to implement or regulate existing policies 
on the basis of authority given by the Treaties. 
 
The following are the main types of legislation: 
a. Regulations 
The regulations become directly part of the national law of the MS. They are 
binding and directly applicable (meaning that they do not have to be implement-
ed by any national legislation) to all member states. If there is a conflict between 
a regulation and an existing national law, the regulation prevails. Among the 
many examples, we can cite the Regulation 880/92 on Community eco-label 
award scheme and the Regulation 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, which 
were immediately applicable after their adoption. 
 
b. Directives 
The directives have to be implemented by national laws. They require that MS 
change their national laws within a stated period of time in order to give effect to 
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with each other and are particularly common in matters that affect the operation 
of single market (Puerta, 1999). A good example is the fourteen company law 
directives that intend to harmonize company law in the EU. There are also single-
objective directives, such as the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of October 24, 1995 on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
the Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 20, 
1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts, and many 
others. 
 
c. Decisions 
The decisions address a specific problem. They are not legislative instruments 
aimed at the general public, unlike the regulations, and are binging in their integ-
rity, unlike the directives. The decisions are binding upon those they are ad-
dressed. One example is the Decision of the European Parliament and Council 
for the 6th Environment Action Program, which obliges the EC to present strate-
gies within a given time and including certain elements. 
 
d. Other 
i. Decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
These are binding on the parties to whom they are addressed, whether MS or   
individuals. See, for example, Commission v Spain C-92/96, judgment of 1998-
02-12 (environment and consumers), and Interior v Commission, T-124/96 
judgment of 1998-02-06 (Law governing the institutions). See also the judgment 
of the ECJ in Case C-249/96 Lisa Jacqueline Grant v South-West Trains Ltd 
(discrimination based on sexual orientation is not covered by the equal pay rules 
of the Treaty), etc. 
 
ii. Recommendation and opinions 
These have no binding force, but merely state the view of the institution (such as 
the Commission) issuing them. For example, the opinion of the Advocate Gen-
eral Finely delivered on 5 February 1998 in C-170/96 Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities v Council of the European Union or Recommendation No. R 
(95) 13 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States concerning problems of 
criminal procedure law connected with information technology. 
As the EU is becoming larger and more integrated, the number of secondary leg-
islation is exponentially increasing. In 1970, we can count 46 regulations and 20 
directives; from 1998 to 2004, 18.167 regulations and 750 directives were re-
leased. In Germany, the Ministry of Justice said that between 1998 and 2004, 
84% of all next law originates in Brussels and only 16% in Berlin. 
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V. Implementation 
 
“The policy of European integration is in reality an exercise of war and peace in 
the 21st century.”- Helmut Kohl 
 
A. Transposition of Sources of Law 
 
a. Implementation of regulations 
As we saw, regulations need not to be transposed because they are immediately 
applicable to all citizens; directives need to be transposed. For example, Regula-
tion 1346/2000 CE on insolvency proceedings need not to be transposed and, 
therefore, when Spain approved the new Bankruptcy Law (Ley Concursal) 2003, 
it did not transpose the Regulation, only the new law included a few provisions in 
Title I and IX on international bankruptcies so that the Regulation would not find 
any obstacle for its full application in Spain (Trizo and Cambronero, 2003). 
 
b. Implementation of directives 
The first step towards implementation of directives is transposition (incorpora-
tion of the directive’s provision into national laws). Subsequent to transposition, 
national agencies need to become familiar with their monitoring and supervising 
tasks; the target groups of the policies, duly informed about their rights and obli-
gations, their behavior needs to be monitored and, in cases of non-compliance, 
sanctioned. The transposition of directives can only be implemented following 
their national transposition. The zeal for carrying out transposition varies with 
each MS. Traditionally, the best performer is probably the UK, which at some 
times has complied in 60% of all cases and the worst is Greece with 25.5%. 
Spain is at 47.1%. 
 
B. Steps for Transposition (Pacheco, 2008) 
 
a. Need to transpose 
There is a need to transpose the directive, totally or partially, unless the MS has 
the directive’s matter already developed in its internal system. Indeed, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (ECS) has declared that MS must not pass new legislation 
measures to develop directives in the case that national legislation already covers 
the objectives foreseen by the directive, but it requires guarantees that natural 
legislation effectively covers the directive’s contents. 
 
b. National implementing measures 
The authorities of a MS must issue the necessary national implementing 
measures, which vary from country to country, to incorporate the provisions in 
the directive into national law 
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The proper form to guarantee the useful effect of the directive depends on each 
MS legal system. The MS use different criteria in the process of transposition. 
The ECJ says that transposition cannot be done through a verbal or a circular 
instruction that can be easily changed. A correct transposition requires provisions 
precise, clear and transparent so that everybody can understand their rights and 
obligations. Transposition must be done totally and not through the referral to the 
directive itself; avoiding uncertainties or introducing alien legal categories which 
may complicate the execution; making express reference to the directive in the 
preamble; and containing a derogatory provision of all annulled provisions. 
The Spanish State Council (“Consejo de Estado”) resolved that the trans-
position norm must have the same rank as those which the matters of the trans-
posable directive currently have. The problem arises when such matters are sub-
mitted to the principle of reserve of law. Due to the length of the legislative pro-
cess, sometimes it is not possible to respect the transposition terms and the solu-
tion which has been found is the form of decree-law. If there is not such reserve 
of law, the form of regulation is normally used. The Commission has issued use-
ful recommendations in the form and good practices on transposition of direc-
tives. 
 
d. Procedures 
In countries with a centralized political structure, the transposition is simple. In 
countries, such as Spain with decentralized structures (autonomous communi-
ties), institutional autonomy operates accordant to the Constitution prescriptions. 
In Spain, although at the beginning there was a tendency to expand the compe-
tence of the state, since 1989 the interpretation is more in favor of the autono-
mous communities and therefore, if the matter of the directive to be transposed is 
a matter of autonomic competence, the transposition will generally correspond to 
the autonomous regions. 
 
e. Time period 
Directives must be incorporated to the MS systems in the periods established by 
each directive, regardless of their complexity. Currently, the time granted for 
transposition averages 37 months for new directives, and 30 for amending direc-
tives. The ECJ has hold that, if the MS does not timely transpose a directive, it 
infringes the EU Treaties and the Commission can open an infringement proce-
dure against the infractor. In Spain, in order to avoid delays, a Council of Minis-
ters resolution of July 1990 passed an instruction to accelerate the transposition 
procedures, giving them priority character and recommending the relevant organs 
to speed up. 
 
f. Facts that may speed/delay the transposition 
The performance with the transposition periods varies for a number of factors, 
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  from country to country 
  from different sectors with each country. It also depends on the interests 
of MS governments (the “voluntaristic approach”) 
  from the complexity of the directive; 
  from domestic reasons; 
  federalism (Germany, Spain) v. unitarism; 
  administrative efficiency; 
  inter-ministerial coordination; and 
  involvement of national parliament 
 
g. Notification 
Once the directive has been transposed, the MS must notify such transposition 
(the norms enacted) to the EU institutions and to the other MS. 
 
h. Direct effects 
Generally, the directive acquires direct effects when it is transposed into the na-
tional law. However, the directive may have direct effects, according to the ECJ 
(ECJ: Ratti), provided that the MS has not yet transposed the directive, that the 
directive defines subjective rights and that the rights are sufficiently determined 
and not subject to conditions. There is a vertical direct effect (limited to the rela-
tions between public powers) (ECJ: Ratti) and a horizontal direct effect (limited 
to the relations between individuals) (ECJ: Marshall) (Bulnes, 2006). 
 
C. Infringements 
 
a. Infringement of the transposition obligations 
There are four types of infringements for which the Commission can launch an 
infringement procedure: a) non-notification, b) non-transposition, c) late transpo-
sition, or d) wrong or incorrect transposition. 
 
b. Stages of the infringement procedure 
The following are the main steps of the infringement procedure. 
  complaints launched by citizens, ECOs, corporations; 
  the initiative of the Commission issues event; 
  non-communication of the transposition of directives by MS; 
  formal letter of notice (art. 226) transposition delay beyond 35 
weeks; 
  reasoned opinion (art. 226) (if no satisfactory reply, and after 
giving the MS the opportunity to submit observations, the EC 
may refer it to the ECJ); 
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  ECJ judgment (art. 226); 
  proceedings. Financial penalties (art. 228); 
 
c. The transposition deficit 
i. Time compliance 
The majority, but far from, all national transposition instruments are completed 
on time (Mastenbroek, 2003). Regarding time compliance, there are generally 
three main groups of outcome: the first group (50% of cases) represents their 
national instruments notifies on time; a second group of instruments (15% of 
cases) has delay of less than 6 months; and finally, a third group of national 
measures (35% of cases) are transposed more than 6 months late. The MS can be 
generally clustered into three groups with Sweden and the UK performing the 
best having a transposition delay of less than 2 months; Germany, France, Spain 
and Ireland performance range below 30 weeks delay; the Netherlands, Greece 
and Italy generally represent a group of their own performing worst with an aver-
age. There are a good number of periodical controls and studies on the state of 
transposition of directives issued by different directorates, general secretariats, 
etc. with regard to the sectors affected (internal market, public procurement, tax, 
etc.). 
There are also sectorial analyses. For instance, with regard to social di-
rectives, a study on Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain and UK showed 
that only in 42.7% of cases MS transposed in time, and that 17.5% exceeded the 
deadline by more than two years (Haverland, 2007). The transposition deficit 
target (the percentage of internal market legislation not yet introduced into na-
tional legislation by MS) was set by the European Council in 2001 in 1.5%. The 
Internal Market Scoreboard July 2007 issued by the European Commission 
showed that the transposition deficit which was 1.2% at the beginning of 2007 
had increased to 1.6%, which means that MS were relaxing their implementation 
efforts. According to the latest Internal Market Scoreboard of July 2008, for the 
third consecutive time, 1.0% of Internal Market Directives for which the imple-
mentation deadline has passed are not currently written into national law. This 
means that MS are again in line with the 1.0% target agreed by Heads of State, 
which was to be achieved by 2009 at the latest. In total, 18 Member States are 
either at or below the new target, while 13 MS achieved their best score so far. 
Overall Denmark and Malta are the best performers, and Greece and Poland are 
at bottom of the league. Among other nine MS, Spain reached the 1% target last 
time round have managed to reduce their deficits even further. 
According to the EC Secretariat General’s report on progress in notifica-
tion of national measures implementing all directives in force dated 5 September 
2009, among the directives whose deadline for implementation had passed by the 
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which measures of implementation have been notified 1633 out of an EC average 
of 1634 and a percentage of notification of 98.97% out of the average of 98.91%. 
 
ii. Compliance by sectors 
Environment, taxation and customs union, energy and transport and employment 
are the sectors that generally give raise to the maximum number of transposition 
infringements. Justice, health and consumer protection and information are the 
ones which give less. 
Most MS are doing well when it comes to transposing EU internal market direc-
tives on time, but appear to pay less attention to transporting and then applying 
those directives correctly. The number of infringement proceedings for incorrect 
transposing of application of directives has increased constantly. Every year, the 
Commission draws up an annual report on its monitoring of the application of 
community law in response to requests from the European Parliament and the 
MS. Four factors have been distinguished affecting the implementation of Euro-
pean policies at the national level: political institutions, the degree of coopera-
tion, citizen’s support for the EU and political culture in the MS (Lampinen and 
Uusikylä, 1998). 
 
d. Causes of delays in transposition 
The transposition of directives is a question of political will. However, as we 
have seen, delays of transposition are caused by combination of constitutional, 
legal, political and operational factors whose effect cannot be judged inde-
pendently. Legal factors improving the speed of transposition are the transposi-
tion of directives with delegated instruments, avoiding national “extras” when 
transporting directives and avoiding complications at the transposition stage by 
anticipating transposition issues during the negotiation stage of the directive. 
Political factors are: giving priority to transposition and activating the national 
parliament at the negotiation stage. Operational factors include clear-cut lines of 
administrative responsibilities to transposition, lack of administrative depart-
ments with the explicit task to specialize in transposition, and accurate and fre-
quent monitoring of progress. 
As it has been said, whatever the degree of misfit with the new EU 
norms and standards, the implementation of directives confronts two political 
systems. This conforms to a view of the EU as a federal phenomenon with two 
different levels of government (national and European). This multi-layer perspec-
tive suggests that the preference formation processes of the lower-level polity 
and the higher-level polity are clearly distinct and implies that in cases where a 
national government is unsuccessful in “uploading” its own preferences at the 
EU level as the template for the joint measure or standard, it will try to resist 
during the “downloading” process. Only in those cases where there is no national 
protest against a specific measure during EU-level decision-making, implementa-
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spective. Non-transposition could hence be considered a means to protest against 
being outvoted or otherwise “minoritized” in the EU’s policy process. 
 
VI. How Community Law is Transposed in Spain (Steunenberg and Vier-
mans, 2006) 
 
A. In general 
A recent report of the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs on the evaluation of 
compliance by Spain of the transposition of EU directives stated that, in line with 
the traditional behavior that is recorded in subsequent monitoring of transposition 
of directives, Spain continues to test a sustained effort to improve the transposi-
tion of directives.  With only two exceptions, since 2004 Spain belongs to the 
group of EU countries that meet the transposition targets set by the European 
Council. 
As previously stated, in the official scoreboard carried out by the Euro-
pean Commission in October 2007, Spain recorded a level of deficit of 1%, a 
figure that is below the then permitted maximum of 1.5%, and that it equals the 
future transposition deficit target set by the European Council for 2009. 
Spain has managed to improve its rates of transposition of internal market direc-
tives. Indeed, in the control that closed in May 2008, it would have further im-
proved such index, presents only a transposition deficit of 0.8 per 100, two tenths 
below the previous control result. 
 
B. Complaint and Condemnation 
In reality, Spain has had different periods between the first and the worst pupils 
in the class and recently with an acceptable current performance. Spain has 
transposed 98.5% of the EU directives in the internal market. Notwithstanding 
this, Spain has received a good number of complaints/letters of notice from the 
Commission for infringements in transposition of several directives in a variety 
of subjects, such as money laundering, information and consultation, financing, 
investment services, race equality, and some others. 
Spain has also been condemned by the ECJ for transposition or applica-
tion infringements in several matters such as in environmental law such as Direc-
tives 85/337 and 97/11 (since a Valencia project did not affect the environmental 
impact), Directive 2001 on copyright, directives on security in work, etc. The 
Commission sent also reasoned opinions in 2006 to Spain, among others, over 
non-communication of national measures on insurance mediation, market abuse 
directive, occupational pensions, public procurement law, etc. Two of the sectors, 
on which Spain has shown particular delay or bad transposition of directives, are 
with regard to immigration and asylum and environment. 
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C. Examples of Well Transposed Directives by Spain 
 
The quality of the transposition of directives by Spain is unequal. In my profes-
sional experience, good examples of good implementation are: 
  Regulations and directives harmonizing EU company law 
  Directive 1985 on product liability 
  Directive 94/45 on the constitution of an enterprise committee and a pro-
cedure of information and consultation of their employees, which was 
transposed through Law 10/1997 of 24 April (replaced by Directive 
2009/38). 
 
But others have had worse luck like, for instance, the transposition on the 
Timesharing Directive 94/47. 
 
D. Spain and Environmental Directives 
 
The acquis on environment law is broad and ambitious, applies to widely diverse 
situations in MS, is administered by many different government agencies acting 
at different levels and gives rise to a high level of public interest. Many problems 
are due to late and incorrect transposition of directives, the former accounting for 
125 new infringement actions during 2007. To these are added the sectorial chal-
lenges described in detail in the Communication on 'Implementing European 
Community Environmental Law'. The overall EU environmental acquis compris-
es over 500 legislative items and about 75% of all national environmental acts go 
back to EU directive. It has been said that environmental policy is one of the 
“legislation factories of the EU”. 
Environmental directives can be subdivided into two main categories: 
those aiming at establishing concrete environmental objectives and targets and 
those that introduce procedures which should help to achieve more environmen-
tally sustainable action (which are the most numerous). Italy (61) and Spain (42) 
were the countries with more infringements of these directives in 2006-2007. The 
transposition of directives is often an important driver for the development of a 
sector. This is the case for instance in the so expanded renewable energies in 
Spain where transposition of Directive 2001/77 on renewables, and Directive 
2006 on bio carburant have definitely helped the development of this sector (So-
lar, 2009). 
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E. Spain and the Service Directive 
 
On 28 December 2006, EC Directive 1006/123 regarding services in the internal 
market came into force and MS have a transposition deadline of 3 years which 
ends on 28 December 2009. 
The transposition of this Directive is extremely complex since it affects all ser-
vice sectors (70% GNP) in which 66% of Spanish employees work. However, the 
transposition into the Spanish legal system is viewed both as a challenge and as 
an opportunity, as a unique occasion to lower unjustified or disproportioned bar-
riers to the access and exercise of a service activity in certain sectors, which will 
encourage business activity and contribute towards improving regulation, gaining 
in productivity, efficiency and employment. 
 
VI. The Lisbon Treaty 
 
Everybody is happy that the Treaty has finally gone into effect after the Czech 
Constitutional Court has approved it. The Treaty will certainly provide a tool to 
transform the EU into the world’s most dynamic power. We cannot overstate the 
benefits of the Treaty because it has taken 8 years to be approved, it has required 
2 different texts and 3 failed referendums, and it has caused endless trouble in the 
Czech Republic, Ireland and the UK. However, the implementation of communi-
ty law will benefit from the Treaty of Lisbon and especially through the introduc-
tion of a full time President of the European Council and the Citizens’ initiative 
(citizens may refer matters to the Commission). 
Although the Treaty will not end all the EU’s problems, such as the pro-
spect of another Russian gas import crisis looming into the EU horizon, the seri-
ous foreign and economic policy problems and the lack of a common external 
energy policy, the reality is that it will clearly advance the construction of Eu-
rope. As Jean Monnet said, “The Common market is a process, not a product”. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
There is a serious commitment of the Spanish government to ensure that EU 
legislation is transposed into Spanish law through a fast implementation, on time 
and correctly. Spain is an open MS in which the internal market rules operate and 
in which those obstacles which prevent businesses and citizens the full and effec-
tive exercise of rights under Community law will progressively disappear. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper upholds thatlegal Europeanization has occurred so that European 
membership has transformed, after 25 years from its accession in the case of 
Spain, domestic legal standards to common European criteria, standards and pro-
cedures - even without legal uniform patterns -   from public law to private and 
economic law. This paper focuses its review on three topics: competition law, 
internal market and consumers law, and private international law, taking into 
full account that Spain is a non-federal, pluri-centric and pluri-legal, asymmetric 
member State of the European Union. 
 
 
1. Introduction and General Approach 
 
The last 25 years have given rise to some specific questions for Europe, among 
the first of which –both from a historical and from a present perspective– would 
probably be what has been the legal and institutional added value for the “80’s 
newcomers” not only to belong to, but to be full members of the European Union. 
This review of the legal meaning of European membership –involving all its 
implied consequences– is currently absolutely necessary, even peremptory, and 
requires a review of current scenarios in the light of historical lessons. We will 
deal with this issue after stating two facts. First, the accession of Greece, Portugal 
and Spain to the European Communities was not only a step further on the way 
for stronger European integration but also a tool for the consolidation of democ-
racy in Southern Europe. It also led to the inclusion of countries where welfare 
levels, political cultures or social structures were rather far from Northern Euro-
pean standards – and in the case of Spain, the inclusion ofa State whose structural 
weight and size supposed a gamble and a new shared experience for the Commu-
nity itself. Second, after the first democratic elections in 1979 and after the for-
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Spain’s agenda was one of dealing simultaneously with three major political 
currents. During the 1977-1986 decade the pursuit of the politically agreed trans-
formation was undertaken in parallel with the task of the democratization-
federalization and Europeanization of the country. The existence of a strong po-
litical will was present at the domestic level combined with political support at 
the EU level. However, in the course of the last decade the results of this intense 
task during the decade in question have appeared to be unfinished, at least as 
regards the last two features: incomplete federalism at a national level, at times 
hesitant “Europeanization”. This paper reviews this process under an objective 
and positive approach, establishing connections between certain aspects of this 
important experience.  
 
a) The Concept of Legal “Europeanization”: Inwards and Towards 
 
The concept of Europeanization has been developed over two decades by the 
political science and international relations literature, showing how European 
integration puts pressure on new EU members, as well as on the standards of 
candidates and future candidates to adapt their institutions, structures and behav-
iors in accordance with a predominant European model (North 1990; Knill 2001). 
From the legal point of view, this concept mainly involves: a) the ability and, in 
fact, the capacity to undertake all European legal obligations necessary for full 
membership under the EU Treaties, and specifically under the principles of the 
primacy of European law and loyal cooperation between Member States, includ-
ing its consequences in the field of State liability (inward approach); and b) as a 
process, the capacity to act and react by adopting “European” behavior, including 
generating new legal/governmental common tools or choosing new “playing 
fields” for the game (toward approach). The legal importance of the ECJ follow-
ing European membership and its consequences, clearly lies within the inward 
approach, but is also clearly linked to the towardsapproach, a pro-active profile 
of membership. Under a diachronic / synchronic approach (Cafaggi and 
Gorywoda 2010, p. 8) legal Europeanization combines “a time-sensitive dia-
chronic analysis with a more explanatory synchronic examination,” in order to 
identify points of change in the development of national private laws and explain 
some critical events or turning points as causes of changes, inwards and towards. 
Therefore, this brief mainstream examination is based on qualitative standards of 
legal phenomena, rather than quantitative ones. 
  In the case of Spain, the issue of Europeanization –understanding this 
concept both as a process and as performance– focused on and produced three 
results: modernization of the country, economic development and social welfare 
and mobility of persons and companies. These three objectives were served by a 
conscientious policy during the first decade of timely adaptation to European 
legal “acquis” of secondary law, developed under high technical difficulties due 
to the complexity of the Spanish para-federal model. Let us say that the moderni-The Legal Added-Value  
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zation issue implied radical changes regarding the Armed Forces and a new com-
posed and pluri-centric Administration, as well as the impact of the new Europe-
an rules (consistent with constitutional constraints) on gender issues and on the 
so-called Spanish market culture, as we will later see on reviewing competition 
and consumers issues. The issue of mobility, implementing European regulations, 
including educational mobility under two ERASMUS programs established for 
European universities, has also been important for the development of Spanish 
civil and institutional society. 
 
b) What Does “Added Value” Mean In This Diagnosis? 
 
Added value implies, from this perspective, law-buildingcapacities using and re-
creating new common playing fields at the European level. From this perspec-
tive, the first five years of the Spanish presence and membership in the EU were 
not limited to this inward action and performance; indeed, Spain soon tried to act 
as a new member, deriving all the possible consequences from its new status 
(Powell 2006). In fact, not only did Spain accept very soon the 1992 Internal 
Market Agenda, but during the time elapsing between its first presidency and its 
second presidency President González developed new aspects to Spanish Euro-
pean policy, notably linking the creation of new Spanish membership needs to be 
developed by at least three new tools:1) developing a practical concept of cohe-
sion, as a response to the considerable effort for Southern economies to adapt to 
freedom of movement and increased competition under the single market pro-
gram by 1992; 2) creating –during the late 80s and early 90s, by the Spanish del-
egation to the IGC of October 1990, which prepared the Maastricht’s agenda– the 
concept of European citizenship,built from the concept of a pure European free-
dom of movement, and doing so by introducing a new “area” (space) of freedom, 
security and justice; 3) and finally, invoking the Spanish cultural leadership in 
the area, by creating the basis for a new for EU relationship and agreements with 
Latin America.  
  The Spanish experience can also be seen as a laboratory. The country is 
characterized by a high degree of legal diversity ad intra and ad extra, which 
means that it can be seen as a perfect test of the most efficient and sustainable 
degree of diversity possible in Europe in both ways. Membership itself is able to 
create a proactive force for pursuing common objectives, in a sort of dialectic 
functioning of the process of Europeanization. For instance, the Spanish legal 
approach on gender in the Act against Gender Violence (Ley Orgánica 1/2004 de 
Medidas de Protección Integal contra la Violencia de Género) and the procedures 
and mechanism instituted therein could suppose – as the last Spanish presidency 
of the EU tried– the establishment of new playing fields and new scenarios for 
EU future rulings. 
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c) Law and Judge: Legal Preemption of European Law and Domestic Judge 
as Natural European Judge  
  
The building blocks for the legal construction under the EU Treaties and ECJ 
judicial development regarding the status of EU law and its enforcement by 
Member States are (1) the primacy and direct effect of European law –previously 
unlocked its constitutional basis: Treaties and secondary law– upon domestic 
law, which carry further consequences in case of failure to implement common 
legal obligations, both positive and negative, even providing for an objective 
system of State liability; and (2) the involvement of not only the administrative 
dimension, but also the judicial dimension in the implementation of European 
law, with domestic judges acting as European “natural judges” under their do-
mestic framework of competences, including the well-known procedure of the 
request for a preliminary ruling of the ECJ. The principles of primacy and direct 
effect of European provisions entail, in fact, a legal preemption of EU rules over 
domestic rules. After the Simmenthal judgment (1978), the “second generation” 
of decisions the ECJ (after 1989) in this field had to do, on the one hand, with 
more practical issues such as the scope of the protective effects of EU law as 
regards individuals, and on the other hand, with the role of the judgein its imple-
mentation. In its Report to the 1995 IGC Conference, the ECJ held that “the suc-
cess of Community law in embedding itself so thoroughly in the legal life of 
Member States is due to its having been perceived, interpreted and applied by the 
nationals, the administrations and the courts and tribunals of all Member States 
as a uniform body of rules upon which individuals may rely upon their national 
courts.” 
 First,  a  key question concerns the scope of the direct effects of European 
Directives (“… the useful effect of Directives might be weakened if individuals 
were not able to invoke them before their national courts to ensure that national 
authorities have kept within the limits of their discretion...”, Case 51/76). After 
the Von Colson/Kamann and Harz judgments (1986), the legal basis for the deci-
sion came from Article 5 EC Treaty (currently Art. 4.3 TEU, principle of loyal 
cooperation), which provides that all Member State authorities should “take all 
appropriate measures” to ensure compliance with Community law. The ECJ then 
held that this included national courts, which were obliged by virtue of Article 5 
to interpret national law in accordance with the aims and objectives of the Di-
rective (Marleasing, 1990). During this important decade, ECJ decisions were 
less concerned with primacy itself than with the ultimate consequences of prima-
cy in the field of judicial alternatives for the implementation of EU provisions. 
So far, primacy has in practice resulted in the obligation for EU Member States 
to protect rights conferred to individuals by EU law, including provisional pro-
tection by means of interim measures (Factortame I, 1990). The question arises 
of which legal consequences deriving from this doctrine are to be supported by 
Member States in case of infringement by maintaining non-adapted domestic The Legal Added-Value  
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rules? In the Francovich (1991) decision, a case of breach for non-transposition 
of a Directive lacking direct effect, the ECJ stated that because of the rights con-
ferred, the Member State responsibility was fulfilled by means of the obligation 
to make reparation for the loss and damage caused to those individuals. 
  Second, European membership does not only imply the obligation for 
Member States to implement laws, but also the obligation for domestic judges to 
act as European natural judges under the principle of loyal cooperation. To be 
sure, this entails (Temple Lang 2006):  a) a duty to set aside any rule of national 
law of any private contract which could interfere with the full and complete ap-
plication of European law; b) a duty to fill gaps –mainly procedural ones– in the 
Community legal order by supplementing rules and procedures; and c) a duty to 
apply, perhaps expand, or even perhaps invent new national remedies in order to 
effectively protect the rights or freedoms conferred or guaranteed by Community 
law. Hence, the national judge acts as European natural judge (Ruiz-Jarabo Co-
lomer 1993). 
  In contrast with the total lack of requests for preliminary rulings coming 
from Greek jurisdictions at the moment of Spain’s accession, Spanish jurisdic-
tions were very active in resorting to the ECJ from 1987 onwards: sometimes 
misunderstanding the Community mechanisms (TCT 1987, Vilà 1987), some-
times raising good-quality and interesting questions with the Court (Marleasing, 
Publivía, El Corte Inglés, Canal Satélite Digital; for a general and qualified over-
view see Le Barbier-Le Bris 1998). Spanish courts became accustomed to direct-
ly applying EU law provisions, in accordance with the principles of primacy and 
direct effect, setting aside domestic rules in case of conflict and developing the 
well-known doctrine of the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) and the Constitu-
tional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) (Pérez Tremps, 2009; see Chronicles in 
REDE, RDCE and RGDE). The Spanish Constitutional Court handed down a 
Declaration on 13 December 2004 (BOE num. 3, 4 January 2005; see comments 
in Rodríguez Iglesias 2005; Cienfuegos 2011, pp. 171-172) which distinguished 
between primacy of EU law and supremacy of the Spanish Constitution: “Prima-
cy and supremacy are categories which develop at different levels: the former, at 
the level of the implementation of legal rules; the latter, at the level of the proce-
dures of construction of rules. The supremacy of the Constitution is compatible 
with a procedural application establishing a preference in favor of rules other 
than the domestic ones, provided it has a constitutional basis, precisely as in the 
case of the provision of Article 93 of the Spanish Constitution.” Let us mention 
several Supreme Court decisions on EU affairs, as the Canal Satélite Digital 
decision (STS 12 June 2003) on State liability arising out of a breach of EU law 
in the digital TV decoding market, imposing a high reparation for loss of 26.4 
million €; or the “Basque taxation” cases (STS 9 December 2004) annulling 
some fiscal advantages of the Basque Country which had been held by Commis-
sion to be discriminatory and incompatible with European competition rules, 
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overturning this strict approach under the new and more permissive decision of 
the ECJ in the Açores taxation case (ECJ 6 September 6 2006). It is not rare for 
the Supreme Court to openly follow the legal reasoning of the ECJ and express 
itself in equal terms (e.g. in the recent STS 24 June 2009, which reminds of the 
Schulz-Hoff decision of 20 January 2009: Cienfuegos 2011, p. 172). 
  Spanish jurisdictions have been especially active in referring questions to 
the ECJ for preliminary rulings (Judicial Report of the Activities of the ECJ 
2009). Between 1986 and 2010, a total of 222 procedures were brought to Lux-
embourg (Greece, from a slow beginning, became more active over time after 
2006, a total of 145 cases; Portugal brought to the ECJ some 67 cases for prelim-
inary rulings). The figures for some of the longer-standing Member States are as 
follows: Germany, 1,731 references; Italy, 1007; France, 783; the Netherlands, 
743; the UK, 477; and Austria, which was judicially very proactive after 1995, 
with 348 requests for preliminary ruling. 
  Spanish infringement procedures based on the former Art. 226 EU Trea-
ty (now Art. 258 TFUE) are permanently open before the ECJ, and Spain is in a 
medium position in relation to other EU Member States, mainly affecting envi-
ronmental, Internal Market and consumer matters. The ECJ statistics of 2010 
(source: ECJ Report, Statistics, p. 85) show that between 2005 and 2009 Spanish 
infringements examined by the Court were as follows: in 2005, 10 infringements 
settled, 1 dismissed; in 2006, 10 settled, 1 dismissed; in 2007, 13 settled, 1 dis-
missed; in 2008, 15 infringements settled, 1 dismissed; and in 2009, 11 infringe-
ments settled, none dismissed. From these indicators it is possible to perceive a 
gap between the stated goals of EU environmental and consumer law and the 
Spanish implementation on the ground, but also –and what is more important, as 
we will show in the second part of this paper– a situation of a gap between an 
apparent willingness for legal Europeanization and a developing critical mass of 
bad domestic practices on legal procedures and techniques for the transposition 
of Directives, which cannot be justified on grounds of the domestic pluricentric 
model. 
 
 
2. - Some Specific Sectoral Issues: Competition, Internal Market, Private 
International Law 
 
 
 
a) Competition Law and Market “Culture”: Its Role on Modernization 
  
At the outset, we choose to focus in this paper on the sector of competition law 
not only because it plays a major role in EU life and the EU’s capacity to bring 
conformity to structures, institutions and behaviors, but also because, even if 
competition law contains a “regulation pack” of provisions, Europeanization The Legal Added-Value  
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under competition patterns implies much more: a complete change –not a formal 
one– of a country in its habits and market culture. 
  Today it is beyond any doubt that the Spanish way to an open economy 
was a long process which started at the end of the fifties with the Stabilization 
Planning of 1959. It then grew rapidly during the sixties with the opening up of 
Mediterranean countries to tourism and to a certain degree of economic devel-
opment, technocratically transforming its old-fashioned, closed economic struc-
tures and institutions. It was during this decade –more precisely in 1963– that the 
first Act on regulation of competition saw the light of day, together with the first 
Spanish request for accession to the EEC. The Competition Restrictive Practices 
Act of 1963 (Ley 110/1963) was literally a textual copy of Arts. 85 and 86 of 
EEC Treaty, to some extent adapted by the Cortes Españolas (Spanish Parlia-
ment) so as to set aside any eventual legal impact on a still totally controlled 
market (Vilà 1979, pp. 319-333). In any case, we can consider it as a sort of pure-
ly formal attempt or sign of Europeanization of the old regime.  
  Once a member of the EC, Spain began a national debate on all econom-
ic market regulation, seeking to transform the former “virtual” discipline into a 
system of market competition; thus, it evolved from the 1963 Act to a true com-
petition regulation Act. It is interesting to note that even though the plan was to 
simultaneously draft regulations on free competition and unfair competition (the 
latter not covered by Arts. 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, but linked with other 
EEC market and consumer regulations) the results were two different sets of 
rules, the Competition Defense Act of 1989 (Ley 16/1989 de Defensa de la Com-
petencia), and the Unfair Competition Act of 1991 (Ley 3/1991 de Competencia 
Desleal). Showing a remarkable lack of coherence in approach, the tasks of the 
technical preparation of these Acts were entrusted respectively to different teams 
in two Spanish ministries: while the Ministry of Economy dealt with the Compe-
tition Defense (free competition) Act under an EEC full legal pattern, the Minis-
try of Justice drafted the Unfair Competition Act under a typical German legal 
model, quite inconsistent with the previous act. This shows, in a very important 
chapter of the Spanish legal Europeanization process, an excess of “virtual” im-
petus but a lack of technical coordination for this purpose, which was a clear sign 
of the path Spain followed for carrying out such tasks. 
  In any case, the Competition Defense Act of 1989 has been an example 
of an efficient regulation, allowing Spanish institutions to Europeanize the mar-
ket, to open it and to do away with the Iberian region as the last closed market for 
internal commercial interests as required under the free internal market for goods, 
and in that way to benefit from a more open culture of free competition. But the 
Spanish institutional framework of competition authorities depended on the Min-
istry of Economy until the creation of a new Comisión Nacional de la Competen-
cia (National Competition Commission or CNC) and the regulations adopted 
after 2003, implementing in many aspects the EU Regulation 1/2003: the Compe-
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petition) and the Act 1/2002 establishing the coordination of the State and Au-
tonomous Communities’ Competences on Competition Defense. In fact, the 
Comisión Nacional de la Competencia is the public agency in charge of preserv-
ing, guaranteeing and promoting effective competition in markets at the national 
level, and procuring consistent application of the Competition Act (Ley de De-
fensa de la Competencia or LDC) through exercise of the functions conferred by 
the Act, through coordination of the activities of industry regulators and the 
competent offices of the Autonomous Regions, as well as cooperation with the 
competent courts. The CNC is now a unique institution independent of the Gov-
ernment, which incorporates the former functions of the Tribunal for Defense of 
Competition, exercises its functions at a nationwide scale and is related to all 
markets and sectors of the economy, being the national competition authority 
integrated to a European-wide scale Network of authorities for the application of 
EU competition law from the Spanish market, and of course at national scale.  
  Let us say that this process of adopting European habits in competition 
law implies a clear but flexible process of getting structures and a behavior in-
volved in the market and means a praeter lege achievement of Europeanization 
of the Spanish market culture. It has been slowly transformed over the last 20 
years. In this task, the most efficient outcome has been the creation since 2003 of 
both the Network of National Competition Authorities and the Network of Spe-
cialized Judges: the praxis of meeting during the year, and the close interaction 
between countries and the European Commission. However, at the same time 
certain limits to Europeanization in the field of competition are appearing, for 
example, as regards some legal features previously unknown in Spanish or 
Southern laws, such as leniency procedures. 
 
b) Internal Market and Consumer Law: European and Domestic Tests 
 
Since Spain was not a member of the EC until the mid-eighties, acting as a sim-
ple observer during the process of revision of the original Treaties, and could 
only intervene once the Single European Act was adopted and entered into force 
in 1987, the Internal Market issues and 1992 Agenda were seen as a true chal-
lenge to the Spanish government. The task of implementation of the previous 
“acquis” was fundamentally launched in 1984, with the adoption of the Ley Gen-
eral de Consumidores y Usuarios, whose goals were both constitutional and Eu-
ropean goals for individuals as consumers. However, the ambitious Delors 1992 
program of opening the market, and the legal techniques to do so, was just start-
ing at that moment. The Single European Act moved to a majority voting system 
for the adoption of IM provisions, without veto, and the common legislative task 
mainly under the New Approach on technical harmonization had to be realized in 
just five years. Spain took steps at that time to be ready for the required effort. 
We have chosen three major examples to show its conscientiousness in this re-The Legal Added-Value  
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gard: the field of toys and general security, the field of consumers, and finally the 
general Directive on Services in the Internal Market (123/2006).  
  Internal Market provisions are interesting not only because they have 
been substantially renewed from the very beginning of the EC, but also because 
their judicial reviews –after the Dassonville (1974) and Cassis de Dijon (1979) 
cases– and their renewed impact on administrative praxis and economic import-
export practices have made them a laboratory for the examination of the transpo-
sition of Directives. The case of Spain is a very particular case, because the coun-
try is a para-federal State whose normative competences are shared by the central 
State (responsible ad extra before the EU and other Member States) and sub-state 
unities, the Autonomous Communities, or at least a member of them. 
  The Council Directive 88/378/EEC of 3 May 1988 on the approximation 
of the laws of the Member States concerning the safety of toys, modified by Di-
rective 93/68/CEE of 22 July 1993 were quickly transposed by the Spanish gov-
ernment under the form of delegated law by means of the Real Decreto 880/1990 
of 29 June 1990, approving these safety rules, modified by the Real Decreto 
204/1995 of 10 February 1995. This was one of the new approaches proposed by 
the Delors Commission, a testing regulation on the safety conditions for Europe-
an products – a matter on which the EC had been unable to establish a regulation 
before the Cassis de Dijon case. The EC had then to regulate not on products as a 
whole, but on their safety, or on the interoperability (only the essential condi-
tions) of products, going ahead and unblocking the Internal Market on the basis 
of the new qualified majority of Art. 100 A 4 EEC Treaty. Once the safety of a 
specific producthad been regulated, the general safety of products was ready to 
be regulated under a more horizontal, mainstream technique on the same basis: 
Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 De-
cember 2001 on general product safety (the second, updated one), which was 
once more transposed in time by the Real Decreto 1801 of 26 December 2003. 
 What  about  consumer law? The Spanish general consumer regulation, 
dating from 1984, soon revealed itself as too wide and old-fashioned. The Coun-
cil Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regu-
lations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability 
for defective products was transposed in Spanish law by the Ley de Responsabi-
lidad por los Daños Causados por Productos Defectuosos (Ley 22/1994) and by 
the Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2007 of 16 November 2007, approving the modi-
fication of the Ley General para la Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios of 
1984. That Act was also indirectly but substantially modified by another Europe-
an provision in this field, the Directive on Unfair Terms 93/13 of 5 April 1993, 
which was transposed very late and with a bad technique by the Ley 7/98 of 13 
April 1998, on Condiciones Generales de la Contratación (General Contractual 
Conditions) and by the Ley 44/2006 of 20 December 2006, de Mejora de la pro-
tección de los consumidores y usuarios (Consumer Protection Law). Finally, 
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respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises was properly trans-
posed by the Spanish Ley 26/91 of 21 November 1991, sobre contratos celebra-
dos fuera de los establecimientos mercantiles. 
  Even if becoming a member of the European Union did not suppose for 
Spain –under Article 93 of the Constitution– any change on how to act by legisla-
tive powers, it is also true that, particularly in the large field of the Internal Mar-
ket, cooperation between administrations, both central and peripheral, was seen 
as a necessary tool in order to effectively transpose a high number of Directives. 
The European origin of laws concerning the Internal Market accounts for more 
than 30% of the normal legislative activity of the Cortes Generales (Spanish Par-
liament), and usually the first step of the transposition procedure consists in a 
draft act coming from the Spanish government. But quite often the development 
and final legal implementation procedures clearly need the participation of the 
Autonomous Communities –either on account of their own competences, or of 
transferred competences–, and sometimes even local administrations.  
  A spectacular case can be seen in the field of free provision of services, 
with the recent Ley 25/2009, Ley Omnibus, of 22 December 2009, for the modi-
fication ad adjustment of several acts (a total of more than 300, including local 
public administrations and their acts!), transposing the EU Directive 123/2006 on 
Services in the internal market. This internal law shows an apparently positive 
will for a technically immense adaptation to the European required performance 
in services (a very long and inconsistent logistic body of provisions) by a wide 
domestic umbrella of rules, probably unnecessary, based on a misunderstanding 
of the final goals to be achieved, and radically disproportionate to the task, which 
was to turn into a transparent public and private market culture. 
  Just a word (for a general official overview of questions see Informe del 
Consejo de Estado 2008) on some “half” successful formulas invented inwards, 
looking at the implementation of EU law after the very first experience:  
1) The Law 8/1994 of 19 May 1994, which instituted a Joint Commission for the 
EU establishing a system of proximity for the monitoring, agenda and parliamen-
tary discussion of EU affairs, and the immediate presentation by the government 
after European Councils. However, this Joint Commission is not a permanent 
legislative commission of the Parliament, leaving part of this work out of its func-
tions. 
2) For the purposes of coordinating both the bottom-up and the top-down partici-
pation of Spanish sub-state entities in EU affairs, Spain adopted since the 90’s a 
system of multiple Sectorial Conferences (important in fields like Health or Fis-
cal and Financial Policies, virtual in other: Cienfuegos 2011) and a sole General 
Conference (CARCE from 1997, now CARUE, whose regulation was modified 
in April 2010 for a better general coordination) for Affairs Related to the Euro-
pean Union, which was able to generate several good practices. Moreover, in 
1996 a permanent Consejeria for Autonomic Affairs was created in Brussels, at The Legal Added-Value  
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the Spanish REPER, consisting of two high profile representatives of this com-
posed system.  
 
c) Private International Law: Interconnected Uniform Regulations 
 
The status of Private International law in EU law has substantially changed from 
the original Rome Treaty, where article 220 only offered the possibility to con-
clude European Conventions on very strict legal grounds, in the fields of conflict 
of jurisdictions or recognition of judicial EC foreign resolutions. The general 
clauses of articles 61 and 65 of the Amsterdam Treaty, based on the previous 
successful experience in civil judicial cooperation of the Brussels Convention on 
jurisdiction and recognition of foreign resolutions of 19 September 1968 – where 
a compact body of legal decisions of the ECJ was built– were amended so as to 
cover the typical Private International law issues: conflict of jurisdictions, recog-
nition, conflict of laws, together with other possible common actions in the field 
of civil cooperation, in the framework of former Title IV, instituting an Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice. We should point out that previously, in 1985, 
Spain tried to adjust its general domestic procedural grounds of jurisdiction (Ley 
Orgánica de Poder Judicial of 2 July 1985) to the Brussels Convention of 1968, 
adapting its general criteria in a sort of pre-accession Europeanization. However, 
an error occurred and, once again, the adjustment had to be made by a “domestic 
system” of corrections of errors about two months later… 
  Anyway, the task of recent Europeanization of PrIL has been a large 
success, and nowadays fifteen regulations –i.e., uniform sets of rules– have been 
adopted in this sensitive field, in which domestic disparity of laws and proce-
dures in the private sector is well-known and causes a certain number of limita-
tions in fundamental rights. The Spanish cooperation during the task has been, 
and still is, remarkable: for instance, Spanish academics have been Reporters of 
the proposals of these regulations (Prof. A. Borràs, Proposal on the Brussels II 
Regulation), or acted as authors of the European Judicial Atlas of the European 
Commission Directorate for Justice and Home affairs (Prof. J.J. Álvarez), and 
Spanish academic and civil teams have also reacted to the legal discussion 
launched by the Green Papers presented by the Commission, showing a very 
large involvement in these issues. On the other hand, the European Union has 
signed a substantial agreement with the Hague Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law so as to accede as a party to this forum by Council Decision 
2006/719/EC of 5 October 2006. This issue is of high relevance in considering 
EU matters as falling within the scope of its external competences (e.g., Family 
Law), especially under Lisbon Treaty rules. 
  Between 2001 and 2010, under the new provisions of the Amsterdam and 
Lisbon Treaties (now Title V of the TFUE), the rules enacted so as to try and 
reduce the disparities between Member States for the purposes of European civil 
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– Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency pro-
ceedings, which was praeter legem a pattern for the new Spanish bankruptcy and 
insolvency modernized rules established by the Bankruptcy Act 22/2003 of 9 
July 2003. It should be noted that in this case the teamof Spanish negotiators of 
the PrIL EU Regulation were also the technical authors of the domestic proposal. 
– Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 (“Brussels I”) on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and com-
mercial matters, the first, largest and most relevant one, succeeding the former 
1968 Brussels Convention, which bears its own heritage of a rich doctrine based 
on ECJ previous decisions. 
– Council Regulation (EC) No. 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation be-
tween the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or com-
mercial matters. 
– Council Directive 2002/8/EC of 27 January 2003, improving access to justice 
in cross-border disputes by establishing minimum common rules relating to legal 
aid for such disputes, transposed by the Ley 16/2005, modifying the Ley 1/1996 
de asistencia jurídica gratuita. 
– Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 (“Brussels II”) 
concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regula-
tion (EC) No 1347/2000. 
– Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 f the European Parliament and the Council of 21 
April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims. 
– Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 December 2006 creating a European order for payment procedure. 
– Regulation (EC) No 861/2007of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 
July 2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure. 
– Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 
11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (“Rome II”). 
– Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extra-
judicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents), repeal-
ing Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000. 
– Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
May 2008 
on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters. 
– Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council of 
17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (“Rome I”). 
– Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, 
applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in 
matters relating to maintenance obligations. 
– Regulation (EC) No 662/2009 of the European Parliament and the Council of 
13 July 2009 establishing a procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of The Legal Added-Value  
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agreements between Member States and third countries on particular matters 
concerning the law applicable to contractual and non-contractual obligations. 
– Council Regulation (EC) No 664/2009 of 7 July 2009 establishing a procedure 
for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements between Member States and 
third countries concerning jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments and decisions in matrimonial matters, matters of parental responsibility 
and matters relating to maintenance obligations, and the law applicable to mat-
ters relating to maintenance obligations. 
– Finally, Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 was adopted in20 December 
2010, in order to implement, for the first time in this field, after locked negotia-
tions during previous years, an enhanced cooperation between fifteen Member 
States (among which Spain) in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal 
separation. 
  What has been the European lesson in this large and differentiated (be-
tween domestic legal orders and procedures, and before usual sectors of EU law) 
field of Private International law? Authors say (Tulibacka 2009) that the Europe-
anization of civil procedures has very ambitious aims if we compare it with the 
more timid goals retained by the original legal sources, which merely referred to 
simplifying the functioning of the Internal Market and improving the enforce-
ment of EU law. Even if the most frequent instruments have been Regulations 
(there are only two Directives), which are per se uniform tools, the high level of 
legal disparity and diversity requires the bringing together of at least four critical 
mass sectors of Pr IL: 
a) Jurisdiction; recognition of judgments – as a partial reflection of the Internal 
Market rule of mutual recognition, general or sectorial (civil/commercial judg-
ments; insolvency; marriage/parental responsibility; maintenance; divorce). 
b) Several elements of procedure, mostly concerning fundamental rights like the 
right to a fair trial and public policy; transnational service of documents; evi-
dence. 
c) Conflict of laws, the most decisive subsisting legal disparity on substantial 
rules and economic contractual and non contractual answers. Also matters of the 
former Rome Convention of 19 June 1980, probably the most interesting Europe-
an new conventional instrument in the 80’s (now “Rome I” Regulation, preceded 
by the “Rome II” Regulation on Torts) 
d) Finally, some unified pieces on true European common procedures when criti-
cal economic mass is rather low, and the interest in simplified cross-border pro-
cedures is rather high. 
  
In fact, even with Regulations as a general legal instrument in this field, a 
high degree of substantial and procedural diversity subsists. However, the logics 
of this broad field of Private International Law issues have to be consolidated 
with the logics of the Internal Market rules and patterns. Procedures and families 
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mon rules contained in the above-mentioned EU Regulations only try to reach an 
agreement in some universal criteria –rather than changing domestic substantial 
private law–, in order to implement the principles of justice and legal security in 
cross-border European private cases. 
 
Some Methodological Conclusions Applicable to the Spanish Case 
 
Some conclusions can be drawn on Spain’s experience in the legal field after 25 
years of Spanish EU membership. First of all, Spain has been not only a con-
vinced member of the European Union, but a true Laboratory where Diversity has 
been experienced.  
Secondly, the legal added value of European Membership has not been a “quanti-
tative” issue ( in terms of transposition) but a qualitative one,  nor a problem of 
better choice of  the needed legal instrument    ( regulation vs. Directive, etc. ). 
“Add value” means here the right capacity of creating and using these new play-
ing fields for all Member States - or for “enforcing cooperative” Member States- 
through different possible dialectic processes.  
Finally, Spain’  Laboratory of Diversity and of European engagement  has added 
new arenas for its own Multilevel Governance experience, as well as new  ideas ( 
in issues such as social cohesion, gender, family law, citizenship, or citizen’s  
legislative initiative ) challenging the limits of an efficient “management of di-
versity”, which can be useful in the construction of a European legal model. 
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Abstract 
 
The paper examines the complex web of economic interests, ideological prefer-
ences, administrative and normative resources and international pressures coming 
from the EU or other member States, which has produced the ambiguous Spanish 
immigration policies of the last decades. Special attention is devoted to the man-
agement of migratory flows, to irregularity as the most common way of immi-
grants’ entry in the country, and to European demands of frontier control. The 
policy game involved in the EU-Spain relationship around irregular migration 
coming from Africa is analyzed. The paper provides the main data which feature 
the nature and impact of this migration in Spain, the European country which has 
received the biggest number of immigrants during the last decade. 
 
 
Introduction: the Unplanned Social Change 
 
When Spain joined the EEC it was still a country of emigration, foreigners were 
scarce and immigration was politically irrelevant.  Immigrants were mostly re-
tired Western Europeans living in the Mediterranean coasts to which some thou-
sands of political refugees from Latin American countries should be added.  In 
all, 200,000 people made up less than 0.5% of the population.  As a result, the 
first Law on Foreigners enacted in 1985
2  was not directed to order the flow of 
immigration; in fact, this was not even an issue.  Rather, the idea behind the law 
was to ease the concerns of countries in central and northern Europe about the 
possibility that new members of the European Community might become an 
                                                 
1This paper benefits from the information gathered during the development of the research project 
SEJ2005-04193/CPOL (financed by the Spanish CICYT) and the late interviews conducted during the 
drafting of the Royal Institute Elcano Report on Immigration (González 2010).   
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entry point for undocumented immigrants, particularly Spain, Greece and Portu-
gal.  With that goal in mind, a law was devised that was basically restrictive in 
nature, establishing mechanisms for imposing sanctions against irregular immi-
grants, and making it very difficult to get into Spain through legal channels and 
renew stay permits.  It ruled out, for instance, family reunification, and made no 
provision for a permanent residency permit (Aja 2006).  The law was passed 
without discussions and its only publicly marked effect, and an undesired one at 
that, took place in the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa: one-
third of their population was of Moroccan origin, a circumstance that lawmakers 
were not aware of when the bill was drafted.  The law thus turned them into un-
documented immigrants, even though most of them were born in the Spanish 
cities, triggering fierce protests and demands of nationalization which led to the 
opening of a special process of access to citizenship in both towns. 
The economic growth which followed the entry into the European Union 
fueled the beginning of labor immigration in the late 1980s, mainly devoted to 
agricultural labor in the Mediterranean arc, but this immigration only became a 
socially perceived and relevant phenomenon during the late nineties.  In a similar 
evolution to that experienced by other South European countries like Greece and 
Italy, immigration arrived as the result of several demographic and economic 
changes, notably the decline of the fertility rate and the increasing of the educa-
tional level of new generations, their movement towards qualified jobs and the 
consequent appearing of a non-satisfied labor demand in work intensive sectors 
such as agriculture, construction, trade, domestic help or restoration.  Since the 
beginning of the eighties, while North and Central European countries kept their 
doors closed to labor immigration, a new immigration wave directed towards 
Southern Europe, where it found a very different economic and political frame-
work: employment in small enterprises and families, instead of the big industrial 
companies that featured the main demand for migrated labor in the Sixties in 
Central and Northern countries, and  irregularity in the entry or the stay and in-
formal employment as common stages in immigrants lives.  In highly segmented 
labor markets, immigrants occupied and still occupy the worst positions, not only 
regarding salaries and work conditions, but also in terms of instability and lack of 
Social Security protection.  
During the decades of the 1990s and 2000s, South Europe and especially 
Spain became the main destiny of new migration in the EU.  According to Euro-
stat data,Italy and Spain received 56% of total EU immigration that arrived dur-
ing the period 1997-2008, while Spain alone received 50% of the total during the 
past decade, 2000-2009.  In comparative terms the effect of this migration is 
bigger in Spain than in Italy as the size of the native population is much smaller.  
In all, Spain received more than 5 million new migrants (i.e. net migration) dur-
ing the 2000s, over a population of 40 million at the beginning of the period in a 
process of unknown intensity in Europe. From being 0.5% of the population in 
1985, the number of immigrants amounted to 14% in 2010.  The Making of Immigration Policies   119 
 
 
The economic crisis made evident in 2008 has not stopped the constant 
increase of immigration, but has just caused a slowdown of its growth rate.  This 
fast and massive immigration has constituted the major social change experi-
enced in the country since the decade of 1960, when industrialization, urbaniza-
tion and inner migration transformed the demographic landscape.  Immigration 
has provoked relevant impacts in almost all realms of economic and social life: in 
the labor market, in the housing market, in the social life of the municipalities 
and districts where immigrants have concentrated, in all kind of public services, 
education, transport, postal services, health, etc.  Immigration has also become an 
important issue in the political field as the electoral competition and immigrants 
themselves have turned into political subjects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Institute of Statistics; Own drafting; Immigrants are defined 
here as foreign-born.  
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Source: Eurostat; Own drafting 
 
There are various factors that help explain why Spain has been so 
attractive to immigrants over these years: firstly, a strong and relatively vibrant 
informal economy in which irregular migrants could find employment; secondly, 
the relatively positive social attitudes towards immigrants, compared with other 
European countries; thirdly, the traditional tolerance towards illegality embedded 
in Southern European political culture; and finally, the provision of social rights 
for irregular immigrants in Spanish law.   
Migration to Spain has concentrated in the sectors which feed the 
underground economy, whose weight in the gross domestic product is estimated 
to be around 20 percent (Schneider 2009; Alañón & Gómez 2003), one of the 
largest in the EU-15 after Greece and Italy and on the same level with Portugal. 
3   
The “construction bubble” which has constituted the most important engine of 
economic growth during the 2000s and the most outstanding refuge of “black 
money”, would not have been possible without the supply of a cheap and 
abundant immigrant labor force.  As for public opinion, at the beginning of the 
period of most intense arrival of immigrants, Spaniards’ attitudes towards 
foreigners were exceptionally positive: 
 
  Table 1: Refusal to the coexistence with people of different nationality, race or 
religion  
                                                 
3See Friedrich Schneider  “The Size of the Shadow Economy in 21 OECD Countries” 
http://www.econ.jku.at/members/Schneider/files/publications/ShadowEconomy21OECD
_2009.pdf The Making of Immigration Policies   121 
 
Do you personally find disturbing the presence of people of another nationality, 
race or religion?  Percentage who find it disturbing. 
   Other nationality Other race Other religion 
Greece  38  27 31
Denmark  24  24 26
Belgium  20  23 21
Ireland  17  20 17
United Kingdom  17  19 17
Netherlands  17  17 17
Germany  16  16 13
France  16  14 12
Austria  15  14 12
Italy  11  11 10
Sweden  11  11 10
Luxemburg  9  11 8
Portugal  9  10 8
Finland  8  9 8
Spain  4  5 6
Source:  Eurobarometer EB 53 and European Monitoring Centre on Racism and 
Xenophobia. 2000 
 
Although this exceptionality has gradually disappeared throughout the last dec-
ade, it constituted a strong electoral base for tolerant and permissive migration 
policies when the first serious attempt to order immigration was made in the year 
2000 (Law on Foreigners 4 and 8/2000).  Since that year irregular migrants have 
enjoyed free access to the public health and educational systems under the same 
conditions as Spaniards and regular migrants, with the only condition that they 
register with local authorities.  This free access has become another important 
factor of attraction together with the lack, or weakness of internal controls over 
irregular migrants or irregular labor. 
 
The following are main features of Spanish immigration during the past two dec-
ades: 
 
1. In contrast with the situation in Northern and Central European countries, 
where most immigrants arrive as asylum seekers or family members of previous-
ly established migrants, immigration to Spain has been led by the opportunity of 
finding a job. Asylum forms a statistically irrelevant way of entry. From 2000 to 
2008 Spain has granted protection to only 3,500 asylum seekers, around 7% of 
applications; this percentage of positive answers is much smaller than the Euro-122                                                                                  González-Enríquez 
 
pean average (23%)
4.  On the other hand, Spain receives much less applications 
than the average European country, probably because would-be refugees decide 
to apply in other countries. In the meantime, as irregular immigration has been a 
relatively open door along the decade, an interchange between immigration and 
asylum has evolved, and potential asylum seekers have found in irregular migra-
tion an easier way of entry. Family regrouping has also had a minor role in the 
migration flow due to the short period most immigrants have spent in the coun-
try, but it is growing and will probably account for the bulk of arrivals in the 
coming years.  Immigrants have found jobs mainly in the sectors of construction, 
domestic service, retail trade, catering, personal services and agriculture, where 
they have occupied the lowest posts.  Very few of them have been able to esca-
late the occupational ladder and most have moved only among the first steps 
(Garrido and Miyar 2008, Pajares 2008, 2009 and 2010).  
 
2. Immigrants are young and low qualified.  The age distribution of immigrant 
population concentrates between 20 and 40 years, much younger than the native 
one, and it is sexually equilibrated (although women are scarce among African 
immigrants).  The level of education is low, especially among African immi-
grants, a group composed mainly by Moroccans.  Illiteracy is common among 
females in this last collective. 
 
Table 2. Educational level attained according to geographical origin
%  Native  EU14  Rest of 
Europe
Latin 
America Africa 
Primary or 
less  11  12  13  19  54 
Secondary 
initial  29  16  14  19  17 
Secondary 
advanced  35  33  55  46  24 
University  26  39 17 15 5 
Source: Encuesta de Población Activa, average 2007. People between  20 and 44 
years old 
 
 
3. Latin Americans form the bulk of the immigrant population: In 2010 they ac-
counted for 58% of extra-community foreign residents.  Immigration from Latin 
American countries has been favored by a particularly friendly legal and political 
frame, an institutional legacy of the Spanish historical presence in the area.  As a 
result, while immigrants coming from any other area of the world are required to 
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have a minimum of ten years of legal stay before applying for naturalization
5, 
those coming from Latin America can apply after two years of stay.  As a matter 
of fact, they can achieve nationality even before arriving to the status of perma-
nent residency, which is attainable after five years of stay.  Furthermore, Latin 
American nationals have been exempted from the visa requirement which has 
been applied to those countries from where important influx of irregular immi-
grants was detected, an exemption which has prompted irregular migration.  Only 
when the data on irregular immigrants and their origins achieved shocking num-
bers, the institutional pressure towards rationalizing the immigration process was 
able to overcome the domestic and international resistance against the imposition 
of visas.  In the 2000 decade Spain became the second most important destiny 
country for Latin American immigrants, after the USA, and the first ever country 
in the European Union whose immigration is mainly composed of Hispanics.   
 
  
Table 3.  Origin of foreign born population. Groups with more than 100,000 
persons. Year 2009 
  Thousands
Romania  760,7
Morocco  732,0
Ecuador  471,4
Colombia  354,9
United Kingdom  378,2
Argentina  293,2
Bolivia  226,0
Germany  246,0*
France  226,5*
Peru  186,1
Bulgaria  159,7
Venezuela  151,0
Brasil  152,2
Portugal  147,7
China  144,6
Dominican Rep.  126,4
Source: National Institute of Statistics .Own drafting 
* Roughly half of these immigrants born in France or Germany are descendant of 
Spanish migrants  
 
 
                                                 
5 Sephardic Jews and nationals of Andorra, Philippines and Equatorial Guinea benefit too from the 
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The Development of Spanish Immigration Policy 
 
Economic growth stimulated by accession to the European Economic 
Community created new job opportunities that served as a magnet for immigrants 
who found that they could only work illegally
6, as the 1985 Law on Foreigners 
did not provide legal and realistic mechanisms to labor immigration.  The special 
amnesty, or regularization, decreed by the government in 1991 which granted 
residency papers to 112,000 foreigners (Izquierdo 1996) was the response to this 
lack of legal channels for immigration and became the model to emulate in the 
future.  From 1985 to 1998, when a new immigration law was proposed, the 
foreign population increased by some 500,000, half of them non-Europeans.   
Most arrived as bogus tourists from Latin America and worked without a permit 
in what became the most common way for immigrants to enter the country.   
Another large segment of Spain’s immigrant laborers during the late 
Eighties and Nineties was formed by Moroccans who entered illegally after 
traveling in small boats (called pateras) across the Strait of Gibraltar, just 15 
kilometers wide at its narrowest point, taking advantage of what was then a 
poorly policed maritime border.  During the decade of 1990 the bulk of 
Moroccan immigrants concentrated in Catalonia where they had a hard time 
integrating. Catalan nationalists were very sensitive to this difficulty as they saw 
immigration as a new and powerful threat to the Catalan identity, which they 
perceived as already under pressure from earlier migration from within Spain in 
the 1960s and 70s.  These worries among Catalan nationalists were at the heart of 
a proposal to amend the law governing foreign residents.  The proposal was 
submitted to Parliament in 1998 by the CiU (Convergencia i Unió, the main 
Catalan nationalist party) who criticized the 1985 law on grounds that it made it 
hard for immigrants to integrate due to their lack of social rights.  Back then in 
1998, when CiU presented this bill no one foresaw the huge rise in immigration 
that was to come years later.  At the time, statistics showed only 700,000 foreign-
born people living in Spain.  The goal of CiU and other parties (the Socialist 
Party later submitted its own bill) was to facilitate the integration of the 
immigrants.  Regulating future migratory flows was at best a secondary concern; 
for this reason, the debate focused on the rights of irregular immigrants whose 
number was unknown and underestimated.  
The bill evolved in a peculiar way.  The ruling party, the center-right 
Popular Party had never held an internal debate on immigration and had no 
common position on it.  Within the government itself, there were two opposing 
views.  The interior Ministry was concerned about controlling illegal 
                                                 
6The Law stipulated that foreigners could migrate to Spain legally only with a job offer which 
allowed them to apply for a visa in their country of origin. But the system was inappropriate for 
most employers, which did not have contacts in the origin countries of immigrants, while Spanish 
consulates did not offer the services to handle such demands. The Making of Immigration Policies   125 
 
immigration, while the Labor Ministry was more interested in facilitating the life 
and work conditions of immigrants.  Meanwhile, the Finance Ministry warned 
that the Spanish economy needed immigrants.  In fact these differing approaches 
to immigration have always remained present in the three ministries, whether it 
was the center-right or center-left in power.   
While the law slowly made its way through the legislature
7, the 
prevailing sentiment in the Spanish media was one of compassion toward 
immigrants.  NGOs were prominent in public debate on the issue and surveys 
showed Spaniards held positive attitudes towards immigrants. All of this made 
for an atmosphere in which those with reservations about immigration were wary 
of expressing them in public.  This pressure also affected the Popular Party.  Its 
internal debates on the effects of granting broad social rights to irregular 
immigrants were never made public.  In the law, the granting of social rights to 
irregular foreigners was accompanied by a procedure under which they could 
obtain stay permit after living in the country for two years.  In doing so 
legislators made the implicit admission that the State was unable to avoid 
irregular immigration. They set up mechanisms to make life easier for 
undocumented foreigners while at the same time offering them the prospect of 
near regularization.   
As for other issues, the law corrected some of the main defects of its 
predecessor of 1985; it granted the right to family reunification and introduced 
the concept of a permanent residency and work permit; it also reduced the state’s 
discretionary powers in renewing permits and in expulsion procedures and 
enhanced immigrants’ legal guarantees and declared their integration into 
Spanish society to be a goal of the State at the national, regional and local levels 
(Aja 2006).  When the law was about to be approved, some members of the 
Popular Party-run government became alarmed over what they saw as a 
diminishing of the State’s ability to control immigration, and the party tried to 
obstruct the approval, but it did not hold majority in the Congress and the law 
passed against its will.   
When shortly afterwards the 2000 March general elections granted the 
PP a comfortable majority, it presented a reformed version of the Law which 
curtailed some immigrants` rights.  This second look at the Law marked the first 
time in which immigration emerged as a major issue for the Spanish public, with 
extensive media coverage, pressure from NGOs, associations of immigrants, 
trade unions, legal experts and the Catholic Church.  However, for several 
months the debate centered on secondary issues, such as undocumented 
immigrants’ rights to hold demonstrations, form associations and unions and go 
on strike (not very relevant for those who cannot legally stay nor work).   
Meanwhile, other more substantial changes in the reformed law did not attract 
public attention, such as the extension from two years to five of the period 
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irregular migrants had to spend  in order to regularize, or the restoration of 
expulsion as punishment for irregular staying (Law 4/2000 had done away with 
this).  
During years 1999 and 2000, when discussions were held on the first and 
second Laws on Foreigners, one of the government’s priorities was to limit 
public spending.  This ruled out designing mechanisms to select and hire 
immigrants while they were still in their home countries, as this procedure would 
require significant investments.  The only legal tool, known as the General 
Regime, only worked for large companies that could undertake contacts overseas 
on their own.  Spanish Foreign Service is quite modest compared to that of 
countries of similar economic weight, and a big injection of staff and resources in 
Spanish consulates would have been needed to   advertise, manage and fill the 
job openings for foreigners that emerged.  Furthermore, in terms of balance 
between the demands of the labor market and the arrival of immigrants, if it 
occurred spontaneously with no need for the State to intervene as an 
intermediary, as seemed to be happening, why set aside ever-scarce resources to 
something which the law of supply and demand could fix on its own?  In the end, 
what was being offered implicitly was the lowest-cost solution: allow immigrants 
to come in irregularly, as bogus tourists, and then regularize them after they have 
lived in the country for few years, either through the normal procedure or a 
special amnesty.  In the meantime, in order to make their lives easier and prevent 
problems relating to public health or public order, irregular immigrants would be 
granted health care and schooling for their children.  What thus emerged was a 
“cheap model” (Martin 2008) for managing migratory flows, a model that was 
the result of several historical and ideological elements as well of material 
interests.  It was also the model inherited from the earlier period, the decades of 
1980 and 1990. 
The experience of the 1990s did not help Spain anticipate the coming 
boom in immigration (Graphic I).  In the 1990s, Spain’s immigrant community 
increased at the rate of about 100,000 people a year but in the next decade it shot 
up to an average of 560,000 a year.  As for ideological and pragmatic concerns, 
the preeminence of public discourse that expressed compassion and solidarity 
toward immigrants turned out to be functional with demand for workers in 
sectors that Spaniards had abandoned, such as domestic help, elder care, 
construction, farming, retail trade and catering; if the State declined to regulate 
the hiring of immigrants at the source, then why not facilitate legal arrivals by 
instituting, say, a job-searching visa?   The first reason, already mentioned, is the 
Central and North European pressure on Southern countries belonging to 
Schengen space (Spain belongs to it since 1991) to avoid the arrival of 
immigrants who could use their territories as a gateway into Northern countries 
of the border-check-free group.  Besides this outside pressure, a domestic fear of 
an “avalanche” of immigrants existed, not often expressed in public but still 
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Convergencia i Unió, the Catalan nationalist party, dared as far back as 2000 to 
say it was concerned, wondering what such inflows would do to the Catalan 
identity, but that fear also existed in the Popular Party and in part of the Socialist 
Party, the trade unions and public opinion in general.  
In the nearly year-long period that transpired between the passage of Law 
4/2000 (the first immigration law, approved in January of that year) and Law 
8/2000 (approved in December of the same year) two major events took place 
which had a significant effect on public opinion: in February, in the town of El 
Ejido (Almería, on the southern Mediterranean coast), which lives off high-tech 
greenhouse farming using abundant Moroccan manpower, locals attacked 
Moroccan immigrants.  The assault lasted several days, and left more than 100 
people injured and many homes and stores destroyed.  It was triggered by three 
killings earlier committed by Moroccans, but reflected bad blood that had 
accumulated during years of minor conflicts between locals and Moroccans.  The 
attack in El Ejido was widely condemned by all Spanish media, intellectuals and 
politicians in the rest of Spain, but beyond that it left Spaniards worried about 
relations between locals and immigrants.  This was an issue that had not been 
raised until then, except for a much more minor incident in Catalonia.  The 
second big event was that the regularization process provided for an additional 
provision in Law 4/2000, available to those who had been in Spain since June 1, 
1999. The number of people who applied far exceeded all expectations.   
According to news reports, the government expected some 80,000 to 100,000 
immigrants to come forward, but 244,000 applied (and 188,000 were accepted).   
A few weeks after the passage of the second immigration law, a dramatic 
event showed the inefficiency of Spain’s migration policy, the high volume of 
irregular immigrants and the power of the business sector.  In January 2001, in 
Lorca (Murcia), a train ran over a van taking undocumented Ecuadorian 
immigrants to work on a farm, killing 12 of them.  In the wake of the accident, 
Spanish media showed how the farm-intensive southeast of Spain had become a 
flagrant and open market for thousands of foreign workers who had no work 
permits.  The scandal caused by photos and footage of undocumented workers 
standing in village squares waiting for someone to come up and offer them day 
work forced the government to act and enforce the law.  Inspections in the 
farming areas of the southeast increased, even as farmers claimed the only 
workers available were irregulars, and they rallied in favor of the colleague 
arrested for hiring the ones who had died in the accident.  In response to pressure 
from some 4,000 farmers and sympathy toward Ecuadorians in the wake of the 
accident, the government came up with a plan to grant permits specifically to 
Ecuadorians.  It would force them to go back home so they could later return to 
Spain with a work permit, while the government would pay for the trip. The plan 
was manifestly unreasonable, and it was abandoned.  Instead, there was a 
targeted regularization that granted papers to some 24,000 Ecuadorians 
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When the regularization process of 2000 was ended, immigrants who did 
not manage to become legal staged protests, waging sit-ins at churches, with the 
support of NGOs, trade unions and the Catholic hierarchy.  This prompted the 
government to again offer regularization in 2001, this one based on “arraigo” 
(rootedness).  A total of 339,000 applications were presented and 158,000 were 
accepted.  Once again, the number of applications surprised Spanish society.  It 
was stunned that in the space of just one year so many new undocumented 
foreigners had accumulated, leaders of the Popular Party began to suspect that 
these amnesties were attracting more foreigners.  The government declared that it 
would not stage any more general regularizationbut at the same time it retained in 
the Implementation Rules of the Foreigners Law
8 an individual legalization 
mechanism.  On the other hand, the government did not provide efficient 
channels that would facilitate legal immigration in the future.  In order to do this, 
it would not only have had to improve its overseas services but also the national 
employment service, whose intermediation in the labor market is weak.  From 
2002 to 2004, the only instrument for promoting legal immigration was the 
contingente, a quota for hiring foreigners in their native countries.  It was 
calculated through yearly agreements between the central and regional 
governments, with assistance from unions and business associations (Aparicio 
and Roig 2006), but it offered only 20,000 to 30,000 jobs per year, when more 
than 600,000 immigrants arrived in Spain each year during that period.   
In 2003, feelings about immigration, both among the broad society and 
the main political parties, had changed, and concerns over illegal immigration 
and public safety became a central issue.  Spanish media carried more and more 
stories about irregular immigrants, and crime committed by foreigners was on the 
rise, especially crime by violent organized gangs from Eastern Europe and 
Colombia.  News also emerged about violent young Latino street gangs.  The 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States had a negative effect on 
the way Spaniards perceived Moroccan immigrants, who at the time were the 
largest single national immigrant group in the country.  It was in this context that 
the ruling Popular Party and the main opposition group, the Socialist party, 
agreed to modify the Law on Foreigners and the Penal Code with some 
restrictive measures devoted to facilitate the fight against irregular migration.  
These changes to the Law on Foreigners were approved in November 2003, just 
months before the general elections scheduled for March 2004.   
During the electoral campaign, immigration was a secondary issue at best 
because the two main parties perceived it as too sensitive from an electoral 
standpoint.  They feared losing votes to the right (by expressing a pro-immigrant 
message) or to the left (with a restrictive one).  In fact, in its electoral platform, 
the Socialist party did not include regularization for undocumented foreigners 
that it did propose shortly after winning the 2004 elections.  This new 
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regularization, which Socialist government labeled “normalization”, was 
announced in August 2004 and was presented as a measure to address Spain’s 
huge underground economy.  The proposal was to let thousands of workers who 
got paid under the table, without contributing into the Social Security system, 
come forward and have both them and their employers contribute to the system.  
There was also a promise of a substantial increase in workplace inspections, the 
lack of which made it possible for so many people to work irregularly.  The 
“normalization” process required immigrants to present a job offer and pay 
Social Security fees.   
The process of regularization was carried out in early 2005.  Nearly 
700,000 applications were received, of which 578,000 were accepted.  In the end, 
550,000 new workers signed up to pay into the Social Security system.  The 
result was seen as a success because it brought a part of the underground 
economy out into the open, and the government defended the process firmly in 
the face of criticism from other European countries, mainly France, and from the 
European Commission.  Within Spain, the Popular Party was vehemently against 
the measure, arguing that it amounted to a reward for “trafficking and 
smuggling” networks and would lure more undocumented foreigners to Spain.   
In order to ensure that immigration that kept coming in did so legally, the 
new Implementation rules provided for a mechanism that was more realistic than 
the previous “contingente,” the list of hard-to-fill job openings (the “catálogo”).  
The list is prepared quarterly for each Spanish province with information 
provided by Autonomous Communities and the state job-placement service, the 
National Employment Institute (INEM).  This model emphasizes hiring 
immigrants in their own country, and it is more accurate and flexible than the old 
system because the list of job openings is published quarterly rather than 
annually and better reflects labor market demands because it is done by province. 
However, several problems remain.  The first is that the basic information comes 
from the INEM which act as intermediary in only a very small percentage of 
hiring (less than 10% of the total). The rest is done through private job-placement 
companies, or through informal channels (friends, relatives, etc.).  Secondly, the 
administrative handling of the applications that employers must present is slowed 
down by a lack of staff and resources at the offices in charge of processing them, 
causing the process to take much longer than it should.  In 2007, for instance, it 
took an employer in Madrid a full year on average to hire an immigrant in his or 
her native country.  All of these shortcomings, added to the government’s failure 
to fulfill its promise of providing more Labor inspectors, have led to immigrants 
without permits continuing to arrive in large numbers. The job-seeking visa, 
included in the Socialist party’s electoral platform in the 2004 election, was 
never implemented, due to opposition from trade unions.  They feared that, given 
the shortage of labor inspectors, this kind of visa would turn into a new way of 
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The political discourse and policies of the Socialist government became 
more restrictive as a result of the so-called “crisis of the cayucos,” (small boats), 
when in the summer of 2006 some 25,000 undocumented migrants arrived in the 
Canary Islands aboard such vessels after sailing from the coast of West Africa.  
From that point on, the government started stressing the importance of stopping 
illegal immigration, and Spanish Foreign Ministry launched a campaign in Africa 
to sign agreements on swift repatriation of migrants and cooperation in 
monitoring African coastal waters to avoid irregular migration.  But the biggest 
change of tone came after the general elections of March 2008, in which the 
Socialist party won re-election, when unemployment became evident as results of 
economic crisis.   
 
Irregularity as a Regular Path 
 
Irregularityhas been a phase in the life of most immigrants in Spain, as the results 
of polls, regularizations and demographic data show (Díez Nicolás 2001, Pérez 
and Rinken 2004, CERES 2004).  After the last extraordinary regularization of 
2005 the number of irregulars decreased dramatically, but a big poll conducted in 
the last weeks of 2006 still showed at least a 13% of irregularity among 
immigrants as admitted by them.  Regularity increases with the time of stay, but 
irregularity is a common way of entry: 40% of those arrived during 2006 were 
still irregulars at the end of that year (Reher and Requena 2008).  The entry of 
Romania and Bulgaria in the EU in January 2007 reduced drastically the 
percentage of irregularity, which, according to our estimates, was of 43% as a 
mean during the period 2000-2006 (González-Enríquez 2009). 
As in all Southern European countries, regularizations have constituted 
the main tool for reducing the number of irregular immigrants and managing 
migratory flows.  Altogether, seven extraordinary regularizations have been con-
ducted, which legalized more than 1,100,000 people.  To this must be added 
those who were legalized individually through the routine mechanism, the overall 
number of which has not been published.  However, after each major regulariza-
tion (the one in 2000-01 and the one in 2005, both of which granted papers to 
some 500,000 people), governments have seen how immigrants continue to ar-
rive in the country illegally.  What is more, some of those who gain legal status 
in such amnesties lose it later because the requirements for renewing work and 
residency permits are stricter than those applied in the regularization.  On the 
other hand, given volatility in the economic sectors in which most immigrants 
work, they often cannot show a contract when it comes time to renew their per-
mits (Cabellos and Roig, 2006).  
When governments of both the center-right and center-left have realized 
this permanence or increase after regularization in the number of immigrants 
staying illegally, they have reversed course in their discourses and their policies, 
becoming stricter.  Examples of this reversal are the closure of virtually all legal The Making of Immigration Policies   131 
 
entries in 2002, the exigency of visa to Colombians (2001) and Ecuadorians 
(2003), both decided by the government led by the Popular Party after the 2000-
2001 regularization processes, or the shift in the public discourse of the Socialist-
led government after the 2006 “crisis of the cayucos”, stressing the fight against 
irregular migration, and its decision also that year to demand visas from Bolivi-
ans (in force since 2008). 
In both of these policy shifts, the fight against the presence of undocu-
mented foreigners became the central focus of government discourse on immi-
gration, accompanied by political and police measures.  One of those that had the 
most significant effect was the requirement of entry visas for nationals of Latin 
American countries known to be major sources of irregular immigrants.  On the 
other hand, Spain has made substantial efforts to seal its maritime frontier with 
Africa
9, through the development in 2002 of the Integrated System of External 
Surveillance (SIVE) provided with powerful technical resources and able to de-
tect virtually all boats which approach the coastline.  This system has brought a 
dramatic decrease of the arrival of irregular Moroccan immigrants as the read-
mission agreement signed between Spain and Morocco in 1992 made it possible 
to immediately return the irregular immigrants intercepted on arrival at the Span-
ish coasts
10.   
A different challenge has been posed by Sub-Saharans who crossed Mo-
roccan territory to finally travel by boat to Spain.  Morocco still does not accept 
the return of these immigrants when they are caught in Spanish waters or coast-
line, but in 2004 the pressure of the EU achieved the cooperation of Moroccan 
authorities in the surveillance of their own coasts to avoid the departure from 
them of irregular immigrants.  From then on, Sub-Saharans began a riskier travel 
to Spain, beginning in Mauritania to arrive in Canary Islands.  When Spain at-
tained the Mauritanian collaboration in 2005, Sub-Saharans moved further south, 
to Senegal and even Côte d`Ivoire.  As mentioned, the year 2006 was the highest 
point in the arrival of these boats to the Canary Islands, when 25,000 immigrants 
arrived that summer.  
Freedom was the destiny of most Sub-Saharans arriving by boat until 
2006, because of the lack of readmission agreements with their origin countries, 
but the diplomatic offensive of the Spanish government in the Western African 
Coast since 2006 has achieved the signing of accords with Green Cape, Mali, 
Guinea Conakry, Guinea Bissau and Niger and varied forms of cooperation with 
other states in the region, with the result of a notable decrease of irregular arri-
                                                 
9 Although African irregular immigration is statistically irrelevant in comparison with that coming 
from Latin America, it has attained bigger media attention and political concern due to the dramatic 
circumstances which usually surround the travel and to the lower level of professional and language 
skills of African migrants. 
10 However, the problem subsists regarding non-accompanied Moroccan minors. An accord (Mem-
orandum of Understanding) for the repatriation of these minors was signed in 2003 but not applied 
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vals from Africa.  However, a systematic policy to trace and detect irregular im-
migrants inside the country, which would have been coherent with the declared 
priority of fighting illegality, was not carried out until 2008, when the economic 
crisis and the high rate of unemployment among Spaniards, and especially among 
immigrants, put an end to the capacity of the Spanish society for absorbing a big 
influx of immigration.  
There was heavy impact of the crisis on the Spanish labor market and 
notably among immigrants; their concentration in the construction sector, which 
was the worst hit by the recession, dramatically altered the scenario in which 
immigration issues where perceived.  The sudden stop of a period of continuous 
growth and job creation and overwhelming unemployment led to a shift in the 
immigration policy, with the virtual closure of the list of posts offered to 
immigrants, the offering of incentives to the return of unemployed immigrants, 
the hardening of conditions permitting family regrouping and the activation of 
police controls inside the country to identify and arrest irregular migrants. 
 
 
 
Europeanization of Spanish Migration Policy and Spanish Influence in the 
European Agenda 
 
Relations between Spain and the EU in the realm of regulation and management 
of immigration have evolved in two distinct phases, the first being the time peri-
od from Spanish accession to the beginning of the new century, when Spain was 
only a recipient of EU norms and anxieties and acted in the domestic sphere with 
a view to calming these fears towards a new open- door to the Schengen area.  As 
already mentioned, the first attempt to regulate immigration was the answer to 
this Northern anxiety.   
From 2000 on, as immigration became an issue in the domestic political 
and institutional life, Spanish successive governments adopted a more proactive 
approach in their relations with the EU as a whole and with individual member 
States in this realm.  Irregular migration has always been the main axis of this 
relation, as Northern states frequently have perceived the Southern ones as too 
permissive and hence counteracting the restrictive efforts in the North.  Spain has 
been one of the main promoters of Frontex (the European agency for the man-
agement of the external borders, established in 2004) and has pressed to obtain 
EU financial and operative help for the prevention, control and return of irregular 
migration. The establishment in 2007 of a European financial fund for the return 
of irregular migrants 
11or the launching of European repatriation joint flights are 
also results of this Spanish demand for bigger implication of Northern countries 
in the financial cost of immigration management.  Successive regularizations 
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have not helped Spain on this process and have tainted its image, as the govern-
ment could verify in the summer of 2006 when it demanded greater European 
involvement in the fight against African irregular immigration (that summer 
25,000 Sub-Saharans arrived in the Canary Islands); its request was met coldly 
and with reproaches for the big regularization process of the previous year.  
Spanish influence on the European design of a migration policy has been 
especially noticeable in the policy towards migration sending countries.  The so 
called Process of Rabat, established in the Euro-African ministerial meeting of 
July 2006, is the result of a Spanish initiative, then culminated in the Africa-EU 
Partnership signed in 2007.  The leading rationale behind the Rabat Process is 
linking the opening of channels for legal migration with development aid and 
control of irregular migration in the sending or intermediate countries.  This same 
proposal was the core of the “Global Approach” to immigration, also a Spanish 
initiative, approved in the European Council of June 2007, which should lead to 
the incorporation of European migration priorities into the European foreign pol-
icy.   
From the perspective of Spanish efforts to involve EU in the attempt to 
curb irregular migration arriving from Morocco, the more outstanding success 
was the beginning in 2004 of the Moroccan cooperation in the vigilance of its 
coasts to avoid the departure from them of Sub-Saharan irregular migrants. This 
cooperation was the direct result of the EU pressure on Morocco during the nego-
tiations of the Action Plan of the Association Accord and the definition of the 
European financial help through the MEDA funds.  Morocco has resisted the 
European demands for the signing of an accord of readmission of irregular mi-
grants, but the completion in 2008 of the document stating an “advanced status” 
between Morocco and the EU will ease the way towards a future readmission 
accord which would benefit the whole Schengen area and first and foremost 
Spain.   
European norms and institutions have also played the role of external 
sanctions in domestic Spanish decision-making, as the length of the period that 
irregular migrants can be detained was extended from 40 to 60 days.  This exten-
sion had already been decided by the Interior Ministry in 2008 but only imple-
mented after the approval of the European Directive on Return of Immigrants, 
which established a maximum detention period of six months
12.  This Directive 
had been promoted, among others, by the Spanish government,and had provoked 
strong criticisms among champions of human rights, yet went unnoticed by the 
media and hence by the public.   
Spain was very active in the design of the European Pact on Immigration 
and Asylum (2008), proposed by France during its presidency of the EU and 
drawn up in very restrictive terms.  The Pact has constituted the first occasion in 
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which the EU has included in a unique document a complete declaration of intent 
regarding immigration.  The Spanish Socialist government achieved a substantial 
transformation of the text that was finally approved.  The Pact rejects massive 
regularizations, one of the most important elements in the French approach, but 
does not include the French proposal of making the “integration contract” obliga-
tory, a proposal deemed as xenophobic among big parts of the left in Spain.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Spain has experienced during the last decade the biggest inflow of immigration in 
the European Union in an unexpected and unplanned process.  The country was 
unprepared for the management of this inflow of mostly low qualified 
immigrants whose presence has greatly contributed to the strength of the hidden 
economy and the sustaining of the construction bubble, the main motor of 
Spain’s extraordinary economic growth during the first years of the decade, and 
which was well above the European average.  In the period of continuous growth 
(1996-2007), immigrants occupied the jobs that Spaniards left vacant in several 
sectors, such as construction, domestic help, small trade, catering and agriculture.  
A good part of immigrants entered the country irregularly, mainly as bogus 
tourists, and since the year 2000 had enjoyed free access to all kinds of social 
services and were offered guarantees of near-regularization.  The understaffing of 
administrative services dealing with the management of immigration and the 
weakness of internal labor or police controls led to the periodic formation of big 
stocks of irregular migrants, which regularizations absorbed into legality in what 
became the main tool of migration management. 
During the 2000 decade public opinion on this realm evolved from an 
exceptionally positive and sympathetic position on immigration to a negative 
one.  The impact of the demographic change in the public services (which have 
not received the extra funding needed to support a bigger population), the 
competition created in the lowest social levels among immigrants and natives 
regarding low qualified jobs and access to certain social benefits, the effect of 
terrorist attacks on the image of Muslim immigrants, and the new forms of 
criminal activity led by foreigners have all affected public opinion.  Finally, 
when the construction bubble exploded in 2007 due to the international financial 
crisis and the domestic collapse of the domestic model of economic growth, 
Spain achieved the highest rate of unemployment in the EU
13, and public mood 
towards immigration deteriorated greatly.  Since 2008, a more restrictive policy 
has been implemented, which has not achieved a complete stop in the increase of 
the immigrant population, but has greatly reduced its growth rate.  During the 
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years of economic growth successive governments have been subjected to pro-
immigration pressures coming from the business sector, the Catholic Church, the 
ONGs, and the leftist parties and media, while on the opposing side only the 
European Union and individual member states such as France have expressed 
their concerns about the Spanish experience.  In the domestic sphere, the 
unarticulated opposition of lowest social classes, only visible through opinion 
poll, has remained unnoticed.   
The European Union has played a double role in the Spanish immigration 
process: Spain has obtained EU support in the financial and political effort to 
reduce irregular migration, especially coming from Africa, and has used EU 
decisions as external legitimization for the introduction of domestic policies that 
could arouse opposition. 
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Abstract 
 
Membership in the EEC/EU has brought incentives for Spain to achieve econom-
ic ‘real’ convergence. Figures of economic growth are significant in this respect: 
in 1985 the per head income in purchasing power parity (PPP) was 70.6 percent 
of EU's mean; in 2007, it had already reached 103.0 percent regarding the UE-27. 
During the last 25 years, Spain’s welfare has converged with those more mature 
systems of social protection in the EU. Social spending has grown at both a 
quicker and higher pace as compared to other European countries. The process of 
Europeanization has had a great impact in Spain’s welfare development. This 
paper reviews social developments in Spain having as analytical reference the 
European welfare state in its diverse institutionalizations. Spanish welfare state 
appears as a via media between corporatist Continental, liberal Anglo-Saxon, and 
social-democratic Nordic worlds of welfare capitalism.  
 
Introduction 
 
During the 20th century the rise of the welfare state --a European ‘invention’-- 
allowed provision for the basic needs of ‘the people’, through income security, 
health care, housing, and education. After the signing on May 9, 1950 of the Coal 
and Steel Treaty (Day of Europe), the EEC achieved during the so-called trentes 
glorieuses, or ‘Golden Age’ of welfare capitalism (1945-75), unprecedented eco-
nomic growth and high levels of citizens' well-being.  Since 1986, membership in 
the EEC/EU has brought incentives for Spain not only to achieve ‘real’ conver-
gence with other large EU economies. The consolidation of a fully-fledged Euro-
pean welfare state has also been the main challenge Spain decided to address in 
order to be able to offer the benefits to its population as in the other large EU’s 
member states. As could not be otherwise, the process of Europeanization has 
had a great impact on Spain’s social policies.  138                                                                                                    Moreno 
 
 
This paper reviews social developments in Spain having as analytical 
reference the European welfare state in its diverse institutional settings. The 
Spanish welfare state appears as a via media between corporatist Continental, 
liberal Anglo-Saxon, and social-democratic Nordic worlds of welfare capitalism 
A succinct review of Spain’s catching up’ process with Europe is reviewed with 
relation to the construction of the welfare system. Later on, attention is paid to 
Europeanization and EU inputs on labor activation. The increasing participation 
of women in the formal labor market is singled out as a societal transformation 
with far-reaching consequences for the recasting of Spain's welfare state.  
 
Spain’s Via Media of Welfare Development 
 
The European Social Model may be regarded as a project focusing on collective 
solidarity, social equality and productive efficiency. The principles which delimit 
the ESM are in contrast to other socio-economic systems where individualistic 
re-commodification is the feature characteristic of welfare policies (USA), or 
where the social dumping model is proposed as the means for economic growth 
(China). The ESM promotes social citizenship, understood as a limitation to so-
cial and economic inequality, better protection for the most vulnerable, and an 
active social partnership. As a strategic objective, the ESM aims at achieving 
sustained economic development, full employment and sustainability based on 
social cohesion. The articulation of ‘floors’ or ‘nets’ of legal rights and material 
resources for citizens to participate actively in society can be seen as a primary 
concern for European countries. Accordingly, the fight against poverty and social 
exclusion plays a central role in the European social model. However, when 
viewed from below, European social policies appear much more diverse, as a 
kaleidoscope of sediments and peculiarities, although sharing a common perspec-
tive on social risks coverage and the promotion of social citizenship (Moreno and 
Serrano-Pascual 2007; 2011). In the EU context, four types of welfare regime 
may be identified and described briefly as follows: 
The Bismarckian Continental regime is organized on the basis of occupa-
tional categories and is designed much less to reduce inequality than to maintain 
status. It is characterized by concerted action between employers and trade un-
ions, and is financed by the contributions they make. Welfare policies by state 
institutions uphold this arrangement, which is organized through social insur-
ance. There is a sharp distinction between labor market ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. 
The universality of coverage is therefore dependent on the achievement and 
maintenance of full employment.  
The liberal Anglo-Saxon regime was initially patterned by its commit-
ment to a form of universality in the case of the UK (Beveridge Report). Focused 
on poverty alleviation it is financed by general taxation and incorporates residual 
means-tested services and flat-rate benefits. It has more recently pursued a radi-Spain’s Membership   139 
 
 
 
cal shift toward market principles, involving deregulation of the labor market, 
wage flexibility and retrenchment in social expenditure. A low level of de-
commodification of individuals implies a larger measure of dependence by citi-
zens on the market to ensure their primary income and social protection. 
The social-democratic Nordic regime is premised on the combination of 
solidaristic ideas with growth and full employment, and the minimization of fam-
ily dependence. It is financed by taxes, characterized by the principle of univer-
sality, and favors the public provision of free services rather than cash transfers. 
The main aim of this type of welfare state is to ensure the equality and homoge-
neity of social groups within an all-embracing middle class. Full employment is a 
goal based on broad political compromises and consensual governance. 
The familistic Mediterranean regime is characterized by the central role 
played by the family and its interpenetration in all areas of welfare production 
and distribution.  This results in a strong household micro-solidarity and other 
solidarity networks. Southern welfare has performed as a mixed weave of typol-
ogies in trying to integrate citizenship programs (social assistance, non-
contributory pensions), occupational benefits and services (family dependent 
entitlements, labor-related benefits), or even universal schemes (education, health 
care). 
European welfare states are in a process of convergence towards the 
middle concerning, among other indicators: income inequality, public expendi-
ture and social protection expenditure (see Table 1). Gini coefficients and the risk 
of poverty have been reduced slightly, while expenditures have risen in absolute 
terms (Adelantado and Calderón 2006). The politics of the so-called “welfare 
retrenchment” have in fact translated into a generalized concern for “cost con-
tainment” which can be illustrated by: (a) a hardening of the criteria of access to 
and eligibility for welfare entitlements in Continental Europe; (b) a reduction of 
about 10 percent in the generous welfare benefits provided by Nordic welfare 
states; and (c) a transfer of responsibilities from the state-public to the profit-
making private sector in parts of the British welfare state (e.g., pensions) (More-
no and Palier 2005). In all three instances, approaches to reform have been --at 
least partially-- path-dependent on those ideas, institutions and interest upon 
which those welfare states were first built and later developed (Moreno 2008). 
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Table 1: Social Expenditure as percentage of GDP (EU-15) 
 
   1990  1995 1998 2002 2005 
Continental   29.6  30.1 28.8 29.3 29.5 
Nordic  28.1  32.1 30.1 28.8 28.2 
Southern   18.0  22.2 23.7 24.6 24.1 
U. Kingdom  24,3  27.7 26.8 27.6 26.8 
Average EU-15  N.A.  27.7 27.1 27.4 27.8 
Unweighted averages. 
 
Continental Europe: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, The Netherlands; Nordic countries: 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden; Southern Europe: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain. 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
During its phase of expansion (1975-1995), the Spanish welfare state witnessed a 
sharp increase in social spending on social insurance benefits and a widening in 
the public health coverage. The cross-party social agreement of the Pactos de la 
Moncloa in 1977 highly legitimized the accomplishment of both democracy and 
the construction of a welfare state according to European standards. The system 
of social protection in late Francoism was of a Bismarckian nature but it soon 
adopted new traits of other European welfare regimes.  
Already in the early 1990s, Spain’s welfare development appeared as a via media 
between both Bismarckian Continental and liberal Anglo-Saxon worlds of wel-
fare capitalism (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; Moreno 2001). It also incorpo-
rated inputs and traits of the Social-Democratic Nordic welfare typology (More-
no and Sarasa 1992). Later on, while it became more liberal in macroeconomic 
policies, social policymaking followed a pattern of generalization and universali-
zation of welfare entitlements and provision. As a consequence, there has gradu-
ally been a detachment from the Bismarckian principle of income maintenance in 
parallel with an expansion of the social assistance realm financed by general 
taxation (Moreno 2008; Guillén 2010). 
Spain belongs to the Southern European welfare typology. Social-
demographic trends, institutional peculiarities, political resources, socio-
economic backgrounds, patterns of public policy and value-systems are rather 
similar in EU’s southern countries (Sarasa and Moreno 1995; Ferrera 1996; 
Moreno 2006). If there is analytical agreement to include Greece, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain in a South European typology (Giner 1986; Gunther et al. 1995; Male-
fakis 1992; Morlino 1998), the boundary limits of the Mediterranean mode of 
social protection remains a debatable issue (Ferrera 1997). Questions in this re-
spect relate, for instance, to whether France should be included as a Mediterrane-Spain’s Membership   141 
 
 
 
an welfare country, or if new (Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia) or prospective EU mem-
ber states (Croatia, Turkey) share analogous welfare characteristics with coun-
tries located in the West of the Mediterranean Sea. 
 
The catching up process with Europe and the construction of the welfare system 
 
From the time of its accession to the EEC/UE in 1986, Spain’s economic growth 
accelerated in order to catch up with the main European central economies (see 
Table 2). Evidence has lent no support to the ‘social dumping’ explanation for 
such an achievement (Guillén and Matsaganis, 2000). If anything, Spain offers a 
good example of a pattern of “leapfrogging,” or a very compressed transition 
from preindustrial to postindustrial socioeconomic structures (Ferrera, 2007). In 
the referred-to period 1945-2008, Spain passed from peripheral to core status 
within the international economic order (Espina 2007). Since the 1960s the coun-
try followed a pattern of ‘mixed market economy’, a variant of the ‘coordinated 
mixed economy’ variety of contemporary capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
Spain, together with other Mediterranean market economies (Italy, Portugal and 
Greece), is in a cluster which incorporates market, non-market and mixed forms 
of economic coordination (Amable 2003; Royo 2008). 
 
Table 2: Spain’s economic ‘catch-up’ drive (EU-15) 
 
1945  1960  1985 2009*
49.5%  57.2%  69.8% 95.2%
 
Note: Per capita income (in purchasing power parity PPP) as percentage of Euro-
pean mean 
 
* Estimate regarding the EU-15. The corresponding figure for EU-27 was 103% 
Source: González-Temprano (2003), Moreno (2004), Eurostat. 
 
A great deal of Spain’s welfare provisions and institutional arrangements has 
been made possible by the financial resources available. Certainly, high public 
expenditure does not translate automatically into a generous welfare state. It is a 
necessary although not sufficient condition. A look at Table 3 illustrates the big 
increase in Spain’s tax revenue as percentage of the GDP in the period 1965-
2008, in line with other EU countries. Tax as percentage of GDP has been steadi-
ly higher than not only USA or Japan, but also than all non-European OECD 
countries (except New Zealand).  
Two-thirds of citizens in Spain have repeatedly expressed their support 
for a direct public provision of welfare (Table 4). The high proportion of those in 
favor of the option for ‘universalistic statism’ is high among voters for both main 
right-wing and left-wing parties (Popular Party-PP and Socialist Party-PSOE. 142                                                                                                    Moreno 
 
 
Such citizens’ attitudinal expressions provide a wide legitimating political base 
for the development of the welfare state (Arriba et al. 2006). 
 
Table 3: Total tax as percentage of GDP in selected countries (1965-2008) 
 
  1965  1975  1985  1995  2004  2008  65-08 
Argentina  -----  -----  -----  21.2  19.1  23.2*  +2.0 
Brazil  -----  -----  ----  27.3  32.2  26.1  -1.3 
Chile  -----  -----  ----  17.6  18.2  14.2  -3.4 
Mexico  -----  -----  17.0  16.7  19  12.5  -4.5 
USA  24.7  25.6  25.6  27.9  25.5  26.1  +1.4 
         
Denmark  29.9  39.3  46.5  48.8  48.8  48.2  +18.3 
Finland  30.4  36.7  39.9  45.6  44.2  43.1  +12.7 
Sweden  35.0  41.6  47.8  48.1  50.4  46.3  +11.3 
          
France  34.5  35.5  42.4  42.9  43.4  43.2  +8.7 
Germany  31.6  35.3  37.2  37.2  34.7  37.0  +5.4 
UK  30.4  35.3  37.7  35.0  36.0  35.7  +5.3 
         
Greece  19.9  21.3  28  31.7  35  32.6  +12.7 
Italy  25.5  25.4  33.6  40.1  41.1  43.3  +17.8 
Portugal  15.8  19.7  25.2  31.7  34.5  35.2  +19.4 
Spain  14.7  18.4  27.2  32.1  34.8  33.3  +18.6 
          
UE-15  27.9  32.4  37.7  39.2  39.7  -----  +11.8 
OECD 
(total)  25.8  29.7  32.9  35.1  35.9  34.8  +9.0 
 
Unweighted mean. 
*2007 for Argentina 
Source: Revenue Statistics. OECD (www.oecdwash.org/DATA/STATS/taxrevenue.pdf; 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/total-tax-revenue_20758510-table2 ) and ECLAC for Brazil 
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Table 4: Legitimation bases for the welfare state in Spain 
 
  1985 1989 1993 1995 2005 2006  2008 
The Government is responsible for 
each and everyone of citizens’ 
welfare and has the duty to help 
them out to solve their problems 
68  58  61  62  68  66  74 
The Government is responsible 
only for the least-favored citizens 
and has the duty to help them out 
to solve their problems  
*   21  18  15  23  21  15 
Citizens are responsible themselves 
of their own welfare and have the 
duty of sorting out their own prob-
lems 
18  5  16  16  5  10  7 
D.K./N.A.  13  16  5  5  4  3  4 
N  2489 2494 2500 2487 2490 2490  2454 
 
 
Percentages have been rounded. 
* Option not included in 1985. 
 
Source: Spanish Sociological Research Center (CIS): Studies 1.465 (1985), 1.849 
(1989), 2.063 (1993), 2.187 (1.995), 2.594 (2005), 2.644 (2006) and 2.765 (2008)  
 
In institutional terms, the consolidation of Spanish welfare rests upon four pillars 
concerning education, health, income transfers and social services (see Table 5). 
Spain has preserved its basic four pillars for the provision of social protection 
and services, which is relatively extensive in coverage (health, pensions and un-
employment protection and, to a lesser degree, personal services), but with a 
relatively low intensity of protection. There is a noticeable participation of the 
market and a growing Third Sector involvement, which implies in many cases a 
shifting to the individuals and the households of the costs of welfare provision. 
New policies of territorial cohesion have been introduced to avoid financial inef-
ficiencies in the National Health System. Likewise, renewed attempts to reforms 
the pensions systems have been voiced despite the fact that the system does not 
face the kind of sustainability problem as happens with the 'generous' provision 
in Greece and Italy (Ramos and del Pino 2009). Further development of the na-
tional service for long-term care appears uncertain due to the extra financing 
required from both central and regional governments (Marbán 2009). In sum, the 144                                                                                                    Moreno 
 
 
Spanish welfare state can be regarded as an incomplete universal system, of an 
institutionally mixed nature, relatively fragmented in several levels of social pro-
tection and with spending levels around the EU-27 mean. In fact, the financial 
effects of the crisis have meant a sharp increase in social spending, particularly in 
unemployment benefits, coupled with a fall and subsequent stagnation of GDP 
growth (González-Temprano, 2003; Moreno and Rodríguez-Cabrero 2007; 
Moreno 2009; Navarro 2009; Rodríguez-Cabrero 2010).  
 
Table 5: Pillars Spain's welfare state 
 
Policy 
area 
Rights and entitle-
ments 
Institutional landmarks Public 
pending 
(% GDP) 
Education  Basic and compulso-
ry instruction (6-16 
years) 
Law on Education (1985) 
Law on Education, 
LOGSE (1990) Law on 
Education (2006) 
 
 
4.5% 
 
Health  Universal access to 
benefits and services 
of the National 
Health System 
Law on Health (National 
Health Service, 1986) 
Law on Cohesion and 
Quality of the National 
Health Service (2003)
 
6% 
 
 
Income 
transfers 
Pensions and social 
insurance benefits 
 
Minimum income 
support (means-
tested) and assis-
tance for unem-
ployed 
Law on Social Security 
(1966) 
Law on Non-Contributory 
Pensions (1990, disability 
and retirement)  
Regional laws on mini-
mum  (1989-1995) 
 
 
16.3% 
Social ser-
vices and 
care 
Universal and de-
centralized access to 
the basic network of 
benefits and services 
Long-term care and 
promotion of per-
sonal autonomy 
Intergovernmental Con-
certed Plan on Social Ser-
vices by provided by Local 
Authorities (1987) 
Regional laws on social 
services (1980-1996) 
Law on Dependency and 
Long-Term Care (2006)
 
 
1.4% 
 
Source: Own elaboration. Financial data provided by the 2009 National and Re-
gional budget accounts (NB. Social spending by the local administration has not Spain’s Membership   145 
    
 
 
been aggregated). Data on both central and regional correspond to spending in-
ternally consolidated. 
 
EU's Input On Activity Rates and Female Labor Participation 
 
The paradigm of labor activation championed by the EU and other international 
institutions, such as the OECD and the IMF, has been fully embraced by Spanish 
authorities. A look at the evolution of labor market (Figure 1) helps to explain the 
degree of Europeanization in a policy area of important implications for the fu-
ture evolution of the Bismarckian component of the Spanish welfare state.  
 
It is a well-known structural fact that Spain’s labor market can create great num-
bers of jobs in short periods of time, but it also destroy much employment in 
times of crisis (Garrido-Medina 2010). Such oscillations produce acute knock-on 
effects in welfare provision. As a reminder, during the period of accelerated 
growth, 1994-2007, 8 million jobs were created and unemployment fell to 8.3%. 
No other large EU country experienced increases in its labor activity rates of 
such proportions. In 2010, in the midst of the financial crisis, unemployment 
jumped to around 20% of the active population, highest in the Eurozone: 1 in 5 
active workers were jobless. As unusual as it may seem, such a swing in fortunes 
was not extraordinary as compared to the previous growing economic cycle of 
1986-1991. In 1994, unemployment reached 24.2% of the active population, or 1 
jobless for every 4 active workers 
 
Figure 1: Active population and employment by sex (1976-2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Encuesta de Población Activa (Spanish Labor Force Survey) 
(www.ine.es), Arriba 2010. 
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A result of Spain’s workfare policies has been a quantum-leap increase in the 
participation of women in the formal labor market. This can be singled out as the 
great transformation in Spain's political economy and welfare development in 
contemporary times. In 1977 Spain's female activity rate was lower than half of 
the male rate. In 2000 it was around 85% of that corresponding to active male 
workers. As reflected in Table 6, the percentage of women’s activity rate during 
1976-2009 nearly trebled in the young to middle age-groups (25-49 years). This 
process is of the outmost importance in a familistic welfare regime. It affects an 
age group where women often confront not only demanding job careers, but also 
a greater household involvement related to reproduction and child care activities. 
In 2010, almost 3 out 4 Spanish women aged 25-54 years were active in the for-
mal labor market. Furthermore, and contrary to other patterns in Central and 
Northern Europe, Spanish women participated primarily in the labor market on a 
full-time basis,  something which made the combination of domestic and paid 
work all the more difficult. 
 
Table 6 Female activity rates in Spain (1976-2009) 
 
Age 
groups  1976  1980  1985  1990  1995  2003  2010 
% popula-
tion by 
age 
groups 
16-19  48.57  39.97  31.97  30.25  21.77  18.4  19.64 4.49 
20-24  53.49  54.71  54.53  61.20  57.95  56.36  64.25 6.57 
25- 54  29.07  30.40  35.62  47.87  56.47  66.01  77.90 53.81 
+55  13.84  11.24  10.05  8.99  8.46  9.68  15.22 35.13 
Total  28.53  27.77  28.96  34.56  37.86  43.15  55.22 100.0 
 
Source:  Encuesta de Población Activa (Spanish Labor Force Survey), INE 
(www.ine.es) 
 
Within families the role of women has traditionally been pivotal, as they have 
often cared particularly for children or older relatives at the expense of erratic 
careers or full withdrawal from the labor market. However, as the hyperactivity 
of cohorts of “superwomen” vanishes gradually, there is a serious vacuum Spain’s Membership   147 
    
 
 
emerging in welfare provision which will have enduring effects in social care 
(Salido and Moreno 2009). The increasing externalization of personal care ser-
vices traditionally provided by the family has taken a particular turn in Spain, as 
in other South European countries. Such services are often purchased from im-
migrants at low cost. This process has generalized since 2000, something which 
reiterates preferences in Southern Europe for contingent solutions (Moreno-
Fuentes 2009). Developments in this case have unfolded along the lines of the 
liberal Anglo-Saxon model of private preference for market provision, rather 
than for the ‘top down’ institutionalization of structural reforms, as in the Nordic 
countries.In fact, sorting out the apparent conflict between society’s expectations 
of women’s role as mothers and active workers appears as a crucial element in 
order to adapt Spain’s familistic Mediterranean welfare regime to the dual chal-
lenge of increasing labor productivity growth and preserving social cohesion 
(Salido 2006; Salido and Moreno 2007). 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Since 1986, gradual and accumulative reforms of the Spanish welfare state have 
been of a piecemeal and fragmented nature. Unlike cases in Central and Northern 
Europe, Spain’s catching up with EU core countries has been achieved following 
a Mediterranean mode of welfare development. A syncretic via media which has 
incorporated elements and rationale characteristics of other worlds of welfare 
capitalism (Bismarckian, Liberal and Social-Democratic) is responsible for such 
a process. 
Prior to the 2007 financial crisis, Spain’s economy had successfully ac-
complished its long-standing goal to catch up with EU’s core. During the 1990s 
and 2000s the Spanish economy benefited from the global real estate boom, 
reaching figures such as16% of GDP and 12% of employment. After the collapse 
of the construction sector, the level of private debt has skyrocketed putting great 
pressure on the middle classes and calling into question an economic model 
based on 'the brick and the sun’ (Spain is the world's second largest tourist desti-
nation). 
Regarding Europeanization, it can be expected that Spain will continue to follow 
political developments in the European Union as main points of references for its 
own political economy and welfare policies. European governance based upon 
decentralization and the involvement of stakeholders in policy elaboration and 
design has had a considerable impact on Spain’s federal-like ‘State of Autono-
mies’ (Moreno 2010). Indeed, Spanish political economy and welfare develop-
ment will continue to be shaped by the process of Europeanization. This should 
come as no surprise in a country with an ‘optimistic’ view on the future of Eu-
rope. 
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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to use the experience of Portugal and Spain in the 
European Union (EU) to draw some lessons that may be applicable to Eastern 
European countries. Portugal and Spain’s experiences will illustrate some of the 
opportunities and challenges associated with EU and European Monetary Union 
(EMU) membership. The paper examines the economic performance of both 
countries during the last decade, analyzes the impact of the global financial crisis 
and outlines some lessons that can be derived from the Iberian experiences. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
After decades of relative isolation under an authoritarian regime the success of 
the Portuguese and Spanish democratic transitions in the second half of the 1970s 
paved the way for full membership in the European Community. For Portugal, 
Spain, and its European Community (EC) partners this momentous and long 
awaited development had profound consequences and set in motion complex 
processes of adjustment.
1 
There was no dispute that Portugal and Spain belonged to Europe. This 
was not just a geographical fact. Portugal and Spain both shared its traditions, 
culture, religion, and intellectual values with the rest of Europe. Moreover, they 
                                                 
1References to the European Economic Community (EEC) or the European Union (EU) can be 
misleading if the historical period covered extends past the last two decades. This paper addresses 
themes in the European Economic Community prior to the introduction of the European Union 
label in the Maastricht Treaty of 1991. The terms ‘the European Community’ (EC) or ‘the Europe-
an Union’ (EU) are used indistinctly to refer to the European integration process and institutions 
throughout the article. Similarly, ‘Europe’ is here always used to refer to the countries that are 
members of the European Union, either before or after the Maastricht Treaty. 156                                                                                                         Royo 
 
 
had historically contributed to the Christian occidental conceptions of mankind 
and society dominant in Europe. Without Portugal and Spain the European iden-
tity would only be a reflection of an incomplete body. It belonged to Europe. Its 
entry into the European Community was a reaffirmation of that fact. 
The purpose of this paper is to use the experience of Portugal in the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) to draw some lessons that may be applicable to Eastern Eu-
ropean countries. Portugal and Spain’s experiences will illustrate some of the 
opportunities and challenges associated with EU and European Monetary Union 
(EMU) membership. 
The paper examines the economic performance of both countries during 
the last decade, analyzes the impact of the global financial crisis and outlines 
some lessons that can be derived from the Iberian experiences. 
 
 
Spain: From Miracle to Bust 
 
Before the global crisis that hit Spain in the spring of 2008, which has had devas-
tating consequences for the Spanish economy, the country had become one of 
Europe’s (until then) most successful economies.
2 While other European coun-
tries had been stuck in the mud, Spain performed much better at reforming its 
welfare systems and labor markets, as well as at improving flexibility and lower-
ing unemployment. Indeed, over the last decade and a half the Spanish economy 
has been able to break with the historical pattern of boom and bust, and the coun-
try’s economic performance was nothing short of remarkable. Propped by low 
interest rates and immigration, Spain was (in 2008) in its fourteenth year of unin-
terrupted growth and it was benefiting from the longest cycle of continuing ex-
pansion of the Spanish economy in modern history (only Ireland in the Euro zone 
has a better record), which contributed to the narrowing of per capita GDP with 
the EU.
3 Indeed, in 20 years per capita income grew 20 points, one point per 
year, to reach close to 90 percent of the EU15 average. With the EU25 Spain has 
already reached the average. The country has grown on average 1.4 percentage 
points more than the EU since 1996. 
 Unemployment fell from 20 percent in the mid-1990s to 7.95 percent in 
the first half of 2007 (the lowest level since 1978), as Spain became the second 
country in the EU (after Germany with a much larger economy) creating the most 
                                                 
2 This article draws upon Royo2008, 2009, and 2010. A previous version was present at APSA in 
2010. 
3 “Zapatero Accentuates Positives in Economy, but Spain Has Other Problems,” in Financial 
Times, April 16, 2007, p. 4; and “Spanish Economy at Its Best for 29 years, Says Zapatero,” in 
Financial Times, April 18, 2007, p. 3. Lessons   157 
    
 
 
jobs (an average of 600,000 per year over the last decade).
4 In 2006 the Spanish 
economy grew a spectacular 3.9 percent and 3.8 percent in 2007. As we have 
seen, economic growth contributed to per capita income growth and employment. 
Indeed, the performance of the labor market was spectacular: between 1997 and 
2007, 33 percent of all the total employment created in the EU-15 was created in 
Spain. In 2006 the active population increased by 3.5 percent, the highest in the 
EU (led by new immigrants and the incorporation of women in the labor market, 
which increased from 59 percent in 1995 to 72 percent in 2006); and 772,000 
new jobs were created. The public deficit was also eliminated (the country be-
tween 2005 and 2006 had a superavitwhich reached 1.8 percent of GDP, or 18 
billion Euros, in 2006), and the public debt was reduced to 39.8 percent of GDP, 
the lowest in the last two decades.
5 The construction boom has also been remark-
able: more than 400,000 new homes have been built in and around Madrid be-
tween 2002 and 2007. 
The overall effects of EMU integration were also very positive for the 
country: it contributed to macroeconomic stability, it imposed fiscal discipline 
and central bank independence, and it dramatically lowered the cost of capital. 
One of the key benefits was the dramatic reduction in short-term and long-term 
nominal interest rates: from 13.3 percent and 11.7 percent in 1992, to 3.0 percent 
and 4.7 percent in 1999, and 2.2 percent and 3.4 percent in 2005.
6 The lower 
costs of capital led to an important surge in investment from families (in housing 
and consumer goods) and businesses (in employment and capital goods). Without 
the Euro the huge trade deficit that exploded in the second half of the 2000s 
would have forced a devaluation of the peseta and the implementation of more 
restrictive fiscal policies.  
The economic success extended to Spanish companies, which now ex-
panded beyond their traditional frontiers (Guillén 2005). In 2006 they spent a 
total of 140 bn Euros ($184bn) on domestic and overseas acquisitions, putting the 
country third behind the United Kingdom and France.
7 Of this, 80bn Euros were 
to buy companies abroad (compared with the 65bn Euros spent by German com-
panies).
8  In 2006 Spanish FDI abroad increased 113 percent, reaching 71,487 bn 
Euros (or the equivalent of 7.3 percent of GDP, compared with 3.7 percent in 
2005).
9  In 2006 Iberdrola, an electricity supplier purchased Scottish Power for 
$22.5bn to create Europe’s third largest utility; Banco Santander, Spain’s largest 
                                                 
4 “El paro se sitúa en el 7.95% y alcanza su nivel más bajo desde 1978,” in El País, Friday, July 27, 
2007. 
5 “La economía española se hace fuerte,” in El País, March 25, 2007 and “La economía repuntó al 
3.9% en 2006 tras el mayor avance de la productividad en nueve años,” in El País, February 22, 
2007. 
6 Guillermo de la Dehesa, “La Próxima Recesión,” in  El País, January 21, 2007. 
7“Spain’s Bold Investors to Offset ‘Gentle Slowdown,’” in Financial Times, February 22, 2007. 
8 From “Modernised Nation Faces Uncharted Territory,” in Financial Times: Special Report, 
Thursday, June 21, 2007, p. 1. 
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bank, purchased Britain’s Abbey National Bankfor $24bn, Ferrovial, a family 
construction group, concluded a takeover of the British BAA (which operates the 
three main airports of the United Kingdom) for 10bn pounds; and Telefonica 
bought O2, the U.K. mobile phone company.
10 Indeed, 2006 was a banner year 
for Spanish firms: 72 percent of them increased their production and 75.1 percent 
their profits, 55.4 percent hired new employees, and 77.6 percent increased their 
investments.
11 
The country’s transformation was not only economic but also social. The 
Spanish became more optimistic and self-confident (i.e., a Harris poll showed 
that they were more confident of their economic future than their European and 
American counterparts, and a poll by the Center for Sociological Analysis 
showed that 80 percent were satisfied or very satisfied with their economic situa-
tion).
12 Spain is “different” again and according to a recent poll it has become the 
most popular country to work for Europeans.
13 Between 2000-2007, some 5 mil-
lion immigrants (645,000 in 2004 and 500,000 in 2006) settled in Spain (8.7 per-
cent of the population compared with 3.7 percent in the EU15), making the coun-
try the biggest recipient of immigrants in the EU (they represent 10 percent of the 
contributors to the Social Security system). This is a radical departure for a coun-
try that used to be a net exporter of people, and more so because it has been able 
to absorb these immigrants without falling prey (at least so far) to the social ten-
sions that have plagued other European countries (although there have been iso-
lated incidents of racial violence) (Calativa, 2005).
14 Several factors have con-
tributed to this development.
15 First, economic growth, with its accompanying 
job creation, provided jobs for the newcomers while pushing down overall un-
employment. Second, cultural factors: about one-third of the immigrants come 
from Latin America, and they share the same language and part of the culture, 
which facilitates their integration. Third, demographic: an aging population and 
low birth-rates. Finally, the national temperament characterized by a generally 
tolerant attitude, marked by the memory of a history of emigration, which make 
                                                 
10“Siesta’s Over for Spain’s Economy,” in Los Angeles Times, April 7, 2007. 
11Deloitte’s “Barometro de Empresas,” from “Un año de grandes resultados,” in El País, Sun-
dayJanuary 14, 2006. 
12 “Spanish Bulls,” in Financial Times, Tuesday, February 20, 2007.  
13 According to the Financial Times, 17 percent of those polled selected Spain as the country where 
they would prefer to work ahead of the United Kingdom (15 percent) and France (11 percent).  See 
“Españavuelve a serdiferente,” in El País, February 19, 2007, and Financial Times, February 19, 
2007. 
14Calativa provides a detailed analysis of the immigration experience in Spain and exposes the 
tensions associated with this development. She also highlights the shortcomings of governments’ 
actions in regard to integration, and the impact of lack of integration on exclusion, criminalization, 
and radicalization. 
15 “Tolerant Spain Is Booming as It Absorbs Flood of Foreign Workers,” in Financial Times, Tues-
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the Spanish more sympathetic to immigrants (according to a recent poll no fewer 
than 42 percent states that migration has had a positive effect on the economy). 
The proportion of children from mixed marriages increased from 1.8 percent in 
1995 to 11.5 percent in 2005.
16 
These immigrants contributed significantly to the economic success of 
the country in that decade because they boosted the aggregate performance of the 
economy: They raised the supply of labor, increased demand as they spent mon-
ey, moderated wages, and put downward pressure on inflation, boosted output, 
allowed the labor market to avoid labor shortages, contributed to consumption, 
and increased more flexibility in the economy with their mobility and willingness 
to take on low-paid jobs in sectors such as construction and agriculture, in which 
the Spanish were no longer interested.
17 
Indeed, an important factor in the per capita convergence surge after 
2000 was the substantive revision of the Spanish GDP data as a result of changes 
in the National Accounts from 1995 to 2000. These changes represented an in-
crease in GPD per capita of 4 percent in real terms (the equivalent of Slovakia’s 
GDP). This dramatic change was the result of the significant growth of the Span-
ish population since 1998 as a result of the surge in immigration (for instance in 
2003 population grew 2.1 percent). The key factor in this acceleration of conver-
gence, given the negative behavior of productivity (if productivity had grown at 
the EU average Spain would have surpassed in 2007 the EU per capita  average 
by 3 points), was the important increase in the participation rate, which was the 
result of the reduction in unemployment, and the increase in the activity rate 
(proportion of people of working age who have a job or are actively seeking one) 
that followed the incorporation of female workers into the labor market and im-
migration growth. Indeed between 2000 and 2004 the immigration population 
has multiplied by threefold. 
 
 
Table 1: The Determinants of Real Convergence in Spain 2000-04 (UE25=100) 
 
  Per Capita 
Rent 
Labor Produc-
tivity 
Participation 
Rate 
Demographic 
Factor 
2000  92.7   99.0  91.8  102.4 
2004  97.2 96.8  98.5 102.8 
Difference  +4.5  -2.2  +6.7  + 0.4 
Source OEP 2005, p. 18. 
 
 
                                                 
16 “Spanish Bulls,” in Financial Times, Tuesday, February 20, 2007. Still, 59 percent thought that 
there were “too many foreigners” in the country. 
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As a matter of fact most of the 772,000 new jobs created in Spain in 2006 
went to immigrants (about 60 percent).
18 Their motivation to work hard also 
opened the way for productivity improvements (which in 2006 experienced the 
largest increase since 1997, with a 0.8 percent hike). It is estimated that the con-
tribution of immigrants to GDP in the last four years has been of 0.8 percentage 
points.
19 Immigration has represented more than 50 percent of employment 
growth, and 78.6 percent of the demographic growth (as a result Spain has led the 
demographic growth of the European countries between 1995 and 2005 with a 
demographic advance of 10.7 percent compared with the EU15 average of 4.8 
percent).
20 They have also contributed to the huge increase in employment, which 
has been one of the key reasons for the impressive economic expansion. Indeed, 
between 1988 and 2006, employment contributed 3 percentage points to the 3.5 
percent annual rise in Spain’s potential GDP (see Table 6).
21 
 
The Basis for Success 
 
What made this transformation possible? The modernization of the Spanish 
economy in the last two and half decades has been intimately connected to the 
country’s integration in the European Union. Indeed, European integration was a 
catalyst for the final conversion of the Spanish economy into a modern Western-
type economy. Yet, membership was not the only reason for this development. 
The economic liberalization, trade integration, and modernization of the Spanish 
economy started in the 1950s and 1960s and Spain became increasingly prosper-
ous over the two decades prior to EU accession. However, one of the key conse-
quences of its entry into Europe has been that it consolidated and deepened that 
processes, and it has accelerated the modernization of the country’s economy. 
EU membership facilitated the micro- and macroeconomic reforms that succes-
sive Spanish governments undertook throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Spain has 
also benefited extensively from European funds: approximately 150 million Eu-
ros from agricultural, regional development, training, and cohesion programs. 
Moreover, European Monetary Union (EMU) membership has also been 
very positive for the country: it has contributed to macroeconomic stability, it has 
imposed fiscal discipline and central bank independence, and it has lowered dra-
matically the cost of capital. One of the key benefits has been the dramatic reduc-
tion in short-term and long-term nominal interest rates: from 13.3 per cent and 
11.7 per cent in 1992, to 3.0 per cent and 4.7 per cent in 1999, and 2.2 per cent 
                                                 
18 “El paro baja hasta el 8.3% en 2006, la mejor tasa desde 1979,” in El País, January 26, 2007. 
19 Guillermo de la Dehesa, “La Próxima Recesión,” in  El País, January 21, 2007. 
20 “La Economía española creció en la última década gracias a la aportación de los inmigrantes,” in 
El País, Monday, August 28, 2006. 
21 See Martin Wolf, “Pain Will Follow Years of Economic Gain,” in Financial Times, March 29, 
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and 3.4 per cent in 2005. The lower costs of capital led to an important surge in 
investment from families (in housing and consumer goods) and businesses (in 
employment and capital goods). Indeed, EMU membership (and the Stability 
Pact) has provided the country with unprecedented stability because it has forced 
successive governments to consolidate responsible economic policies, which 
have led to greater credibility and the improvement of the ratings of Spain’s pu-
bic debt (and consequently to lower financing costs). 
Another important factor to account for the country’s economic success 
has been the remarkable economic policy stability that followed the economic 
crisis of 1992-93. Indeed, there have been few economic policy shifts throughout 
the 1990s and early 2000s, and this despite changes in government. Between 
1993 and 2008 there has been only two Ministers of Finance, Pedro Solbes (from 
1993-96, and from 2004-present) and Rodrigo Rato (from 1996-2004); and the 
country only had three Prime Ministers (Felipe González, José María Aznar, and 
José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero). This pattern was further reinforced by the ideo-
logical cohesiveness of the political parties in government and the strong control 
that party leaders exercise over the members of the cabinet and the parliament 
deputies. 
In addition, this stability was reinforced by the shared (and rare) agree-
ment among the Conservatives and Socialists leaders regarding fiscal consolida-
tion (the balance budget objective was established by law by the Popular Party), 
as well as the need to hold firm in the application of restrictive fiscal policies and 
the achievement of budgetary fiscal surpluses: As a result, a 7 percent budget 
deficit in 1993 became a 2.2 per cent surplus in 2007; and public debt decreased 
from 68 per cent of GDP in 1998 to 36.2 per cent in 2007. 
Finally, other factors that contributed to this success include the limited corrup-
tion and the fact that politics are fairly clean in Spain,
22 a relatively open and 
flexible economy, and the success of Spanish multinationals: There were eight 
firms in the Financial Times list of the world’s largest multinationals in 2000, 
and 14 in 2008 
 
The Challenges 
 
However, this economic success was marred by some glaring deficiencies that 
came to the fore in 2008 when the global financial crisis hit the country, because 
it was largely a “miracle” based on bricks and mortar (Martinez-Mongay and 
MazaLasierra 2009; and Martinez-Mongay 2008).
23 The foundations of economic 
                                                 
22According to the latest data (2007) from the World Bank Governance Indicators 
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp), Spain is ranked in the 75-100
th country’s 
percentile ranks in control of corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
and voice and accountability. 
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growth were fragile because the country has low productivity growth (productivi-
ty contributed only 0.5 percentage points to potential GDP between 1998 and 
2006) and deteriorating external competitiveness.
24 Over the last decade Spain 
did not address its fundamental challenge, its declining productivity, which has 
only grown an average of 0.3 percent in the last 10 years (0.7 percent in 2006), 
one whole point below the EU average, placing Spain at the bottom of the EU 
and ahead of only Italy and Greece (the productivity of a Spanish worker is the 
equivalent of 75 percent of a U.S. one). The most productive activities (energy, 
industry, and financial services) contribute only 11 percent of GDP growth.
25 
Moreover, growth was largely based on low-intensity economic sectors, 
such as services and construction, which are not exposed to international compe-
tition. In 2006 most of the new jobs were created in low-productivity sectors such 
as construction (33 percent), services associated with housing such as sales and 
rentals (15 percent), and tourism and domestic service (30 percent). These sectors 
represent 75 percent of all the new jobs created in Spain in 2006 (new manufac-
turing jobs, in contrast, represented only 5 percent). The labor temporary rate 
reached 33.3 percent in 2007, and inflation is a recurrent problem (it closed 2006 
with a 2.7 percent increase, but the average for that year was 3.6 percent), thus 
the inflation differential with the EU (almost 1 point) has not decreased, which 
reduces the competitiveness of Spanish products abroad (and consequently Span-
ish companies are losing market share abroad).
26 
In addition, family indebtedness reached a record 115 percent of dispos-
able income in 2006, and the construction and housing sectors accounted for 18.5 
percent of GDP (twice the Eurozone average). House prices have risen by 150 
percent since 1998, and the average price of a square meter of residential proper-
ty went up from 700 Euros in 1997 to 2,000 at the end of 2006, even though the 
housing stock had doubled. Many wonder whether this bubble is sustainable.
27 
The crisis that started in 2008 confirmed the worst fears. 
40 to 60 percent of the benefits of the largest Spanish companies came 
from abroad. Yet, in the last few years this figure has decreased by approximate-
ly 10 percentage points, and there has been a decline in direct foreign investment 
of all types in the country, falling from a peak of 38.3 billion Euros in 2000 to 
                                                                                                                         
credit impulse and strong immigration, underpinned by some right policy choices. In the absence of 
new positive shocks, the resilience of the Spanish economy to the financial crisis might be weaker 
than that exhibited in the early 2000s. The credit impulse has ended, fiscal consolidation has 
stopped, and the competitiveness gains of the nineties have gone long ago”  
24. “Fears of Recession as Spain Basks in Economic Bonanza,” in Financial Times, Thursday, June 
8, 2006.  
25 “Los expertos piden cambios en la política de I+D,” in El País, Monday, December 18, 2006. 
26Angel Laborda, “El comercio en 2006,” in El País, Sunday, March 11, 2007, p. 20.  
27 Wolfgang Munchau, “Spain, Ireland and Threats to the Property Boom,” in Financial Times, 
Monday, March 19, 2007; “Spain Shudders as Ill Winds Batter US Mortgages,” in Financial Times, 
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16.6 billion Euros in 2005.
28 The current account deficit reached 8.9 percent of 
GDP in 2006 and over 10 percent in 2007, which makes Spain the country with 
the largest deficit in absolute terms (86,026 million Euros), behind only the Unit-
ed States; imports are 25 percent higher than exports and Spanish companies are 
losing market share in the world. And the prospects are not very bright. The trade 
deficit reached 9.5 percent in 2008.
29 
While there is overall consensus that the country needs to improve its 
education system and invest in research and development to lift productivity, as 
well as modernize the public sector, and make the labor market more stable (i.e., 
reduce the temporary rate) and flexible, the government has not taken the neces-
sary actions to address these problems. Spain spends only half of what the Organ-
ization of European Cooperation and Development (OECD) spends on average 
on education; it lags most of Europe on investment in Research and Development 
(R&D); and it is ranked 29
th by the UNCTAD as an attractive location for re-
search and development. Finally, other observers note that Spain is failing to do 
more to integrate its immigrant population, and social divisions are beginning to 
emerge (see Calavita 2005).
30 
By the summer of 2008 the effects of the crisis were very evident, and 
since then the country has suffered one of the worst recessions in history, with 
unemployment reaching over 18 percent at the end of 2009, and more than 4.2 
million people unemployed. This collapse was not fully unexpected. The global 
liquidity crisis caused by the subprime, and the surge in commodities, food, and 
energy prices brought to the fore the imbalances in the Spanish economy: the 
record current account deficit, persisting inflation, low productivity growth, 
dwindling competitiveness, increasing unitary labor costs, excess consumption, 
and low savings, had all set the ground for the current devastating economic cri-
sis (see Royo 2009). 
 
Portugal: The Consequences of ‘Chronic Fiscal Misbehavior’ 
 
Portugal’s economic performance was also remarkable in the 1990s. Between 
1994 and 2000 real GDP growth, export-led but also boosted by private con-
sumption and fixed investment, averaged more than 3 percent annually and eco-
nomic expansion continued for seven years. In 1996, the fifth year of expansion, 
GDP growth reached almost 4 percent, and in 2000 3.25 percent.  The unem-
ployment rate also fell, reaching a record low of around 4 percent in 2000 (one of 
the lowest in Europe), and inflation was brought down to just over 2 percent in 
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1999. Portugal was also able to meet the Maastricht criteria for fiscal deficit fol-
lowing the consolidation efforts prior to 1997, which brought the deficit down to 
2.5 percent of GDP. One of the important factors that contributed to this perfor-
mance was the transformation of the financial sector, largely spurred by EU di-
rectives in interest rate deregulation, liberalization of the regulatory framework, 
privatization, and freeing of international capital movements (OECD 1999, 13). 
The privatization program, one of the most ambitious in Europe at the time (more 
than 100 firms were sold), was also a contributing factor because it increased 
competition and enhanced productivity gains, and generated revenues that aver-
aged more than 2 percent of GDP per year 
The performance of the labor market was also very satisfactory, particu-
larly compared with Spain (see Table 7). Real wage flexibility facilitated labor 
market adjustments, and access to atypical forms of employment, such as self-
employment, made it possible to circumvent rigid regulations. In addition, regu-
latory reforms and new policy initiatives contributed to improve education and 
training; modified the legal regime governing redundancies, and reduced the 
compensations that companies have to pay to dismiss workers; changed the un-
employment benefit system to avoid the unemployment “trap,” and the social 
security contributions for self-employed were brought into line with those for 
employees (OECD 1999, 16-17). A high degree of wage flexibility, active em-
ployment policies, and the increasing use of more flexible forms of employment, 
such as fixed-term contracts, were all credited for the low unemployment (4.0 
percent in 2000, down from 7.3 percent in 1996) and relatively high employment 
rates (the participation rate was 71.3 percent by 2000). Moreover, the concentra-
tion policies of the 1990s contributed to social peace and wage moderation. For 
instance, in the Social Pact of 1996 management and labor reached binding 
commitments that facilitated reforms and wage restraint (Royo 2002). Yet, the 
economic boom pushed wages up, and since 1999 there was increasing wage 
drift, which hindered competitiveness. 
However, starting in 1998 this performance started to deteriorate. The 
disinflation process was halted and inflation increased 2.8 percent by the end of 
that year fuelled by inflation and the Expo 98; and the trade deficit deteriorated 
from 5.4 percent of GDP in 1997 to 6.6 percent in 1999. The harmonized CPI 
reached over 4 percent in early 2001, above the EU average, pushed by higher oil 
prices and a weaker Euro. Furthermore, economic growth also started to slow, 
dragged down by the ending of major infrastructure projects and Expo 98. The 
outset of EMU membership led to a progressive easing of monetary conditions 
and a sharp decline of interest rates. This happened, however, at a time of high 
consumer demand in which domestic credit was also booming and the current 
account deficit was widening (it remained at around 10 percent of GDP up to 
2002). Access to EMU in 1999 did not alleviate the situation because Portugal 
was in a more advanced position in the cycle than the other EMU member states Lessons   165 
    
 
 
(the country was experiencing a credit boom and signs of overheating were start-
ing to emerge), but now monetary policy was in the hands of the European cen-
tral bank, and it was making decisions based on developments in the entire EMU 
area, hence the cut in interest rates in April of 1999 (OECD 1999, 10-11). Indeed, 
there was change of conditions as the tightening of monetary conditions after the 
ECB started to gradually raise rates from November 1999 on. 
Furthermore, the end of the decade, which coincided with the country’s 
accession to EMU (e.g. the pressure to fulfill the Maastricht criteria was no long-
er a powerful incentive), also witnessed a slowdown in the fiscal consolidation 
efforts, which had led to the successful reduction of the fiscal deficit between 
1994 and 1997 (there was an annual reduction of almost 1.2 percentage points, 
and the deficit was reduced to 2.5 percent by 1997).  Yet about half of this fiscal 
adjustment was the result of the reduction of the public debt burden facilitated by 
the lower interest rates and non-recurring receipts (such as the sale of mobile 
concessions in 2000). As a matter of fact, the primary surplus increased half a 
point per year between 1994 and 1997. On the contrary, there was no increase of 
taxes, or increases in revenues as the result of improvements in the collection of 
taxes or social security contributions. Moreover, current expenditures on educa-
tion, health, and social protection increased steadily (OECD 1999, 11). This pro-
cyclical policy stance did not bode well for the subsequent slowdown of the 
economy because Portugal was left with little fiscal leeway to apply counter-
cyclical measures once the crisis hit. In order to improve the margin of maneu-
ver, Portugal should have reduced the weight of the public sector and also im-
plemented structural reforms to check the growth of current expenditures, which 
would have allowed for a reduction in tax pressure. The country would have 
needed a significant surplus to ensure balance for the budget over the cycle, but 
unfortunately this did not happen. 
Indeed, in the context of EMU, fiscal policy was the main instrument 
available to the government to dampen demand pressures and bring the current 
account deficit (8 percent of GDP in 2002) and inflation (over 3.8 percent) down. 
Yet, while the general government deficit continued to decline in accordance 
with the Stability and Growth pact (SGP), and fell below 3 percent of GDP in 
2000, the pace of fiscal consolidation was slow and the gains from lower debt 
payments and higher revenues were used to increase primary current spending. 
Given the inflationary pressures and the advanced stage of the economic cycle, 
fiscal consolidation would have helped to control demand pressures. Increasing 
taxes was not an attractive option because, although the overall tax burden (at 34 
percent in 2000) was comparatively low, it would have been difficult politically, 
and also it risked eroding the export-oriented growth and harming the country’s 
competitive position. Therefore, in order to meet budget deficit targets, the gov-
ernment became accustomed to implementing spending freezes. But it failed to 
address the structural causes of spending overruns: the public sector payroll bill 
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and pension benefits); and pressures in the social security system caused by pop-
ulation ageing.  On the contrary, it continued to rely on increases in current reve-
nue, as opposed to significant progress in spending control, and when these did 
not materialize, it adopted contingency measures to reduce expenditures, which 
showed fundamental weaknesses in the budget process (OECD 2001, 12). This 
would prove to be a major Achilles heel for the sustainability of economic 
growth. 
In the end, economic performance started to deteriorate markedly after 
2000. Real GDP growth averaged less than 1 percent between 2000 and 2005 (in 
2003 the economy contracted 0.8 percent), and annual growth remained fragile 
until 2006. In 2005 the Portuguese economy grew a meager 0.91 percent of GDP, 
and in 2006 1.3 percent as a result of the depression of demand (consumption is 
one of Portugal’s important pillars of economic growth but it grew only 2.3 per-
cent in 2004, 2.1 percent in 2005, and 1.1 percent in 2006), and in particular of 
private demand given the few incentives on consumption (it grew 0.2 percent in 
2004, decreased 3 percent in 2005, and grew only 0.8 percent in 2006); as well as 
investment, which was pushed down as a consequence of the restrictions on pub-
lic spending and the increase of taxes to bring down the deficit. The accumulated 
output gap since the recession was one of the largest in the Euro area, and 
productivity growth in the business sector fell to around 1 percent between 2004-
05 (it was 3 percent in the 1990s). Unemployment also increased sharply, reach-
ing 7.6 percent in 2005 and 8 percent in 2007, the highest rate in 20 years (it was 
only 3.8 percent in 2000) (IMF World Economic Outlook 2009). 
The recession was far longer and more intense than anyone anticipated, with a 
dramatic impact on the government accounts: the fiscal deficit reached unsus-
tainably high levels (see Table 8), pushed by the bill from organizing the Europe-
an Championship Cup in 2004, which left no room to stimulate demand and 
thereby contributed to the length of the crisis. The government attempted to re-
duce the fiscal deficit by raising indirect taxes and establishing emergency 
spending cuts or freezes, and one-off decisions, such as measures to control the 
wage bill over the short-term. However, while these measures helped to reduce 
the deficit in the short-term (and it was brought down to 2.8 percent in 2003), 
they proved insufficient because of the lower revenues at a time of a depressed 
economic environment (it went up again to 6.1 percent in 2005). Portugal had 
violated the SGP during several years (see Table 8), as it had remained above the 
maximum 3 percent deficit established by the SGP, and therefore it was submit-
ted to the excessive deficit procedure, which further hindered confidence and 
dampened expectations. Public debt also deteriorated: it grew from 53 percent of 
GDP in 2000, to 65.9 percent in 2005, and decreased to 60 percent in 2006; as 
well as capital fixed formation, which fell 2.9 percent in 2005, 0.7 percent in 
2006 and grew 2.8 percent in 2007. The country also suffered a decline in in-
vestment and savings. The investment rate fell from a peak of 28.1 percent of Lessons   167 
    
 
 
GDP in 2000 to 20.6 percent in 2006, while the gross savings rate fell from 17 
percent in 2000 to a pale 12.3 percent in 2006, bouncing back a bit in 2007 to 
15.1 percent (OECD 2006).  
In the end, the reliance on one-off measures, however, did not address 
the structural reasons for the deficit, and also reduced the necessary sense of ur-
gency to tackle structural reforms. For instance, once the deficit was below 3 
percent, the government decided to lower taxes rapidly, despite the fact that the 
situation had not improved much. Three of the fundamental challenges were: 
first, the reform of the civil servants pension system and the need to bring it into 
line with the general pension system (the system was under strong pressure from 
the ageing population, and also by the high replacement rates granted to pension-
ers: it was estimated that lack of action would bring the system into deficit by 
2007); second the reform of the health system; and finally the reform of the pub-
lic administration to align legal condition of employment, and remuneration with 
the private sector, and restructure the central administration (OECD 2006).  
The victory of the Socialist Party in the 2005 election brought in a new 
government committed to implementing the structural reforms needed to bring 
the deficit below 3 percent by 2008. Indeed, the new government pushed for 
important structural reforms and implemented tough decisions. Upon taking of-
fice in March 2005, Prime Minister Sócrates announced the immediate increase 
of the value added tax by 2 percent, breaking his electoral commitment not to 
increase taxes, in order to cope with the budget deficit. Moreover, in the face of 
strident opposition from labor unions and organized interests, his government 
pushed for the reform of the public sector and the civil servants, and an extensive 
restructuring of Portugal’s state bureaucracy, increasing the retirement age to 65 
years and eliminating traditional benefits such as vacations, automatic promo-
tions, and corporative medical insurance. One of the main goals of this reform 
according to Fernando Teixeira dos Santos, Finance Minister, was that “from 
now on, governments will be able to run the public administration in accordance 
with the demands of public management and not, as it has been in the past, the 
other way around.”
31 
The government also approved a comprehensive pension reform plan in 
the summer of 2005, which sought to address the combined threat of a sharp 
decline in birth rates, which had fallen 35 percent over the last 30 years (from 2.6 
to 1.5), and increased longevity (people over 65 years old are forecast to com-
prise more than 32 percent of the population in 2050, compared to 17 percent in 
2005). As a result, the pension system posed a serious structural challenge: Por-
tugal has 1.7 million pensioners, 1.1 million of which receive less than 375 Euros 
per month, but pensions in Portugal were in 2006 among the most generous in 
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the European Union, often reaching more than 100 percent of an employee’s 
final salary, and the system was expected to face financial collapse by 2015. It 
was estimated that pension expenditures would grow from 5.5 percent of GDP in 
2006 to 9.6 percent by 2050. Based on this reform workers have the choice of 
working longer or increasing their pension contributions, and includes a “sustain-
ability co-efficient” that will be used to adjust pensions according to life expec-
tancy during the working life of contributions (for instance, it would decrease 
pension about 5 percent if the life expectancy were to increase by one year over 
the next decade). At the same time, in order to increase Portugal’s birth rate, the 
reform also establishes a new system under which pension contributions are cal-
culated as a percentage of earnings according to the number of children employ-
ees have: contributions would remain unchanged for employees with two chil-
dren, decrease if they have more than 2, and increase if they have less. Finally, 
the system establishes a radical change in the way pensions are calculated: before 
the reform only the 10 best years of the last 15 years of an employee’s working 
life were taken into account to calculate the pension, after the reform the pension 
would be calculated using the whole working life of the contributors. According 
to some estimates, as a result of these reforms, most pensions are expected to be 
reduced by at least 10 percent for people retiring over the next 20 years and will 
hit high earners the hardest. These reforms, which came into force in 2006, are 
expected to guarantee the sustainability of the system up to 2050 and beyond.
32 
The Sócrates government also carried through an ambitious privatization 
plan that sought to raise 2.4 bn Euros from the sale of public enterprises between 
2006-2009, including the three leading public energy groups (GALP, EDP, and 
REN), the paper sector (PortucelTejo, Portucel, and Inapa); as well as the Portu-
guese flag airline company (TAP) and the national airport company (ANA). This 
was quite exceptional coming from a Socialist government, especially in light of 
the long-standing opposition to the privatization of companies that have been 
declared “untouchable” for years. The aim of this decision was to reduce the 
public deficit and the role of the state in the economy, which in 2006 still had 
direct participation in 150 companies. 
Education reform has also been high on the agenda. Education attain-
ment is a huge problem in Portugal and its low level has hindered competitive-
ness and productivity (see below). The government decided that “it cannot wait 
for the next generation to replace the current workforce” in the words of Prime 
Minister Sócrates, and therefore it tried to provide education and training for 
people currently at work, with the aim “to have a million more employees with 
an educational level equivalent to full secondary schooling.” In order to achieve 
this goal, the government introduced a new program called “New Opportunities” 
                                                 
32 See “Child-free to pay more under Lisbon pension reform,” in Financial Times, May 5
th, 2006; 
and “Portugal reducirálaspensionesparaevitar la quiebra,” in El País, May 16, 2006. Lessons   169 
    
 
 
that seeks to encourage adults to complete their secondary education. It also pro-
vides vocational training for youngsters. The initial results were very encourag-
ing: it attracted 250,000 applicants within three months of its launch in early 
2007.
33 
The government also tried to counter the opposition to these reforms 
with an ambitious infrastructure plan that would have cost over 50 bn Euros (on-
ly 8 percent from public funds, the rest will be from private funding and mixed 
concessions), and included the constructions of new airports (Lisbon, Alcochete); 
the building of new dams (one of the cornerstones of the government’s energy 
policy to reduce oil dependency) and highways (there are 11 new tenders); new 
high speed trains (AVE Porto-Lisbon, and Lisbon-Madrid which also involves a 
new bridge over the Tagus river); as well as other projects in the private sector, 
such as a new refinery in Sines (4 billion Euros); a Volkswagen manufacturing 
plant in Palmela to produce the VW models Siroco and Eos (750 million); new 
tourist resorts in Melides (510 million) and Troia (500 million); a new paper 
plant in Figueira da Foz (500 million); a new furniture plant and new Ikea shops 
(350 million), and a new Corte Ingles commercial center in Gaia (150 million), 
which are expected to generate billions of Euros in investment and employment. 
The most ambitious proposal, however, is the Technological Plan to advance the 
EU Lisbon Agenda in Knowledge, Technology, and Innovation. The government 
is committed to install broadband in all Portuguese schools, and has signed an 
innovative agreement with MIT,
34and another one with Bill Gates to facilitate the 
learning of computing to one million Portuguese.
35 
In the end the combination of fiscal consolidation (the ratio of public 
spending to GDP fell from an excessive 47.7 percent of GDP in 2005 to 45 per-
cent in 2008), structural reforms, and increasing revenues from stronger econom-
ic growth have all helped Portugal to bring the deficit back under control: The 
                                                 
33From “Lisbon leads the Union while lagging in performance leagues,” in Financial Times, July 
3
rd 2007, p.4. 
34 The agreement with MIT provides for long-term collaboration to expand research and education 
in Portugal in the fields of engineering systems, in areas such as energy, transportation, information 
systems, and telecommunications. In September of 1996 160 students started  Ph.D.s and other 
advanced degree programs, which have targeted bio-engineering systems, engineering design, 
advanced manufacturing, sustainable energy, and transportation systems. The government is invest-
ing 80 million euros in the first five years of the MIT program. More than 20 companies have 
already signed up to the project’s industrial affiliates program. This program illustrates the com-
mitment of the Portuguese government to science and technology, and higher education: it has 
increased the budget of its ministry by more than 60percent at a time in which it was cutting ex-
penses in every other ministry. See “Strategic step with lasting impact,” in Financial Times, Tues-
day April 8, 2008, p. 4 (special section on Investing in Portugal).   
35See “Portugal ingresara 2,4000 millones con la venta de empresas públicas,” in El País, February 
20, 2006, and “La nueva cara de Portugal,” in .El País, June 29, 2008. It is important to note, how-
ever, that some of these initiatives were real investments (Corte Ingles in Gaia, for instance), while 
others were previous investments (automobile plants in Palmela), and other mere plans (Ave, the 
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Socrates government, which inherited a deficit of 6.8 percent of GDP from the 
previous administration, has been able to bring its budget deficit below the max-
imum limit allowed by the EU a year ahead of schedule, after achieving a larger 
cut than forecast in 2006. The deficit fell to 3.9 percent of GDP in 2006, 0.7 per-
centage points lower than the 4.6 percent target agreed with the European Com-
mission as part of the plan to avoid the sanctions hanging over the country for 
breaching the SGP. In 2007, one year ahead of schedule, the deficit fell to 2.5 
percent, below 3 percent (well down from the initial goal of 3.7 percent) and the 
lowest level since 2000. More importantly this reduction was achieved not only 
through ad hoc cuts, although the government had to apply severe cuts in public 
spending and investment, but largely through structural reforms and a sharp in-
crease in tax revenues (after the government recruited a private sector banker to 
spearhead the crackdown on tax evasion), which will make it easier to consoli-
date the gains.   
The government was also relatively successful in its attempt to bring 
down inflation, which decreased from 4.41 percent in 2001, to 2.1 percent in 
2005 (but it grew to 3 percent in 2006). Other economic indicators also improved 
markedly: exports (which represent 20 percent of GDP) increased 8.9 percent in 
2006 and 6.2 percent in 2007, and 5.6 percent in 2008; fixed capital formation 
also increased 2.5 percent in 2007 (it fell 1.6 percent in 2006); as well as con-
sumption, which grew 1.5 percent in 2007. Unemployment, however, is still a 
challenge: despite the creation of more than 100,000 jobs since 2005, it rose from 
6.25 percent in 2003 to 7.65 percent in 2006, and the unemployment rate more 
than doubled between 2000 and 2007 (from less than 3.9 percent to 8 percent). 
Finally, stronger economic growth resumed: in 2006, the economy grew 1.3 per-
cent, and in 2007 1.8 percent, the highest rate in six years. This sudden and un-
expected turnaround since 2006 took many economists by surprise. Yet, growth 
was negative again in 2008 at -0.045 percent, led by the effects of the global eco-
nomic crisis, which have forced the government to adopt new measures to ad-
dress it, including the so-called Robin Hood Tax an exceptional tax of 25 percent 
for the oil companies to fund social expenditures, 
36and the reduction of taxes 
(the IRS) for housing purposes for the population in the lower tax brackets, as 
well as a modification of the maximum rates of the municipal real estate taxes.
37 
 
                                                 
36  The tax would be applied at a rate of 25 percent on the oil stocks of oil producing and distrib-
uting companies. The oil tax was expected to raise 100 million euros in revenues for the govern-
ment in 2008. In the end, however, declining global oil prices, combined with the fact that Portugal 
imports most of the oil that it consumes and that it cannot tax producers in other countries, means 
that the long-term overall impact of this tax is likely to be more modest. 
In fact, Italian oil companies' profits have been declining, not rising. 
37 “Liberando el lastre,” in El País, March 9, 2008, p. 20-N; “Portugal sufre mal de ojo,” in El País, 
May 4, 2008, p. 40-N; and “Un impuesto ‘Robin Hood’ en Portugal,” in El País, July 20, 2007. Lessons   171 
    
 
 
After the Fiesta: The Global Crisis Hits Iberia  
 
When the global financial crisis hit both countries, starting in the winter of 2008, 
they were in different positions. As we have seen, while Spain was ending one of 
the most successful economic periods in the country’s modern history, Portugal 
was just coming out of a recent recession. In addition, whereas Spain was (at 
least theoretically) in an enviable fiscal situation, Portugal was still struggling 
with its fiscal problems. Yet, despite these different starting points the intensity 
of the crisis has been such that it has had devastating consequences for both 
countries and it has brought to the fore the imbalances and shortcomings of both 
economies. 
In the case of Spain the imbalances that were outlined in the previous 
section roared to the fore in 2007-08 when the real-estate market bubble burst 
and the international financial crisis hit Spain. In just a few months the ‘debt-
fired dream of endless consumption’ turned into a nightmare. Spain is facing (as 
of summer of 2010) the worst economic recession in half a century. According to 
the government data 2009 was the worst year in recent economic history, and the 
worst since there has been reliable data: GDP fell 1.6 per cent (three point less 
than the previous year), unemployment reached over four million people (or 
close to 20% per cent of the active population), and the public deficit reached a 
record 11.4% of GDP (up from 3.4% in 2008).  Consumer confidence has been 
shattered, the implosion of the housing sector has reached historic proportions 
and threatens to extend for several years, and the manufacturing sector is also 
suffering. 
Initially, the government was reluctant to recognize the crisis, which was 
becoming increasingly evident as early as the summer of 2007, because of elec-
toral considerations: the country had general elections in March 2008. And after 
the election, it was afraid to admit that it had not been entirely truthful during the 
campaign. While this pattern has been quite common in other European coun-
tries, the increasing evidence in Spain that the model based on construction was 
already showing symptoms of exhaustion in 2007 compounded it. Yet, the Span-
ish government not only refused to recognize that the international crisis was 
affecting the country, but also that in Spain the crises would be aggravated by the 
very high levels of private indebtedness. As late as 17 August 2007, Finance 
Minister Solbes predicted that ‘the crisis would have a relative small effect’ in 
the Spanish economy. When it became impossible to deny what was evident, the 
government’s initial reluctance to recognize and address the crisis was rapidly 
replaced by frenetic activism and the introduction of a succession of plans and 
measures to try to confront it, and to address the unprecedented dramatic surge of 
unemployment (see Royo 2009).  
The sharp deterioration of the labor market has been particularly striking. 
It has been caused by the economic crisis and the collapse of the real estate sector 
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gratory flows: in 2007 there were 3.128 million immigrants in the country, of 
which 2.745 were employed and 374,000 unemployed. In 2008 the number of 
immigrants increased by almost 400,000, to 3.523 million (representing 55 per 
cent of the growth of the active population), but 580,000 of them were unem-
ployed (and 2.943 million employed), an increase of 200,000. To place these 
figures in perspective, in October of 2008 the number of unemployed among 
Spaniards increased by 400,000 while the number of employed, contrary to what 
happened with the immigrants, decreased by 130,000. Only in the construction 
sector, unemployment increased 170 per cent between the summer of 2007 and 
2008, and the manufacturing and service sectors (also battered by the global cri-
sis, lower consumption, and lack of international competitiveness) have been 
unable to incorporate these workers (Wart 2008).  
There is general consensus that the Spanish government was slow to rec-
ognize and react to the crisis. As a result, a few precious months were lost and 
the government prepared a budget for 2008 and 2009 that were utterly unrealistic 
based on the rapidly deteriorating circumstances. As a matter of fact, as late as 
2010, things are still getting worse. The most significant decline has been in con-
sumers’ confidence, which has been hammered by the financial convulsions, the 
increase in unemployment, and the scarcity of credit. As a result, household con-
sumption, which represents 56 per cent of GDP, fell one per cent in the last quar-
ter for the first time in the last 15 years, contributing sharply to the deterioration 
of economic conditions. According to the Bank of Spain, this decline in house-
hold consumption has been even more important in the recession than the de-
acceleration of residential investment, which has also fallen 20 per cent, driven 
down by worsening financial conditions, uncertainties, and the drop in residential 
prices. So far the government actions have had limited effect stemming this hem-
orrhageand their efficacy has been limited. In the case of Portugal, by the time 
the global crisis hit, the country was already encumbered (in 2009) by high debt 
(90% of GDP) and high public deficit (9.3%), weak competitiveness, high unem-
ployment (10.5%) stagnant growth (it contracted by 2.7%), and low savings rates 
(7.5% of GDP vs. 20% in Spain) [which a better proxy to measure a country’s 
ability to pay down its debt than the debt-to-GDP ratio]. As opposed to Spain, 
which had benefited as we have seen from the decrease in interest rates and had 
experienced a long period of growth, Portugal’s growth rates had been stagnant 
and it did not benefit from a housing or consumer boom.  
Yet, while it avoided the property market collapse that Spain has faced 
(the construction boom added 2.8 million houses over five years, of which only 
1.5 million were sold according to Morgan Stanley); the country is suffering 
from the mismanagement of public finances: its budget deficit rose to 9.3% of 
GDP in 2009, from 2.3% in 2008. Indeed, despite the structural reforms that Por-
tugal undertook in recent years to reduce the public sector, raise the retirement 
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section, the global crisis precipitated a serious financial/fiscal crisis: the increas-
ing cost of financing the debt and the mounting difficulties to generate tax reve-
nues made it difficult to meet the country’s fiscal obligations, thus forcing the 
government to implement tough austerity measures cutting spending and raising 
taxes. Despite these tough measures the country could not avoid having its debt 
downgraded by ratings agencies (Fitch and Standard & poor) over doubts about 
its ability to cut its deficit to sustainable levels, and over comparisons with 
Greece’s situation. Consequently the country’s borrowing costs have soared. 
The deteriorating fiscal situation and markets’ doubts have been com-
pounded because of the country’s loss of competitiveness since it joined the Euro 
in 2000: Portugal, which has largely based its economy on low labor costs, was 
hit hard by the eastward expansion of the EU and the loosening of trade barriers 
with Asia. Hence, Portuguese exporters have been losing market share since it 
joined the Euro, which forced the government to borrow from abroad to finance 
its balance of payment deficit, and thus increasing the debt.
38 To make matters 
worse, concerns about the government’s ability to confront the crisis (it lost its 
absolute majority in the last election in 2009), intensified by the pressures that it 
faces as it tries to reduce public spending.  
In the end, the crisis has exposed the weaknesses of both countries’ 
economies and their respective economic models. Indeed, despite the last two 
decades’ significant progress and achievements, the Portuguese and Spanish 
economies still face serious competitive and fiscal challenges. Unfortunately, the 
economic success of both countries appears to have fostered a sense of compla-
cency, which allowed for a delay in the adoption of the necessary structural re-
forms. And this was not a surprise; some economists have noted that “the Span-
ish economy is living on borrowed time.”
39 Indeed, despite all the significant 
progress accomplished during the past two decades, both Portugal and Spain still 
have considerable ground to cover to catch up with the richer EU countries and to 
improve the competitiveness of their economies. Given the existing income and 
productivity differentials with the richer EU countries, Portugal and Spain have 
to continue and intensify the reform process.  
The experience of both countries shows that EU and EMU membership 
have not led to the implementation of the structural reforms necessary to address 
                                                 
38 The Portuguese parliament voted on March 25, 2010 a four year austerity program that aims at 
lowering the deficit to 2.8% of GDP in 2013, a cut of about 9bn euros. Measures included a public 
sector wage freeze, military spending cuts and tax cuts. On may 13 the government announced yet 
another tax increase and budget cuts to save 2.1bn euros and reduce in 2010 the deficit to 7.3% of 
GDP (down from the current 9.3%). As opposed to Spain where the government has struggled 
mightily to get support from other parties, these measures had the support of the leading opposition 
party, the Social Democratic Party. The government increased the VAT by 1%, income taxes by 
1% for workers who make 2,375 euros monthly and 1.5% to those who make more than that. The 
government also announced additional corporate taxes (2.5% to large companies and banks), an 
increases of capital taxes of 1.5% and the introduction of tolls in free highways. 
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these challenges. On the contrary, particularly in the case of Spain, EMU has 
contributed to the economic boom and a real state bubble (estimated at 30% real) 
fueled by and record-low interest rates, thus facilitating the postponement of 
necessary economic reforms. This challenge however is not a problem of Euro-
pean institutions, but of national policies. Indeed, the process of economic re-
forms has to be a domestic process led by domestic actors willing to carry them 
out. The experience of the Iberian countries offers insightful lessons for other 
countries. To these lessons we turn in the next sections. 
 
Iberian Lessons 
 
As we have seen despite significant progress, both countries still face significant 
economic challenges. Their integration into the EC/EU provides useful feedback 
for other countries. 
 
Membership Supports Modernization 
 
Membership may give countries a better competitive position. Indeed, EU inte-
gration has been a catalyst for the final conversion of the Portuguese and Spanish 
economies into modern Western-type economies. The idea of Europe became a 
driving force that moved reforms forward, and it was a fundamental factor in 
bringing together political stabilization and economic recovery. One of the key 
consequences of the Iberian countries’ entry into the European Union has been 
that it has facilitated the modernization their economies, as well as the implemen-
tation of the micro and macro-economic reforms that successive Portuguese and 
Spanish governments undertook throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Tovias 2005). 
In a context of strong support among Iberian citizens for integration, membership 
became a facilitating mechanism that allowed successive governments to priori-
tize economic rather than social modernization and hence, to pursue difficult 
economic and social policies (i.e., to reform their labor and financial markets), 
with short-term painful effects. Moreover, as a result of enlargement Portuguese 
and Spanish producers gained access to European and world markets, this pro-
vided additional incentives for investment and allowed for the development of 
economies of scale. This has resulted in increasing competitiveness (albeit with 
the problems outlined previously), which has contributed to attract investment 
and has helped to build new industries.  
 
Nominal Convergence Takes Place Faster than Real Convergence 
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Spain and Portugal’s economic record also shows that nominal convergence is 
faster but that real economic convergence is a slow process (Tovias 2005).
40The 
process of financial liberalization, economic reforms, and the significant decline 
in real interest rates permitted Portugal and Spain to meet the Maastricht conver-
gence criteria. Hence, on January 1
st, 1999 both countries became founding 
members of the European Monetary Union and both, which as late as 1997 was 
considered an outside candidate for joining the Euro zone, fulfilled the inflation, 
interest rates, debt, exchange rate, and public deficit requirements established by 
the Maastricht Treaty. This development confirmed the nominal convergence of 
the country with the rest of the EU. Yet, while nominal convergence has largely 
taken place, the income levels of Portugal and Spain have increased at a much 
slower pace and, in particular for Portugal they remain far behind the EU aver-
age: 
 
 
Table 2 : Divergence of GDP per Capita 1980-2006 
  1980  1985 1990 2000 2007 
EU Totals  100.0%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Spain  74.2  72.5 77.8 81.0 98.0
Portugal  55.0  52.0 55.7 74.0 70.0
Source: European Union. 
 
Table 3: Annual Growth in Real GDP per Person Employed (1995 prices) 
  1961-73 1974-86 1987-2000 
Spain  6.5  3.1 1.2
Portugal  6.6  3.0 2.6
Greece  9.1  0.8 1.5
Ireland  4.2  2.7 3.0
EU-15  4.4  2.0 1.7
Source: Barry 2003, p. 3. 
 
This data shows that nominal convergence has advanced at a faster pace 
than real convergence. Indeed, twenty years have not been long enough. Portugal 
and Spain’s European integration has revealed both convergence and divergence, 
nominal and real. Since 1997 inflation in Spain has exceeded the EU average 
every year. In Portugal real convergence has been slowing down each year since 
1998, actually turning negative in 2000 and with both real and nominal diver-
gence decreasing until 2006.  
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Figure 1: Per capita GDP Growth 
 
 
While there is significant controversy over the definition of real conver-
gence, most scholars agree that a per capita GDP measured in purchasing power 
parities is a valid reference to measure the living standards of a country. This 
variable, however, has experienced a cyclical evolution in the Iberian countries 
with significant increases during periods of economic expansion and sharp de-
creases during economic recessions. In the first 15 years since the adhesion of 
Spain to the EU in 1986 per capita income has increased "only" 11.5 percent and 
Portugal's 14.2 percent. Ireland's, in contrast, has increased 38 percent. Only 
Greece with an increase of 6.8 percent has had a lower real convergence than 
Spain and Portugal.  
A possible explanation for this development has been the fact that while 
Spain has grown between 1990 and 1998 an annual average of 2.1%, Portugal 
has grown 2.5% and Ireland 7.3% over the same period. This growth differential 
explains the divergences in real convergence. Other explanations include: the 
higher level of unemployment (15.4 percent in Spain in the mid-1990s); the low 
rate of labor participation (i.e., active population over total population, which 
stands at 50 percent, which means that expanding the Spanish labor participation 
rate to the EU average would increase per capita income to 98.2 percent of the 
EU average); the inadequate education of the labor force (i.e. only 28 percent of 
the Spanish potential labor force has at least a high school diploma, in contrast 
with the EU average of 56 percent); low investment in R&D and information 
technology (the lowest in the EU, with Spain ranked 61-spending even less pro-
portionally than many developing countries including Vietnam-in the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Report of Information Technologies 20002-2003 ); 
and inadequate infrastructures (i.e. road mile per 1000 inhabitants in Spain is 47 
percent of the EU average and railroads' 73 percent). The inadequate structure of 
the labor market with high dismissal costs, a relatively centralized collective 
bargaining system, and a system of unemployment benefits that guarantees in-Lessons   177 
    
 
 
come instead of fostering job search, have also hindered the convergence pro-
cess.
41 
GDP per capita measured in Purchasing Power Parities increased signifi-
cantly in Portugal since its accession to the EU, increasing from less than 7,000 
Euro per inhabitant in 1986 to 17,000 in 2006 (65% of the EU15 average). More-
over, with the exception of the 1992-94 period (when there was a recession), 
Portugal presented growth rates above the EU average, which contributed to the 
convergence process. However, from 2002 onwards the convergence pattern was 
interrupted, and since then growth has been below the EU average, thus diverg-
ing from the EU average. 
More remarkable, however, is the fact that the performance of both 
economies was quite similar during the first 13 years that followed their acces-
sion. 
 
Table 4: Components of Growth in income per Head, 1987-2000 
  Greece Spain Ireland Portugal  EU-15 
Growth in income per 
head 
1.7 3.0 5.6 3.6 1.8 
Components: 
Growth in employment 
rate 
-0.4 0.5 1.0 0.4 0.1 
Growth in labor supply as 
% of population 
0.6 1.3 1.5 0.6 -0.1 
Source: Barry 2003, 12. 
 
 
Indeed, between 1994 and 2000 the growth in income per head was of 3.1 per-
cent in Spain and 3.1 percent in Portugal. Yet since then, instead of catching up, 
Portugal has been falling behind with GDP per capita decreasing from 80% of 
the EU25 average (without Bulgaria and Romania) in 1999 to just over 80% in 
2006; and labor productivity, still at 40% of the EU average, has shown no 
growth since 2000. Portugal’s per capita GDP has fallen far behind Spain, and 
since 2000, the Czech Republic, Greece, Malta, and Slovenia have all surpassed 
Portugal’s. Moreover, Portugal was the first member of the European Monetary 
Union to be threatened with sanctions by the European Commission under the 
Growth and Stability pact (GSA) for violating the excessive deficit provisions. 
The country became, in the word of the Economist, “the new sick man of Eu-
rope.” Spain soon joined that same category, as we have seen. 
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Migration Patterns Can Be Reversed 
 
In addition, the Portuguese and Spanish experience also shows that patterns of 
migration can be reversed. Portugal (and Spain) was made to wait for accession 
in the 1980s, partly over immigration fears that never materialized. As in 1986, 
the new treaties of accession have established a period of seven years for the new 
member states of Central and Eastern Europe. Fears of uncontrolled migration 
were not substantiated after 1986 (or even after the seven-year transition period). 
On the contrary, as a result of improved economic conditions in the Iberian Pen-
insula, one of the key results of EU access was that by 1995 there were 100,000 
fewer Spaniards and 110,000 fewer Portuguese living in other EU member states 
than before enlargement. Furthermore, the reverse process took place, with thou-
sands of Europeans (particularly from Germany and Britain) migrating to Spain, 
many for the purpose of retirement; such concerns are likely to prove to be un-
founded again. 
Estimates differ on the extent of immigration from new Member States. 
Clearly, some countries such as the UK and Ireland (in the boom years) have 
experienced a greater influx from other countries.  Spain has experienced inward 
migration from Romania and Bulgaria after their accession in 2007.  In any case, 
in major host countries such as the UK, cultural similarities that the immigrants 
are general hard-working, filling gaps in the skills base of the economy and con-
tributing to competitiveness. In any case, the continuing existence of language, 
cultural and structural barriers will most likely continue to limitlabor mobility in 
an enlarged Europe. In addition, the rapid economic growth of Eastern European 
countries is likely to have the same effect that it had on migration patterns in 
Portugal after 1986. Given the EU’s aging population and its low fertility rates it 
will be important to facilitate the migration of young people from Eastern Eu-
rope. Instead of displacing local people from the labor market or lowering wages, 
immigrants from the new member states can be expected to continue to contrib-
ute to the host country’s economy by adding value, creating jobs and exerting 
some upward pressure on wages because they will be able to work legally (as 
several hundred thousand workers are currently illegally in the EU).
42 
 
European Union Funds Did Help 
 
During 1994-99, EU aid accounted for 1.5% of Spain’s GDP and 3.3% of Portu-
gal’s. EU funding has allowed rates of public investment to remain relatively 
stable since the mid-1980s. The percentage of public investment financed by EU 
                                                 
42 See: “UK leads way on opening borders to new workers,” in Financial Times, Friday, December 
13, 2002, p.2; and ‘Fears of big move west may be unfounded,’ in Financial Times, Tuesday, De-
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funds has been rising since 1985, reaching average values of 42% for Portugal 
and 15% for Spain. Moreover, the European Commission has estimated that the 
impact of EU Structural Funds on GDP growth and employment has been signif-
icant: in 1999, GDP rose 9.9% in Portugal and 3.1% in Spain. These funds, 
which amount to just over one-third of the EU budget, have contributed signifi-
cantly to reducing regional disparities and fostering convergence within the EU. 
As a result, major infrastructure deficits have been addressed and road and tele-
communications networks have improved dramatically both in quantity and qual-
ity. In addition, increased spending on education and training have contributed to 
upgrading the labor force. In sum, these funds have played a prominent role in 
developing the factors that improve the competitiveness and determine the poten-
tial growth, especially in the least developed regions of both countries.
43 The new 
member states should not expect the same level of aid. Therefore, adjustment 
costs will become higher and it will take them longer to catch up. 
 
EU Funds are not the Panacea 
 
Indeed, receiving EU funds is by no means a guarantee of success. Ireland in the 
1990s received a larger transfer per head than the other 3 cohesion countries 
(Greece, Portugal and Spain). Yet its GDP per head grew only from 52% of the 
French levels to 60% in 1990. Then in 2000 it passed France. Why did it take two 
decades to accomplish this goal? The key was the process of reforms of the 
1990s. In Spain GDP per head grew from 62 to 74% and in Portugal from 53 to 
69% of the French levels from 1986-01. Greece, for its part, received billions of 
Euros in EU funds but experienced more than a decade of decline after accession. 
While it had a higher GDP per head than Ireland until 1986 and a higher one than 
Portugal until 1987, by 2004 it was the EU poorest country. What really matters 
is not so much how much money you receive but how you spend it. This evi-
dence illustrates that success is contingent on the effective use of regional pro-
jects and Structural Funds (i.e. transport projects). Spain is perceived as a case of 
success based on its regional policy and structural projects. Portugal, in contrast, 
has suffered from insufficient matching funds and deficits in administrative ca-
pacity, although the latter has almost certainly been a much more serious prob-
lem in Greece. This will be particularly critical for the new member states be-
cause they will have fewer resources available: The EU allocated only 10.3billion 
euros for the new states for the first 3 years in regional aid and farm subsidies, 
and Poland has received 67 euros per capita and Hungary 49. In contrast, Greece 
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the conference From Isolation to Europe: 15 Years of Spanish and Portuguese Membership in the 
European Union. Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University. November 
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received 437 per head and Ireland 418, although these countries received signifi-
cantly less when regional policy was introduced in 1989.
44 
 
Success Is Not Automatic: The Key is to Exploit Membership’s Opportunities 
 
The experience of the Iberian countries also shows that while access to markets is 
important, EU membership is not enough. Success is not automatic. On the con-
trary it is largely determined by how countries exploit the advantages of member-
ship, namely, access to EU markets and free movement of labor and capital. For 
instance between 1985 and 2002 the ratio of the stock of inward FDI to GDP 
grew in Spain from 5 to 33%; in Portugal from 19 to 36%; whereas in Greece it 
fell from 20 to 9%. In addition, fiscal and monetary discipline, planning, as well 
as market reforms are also critical. The countries that have performed the best 
within the EU are the ones that have followed this policy mix. This is so because 
stability influences the rate of growth and gives confidence to investors. For in-
stance, Greece, one of the worst performers, ran fiscal deficits close to 10% until 
to 1996, and its public debt increased from 48% of GDP in 1986 to 111% in 
1996. On the contrary, in Ireland one of the best performers, the debt fell from 
112% in 1987 to 38% by 2000. It is also critical not use funds to prevent eco-
nomic reforms and support failing industries. The best models are Ireland with its 
investment in education (technical colleges), low corporate taxes, and flexible 
industrial relations; and Finland with its focus on innovation. Finally, it is also 
important to minimize expectations: Austria generated too many expectations to 
oversell EU membership to its citizens and when they failed to materialize, it 
created a backlash. 
 
Focus on Dynamic Effects 
 
While Portugal and Spain had feverishly pursued their integration into 
the Community, the effects of EU integration have not always been favorable. 
Indeed, in manufacturing and in agriculture there has been both trade diversion 
and trade creation, implying further adjustment problems, since greater import 
penetration led to a contraction in domestic production. This was particularly true 
in the case of the Portuguese and Spanish manufacturing sector. Factors such as 
exchange rate movements and the strategies of multinational companies with 
subsidiaries in the country also played a critical role in the final outcome of inte-
gration. This experience proves that the expected static effects, which were not 
always favorable to Portugal and Spain, should not be the main economic expec-
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tation behind the Eastern European countries’ entry to EU membership. Based on 
the Iberian experience, dynamic effects, on the contrary, provide an important 
rationale for supporting integration.
45 Over the long term, they will affect the new 
member states’ rate of economic growth, which will be largely influenced by 
investment patterns, by the efficiency with which these additional resources are 
used and, finally, by their distributional effects among regions. 
 
It is Essential to Prepare for EMU 
 
The Iberian enlargement also shows that prior to monetary integration, candi-
dates had to carry out a process of modernization and nominal convergence with-
out fixing their exchange rate. An additional lesson is that the reform of financial 
institutions does not necessarily bring about institutional changes in other areas 
(e.g., the labor market and fiscal policies). The virtual collapse of the European 
Monetary System in 1992, caused in part by successive devaluations of the Iberi-
an currencies, showed the limits of financial and monetary instruments in pro-
moting institutional reforms in other areas and in balancing domestic and exter-
nal economic objectives. Institutional reforms require active policies by the gov-
ernments that are willing to pay the short-term political price for unpopular poli-
cies. The jury is still out regarding the domestic institutional impact of EMU. 
 
Fiscal Discipline Matters 
 
Lax monetary policies had played a significant role in the slowdown of the con-
vergence process prior to EC accession (Barry 2003). Yet, since Spain and Por-
tugal became founding members of EMU, monetary policies were no longer in 
the hands of their national governments and therefore could not account for dif-
ferences in performance between both countries. However, different fiscal poli-
cies, within the constraints imposed by the Growth and Stability Pact (GSP), 
have played a central role. It is now widely accepted that disproportionate in-
creases in government consumption adversely affect long-term growth, and also 
that while fiscal consolidation may have short-term costs in terms of activity, 
they can minimized if consolidation is credible by implementing consistent deci-
sions that deliver solid results. 
Both the Portuguese and Spanish economies experienced a boom in the 
second half of the 1990s boosted by the considerable fall in interest rates, when 
nominal short-term interest rates converged to those set by the ECB. In both 
countries, they fell more rapidly than inflation, and their impact was further 
boosted by the simultaneous processes of financial liberalization and increasing 
competition that took place at the same time, which contributed to increase do-
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mestic demand, and in particular housing demand. The expansion during these 
years was driven by internal demand. This boom coincided with a period of in-
ternational expansion. This expansion, however, would have required a concomi-
tant prudent fiscal policy, which in the case of Portugal did not take place. On the 
contrary, the cyclically adjusted primary balance fell from 1.2% of GDP in 1994-
1996 to -0.6% in 1999-2001. The combination of expansionary fiscal policies 
and insufficient structural reforms did not prepare the country for the economic 
downturn. 
Indeed, as we have seen in the previous section, one of the fundamental 
reasons for the poor performance of the Portuguese economy between 1999 and 
2006 was the lack of fiscal discipline and the failure to adopt measures to control 
the deficit. Spain, on the contrary, was one of the more disciplined countries in 
Europe, or the world indeed, and was able to maintain a margin of manoeuvre 
that allowed fiscal policy to be used in a counter-cyclical way.  
 
Table 5: General Government Balance Portugal, 2000-2008 
  Units  Scale 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
PORTU-
GAL 
General 
govern-
ment bal-
ance 
Per-
cent 
of 
GDP
-
2.91
9 
-
4.26
8 
-
2.83
9 
-
2.88
2 
-
3.35
2 
-
6.12
4 
-
3.91
9 
-
2.58
5 
-
2.61
1 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, Octo-
ber 2009 
 
There is a widespread consensus that Portugal’s biggest mistake was its 
“chronic fiscal misbehavior.”
46VítorConstancio, governor of the Bank of Portu-
gal, has acknowledged that “when in 2001 we had these big shocks to growth, tax 
revenues dropped and suddenly we were in a situation of an excessive defi-
cit…The sudden emergence of budget problems led to a big revision of expecta-
tions about the future.” 
47 As we have seen, largely as a result of this revision of 
expectations, the Portuguese economy contracted by 0.8% in 2003. The deficit 
reduction, on the contrary is credited by Fernando Teixeira dos Santos, finance 
minister, with restoring “Portugal’s credibility in international markets and 
strengthen confidence in the economy.”
48 The improvement in the financial posi-
tion of the budget allowed the government to cut the value added tax from 21 to 
20% on July 2008 to stimulate the economy. Fiscal consolidation and structural 
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reforms will allow more robust growth and place Portugal in a better position to 
face the current global crisis caused by the US subprime crisis and international 
crunch, as well as the high prices of energy and commodities. Hence the Portu-
guese experience shows that for countries that want to join the Eurozone need to 
have a “comfortable budget position because that will give for maneuver once 
inside.”
49 Not surprisingly of the EU’s so-called cohesion countries, the ones that 
have done better in the last decade and a half have been those that have main-
tained fiscal discipline: Ireland, Spain and Greece, which have either maintained 
a budget surplus or reduced their budget deficits to comply with the SGP, while 
reducing their total expenditures vis-à-vis GDP. Portugal, as we have seen, was 
the exception. 
 
Table 6: Fiscal Position Spain 
Spain  1995  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 
Government 
deficits 
-6.3  -
0.885
-
0.518
-
0.291
-
0.048
-
0.155
1.
1 
1.
8 
Government 
debt 
63.9  65
.86
61.
63
52
.5
48
.7
46.
2
43
.1 
3
9.7 
Source: OECD. 
 
 
Conversion Rates at the Time of EMU Accession Matter 
 
In the case of Portugal, an economic downturn coincided with the country’s ac-
cession to the EMU, and the adoption of the Euro in 2002. EMU, however, can-
not be blamed for the poor performance of the Portuguese economy. If that were 
the culprit, it would be hard to explain how the other EU cohesion countries per-
formed much better. Yet, it is important to note that there was a significant dif-
ference in the conversion rate of the escudo vis-à-vis the Euro, which further 
hampered Portugal’s competitiveness (see GouchaSoares 2008, 5). When the 
national currencies were aligned to the Euro at the end of 1998 the Portuguese 
Escudo was fixed at 200 escudos, while the Spanish peseta was converted at a 
rate of 166 pesetas to one Euro). Yet, in the years previous to the final conversion 
of exchange rates there had been a significant devaluation of the peseta vis-à-vis 
the Euro: it had devalued about 30 percent, while the escudo had devalued only 
12 percent (in the early 1990s the exchange rate was 128 pesetas for one Euro 
and 179 escudos to one Euro, respectively). In other words, the fixed exchange 
rate at which Spain joined EMU was significantly more favorable than Portugal’s 
from a competitiveness point of view. This problem was compounded by the 
appreciation of the real effective exchange rate in the 1990s due to wage increas-
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es: while it depreciated by approximately 15 percent in Spain, in Portugal it ap-
preciated by the same amount. According to the European Commission, the Por-
tuguese real effective exchange rate is approximately 20 percent higher than it 
was in the early 1990s (while Spain’s is at the same level). This is an important 
consideration when trying to account for the loss of competitiveness of Portugal. 
 
EMU Membership Carries Risks 
 
Portugal provides interesting insights into the pitfalls of integration into a mone-
tary union. As noted by VítorConstancio, Governor of the Bank of Portugal, one 
of the main lessons from Portugal’s experience is that “countries used previously 
to high inflation and high interest rates are likely to experience an explosion in 
consumer spending and borrowing” upon joining the monetary union. This spurt 
will make a downturn inevitable, particularly in cases such as Portugal, that are 
vulnerable to higher oil prices and increasing competition from developing coun-
tries like India and China. In Portugal the strong demand stemmed from the sharp 
fall in interest rates and it was further fuelled by expansive fiscal policies. De-
mand, however, was not followed by a parallel increase in supply, as it was hin-
dered by low productivity growth, which led to a significant increase in imports 
and high external deficits and debts. External indebtedness in turn has led to low-
er available income domestically.  
For a decade, central and eastern European countries have seen EMU 
membership as a prize and have been willing to do anything to join. However, 
the current global financial crisis has exposed certain obligations that accompany 
EU membership. While Eurozone countries like Portugal, which no longer have 
the option to devalue their currencies, are undergoing significant fiscal tightening 
and a brutal internal devaluation: lowering real wages and prices to regain com-
petitiveness and growth; non-Euro zone countries like Poland and the Czech 
Republic have allowed their currencies to fall (i.e. Poland’s real effective ex-
change rate fell almost 20% between 2008 and 2009), thus helping to maintain 
their competitiveness and evading the worst effects of recession.
50 
While these countries have currencies that are too small to thrive inde-
pendently and they have high levels of Euro borrowing, there are potential les-
sons for future EMU applicants from Portugal’s experience (Abreu 2006, 5). The 
most important lesson is that lower interest rates and the loosening of credit will 
likely lead to a credit boom, driven by potentially over-optimistic expectations of 
future permanent income, which in turn may increase housing demand and 
household indebtedness; and lead policy-makers to overestimate potential output 
and to adopt expansionary fiscal policies. The boom will also lead to higher wage 
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increases, caused by the tightening of the labor market, higher inflation and loss-
es in external competitiveness, together with a shift from the tradable to the non-
tradable sector of the economy, which would have a negative impact on produc-
tivity.  
In order to avoid these risks new-entrant countries should tighten budget-
ary policies in the case of a boom in demand and/or strong credit expansion. At 
the same time, they should guard against potential overestimation of GDP, and 
measure carefully the weight of consumption on GDP, because they may inflate 
revenues in the short-term and create an unrealistic perception of the budgetary 
accounts. Furthermore, to avoid unsustainable external imbalances, countries 
should also carry out the necessary structural reforms to increase flexibility and 
productivity, in order to allow their productive sectors to respond to the increas-
ing demand and to ensure that their economies can withstand the pressures of 
membership. They should also set wages based on Euro zone conditions to en-
sure wage moderation, and not on unrealistic domestic expectations (Abreu 2006, 
5-6). New EMU members should also take the opportunity presented by the 
boom to move into higher value-added and faster growth sectors and towards a 
more outward-oriented production structure.  Finally, the current global crisis has 
illustrated the need for tight financial supervision to avoid excessive lending and 
misallocation of resources.  
Indeed, EMU membership is not a panacea. On the contrary, Sweden has 
been one of the most successful European economies during the last decade. 
Much of the credit can be attributed to the structural reforms and spending cuts 
that reduced a 12% of GDP deficit into a balanced budget. The single most im-
portant reason for Sweden’s success, however, may have been the country’s de-
cision to abandon the European fixed currency exchange rate regime and switch 
to a floating exchange rate, and give independence to the National Bank. This 
decision allowed for the decline of the value of the currency, which helped to 
restore competitiveness and decreased the budgetary cost of unemployment. At 
the same time it allowed the National Bank to focus its monetary policy on a 2% 
inflation target, instead of just trying to use monetary policy to maintain a fixed 
exchange rate. The subsequent economic growth allowed the government to use 
fiscal policy as a tool of economic reform and income distribution. Sweden is an 
example of the benefits during times of extreme crisis of a floating exchange rate 
and strict inflation targeting, options that are not available to Eurozone coun-
tries.
51 
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Need to Control Labor Costs to Remain Competitive 
 
The experience of Portugal and Spain within EMU also shows that there have 
been lasting performance differences across countries. These differences can be 
explained at least in part by a lack of responsiveness of prices and wages, which 
have not adjusted smoothly across sectors, which in the case of Portugal and 
Spain have led to accumulated competitiveness loses and large external imbal-
ances.  While Germany (and other EMU countries) implemented supply-side 
reforms to bring labor costs down, through wage restraint, payroll tax cuts, and 
productivity increases; making it the most competitive economy with labor costs 
13 percent below the Eurozone average, Portugal and Spain continued with the 
tradition of indexing wage increases to domestic inflation rather than the Europe-
an Central Bank target, and they became the most expensive ones: Portugal with 
labor costs 23.5 percent above average (followed by Spain with 16 percent, 
Greece with 14 percent, and Italy with 5 percent). 
52 
 
Be Aware of New Players in World Trade and the Erosion of Comparative Ad-
vantage 
 
  A problem for Portugal and Spain has been the dramatic erosion of its competi-
tive advantage. The emergence on major new players in world trade, like India 
and China, as well as the eastern enlargements of the European Union have been 
particularly damaging to the Portuguese and Spanish economies because these 
countries have lower labor costs and they competed with Spain and Portugal’s 
traditional exports (as exporters of relatively unsophisticated labor-intensive 
products), which led to losses in export market shares (aggravated by the appre-
ciation of the Euro, and the increase of unit labor costs relative to those in its 
trading competitors). At the same time Spain and Portugal’s attempt to specialize 
in medium- and higher-technology products was also hindered by the accession 
of the Eastern European countries into the EU, which were moving into those 
sectors and also specializing in these products.   
In the end, the Iberian countries’ ability to keep the lid on unit labor costs 
was insufficient to generate enough growth in exports to compensate for increas-
ing domestic demand. While easy access to cheap credit had boosted domestic 
demand for households, it has also caused a shift of resources from tradable to 
non-tradable (most services). This shift was further hastened by high wage in-
creases, also in the public sector, caused by a tighter labor market in the second 
half of the 1990s, which further hampered external competitiveness and produc-
tivity. The result, particularly in Spain, has been an imbalanced economy sus-
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tained by strong domestic demand that translated into higher imports (and exter-
nal deficit). 
Until 2000 the impact of wage increases was offset in Portugal by high 
productivity growth (it grew yearly at an average of 2.2 percent between 1996 
and 2000), thus limiting the growth of unit labor costs.  After 2000, however, the 
international expansionary cycle started to reverse, particularly in the EU, which 
is the leading market for Portuguese exports, where growth slowed to 1.4 percent 
between 2001 and 2003 (compared to 2.8 percent between 1995 and 2000). This 
deceleration of the international economic cycle hit Portugal severely and affect-
ed expectations among consumers and businesses. 
Furthermore, some Portuguese sectors of the economy did not prepare 
well for the WTO liberalization of sectors with major economic impact on the 
country, particularly footwear and textiles. The situation was compounded by the 
Asian crisis of the late 1990s, which led to the devaluation of far-eastern curren-
cies, further eroding the competitiveness of Portuguese exports. As a result, Por-
tuguese exports of footwear and textiles fell from almost two thirds of total ex-
ports of goods between 1995 and 1996, to a little more than one third between 
2004 and 2005, with the concurrent wave of dismissals and closures, which fur-
ther dampened expectations and caused social problems, particularly in the north 
of the country, where these industries are based (Abreu 2006, 3-4). 
 
Political Stability Is Essential 
 
There is consensus that one of the key problems in Portugal prior to 2006 was the 
lack of political and policy stability. Indeed, there have been more changes at the 
prime minister level (there were four PMs between 1995 and 2005) and the pre-
vious three prime ministers (before Socrates) resigned before their terms were 
over for different reasons. These constant changes up to 2005 made economic 
policy continuity more problematic and more importantly, made the implementa-
tion of reforms in the face of popular opposition very difficult.  
Indeed, one of the main differences between both countries has been that 
in Spain there has been remarkable economic policy stability after the crisis of 
1992-93. There have been few economic policy shifts throughout the 1990s and 
first half of the 2000s, and this despite changes in government. Between 1993 
and 2008 there has been only two Ministers of Finance, Pedro Solbes (from 
1993-1996, and from 2004-2009) and Rodrigo Rato (from 1996-2004), (and prior 
to them Carlos Solchaga had been in the position between 1995 and 2003); and 
the country only had three Prime Ministers (Felipe González, José María Aznar, 
and José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero). More importantly, each of the last three gov-
ernments has completed its mandate and there have been no early elections. In 
addition, as a rare occurrence, Pedro Solbes, who was minister of finance under a 
Socialist government in the early 1990s when the process of fiscal consolidation 
started, became minister of finance again in 2004 after the Socialist Party won 188                                                                                                         Royo 
 
 
the general election and he is still in that same position.
53 The power of the Min-
ister of Finance was also reinforced vis-à-vis the other cabinet members because 
both of them also served as deputies of the Prime Minister in the government 
under the Conservative and Socialist administrations. This pattern was further 
reinforced by the ideological cohesiveness of these parties and the strong control 
that party leaders exercise over all the members of the cabinet and parliament 
deputies. 
In addition, this stability was reinforced by the shared (and rare) agree-
ment among the Conservatives and Socialists leaders regarding fiscal consolida-
tion (the balance budget objective was established by law by the Popular Party), 
as well as the need to hold firm in the application of conservative fiscal policies 
and the achievement of budgetary fiscal surpluses. Indeed, this happened to a 
degree in which Spain became the paradigmatic model of a country applying the 
budget surplus policy mantra. The Aznar government repeatedly chastised other 
European governments that were far more lax in their fiscal policies, to a degree 
in which it created tensions with the EU richer countries, because although they 
were in fact running higher deficits, they were net contributors to the EU budget 
and providing Spain with cohesion and Structural Funds (i.e. Germany or 
France). Unsurprisingly, it was hard for them to accept to be called irresponsible 
and to have fingers pointed at them while they were subsidizing Spain through 
the European solidarity programs.  
This dogmatism, however, worked well in the short term and contributed 
to the credibility of the government policies. In the medium- and longer-terms, 
however, there are disputes as to whether a more accommodating policy would 
have been positive in upgrading the productive base of the country with invest-
ments in necessary infrastructure and human capital. The maintenance of the 
balanced budget paradigm as a goal on its own may have blinded the govern-
ments to the benefits of investing in new technology areas in which Spain is still 
lagging behind. This could have contributed to a faster change in the model of 
growth and could have reduced the dependency on the construction sector, which 
is now in the midst of a sharp recession that is having devastating consequences 
for the Spanish economy. In the end, it is important to highlight, as we saw in the 
previous section, that policy stability did not deliver the necessary reforms that 
the country needed, and this failure has intensified the current crisis. In Portugal, 
however, there have been more changes at the prime minister level (there have 
been 4 PMs between 1995 and 2009) and the previous three prime ministers re-
signed before their terms were over for different reasons. AntónioGuterres was 
PM between October 28, 1995 and April 6, 2002. These constant changes up to 
2005, made economic policy continuity more problematic and more importantly, 
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made the implementation of reforms in the face of popular opposition very diffi-
cult. 
Furthermore, the Ministry of finance position became something of a re-
volving door, bringing instability to the economic policy portfolio, with ministers 
often resigning in protest over their inability to manage the financial ambitions of 
their colleagues and control fiscal policies and expenditures. Between 1990 and 
2005 there has been 10 ministers of finance, and on average they have been less 
than two years in the position. The problem was compounded, as opposed to 
Spain, by the finance minister’s limited powers over the budget. Indeed, accord-
ing to a recent study (Halleberg et al. 2004) of all the EU-15 finance ministers the 
Portuguese one has the lowest control over the formulation, approval, and im-
plementation of the budget.  
 
Table 7: Minister of Finance Portugal, 1990-2008 
21-07-2005  Fernando Teixeira dos Santos 
12-03-2005  Luís Campos e Cunha
17-07-2004  AntónioBagão Félix 
06-04-2002  Maria Manuela Ferreira Leite
03-07-2001   Guilhermed'Oliveira Martins
25-10-1999  Joaquim Augusto Nunes de PinaMoura
28-10-1995  António Luciano Pacheco de Sousa Franco 
07-12-1993  Eduardo Almeida Catroga
31-10-1991  Jorge Braga de Macedo
04-01-1990  Luís Miguel Beleza
 
This problem extends to other critical areas, such as education: Maria Lourdes 
Rodrigues, the current minister of education, was the 27
th education minister in 
32 years.  
In the end, the credibility of economic policies (and fiscal policies in par-
ticular) was undermined by the relative political instability that prevailed in Por-
tugal in the first half of the decade. It is not surprising, therefore, that once there 
has been some stability in the position (Fernando Teixeira dos Santos has been in 
the position for four years, the longest tenure in the past 18 years), the govern-
ment has been able to implement substantive reforms and pursue fiscal consoli-
dation. The fact that the PS had an absolute majority in Parliament has also been 
an important factor in facilitating the implementation of reforms. Yet instability 
and political fragility have not disappeared entirely: the Minister of Economics 
and Innovation, Manuel Pinho, was forced to resign in June 2009, two months 
before the scheduled general election, when he called “cuckold” to a Communist 
member of Parliament during a parliamentary session. Fernando Teixeira dos 
Santos, the minister of Finance, also assumed the Economics portfolio. The so-
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has intensified concerns about the government’s ability to implement tough re-
forms and budget cuts.  
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Abstract 
 
As a result of the Franco regime, Spain was not invited to participate in the initial 
formation of the European integration. Only after the 1986 Spanish democratic 
Constitution was approved in 1978 was membership was feasible in. Since then, 
Spain has positively contributed to the advancement of European integration. The 
initial 21 years of Spain's involvement in the EU were extremely economically 
beneficial leading to many improvements within the country, making Spain the 
8th largest economy in the World. Spain experienced prosperity until 2007. Pric-
es and wages rose rapidly, though improvement was temporarily beneficial it 
caused a large external deficit and a growing increase in the external debt re-
quired to compensate the external unbalance.  
At the same time some things remained stagnant and in need for im-
provement. The good performance of the 21 initial years has shifted within EU 
and Spain largely due to the 2008 world crisis and the burst of the construction 
bubble. Since May 2010 the Spanish Government abandoned the fiction that 
Spain had been almost untouched by the economic crisis and, in a breathtaking 
turn, it announced the painful cuts that would be needed within the Spanish wel-
fare state system to stop Spain from going the way of Greece in the need of sup-
port by IMF and the Eurozone. Recessions help show weaknesses and mistakes 
made by Governments, Banks, Industries and Trade Unions. Only if Spain and 
the EU can learn from these mistakes, then they are likely to see a return to the 
growth that they had enjoyed throughout the initial years of Spain's EU member-
ship.  
 
 
The Logic of the Mediterranean Enlargement of the EC 
 
Since the fall of their respective dictatorships in the middle of the 1970s, coun-
tries such as Greece, Portugal and Spain experienced a spectacular transfor-
mation into democracies that enabled   them to apply for membership of the Eu-
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heart of Europe (Círculo de Economía 1973). Greece applied for membership in 
the EC on June 12, 1975; Portugal applied on March 28, 1977 and Spain on July 
28 of the same year.  In order to consolidate democracy in Greece, Portugal and 
Spain, the EC approved a Second Enlargement (the first one occurred in 1973 
and comprised Denmark, Ireland and UK) based on article 98 of the ECSC Trea-
ty, 237 of the EEC Treaty, and 205 of the EURATOM Treaty.  
Negotiations for membership with Greece opened in July 1976, Portugal 
followed in October 1978, and Spain in February 1979. Greece became a full 
member of the EC in 1981 but the EC-Spain and EC-Portugal negotiations expe-
rienced a delay, and membership was only possible in 1986, following the ratifi-
cation of the accession Treaty signed in Lisbon and Madrid on June 12, 1985 
(Granell 1985). 
 
The 1970 Spain-EC Agreement 
 
The ten-member EC was a crucial partner for the Spanish economy as early as 
1962. Franco’s Government expressed interest in an association with the EEC, 
possibly leading to eventual full membership. Integration was not possible for 
political reasons, but a Preferential Trade Agreement Spain-EEC, similar to the 
EC-Israel Agreement, was signed on June 29, 1970.This Agreement known as 
Ullastres Agreement (named after the then Spanish ambassador to the EC) pro-
vided the framework for the asymmetrical progressive elimination of trade barri-
ers between Spain and the six member countries of the EEC at that time (Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands) (Granell 1973). This 
Agreement was challenged by the introduction of the Generalized System of 
Preferences by the EEC in 1971(Donges 1976) and was extended to the new EC 
members after the First Enlargement of the EC (in 1973) and the Second En-
largement (Greece in1981). Between 1970 and 1984, the volume of Spanish ex-
ports to the EC grew in real terms by 355% paving the way for Spain's formal 
accession when the political developments in Spain made it possible: after Fran-
co´s death in 1975 and after the first democratic elections
1. 
 In Spain, the negotiations for entry were supported with enthusiastic po-
litical determination in spite of the skepticism among certain economic sectors 
concerning the lack of competitiveness of Spanish industry to face the opening of 
the economy. Sustained growth in the Sixties defused social conflict with the 
credible promise of higher incomes and better social mobility in the future. It is 
likely that the possibility of European integration reinforced the expectations of 
Spaniards about sustained growth in the future. In 1974, Spain attained a per 
capita income above US$7,000 compared to US$2,000 in 1930. The rapid trans-
formation of Spain in the Sixties had generated a strong middle class that secured 
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popular support for democratization and membership of the EC after Franco's 
death (Gunther, Montero, Botella 2004).       
  On the eve of membership in 1984, Spain had a relatively low level of 
foreign trade. The value of Spain’s exports amounted to some US$23.5 billion 
and her imports to some 28.8 billion. Imports per capita amounted to US$764 
while the equivalent figures were US$1,919 for France, US$1,414 for Italy, 
US$1,775 for United Kingdom and US$1,061 for Japan. The situation in terms of 
exports per capita was less favorable still amounting to US$519 while Italy had 
US$1,281 and France US$1,667.  In terms of sectoral structure, Spain presented 
an image of an underdeveloped country regarding the composition of exports to 
developed countries and it presented the image of a developed country consider-
ing the trade flows to developing countries. In 1984, 33.4% of Spanish imports 
came from the then ten members of the EC while the ten members of the EC 
imported 49.1 of Spanish exports in the same year. During the same year 50% of 
foreign investment attracted by Spain came from the EC’s ten members and most 
of the US$1.2 billion remittances of Spanish migrants working abroad came from 
the EC. In addition, 80% of the yearly tourist income of US$7 billion earned by 
Spain was spent by EC nationals (Granell 1985). In 1984 the number of foreign-
ers working in Spain was relatively small. Spanish companies had a very low 
level of investments abroad and the tourist expenditure made by Spaniards 
abroad was very low. 
 
The Terms of Membership to the EC  
 
In order to start membership negotiations (1979-85), the Spanish Government 
accepted the principle of adopting Community rules, principles and institutions 
(Acquis Communautaire), recognizing that the negotiations should focus on tran-
sitional arrangements (Nin 1980). For the purpose of the negotiations and the 
adoption of arrangements for the transitional period, the Acquis Communautaire 
had been divided into 19 chapters. As a result of the accession negotiations, a 
period of seven years was established for dismantling industrial trade barriers. 
During this period Spain also adopted the EC’s External Customs Tariff and the 
EC Foreign Commercial Policy including the Lomé Convention and the General-
ized System of Trade Preferences (Navarro, Alberto in Westendorp 1994). The 
transitional period allowed for agricultural products was ten years, following a 
complicated negotiation largely because French farmers who feared competition 
from Spain's Mediterranean agricultural products. During the negotiations, Spain 
accepted to put its State monopolies in line with EC requirements and also ac-
cepted the EC's competition rules. Spaniards already working in the EC countries 
received the same rights as nationals of EC countries. Spain adopted the Value 
Added Tax from 1986. Spain also accepted that Spanish trucks and buses would 
be obliged to introduce tachometric control supervision in three to four years. 
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agreed. Spain also accepted the EC's environmental rules (Tamames 1999).  
  
   The adoption of the EC's Common Customs Tariff reduced to one-fifth 
the protection granted by the Spanish Customs Tariff. The reduction in tariff 
protection passed from 20% to 4%. The EC's Tariff combined with the GSP, the 
ACP special relations and other agreements opened Spain not only to the Euro-
pean market but to the rest of the world as well, having an impact on some do-
mestic sectors of production that was more important than the impact produced 
by the high added value products from other EC members not directly competing 
with Spanish production. The introduction of VAT changed the traditional 
Spain’s system of export subsidies and forced central and regional governments 
and other bodies, like the Chambers of Commerce, to be much more active in 
promoting exports to improve the performance of the Spanish economy, and to 
try to reduce the trade gap. Some declining and non-competitive industries suf-
fered from the enhanced competition from foreign products due to cheaper im-
ports. 
  In the field of external relations, a specific issue that Spain sought to 
introduce into the accession negotiations was the need for the EC to establish 
special relations with the Latin-American countries with which Spain had no 
special tariff or trade policy arrangements at that time (Granell 1985). The ques-
tion of the relations with Latin America dramatically changed    years later not 
only because of an increase in trade relations, but because of the vastly increased 
number of Latin-American  immigrants that come to work in Spain and the   
enormous amount  of  investment in Latin America by Spanish multinational 
companies created  by  privatization of  old monopoly companies in the field of  
utilities  (Telefónica, Repsol, Iberia, Endesa…) or by  diversification of banking 
business (Santander-Central Hispano, BBVA). Most of these investments were at 
least in part a consequence of the application increased competition, the bigger 
firms resulting from the mergers and acquisitions to achieve economies of scale 
and later in order to complete effectively following in the introduction of the 
euro. Spain also became involved in EC development assistance to poor countries 
(Granell 1991 and Navarro in Westendorp 1994).    
  The initial effects of joining the EC in static terms were unfavorable to 
Spain in terms of balance of trade, even if in the Treaty of Accession Spanish 
industry obtained advantageous treatment, except in certain sensitive sectors such 
as car production and iron and steel. With the phasing out of tariffs, there was 
both trade creation and the trade diversion which affected agricultural imports 
from United States and Latin America. This led the EC to compensate the coun-
tries affected in the framework of the rules of the GATT. 
   Nevertheless, the overall effect on Spain of joining the EC was highly 
positive in dynamic terms. One factor was the integration of Spanish Industry 
into the European networking of intra-industry trade in added value products. 
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and from other countries, mainly USA and Japan, as well as the European trans-
fers to increase farmers and for investment in infrastructure. But some of the 
dynamic effects were still to come, resulting from the launching of European 
growth after the 1983-85 economic crisis, and the creation of new European in-
struments and policies that were introduced after Jacques Delors became presi-
dent of the European Commission in 1985. 
 
 
The Consequences of Membership for Spain 
 
Comparing with the low growth in 1983-85, the 1986-1991 years had been glob-
ally positive for the Spanish economy making it easier for the country to adapt to 
EC rules (Almarcha 1993). The Socialist  Party came to power  at the end of 
1982 and at the time of presenting the Macroeconomic Convergence Program 
with the EC in April 1992 there was much pride in the economic performance of 
the Spanish Economy and even in the new policy of privatization  in 1983 
(Rumasa). This success came at the price of an increase in the public debt from 
31.4% of GNP to 47.1% in the period 1982-95, increasing to 68.2% in the last 
year of Socialist Party rule (1996).    
  Since EC membership, Spain has actively participated in the Community 
policy process guiding the process of European integration during four six-month 
periods of Spanish Presidency (three under the socialist government: Janu-
ary/June 1989; July/December 1995 and January/June 2010 and one under the 
Popular Party government: January/June 2002) (Granell 2010). At the same time, 
Spanish representatives occupied top jobs in the EU's institutions and  Spain sup-
ported the development of the EC integration in quantitative terms (enlarge-
ments), qualitative terms (for development of community policies)  and in the 
efficiency of the European institutions (Viñas 2006).  
  Since 1986, Spain has been one of the most pro-European countries and 
it has always been in favor of deeper EU integration. In this sense, Felipe Gonzá-
lez cooperated closely with Helmut Kohl, François Miterrand and Jacques De-
lors, helping to make possible one of the most creative periods in the history of 
European integration (González 2010).  At the same time, Spain did not oppose 
enlargement where new members were prepared to share the entire EU Acquis, 
and if European Member States were prepared to accept an increase in the Euro-
pean Budget for financing underdeveloped European regions (Solbes 2002). 
  Prime Minister Felipe González attended the European Council meeting 
held in Milan in June 1985 as his first important European engagement after the 
signing of the Accession Treaty and before the ratification of membership. Gon-
zalez  endorsed the White Paper of  Jacques Delors  introducing the idea of creat-
ing a Single Internal Market by 1992 eliminating non tariff, legal and administra-
tive obstacles still impeding the free movement of labor and capital, goods and 
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Act that the Single Market program included provisions on European political 
cooperation, developed the idea of economic and social cohesion and further 
advanced the European Monetary System (EMS) which the Spanish peseta joined 
under its first Presidency of the Council in June 19, 1989.  
  The decision for the peseta to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism - with 
a central parity of  pesetas 65 per deutschemark  and a fluctuation band of 6% - 
was linked to the need to show to other countries that Spain was a credible part-
ner with an effective anti-inflation policy.  The move strengthened the peseta due 
to an increase in capital inflows which were responding to the high Spanish in-
terest rate differentials with other ERM currencies. However, as a result of per-
sistent inflation and a fixed exchange rate inside the ERM, companies became 
less competitive, negatively affecting competitiveness and leading to successive 
devaluations in September 1992 (5%), November 1992 (6%), May 1993 (8%) 
and March 1995 (7%).      
  After the ratification of the European Single Act on July 1, 1987   Spain 
sought to introduce more flexibility into its economy and was able to introduce 
three hundred measures required to increase freedom of movement under the 
Single Market program (Viñals 1992).  The adoption of EU regulations or trans-
posing the directives has been a continuous process not always easy on Spanish 
companies, especially the economic recession that began in 1992, from which 
Spain only emerged at the time of the Barcelona Olympic Games, the Seville 
World Expo and the award of European Cultural Capital to Madrid.     
As well as the Single Market, other factors helped to promote Spanish 
convergence with the European average income levels: the introduction of com-
mon currency and low interest rates, the increase of the budgetary appropriations 
of funds for the poorer regions of the member States in order to enable them to 
cope better with the increased competition that was expected from the removal of 
internal barriers in the EC, resources for Research, Education, etc.The step in the 
integration process that came with the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) 
signed in Maastricht in February 1992 enlarged substantially the scope of the 
European integration introducing new economic policies, a political pillar and a 
Justice and Internal affairs pillar. Spanish Ambassador Carlos Westendorp was a 
key player in the negotiation of the TEU (Westendorp 1994). Among other things 
the TEU opened the way to Economic and Monetary Union with a European 
Central Bank, established the criteria for new membership and the macroeco-
nomic convergence criteria required for the introduction of a common currency 
(the “euro” according to the decision taken at the European Council held in Ma-
drid in December 1995). Spain was concerned to be part of the Economic and 
Monetary Union. For that reason, Spain requested during the Intergovernmental 
Conference on EMU, a long transition period and insisted on the principle that 
the largest possible number of Member States should participate from the start. 
Spain accepted the Maastricht Treaty provisions on macroeconomic convergence 
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introduction of the euro) to start would be 1999. During this period, Spain’s rec-
ord regarding the macroeconomic convergence criteria established by the Maas-
tricht Treaty was not satisfactory. Spain faced the risk of not participating in the 
third stage of EMU. 
  Spain also supported other elements of the new TEU: the concept of 
“subsidiary”, the notion of an EU citizenship and the establishment of the new 
Committee of the Regions to formalize consultation with the local and regional 
authorities. The creation of the Committee of Regions was especially welcomed 
by Spanish local and regional Governments. They also welcomed the explicit 
definition of subsidiary even if the concept written in Article 3b of the TEU re-
ferred only to relations between the EU institutions and national governments. 
This concept was only more precisely defined, together with the principle of 
proportionality, in the European Council meeting held in Edinburgh in December 
1992 (then incorporated to the Amsterdam Treaty signed on June 1997). In this 
sense, it is important to recall that almost in parallel with EU membership, 
Spain’s Constitution of 1978 formally recognized 17 Autonomous Communities. 
The devolution of powers to regional governments has changed the balance of 
power between the central and regional government.  
  At the same time, the new political environment that followed the col-
lapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 led to a process of German unification for which 
Helmut Kohl found in Felipe González a strong ally at the EC level
2. Partly as a 
result of this support, Kohl accepted the Spanish request for more resources for 
cohesion policy and for the establishment of a cohesion fund under the so-called 
Delors II Financial Package that was agreed in the European Council held in 
Edinburgh in December 1992 (Molle 2007). 
  Regarding a possible enlargement of the EC, accepting into the EC cer-
tain EFTA/EEE countries, the first mention of this possibility was made by the 
EC's European Council held in Maastricht in December 1991. Spain accepted 
from the beginning the request presented by EFTA countries, provided that they 
were ready to accept in full the European Acquis that also included the ac-
ceptance by the candidates not only of the traditional EU acquis but also of the 
extensions deriving from the Single European Act and the Treaty of European 
Union. Spain insisted in two other pre-conditions: the ratification of the TUE 
before enlargement and the approval of the Financial Perspectives 1993-99   
needed for Spain to receive important EU funds . Regarding voting rules in the 
Council in their initial position, both Spain and the UK wanted to maintain the 
number of votes required for a blocking minority on decisions to 23 instead of 
raising it to 27. The issue was only settled by the so-called Ionnina Compromise 
of March 1994. The Greek presidency said:"The EU should not have undertaken 
new responsibilities before the Community structure deepens, before we proceed 
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to necessary structural and economic changes, before we satisfy the precondi-
tions set by the Maastricht Treaty" (Granell 1995). During the subsequent en-
largement negotiations, Spain feared that with the arrival of new member states 
in 1995, the likelihood of starting a third stage of EMU before 1999 would have 
been increased and consequently Spain would face a higher risk of not being 
ready to join the first group of countries. If Spain had been left outside the lead-
ing group of countries,  it would have appeared as a major failure for the Socialist 
government. In this context, at the EU Foreign Affairs Council of December 
1993, Spain requested that the candidate countries (at that time Austria, Finland, 
Sweden and Norway) should be excluded from decisions concerning the passage 
to the third stage of EMU due to be taken in 1996. 
After the 1995 enlargement that brought Austria, Finland and Sweden in-
to the EU, with the full support of Spain, some concerns arose (already present 
during the second Spanish Presidency of the Council in the second semester of 
1995) about the efficacy of the EU’s institutions and about migration policy 
which were subsequently addressed, among others, in the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
signed on October 2, 1997. When the Treaty came into effect on May 1, 1999, it 
provided several amendments to the Treaty of Maastricht. To resolve personal 
security and immigration issues, the EU was allowed to legislate on civil law. 
The Treaty also bestowed more power upon the Parliament in the legislative pro-
cess, and it raised the possibility—albeit under strict conditions—for “closer 
cooperation” between selected member states. Links between criminal justice 
systems in the member states were also intensified. A High Representative for 
EU Foreign Policy was introduced, in a bid to bolster the Union’s international 
profile, and to help to project European values in the outside world. The former 
Spanish Foreign Minister and former NATO General Secretary, Javier Solana 
was appointed as the first High Representative for the CFSP (Solana 2010). 
However, the majority of the Amsterdam Treaty amendments served to tighten 
the political bond between the Union and the citizen. Perhaps resulting from the-
se measures, in a late 2000 survey, 76% of the Spanish population admitted to 
feeling “European,” compared to 60% in the rest of the EU. 
  The question of the conduct of the economy to enter in EMU had been 
important in the last years of the González Socialist government and the first 
years of the Aznar conservative government after the March 1996 legislative 
elections (Cuadrado 1996 and Muns 1997). In fact, Aznar came to power promis-
ing to fight corruption and illegal practices and to fight against ETA terrorism 
(GAL) while promising more economic liberalism including tax cuts
3. However, 
only a few months after he became prime minister many of his intentions were 
abandoned because of the need to prepare for the Single European currency.   
This was at a time of high unemployment (23%) and both domestic demand and 
consumer spending were stagnant. There was a general fear that austerity policies 
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demanded by macroeconomic convergence criteria could push the country into 
recession.  
Due to some improvement in the economic situation, Spain in the end 
met the convergence criteria, making it possible to join the leading group of 
countries entering into the euro on January 1, 1999. Although interest rates were 
no longer to be set in Madrid in a Spanish economic policy context, full partici-
pation in the euro has never been a divisive issue even during the euro crisis of 
2009-2010. In fact, the adoption of the euro has been described as creating a vir-
tuous circle for the Spanish economy (Elias 2001). In the Davos meeting of 2000, 
Aznar called the euro "a great European success that had brought stability, inte-
gration and prosperity"
4 
  In the assessment of the updated convergence program for Spain in Feb-
ruary 2000, it was pointed out that the macroeconomic projections  for 1999-
2003 were in line  with the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact and the 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines agreed at the Cardiff European Council (June 
1998). After the successful application by the Popular Party of the Convergence 
Program 1994-97, Spain achieved international recognition of success in eco-
nomic management in December 2001 by being considered as a country with the 
highest debt rating "AAA” by Moody’s Investors services.  The Aznar govern-
ment introduced a Fiscal Stability Law in 2003 that was stricter than the EU Sta-
bility and Growth Pact and together with more fiscal austerity the Debt/GDP 
ratio fell to 55.8% in 2003 with economic growth near 4%, thus helping in the 
effort to reduce the GDP gap with other EU countries. Only the inflation rate 
exceeded the required target of 2% (Garmendia 2004).  
  Aznar enhanced the Spanish position in the EU through a series of re-
forms that transformed Spain into one of the more robust economies. This in-
cluded reforms in the tax system and labor market and the privatization of public 
companies (Telefónica, Endesa, Repsol, Tabacalera, Argentaria, Iberia) generat-
ing revenues to reduce the debt burden while reducing the weight of the state 
companies in the stock market to a less than 0.5%. 
  Bolstered by Spain's strong economy, Aznar urged his European neigh-
bors to abandon government intervention in the economy (increased taxes, 35-
hour working week and so on) and called for building an "economically powerful 
Europe". Together with Tony Blair he emerged triumphant from the EU Europe-
an Council in Nice on December 2000 because, in the reweighting of votes de-
cided in view of the Nice Treaty, Britain and Spain gained more weight while 
succeeding in protecting their national vetoes in the key areas: for UK, taxes and 
social security, and, for Spain in decisions governing the allocation of future 
“cohesion funds", the source of some €11 billion in EU subsidies per year to 
Spain between 2000 and 2006. 
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  Even if the budgetary flows between Brussels and Madrid probably have 
a marginal importance in the framework of the EU/Spain relations because the 
EU budget is relatively small compared to National and Regional budgets in 
Spain
5, the question is highly political, however, in view of the fact that public 
opinion considered that Spain had to be financially compensated for opening its 
market to imports from more advanced European partners, for supporting the 
significant effort in investment in infrastructures after accession, for converting 
regions and sectors affected by globalization, for fighting against unemployment 
and for adapting Spanish Agriculture under the Common Agricultural Policy.  
The next Treaty of Accession signed in Athens (April 2003), which ad-
mitted ten new countries in the EU on 2005 (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta) and the Luxemburg 
Treaty (April 2005) bringing Bulgaria and Romania to the Union on 2007, called 
for another period of adjustments.  
Regarding the management of the Spanish Economy, the enlargement to 
27 meant that Spain saw certain industries delocalizing. Spain also moved to 
become a net contributor to the EU budget (Roy 2006).  This did not seem to 
concern the Spanish public opinion convinced by Prime Minister Rodríguez Za-
patero that the Spanish economy was going up and up and did not need the same 
level of European regional and cohesion funds. 
After the non-ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, the Berlin Decla-
ration of March 25, 2007, on the occasion of the 50
th anniversary of the Treaty of 
Rome, renewed the impetus for major institutional and policy reform, which 
would soon be realized in the Treaty of Lisbon
6. Spain, together with Luxem-
burg, had a pivotal role in the transposition of the un-ratified Constitutional Trea-
ty into the new Treaty of Lisbon
7 that was agreed by the member states on De-
cember 13, 2007, effective on December 1, 2009, amending the existing treaties 
and dismantling the three pillars structure (Piris 2010). Although Spain was the 
23
rd (fourth to last) country to ratify the Treaty, it did so with an overwhelming 
majority in both the Senate and lower house of Parliament, and this in a context 
of economic crisis. The Treaty received the backing of Prime Minister Zapatero 
and his PSOE party, as well as that of the Popular Party. The Treaty of Lisbon 
also declared the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European (previously 
ratified on December 7, 2000) legally sound. The Charter proclaimed the rights 
of all EU citizens in areas such as equality, solidarity, rights and justice, in a 
move that PSOE considered very close to their interests and electoral social 
promises. 
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Finally, it is necessary to recall that Spain chaired the rotating presidency 
of the Council of the EU (the 4
th presidency since membership) during the first 
semester of 2010 (Granell 2010). This meant that during their presidency Spain 
was responsible for implementing, along with the other European institutions, all 
the changes in the governance of the UE introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon in a 
very stormy period, characterized the EU debt crisis in Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
and in other countries. During the Presidency, life was complicated for Spain 
because of some apparent decline in the image and prestige of the EU linked to 
the euro crisis
8.  
 
 
The Economic Impact of Membership 
 
Between 1985 and 2007, Spain's output growth was very fast (except in the peri-
od that followed the 1992 Olympics in Barcelona, the World Exhibition in Sevil-
la and the Madrid European Cultural capital) due to various factors only in part 
associated with membership to EU. Between 1986 and the year before the crea-
tion of the euro (1998), Spain had an average yearly growth of 3.1% rising in 
some years to nearly 5%, the fastest in the OECD. The initial twenty-one years of 
Spain’s involvement in the European Union were therefore a period of economic 
good fortune, leading to many improvements in the country from major construc-
tion in infrastructure, to the unemployment rate falling from 18% to 10%.  Spain 
became the 8
th largest economy in the world (Piedrafita 2007).  
Spain also improved its weight within the EU economy moving from 8% of the 
Union’s GDP to 9.7%.  Between 2000 and 2006, Spain provided more than half 
of the new jobs within the EU. Spain, in the past a country of emigration, became 
a net receiver of millions of foreign workers. Spanish multinational companies 
and banks expanded around the World, mainly Latin America. The Spanish 
economy expanded by 64.6% in the first twenty years of its membership, while 
the rest of the EU averaged an increase of 47.9%.  Incomes in Spain rose from 
71% of the average income in the EU 15, to more than 90% in 2006. Inflation fell 
to only one point above that of the euro zone, an impressive feat considering it 
was originally six points above the average.  Public spending experienced a ma-
jor increase from 25% of Spain’s GDP in 1978, to reach 40% in 2006.  Motor-
ways developed as well: from 2,000 kilometers in 1985 to 10,000 kilometers in 
2002.  This greatly improved communication and cut costs in goods and services.  
The beneficial additions to the infrastructure sector also greatly improved the 
tourism industry, which in 2006 accounted for 12% of GDP and 10% of em-
ployment.Still, despite this growth, Spain did not benefit in all aspects of its 
economy in the initial years of membership. Some sectors remained stagnant and 
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in need of improvement. High-technology production is one of the fields where 
Spain has had a notable stagnation.  
Further signs of stagnation can be found in the productivity rate.  Though 
employment had increased, productivity remained constant.  This means that less 
work in terms of added value was being done per person. Two contributing fac-
tors to this stagnation were the greater use of temporary and more precarious 
contracts for workers, and an insufficient use of new technologies.  Temporary 
contracts can boost employment; however, with staff rotating frequently, workers 
may not receive proper training or integrate fully into the work force and are thus 
unable to use newer, more complicated technologies.  
 Technological development has tended to lag behind the rest of the Eu-
ropean Union: for every 100 patents filed by the average EU nation, Spain files 
only 18.  This is largely due to the fact that Spain falls far behind the rest of Eu-
rope in spending on Research and Development.  Spain’s investment in R&D 
accounted for only 1.07% of its GDP, whereas the European Union’s average 
was 1.95% of GDP.  Technological development is a significant challenge 
against the background of the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategy in 
which  the EU  aimed to make the EU’s economy “the most dynamic and com-
petitive knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustaining economic 
growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.”   
More recently much of the favorable statistics on the initial twenty-one 
years of membership have shifted within Spain.  The recession has exposed some 
of the weaknesses in Spanish development, some of which can be traced to in-
volvement within the European Union. Certain industries have suffered greatly as 
a result of the recession, and Spain’s ties to the European Union through the euro 
are probably inhibiting a recovery. Some Spanish savings banks – which account 
for 42% of the country’s banking assets – are in difficulty following the collapse 
of the decade-long housing boom, which has left them a large volume of bad 
loans and potentially heavy losses
9. 
The construction industry symbolizes the problems of the Spanish econ-
omy. Between 1995 and 2008 Spanish house prices tripled in nominal terms, and 
doubled in real terms. This was explained by young people leaving the parental 
homes earlier, a rise in immigration, the country's popularity among European 
buyers of secondary residences, low interest rates for mortgages and generous 
fiscal incentives to buy a house.  Spain’s construction industry accounted for 
12% of its Gross Domestic Product.  It brought in immigrants seeking work and 
provided lending and borrowing opportunities in the private sector.  Over a dec-
ade, land prices rose by 500%; in 2007 construction led to an addition of 800,000 
housing units.  However, when the bubble burst, this contributed to an unem-
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ployment rate of around 20% and forced some immigrants that had originally 
found work in Spain to return home
10.   
The first reaction of the Socialist government to the crisis was to spend 
more in order to stimulate the economy and to continue social expenditure to 
preserve social peace.  This effort in expenditure and the reduction of tax reve-
nues due to the decrease of economic activity led to an increased in the public 
deficit for the central and regional governments. Financing the debt on the inter-
national markets was a challenge against a background of indecision and uncer-
tainty in the handling of the European euro crisis
11. This led to an increase in 
prices to be paid for debt issued by the Ministry of Finance and by the Regional 
Governments
12.  However, according to the analysis of Goldman Sachs in a re-
cent study, Spanish public debt is unlikely to exceed 90% at the peak, hardly a 
case of insolvency and reducing the risk of a liquidity crisis that might force 
Spain to seek external assistance similar to the so-called bailouts of Greece and 
Ireland. In addition, Goldman Sachs concluded that Spain's gross government 
debt stood at 64% of GDP, well below the levels of Portugal (83%), Ireland 
(97%) and Greece (140%), with a "prospective burden debt" similar to those of 
"safe France and Germany today
13.  
In May 2010 Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, at last, 
changed economic policy and declared that painful cuts would be needed in the 
Spanish Welfare State
14. 
Taking account of budgetary legal limits and the requirements of the Eu-
ropean Pact for Stability and Growth, and seeing the reality of the situation in the 
markets for debt (and after talks with the European Commission, the European 
central Bank and the IMF) Spain was forced to curb public spending 
15.  In this 
context the government set out a program of reform to reduce the 11.1% budget 
deficit in 2009 to 9.3% in 2010 and 6% in 2011, reforming social security and 
pensions, freezing salaries in the public sector, increasing VAT normal rate from 
16% to 18% and increasing other taxes. The Trade unions immediately reacted 
with a general strike held on September 29, 2010.    
Even if Spanish government officials are saying that the worst of the cri-
sis is over, the Popular Party, international organizations and many independent 
experts remain skeptical
16. The construction industry’s rate of expansion in 
                                                 
10 Suzanne Daley and Raphael Minder: “Newly built towns haunt banks in Spain”, New York 
Times, Dec, 17,2010. 
11Marcus Walker and Neil Shah. "Spain hit with Credit downgrade", The Wall Street Journal, April 
29, 2010  
12  Joseph Stiglitz,“Stiglitz alerta a España de una posible crisis a la argentina”, El Economista, 4 
Oct 2010 
13  Irwin Stelzer : Spain can still avoid financial doom The Wall Street Journal, January 24,2011. 
14Financial Times Special Report.  “Spain.After the bust, a time for adjustment”, June 11, 2010 
15 Francesc Granell. "La crisis griega como referente para España",Catalunya Empresarial, April-
May 2010 
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Spainwas one of the important components of the growth. Spain had the largest 
number of mortgages per capita, and was the most “overbuilt” country in the 
European Union. But prices since the recession have dropped the least.  Making 
matters worse is that the scale of unsold units, and mortgage problems among 
households, is so great that the banks are unable to produce accurate data and 
statistics to demonstrate how severe the problem is.   
During the period of prosperity that Spain experienced up to 2007, prices 
and wages rose rapidly which, though were temporarily beneficial, caused a large 
trade deficit and a growing increase in the external debt required to finance the 
current account imbalance. Following the bursting of the bubble, Spain was left 
with unit production costs that seriously damaged its competitiveness within the 
European Union. The large fall in employment partly reflected attempts by firms 
to rationalize production in the face of strong labor cost pressures in an effort to 
become more competitive abroad.  
It would not necessarily help for Spain to leave the euro that it adopted in 
1999 and devalue. For example, Spain needs to import more advanced technolo-
gy from abroad and that would cost more with a depreciated currency. Investors 
might begin to transfer their money out of Spanish banks to other European 
banks in order not to lose the strength of the euro. But the same euro that during 
ten years contributed to the strong development of Spain is presently trapping 
Spain in a high-cost situation, which is contributing to the persistence of high 
unemployment
17. 
 
The Future 
 
The last three years have shown that continuous prosperity for Spain within the 
European Union’s economy is uncertain. Weaknesses and problems with the 
system have been revealed; however, if Spain can restructure in order to weather 
the storm of the current crisis using the help that is available within the European 
Union, then it will certainly come out far stronger down the road as a result
18. 
  Recessions help to show weaknesses and mistakes made by govern-
ment, public bodies, banks and saving banks, and private industries. If Spain and 
the rest of the European Union can learn from these mistakes, then Spain and 
other weaker European countries are likely to see a return to the growth that they 
had enjoyed throughout the initial years as a member of EC and EU. Spain and 
its European family have maintained a primarily beneficial relationship through-
out twenty five years. This relation will hopefully resume after the present crisis 
has been overcome, with the aid of the instruments of anti-crisis created by the 
EU during 2010 in order to create a permanent rescue fund that would come into 
                                                 
17 Paul Krugman,” The Spanish Prisoner”,  New York Times, November 28, 2010 
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being in 2013. This also demonstrates the commitment of Germany and France 
and all the euro zone countries to the success of the euro as a political project.
19 
The Spanish government has criticized rating agencies for lowering the 
nation's credit rating. Meanwhile, it is negotiating a higher retirement age and 
seeking to establish more flexible labor markets and a better connection between 
wages and productivity. At the same time, central and regional governments try-
ing to balance their budgets and there is an ambitious program for aligning banks 
and savings banks with the requirements established by Basel III. 
 Today the challenge is not only to solve the short-term budgetary and fi-
nancial sector problems, but to create a more competitive economy based on a 
different growth model that promotes rising productivity. Spain needs to compete 
not only in Europe but also in the world markets to avoid a decline in its weight 
in the European and world economy. 
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Abstract 
 
The economic cycle directly affects the living standard and purchasing power of 
citizens. When the business cycle is in the recessionary phase, unemployment is 
the outcome and, in certain extreme cases, high unemployment rates might lead 
to strong labor migration trends.  Changes in the labor structure of a country di-
rectly affect the country’s factors of production which directly affect economic 
growth and social stability. 
The purpose of this study is two-fold. First of all, this paper studies how 
the current economic crisis is affecting the labor market of Spain.   In particular, 
this paper will present that Spain suffered economic hardship in the 1960s that 
led to a major labor migration. Spanish workers left Spain to find a better life in 
Latin American countries and some northern European countries. This migration 
was characterized by young males with low level of education and almost not 
professional skills.  Nowadays, Spain is going through an economic crisis which 
is leading to high levels of unemployment: structural unemployment. This type of 
unemployment is characterized by highly skilled workers with years of profes-
sional experience. Further, this worsening of the labor market is reducing the 
chances of newly graduated students to find a job. As a consequence, this eco-
nomic crisis is creating a pool of highly educated and skilled workers who are 
opting to migrate to other countries—mainly Latin American countries due to 
languages and cultural affinity—to find a job where to practice their academic 
and professional skills. Thus, Spain is suffering a human capital flight or brain 
drain. This brain drain means that Spain suffers an impoverishing of its factors of 
production while those countries which receive these workers witness an im-
provement in their factors. Secondly, this paper aims at demonstrating that since 
the introduction of the euro, Eurozone member states have witnessed a synchro-
nization of the business cycle represented by a harmonization of their unem-
ployment rates. This helps infer that the evolution of the labor market is inde-
pendent from political factors.  This study will present two innovative studies to 212                                                                                          Lorca-Susino 
 
 
shed light to the evolution of the Eurozone labor market. On the one hand, the 
Okun’s law which will present the relationship between the unemployment rate 
and production in certain Eurozone member states; on the other hand, the Phillips 
curve which measures the unemployment and inflation rate.   
 
Introduction 
J. F. Kennedy famously said that it is not only a case of what your country can do 
for you but, what you can do for your country. The current economic crisis and 
financial uproar is affecting much of the world and having a heavy toll on the 
labor market. Most countries have seen a dramatic increase in their unemploy-
ment rate. In Spain, the increase is making headlines as it is the highest among 
developed countries with an unemployment rate of close to 20% in November 
2010. As a consequence, Spain is suffering a modern labor migration process that 
is only paralleled in Ireland. In fact, it has been reported that Ireland “is facing a 
wave of emigration on a scale unseen since the 1980s, as young people desperate 
for work turn their backs on an economy ravaged by debt crisis, high unemploy-
ment and tough austerity measures.”
1 Since 2002, and intensified since 2007, 
Spain is losing a number of highly skilled and well-educated workers who are 
leaving the country to find job opportunities abroad. The question is why this 
migration is taking place; the answer rests on what the country can do and offer 
to retain these workers who escaped from the current labor market. 
What the western hemisphere, in particular, is facing is the recessionary 
phase of the business cycle which negatively affects the living standard and pur-
chasing power of citizens. When the business cycle is in the recessionary phase, 
unemployment is the outcome. In certain extreme cases, high unemployment 
rates might lead to labor migration trends. Changes in the labor structure of a 
country affect factors of production, the economic growth, and social stability.  
The purpose of this study is three-fold. First of all, this paper studies how 
the current economic crisis is affecting the labor market of Spain in a way that is 
resulting in a human capital flight or brain drain. As a consequence, Spain suffers 
an impoverishment of factors of production while those countries which receive 
these workers witness an improvement.  Secondly, this paper presents a snapshot 
of the labor market in Spain in comparison with some Eurozone member states. 
This section will show that since 1990, Spain is the country with the highest level 
of unemployment and that labor market conditions have improved only due to the 
                                                 
1Guy Chazam, and Ainsley Thomson, “Tough Irish economy turns migration influx to exo-
dus,”TheWallStreetJournal,January21,2011. 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703921504576094201825868600.html 
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expansionary phase of the business cycle. Thus, Spain needs to adjust its factors 
of production to end the brain drain and improve the unemployment rate in the 
country. Finally, this study presents some factors that are not only triggering the 
exit of workers but also not incentivizing the return of those who are currently 
living and working in another country. This final section, therefore, sheds light 
into some of the major problems that Spain is facing and that could explain the 
current migration trends.  
This paper concludes that labor migration results when the country is not 
able to retain and attract well-educated and highly-skilled workers to contribute 
to economic growth and social prosperity. 
 
The Current Economic Crisis in Spain: The Modern Brain Drain 
 
Spain is a country of emigrants. The history of emigration in Spain dates back to 
1492 when “the conquistadores” went to the new world searching for fortune and 
glory. Spain also suffered an emigration wave during the Spanish Civil War 
(1936-1939) when most intellectuals left Spain and fled to the US and Latin 
America.  This wave had the most brilliant minds which formed the so-called 
Generaciόn del 27. 
In the 1950’s Spain suffered difficult economic times which forced an-
other major labor migration and the creation of the Instituto Español de Emi-
graciόn. This group was formed by young males with relatively low levels of 
education and almost no professional skills. These workers left to find a better 
life in Latin America where they arrived at their own cost and peril. However, the 
majority of them went to northern Europe including Germany where immigration 
was structured, organized, and agreed upon by the Spanish and German govern-
ments making it even today a case to study and a model to imitate.  
In the 1990’s Spain as member of the European Union experienced im-
proved economic conditions. The country then stopped being a net “exporter of 
labor” and became a “net receptor” of labor coming mainly from Latin America. 
These workers came to Spain looking for work to improve living standards. His-
tory tended to repeat itself and these workers, as those that emigrated in the 
1950s, sent remittances back to their countries to maintain their families. Those 
remittances have become a vital source of income for their families and an im-
portant economic indicator for the country of origin.  
Since 2007, Spain is suffering an economic crisis which is leading to 
high levels of unemployment including among by highly skilled workers with 
years of professional experience that lost their jobs due to the economic down-
turn. Further, this worsening of the labor market is reducing the chances of newly 
graduated students to find a job. As a consequence, Spain has a supply of highly 
educated and skilled workers that would be the envy of many countries. Tragical-
ly, these workers are not finding the opportunities they deserve in Spain and are 214                                                                                          Lorca-Susino 
 
 
migrating to other countries to find a job where they can practice their academic 
and professional skills. Therefore, Spain is suffering from a brain drain. 
The current economic downturn is affecting everyone in Spain including 
an estimated 3.5 million workers who have arrived in Spain since 1990. These 
workers now have the Spanish citizenship and are going back to their country of 
origin at a rate that rose as high as 90,000 workers in just the last quarter of 2009.  
The loss of this group of workers—with or without the Spanish citizenship—
should also be considered a brain drain as they have acquired knowledge and 
skills, and increased their human capital with experience and know-how.  
This overall emigration of workers leaves Spain with less qualified and 
prepared worker, negatively affecting the productive capacity of the country. 
Also, the fact that the euro is relatively high against the dollar is contributing to 
this current trend. The following figure shows that the euro has been reaching 
record highs although it is in a down trend as each high is lower than the previous 
one.    
 
S
ource: Graph provided courtesy of eSignal/Interactive Data Corporation 
 
Reports and statistics support that Spain has been the European country with 
the highest level of brain drain, particularly accentuated during the economic 
crisis that started in 2007.
2 Workers looking for better job opportunities in Eu-
rope and the US are young professionals highly qualified in areas such as engi-
neering, architecture, and computer sciences. There is another group of people 
with knowledge and expertise in the areas of social sciences—economics, man-
agement, etc—that are settling down in countries of Latin America.
3 
Spanish economic growth and factors of production are not only affected 
by brain drain, but also by the fact that, according to the study released in 2005 
                                                 
2“España es el país de la Unión Europea con mayor 'fuga de cerebros,'” El Mundo, February 18, 
2005. 
http://www.elmundo.es/universidad/2005/02/11/actualidad/1108144411.html 
3Pascale Harter,“Immigration and economy fuel Spanish anxiety,” BBC, October 9, 2010. 
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by the External Advisory Group (EAG), Spain only attracts 1 of each 1,188 re-
searchers that leave the country to find chances elsewhere.
4A study published by 
Gilles Saint-Paul
5 (2008) shows interesting findings regarding European immi-
gration to the US. Immigrant workers in the US enjoy better working opportuni-
ties in the US than in their country of origin.  For instance, in 1990 the employ-
ment rate of Spaniards in the US was 85.4% while the employment rate in Spain 
was 79.5%. In 2000, the statistic showed that 80.8% of the Spaniards living in the 
US were working versus 80.2% in Spain. When it comes to female employment, 
the data show that in 1990 the employment rate was 60.9% in the US against 
32.7% in Spain. In 2000, the employment rate for Spanish females in the US was 
61.4% while the employment rate in Spain was 45.1%. When it comes to educa-
tion, it is interesting to report the proportion of workers with a Ph.D. compared to 
the average US worker. This means that these who come to the US form a group 
of highly qualified, and motivated, workers. In the case of Spain, 2.7% of Span-
iards living in the US had a Ph.D. in 1990 and in 2000 that percentage increased 
to 4.6%. According to the data, only 0.82% of the US population had a Ph.D. 
degree in 1990 and 0.98% in 2000. 
 
Expatriates with a Ph.D. in 
the US
Countries 1990 2000
Belgium
France 
UK 
Spain 
Italy 
Germany 
USA
4.33
3.1 
3.2 
2.7 
0.96 
1.72 
0.82
5.78
4.9 
3.9 
4.6 
2.0 
2.36 
0.98
 
However, it is not just the academically brightest that are in the US, but also 
those with high entrepreneurial skills even compared to the US. In the case of 
Spain, almost 11% of the Spanish population living in the US was engaged in 
some entrepreneurial activity in 1990 and 10.29% in 2000. For the US, the level 
of the entrepreneurial skill was about 8% in 1990 and about 9% in 2000. 
 
 
                                                 
4“España es el país de la Unión Europea con mayor 'fuga de cerebros,'” El Mundo, February 18, 
2005. 
http://www.elmundo.es/universidad/2005/02/11/actualidad/1108144411.html 
5SillesSaint-Paul, “The European brain drain: European workers living in the US,” VOX, 
December 24, 2008.   
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/2739 
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Entrepreneurial skills of 
expatriates living in the US
Countries 1990 2000
Belgium
France 
UK 
Spain 
Italy 
Germany 
USA
13.18
10.67 
9.84 
10.96 
13.42 
9.85 
8.08
11.51
11.39 
10.55 
10.29 
14.21 
9.39 
9.08
 
The Spanish Instituto Nacional de Estadística (www.ine.es) reported that 
according to the data from the Censo Electoral de Españoles Residentes en el 
Extranjero (CERE), the number of Spaniards who have left Spain to set their 
residence in another country has increased significantly from 1 million in 2002 to 
1.4 millions in 2010.  
 
 
Source: Author based on data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística.   
http://www.ine.es/oficina_censo/cifras_electores.htm 
 
 
An analysis by city shows that Madrid, Barcelona, and A Coruña have witnessed 
the highest emigration trend. 
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  Source: Author based on data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística.   
http://www.ine.es/oficina_censo/cifras_electores.htm 
 
It is significant that despite the fact that labor market in Europe is open to 
Spaniards; the number of Spaniards choosing to move within Europe has de-
creased significantly. For instance, the number of people choosing Switzerland—
the traditional working country chosen by most Spaniards in the 1950’s— has 
decreased. This graph shows that instead the US and Latin America are the two 
areas which have been receiving this new wave of Spanish emigration. 
 
 
Source: Author based on data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística.   
http://www.ine.es/oficina_censo/cifras_electores.htm 
 
 
Its underlying production strength and growing exports have meant that 
Germany is once again short of workers. This time, however, they do not need 
low skilled workers to help built and reconstruct the country as it happened in the 
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employees”
6 to continue supporting its economic growth which in 2010 
surpassed  3%.  This shortage of workers and a possible project of bilateral 
cooperation in the workplace were  the main theme of the German agenda during 
the regular Spanish-German consultations that took place on February 3 in Ma-
drid.
7 
 
The Unemployment Rate as an Economic and Political Indicator 
 
Unemployment has historically been the Achilles’ heel of the Spanish economy. 
For this reason the health of the economy is mostly measured by the unemploy-
ment rate reported every month. The unemployment rate hints at the performance 
of other economic indicators. For instance, if the unemployment rate is high, it is 
expected to be followed by a drop in gross domestic product (GDP), inflation, 
and consumer and investment spending, and an increase in government spending, 
among others.  There are three important types of unemployment—actual, natu-
ral, and cyclical—and each one sheds light on what is the main problem affecting 
the country.  
The actual rate of unemployment is the one reported for a particular time 
period. The following graph portrayed the evolution of the unemployment rate in 
the Eurozone, and shows that the actual rate of unemployment on November 
2010 was 10.1%. The natural rate of unemployment is the unemployment record-
ed when the economy is not suffering from severe fluctuations.  The evolution of 
the unemploymentrate in the Euroarea shows that, in the past two years, the Eu-
rozone has suffered a dramatic increase in unemployment from an all time low of 
7% in the first quarter of 2008 to an all time high of 10% in 2011. It would be 
safe to say that the natural rate of unemployment in the Euroarea 15 is between 
7%-8% as this level is the lowest rate right before the recessionary phase of the 
business cycle. Finally, cyclical unemployment is the involuntary unemployment 
associated with a change in the business cycle which, in this case, would be 3%.  
                                                 
6Efecom, “Alemania estudia ofrecer trabajos cualificados a jóvenes españoles en paro,” Elecono-
mista.com, January 21, 2011.   
http://www.eleconomista.es/economia/noticias/2762832/01/11/Alemania-estudia-ofrecer-trabajos-
cualificados-a-jovenes-espanoles-en-paro.html 
7 Europa Press, “Germany plans to offer jobs to unemployed young Spanish,” Libertad Digital, 
January 22, 2011. 
http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=http://www.libertaddigital.com/economia/ale
mania-planea-ofrecer-trabajo-a-jovenes-espanoles-en-paro-
1276412505/&ei=Nqc9TcuhBMH68Aa2grj6Cg&sa=X&oi=translate&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=
0CCMQ7gEwAA&prev=/search%3Fq%3DAlemania%2Bplanea%2Bofrecer%2Btrabajo%2Ba%2
Bj%25C3%25B3venes%2Bespa%25C3%25B1oles%2Ben%2Bparo%26hl%3Den%26client%3Dfir
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Following the data provided by the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search (NBER)
8, I have highlighted in blue the beginning and end of the last re-
cession together with the unemployment rate. According to the NBER, the busi-
ness cycle reached its peak in December 2007 inaugurating the recessionary 
phase of the business cycle which reached its trough in June 2009.
9 The graph 
shows that despite the NBER marked the end of the recession on June 2009, the 
unemployment rate in the Eurozone has kept on rising. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Central Bank, “Unemployment 
rate.http://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/html/404.en.html  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8National Bureau of Economic Research, “Business Cycle Dates.” 
http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html 
9The World Bank,“Doing Business.”  http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings 
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However, the following graph demonstrates that the unemployment rate in the US is 
synchronized with the business cycle because since June 2009 the unemployment rate has 
been going down. In the case of the US, the natural rate of unemployment is considered 
to be around 4%-5% and the cyclical unemployment is about 6%.  
 
 
 
 
Economagic. “Civilian Unemployment Rate: Percent: SA.” 
http://sub0.economagic.com/gif/g9806401220154161026364265083538293.gif 
 
These two graphs show that while in the US the natural rate of unemployment is 
around 4.5%, the Eurozone has a natural rate of 7%. This difference could be 
explained by understanding and analysing different structural factors that affect 
the functioning and organization of each labor market. 
The most important piece of information is the unemploy-
ment/employment rates which together with GDP and Consumer Price Index 
make up the three main macroeconomic indicators. The graph below demon-
strates that the employment level in Spain has fluctuated significantly from an 
employment rate of about 50% during the first years of the 1990’s to all time 
high of 70% in 2007.  This graph shows that the US has the highest employment 
level and that the U.K and Germany enjoy the most stable and high employment 
levels among the EU-27. Finally, Ireland and Spain have witnessed an impressive 
improvement in their employment rates; however, since 2007 have suffered a 
dramatic drop. This sharp fall of the employment rate has not only economic 
effects, but also very painful social implications and, in some cases, potentially 
dangerous political results. 
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Source: Author based on data from the Organization for Economic Co-operation Development.  
“Employment rate.” http://www.oecd.org/statsportal/0,2639,en_2825_293564_1_1_1_1_1,00.html 
 
 
The following graph shows the employment rate in Spain from 1992 to 
2009 with a two years simple moving average (SMA). The crossing of the SMA 
and the employment rate signals the change in trend. In 1994 the SMA crossed 
the employment rate marking the beginning of an improvement in the employ-
ment rate that has lasted until 2007. This year they crossed again and the em-
ployment rate began to decline. Further, the blue box in the graph indicates the 
recessionary period as recorded by the NBER.  In 2008, the SMA and the eco-
nomic indicator had crossed and there was a change of trend which coincides 
with the beginning of the recessionary period. 
 
 
Source: Author based on data from the Organization for Economic Co-operation Development.  
“Employment rate.” http://www.oecd.org/statsportal/0,2639,en_2825_293564_1_1_1_1_1,00.html 
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into a solid economic indicator capable of signaling a change of a trend. This is 
very valuable information not only for economics, but also for political purposes.  
 
 
Spain and the Brain Drain: What your Country Can Do and Offer You  
 
There are many factors that could explain the current wave of migration and why 
Spain is currently not offering what is needed to retain highly skilled and well-
educated workers. However, this section would focus on the importance of credit 
to creating and maintaining businesses and companies, and the weight of innova-
tion and research to maintain and attract the brightest. These two points would 
help explain that in Spain the entrepreneurial spirit is very low.  
  To begin with, the latest data from the Banco Central de España demon-
strates that businesses are cutting down on credit. In fact, the rate of demand for 
credits worth less than one million euros has dropped 14.3% and has dropped 
24% for credit over one million euros.
10 This reduction in credit demand is por-
trayed in the graph below and it is what has been labeled the Spanish Credit 
crunch.
11 This credit crunch means that businesses are reducing demand of funds 
which means that business are still stalling investment project.  This lack of 
investments explains that one in every four employers are expected to cut its 
workforce in 2011 because the negative views on the performance of the Spanish 
economy.  
 
                                                 
10Banco de España, “Tipo de interés aplicado por las IFM a los residentes de la UEM.” 
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a1921.pdf 
11Juan Carlos Barba, “El crédito a las familias y empresas se desploma a un ritmo record,” Libertad  
Digital, January 10, 2011. http://www.libertaddigital.com/economia/el-credito-a-familias-y-
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Source: Juan Carlos Barba, “El crédito a familias y empresas se desploma a un ritmo record.” 
Libertad Digital, January 10, 2011. http://www.libertaddigital.com/economia/el-credito-a-familias-
y-empresas-se-desploma-a-un-ritmo-record-1276411403/ 
 
 
  In an effort to halt this credit crunch, the Instituto de Crédito Oficial has 
just renewed the 2011 colaboration with La Caixa to allow businesses and 
individual freelancers to have access to more than €1,500 millions to finance 
start-ups and businesses in three fronts.
12 These funds are expected to first 
provide capital to help businesses with new investment plans. These new projects 
would help companies find new business opportunities and, in turn, kick start 
GDP growth. Secondly, part of these funds are destined to help those companies 
which are expanding internationally. Finally, the purpose of these resources is to 
provide capital to business which are facing liquidity problems. 
  To accompany this effort, the Spanish government approved on January 
14, 2011 the Plan Apoyo a los Emprendedores. This plan has received €84 mil-
lion to contribute to the creation of companies; in particular, the government 
believes that this endowment will help create 5,000 new companies and will end 
up moving up to €300 mill.
13 This new plan must be implemented by the Gov-
ernment in order to keep up with the so-called “Small Business Plan” approved 
                                                 
12“La Caixa concede más de 40,000 créditos ICO a empresas y autónomos,” Libertad Digital, 
January 5, 2011.  http://www.libertaddigital.com/profesionales/la-caixa-concede-mas-de-40000-
creditos-ico-a-pymes-empresas-y-autonomos-1276411086/ 
13 EFE, “El Gobierno destina 84 millones de euro al Nuevo Plan de Emprendedores,” Libertad 
Digital, January 14, 2011. http://www.libertaddigital.com/profesionales/el-gobierno-destina-84-
millones-de-euros-al-nuevo-plan-de-emprendedores-1276411878/ 224                                                                                          Lorca-Susino 
 
 
by the European Commission in June 2008.
14  The government has earmarked 
€15 million to launch a new guarantee program for entrepreneurs. Also the Min-
istry of Industry, Tourism and Trade is going to renew specific funding lines for 
young entrepreneurs worth €20 million and for women entrepreneurs worth €1 
million. Also, €20 million are budgeted to help create and consolidate more than 
150 new companies, and around €6 million have been approved to advise entre-
preneurs to launch their initiatives. Finally, up to €2 million are budgeted to hold 
seminars to promote business values and, most curiously, the so-called “Entre-
preneurs Day.”
15 
  However, in order to create new companies and increase business in-
vestments to boost the economy, it might be more important and cheaper to re-
duce red-tape and taxes, and improve the labor market conditions.   Nonetheless, 
the number of companies that filed for bankruptcy fell by 3%, which is a good 
recovery sign according to the ‘Schedule Bankruptcy 2010' prepared by PwC.
16  
According to the data published by the “Doing Business Index”
17 which 
measures how “business friendly” countries are, in 2011 Spain ranks number 49 
in a list of 183 economies. Spain ranked 144 in 2010, and 147 in 2011 on the 
measure that determines how easy is to start a new business. On a third important 
category—dealing with construction permits, registering property, getting credit, 
and protecting investors—Spanish ranking dropped rather than improved it. Fi-
nally, where Spain must really improve is in speeding up important tasks such as 
legalizing the company’s registration and obtaining a municipal license to open a 
business premises which can take from 15 days to up to 3 months.   
  These results explain that although 93% of the population in Spain has a 
high literacy rate, only 5.7% of the population has in mind the idea of opening a 
business in the next 3 months versus a level of 14% in the US.  The following 
graph compares employment levels between two very important sectors of the 
labor market: professional workers, and legislators and other political appointees.   
While the first group which represents the economic motor of any nation seems 
to be in a plateau, the second group has seen a significant increase. 
 
                                                 
14Eurostat,“Science,TechnologyandInnovation.” 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/science_technology_innovation/data/database 
15 Rodolfo De Juana, “84 millones para apoyar a nuevos emprendedores,” MuyPymes, January 14, 
2011.http://muypymes.com/agenda/ayudas/6973-84-millones-para-apoyar-a-nuevos-
emprendedores.html 
16 Europa Press, “Las quiebras empresariales bajan un 3% en 2010,” Libertad Digital, January 10, 
2011.http://www.libertaddigital.com/profesionales/las-quiebras-empresariales-bajan-un-3-en-2010-
1276411423/ 
17 The World Bank, “Doing Business.” http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings 
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Source: Author based on data from International Labor Organization. “Spanish Labor Force.”   
http://laborsta.ilo.org/STP/guest 
 
  Another important type of employment that should be analyzed is the to-
tal government employment in Spain. The following graph shows that this level 
has increased significantly from 1996 to 2007.  It is interesting to highlight that 
this increase took place during the expansionary phase of the business cycle; that 
is, when the entrepreneurial spirit of Spain should have been at its peak.  
 
 
Source: Author based on data from International Labor Organization. “Spanish Labor Force.”   
http://laborsta.ilo.org/STP/guest 
 
  The second reason that can explain the current rate of brain drain in 
Spain is the lack of investment in research and development.  The last 
Community Innovation Survey
18 concluded that between 2006 and 2008, 80% of 
companies in Germany had tried any kind of innovative activity versus 43% of 
Spanish companies which makes Spain the country with the worst record among 
the EU-15. For instance, in today’s technological enviroment, only 62% of 
business and companies in Spain have a webpage to sell or advertise its products 
versus Denmark (88%), Germany (84%), or Austria (80%). The graph below 
                                                 
18Catherine Bolgar, “Germany- The Home of Smart Innovation,” Wall Street Jour-
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shows that there has not been a serious attempt to invest in research and devel-
opment since it has only increased 1.5% from 2001 to 2008, a very small per-
centage compared to the fact that according to the World Economic Forum’s 
WEF Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 “Germany is the international 
leader in terms of capacity for innovation, occupies fourth place for company and 
government spending on -R&D, and secures the sixth spot for quality of scien-
tific research institutions.”
19 
 
 
Source: Author based on data from Organization for Economic Co-operation Development.  “Spain 
Statistical Profile.” 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/country-statistical-profile-spain_20752288-table-esp 
 
Similarly, the number of full-time researchers has not increase during this 
time either. The Ramon y Cajal plan to bring back Spanish talent has not worked 
as expected since “out of the 774 researchers given contracts in the first phase of 
the program, only 437 have managed to obtain permanent positions.”
20  Also, 
during the “Jornadas de jóvenes post-doc en el extranjero” organized by the Con-
sejo Superior de Investigación Científica (CSIC) in Madrid on December 2010, 
was concluded that  
 
“el problema no es la falta de institutos de alto nivel en España, sino 
que con la formación que traen tras sus estancia en el Extranjero, es-
tos científicos españoles jóvenes no deberían optar a puestos de in-
vestigación junior, que son los que hay disponibles, sino que tendrían 
que tener a su cargo su propio proyecto.”
21 
 
                                                 
19Catherine Bolgar, “Germany — The Home of Smart Innovation,” Wall Street Journal. 
http://online.wsj.com/ad/article/germany-innovation.html 
20El País, “Ramón y Cajal Program: Spain’s brain drain scheme leaves scientists redundant,” 
BarcelonaReporter,November16,2006. 
http://www.barcelonareporter.com/index.php?/pg_print_article/ramn_y_cajal_program_spains_bai
n_drain_scheme_leaves_scientists_redundant/ 
21Europa Press, “Dificultades de los jóvenes científicos para regresar a España,” El País, December 
26,2010.http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/Dificultades/jovenes/cientificos/regresar/Espana/
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Based on these findings, it makes sense that most of the Spanish companies listed 
on the IBEX-35 have been looking for opportunities outside Spain. For example, 
Telefónica, Santander, Repsol, Prosegur, OHL and Mapfre are some of the 
Spanish companies which have been successfully branching out in Latin America 
for the past ten years and who have been responsible for taking with them the 
best and the brightest. But not only multinational companies are expanding, but 
also Spanish small and medium size businesses are looking for business 
opportunities outside national borders; the lastest effort has been a delegation of 
24 mid-size companies going to Turkey. Part of the reason maybe that Turkey is 
receiving funds from the EU to improve public infrastructure and services to the 
point that Spanish total investment in this country in 2009 reached an impresive 
€118 million.
22 But Spain is mainly expanding in South America at the same time 
the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank are investing 
new money in this region.
23 The IDB has pledged to provide the area with new 
money totalling US$12.900 million to fund a total of 170 projects and increased 
by US$512 the already provided amounts to fund technical cooperations. Also, 
the World Bank has earmarked US$49,300 millions—which supposes an 
increase of 18%--to fund projects that would continue fighting poverty. 
 
Final Words 
 
This paper argues that when the economic conditions of a country worsen, there 
tend to be an increase in the level of unemployment which in extreme cases ends 
in mass labor migration. If this is led by highly-skilled and qualified workers is 
called a brain drain. This labor migration is a zero-sum game since those leaving 
the county take with them knowledge and expertise—impoverishing the country 
politically, economically and socially—but enhance the factors of production in 
the country of adoption.    
  This migration could be prevented depending on the measures taken by 
the country to retain their highly qualified workers. These workers have spent 
time and put effort into obtaining knowledge and skills; thus, they are contrib-
uting much to their country. But the political, social, and economic stability of a 
country not only depends on what society can do for the country but also on what 
the country is willing and able to do for its citizens.  
                                                 
22“24 Empresas españolas analizan en Estambul nuevas posibilidades de negocio,” Libertad Digital, 
January 14, 2011.http://www.libertaddigital.com/profesionales/24-empresas-espanolas-analizan-en-
estambul-nuevas-posibilidades-de-negocio-1276411828/ 
23“América Latina ofrece a las empresas madrileñas proyectos de desarrollo,” Libertad Digital, 
January 11, 2011. http://www.libertaddigital.com/profesionales/america-latina-ofrece-a-las-
empresas-madrilenas-proyectos-de-desarrollo-1276411617/ 
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  This paper presents that the Spanish working population is well-qualified 
and highly skilled and due to the current economic crisis these qualified workers 
are finding job opportunities in other countries. This has a negative effect on 
Spanish factors of productions. Also, this paper has identified two reasons that 
explain this trend. One factor is the current lack of credit available to develop 
businesses that is not only hindering the entrepreneurial spirit but also postponing 
hiring and affecting the level of unemployment.  The second factor is a very low 
investment in research and development which is negatively affecting the oppor-
tunities for researchers and academics.  
  History tends to repeat itself.  This time Spain is suffering a surplus of 
labor and Germany is suffering a shortage due to Germany’s spectacular eco-
nomic growth. The first law of economics is that demand and supply will always 
tend to find equilibrium. In this case, Germany has reported that in order to sus-
tain economic growth, the country is in demand of more workers with qualifica-
tions in the areas of engineering and telecommunications. Spain has a large sur-
plus of workers with those requirements and it can be anticipated that the equilib-
rium will be achieved in a way that is unfavorable to its economic prospects.   
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Abstract 
The paper aims at auditing the democratic quality of Spain’s foreign policy. To 
do so, it will examine various interrelated dimensions: the degree of consensus or 
competition among the main political parties; the quality of public debate in civil 
society, media; the degree of prospective or retrospective accountability by pub-
lic opinion, Parliament or other relevant actors; and the role of the Parliament. 
The paper will also deal with two other topics: the efficacy of its administrative 
and policy machinery; and the tension between values and interests, with a spe-
cial attention to the place of democracy promotion and the protection of human 
rights and development cooperation. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper aims to undertake a democratic audit of Spain’s foreign policy. Such 
an effort has both a normative and an empirical dimension. Normative because it 
discusses questions related with how foreign policy ought to be run in a demo-
cratic polity. Empirical because it also tries to establish how foreign policy is in 
fact run in Spain. As this is a large exercise which cannot be dealt with in a short 
paper, this paper represents an initial attempt to set up the analytical framework 
and test its empirical application to the Spanish case with the aim of testing and 
eventually refining the model. Ultimately, the aim is to develop a rigorous model 
for testing and auditing the democratic quality of government’s action in the 
realm of foreign policy. 
What justifies this endeavor? In his famous Gettysburg address, President 
Abraham Lincoln defined democracy as government of the people, by the people, 
for the people.
1 These three dimensions of legitimate democratic government 
                                                 
1 “[…] that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain, that this nation under 
God shall have a new birth of freedom, and that government of the people, by the people, for the 
people shall not perish from the earth”. Abraham Lincoln, “Gettysburg address”. 19 november 
1863, Gettysburg, Pensilvania.  232                                                                                            Torreblanca 
 
 
have become classic in comparative politics. However, they have very seldom 
been applied to the realm of foreign policy. This is probably due to the fact that 
foreign policy analysis is a discipline which very often is excluded from standard 
comparative analysis and thus carried by international relations specialists, whose 
theoretical assumptions and normative preoccupations usually lay far off the 
territory of public policy and comparative politics. With exceptions like the so-
called democratic peace theory, (Doyle 1983) international relations theory tends 
to ignore everything related with the characteristics of the units (the states), and 
therefore concentrates in the characteristics of the interactions among them 
(Waltz 1979). Trying to contribute to the filing of this lacuna, this paper makes 
an attempt to translate these dimensions of legitimacy to the real of foreign poli-
cy. It also contributes to the wider discussion on whether foreign policy is a do-
main reservé, i.e. a sphere of politics in which, given its special characteristics, 
government actions cannot be subject to the same standards of accountability, 
responsiveness and transparency.  
To run a democratic audit of a country’s foreign policy, three elements 
are essential. First, a discussion about the extent to which foreign policy must be 
subject to political consensus or contestation. Are there permanent national inter-
ests, dealing with the hard core of the state´s functions and its survival in a world 
characterized by sovereignty and weak norms, which all governments must de-
fend irrespective of its political color? Or is foreign policy just another public 
policy which can therefore be subject to contestation and change depending on 
the electoral cycle? This is a normative question, dealing with how things ought 
to be in a democracy, but also practical, since there is a reasonable argument to 
be made that no matter the right of each government to follow its voters’ prefer-
ences and thus, if so demanded, change course in foreign policy when acceding 
to power, a stable and bipartisan foreign policy is more likely to be effective than 
one which changes with every election. Therefore, when it comes to foreign poli-
cy, the dilemma between legitimacy and efficacy seems to be the obvious point 
to begin with. 
Second, an assessment of the democratic character of a country’s foreign 
policy requires a close look at the mechanisms of control of the government’s 
actions in the realm of foreign policy. This involves questions about transparen-
cy, responsiveness and accountability (both prospective and retrospective) of the 
government’s actions; the participation of Parliament, media and social society as 
well as the role of public opinion. Therefore, it is not only the quantity of effec-
tive foreign policy that a government is able to deliver but its procedural dimen-
sions that one has to look at. 
                                                                                                                         
[http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gettysburgaddress.htm] last accessed on 30 January 
2011. 
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Third, apart from the quantity and the quality, it is essential to examine the 
set of principles and values which a given foreign policy holds and promotes. In 
particular, whether the same values which are central in a democratic polity, i.e. 
human rights, democracy, equality, and so on, are the same values which the 
government promotes through its foreign policy actions. 
 
Consensus in Foreign Policy 
 
Spain shows something of an unstable record when it comes to the issue of con-
sensus. For a country which has gone through a century-long period of isolation-
ism, the extraordinary importance which foreign policy has played in Spanish 
domestic politics during its democratic period (1978-2011) represents a bit of a 
puzzle. Foreign policy, more particularly, the Iraq war, was not only decisive in 
bringing about the victory of J.L. Zapatero over J.M. Aznar (1996-2004) in the 
2004 elections, but it played a key role during Zapatero’s first term (2004-2008) 
and even continues having a last impact in its second mandate (2008 to-date). 
This has a two-fold explanation.  
To the Socialist government, foreign policy has offered a very appropri-
ate playing field when it came to strengthening the progressive values and princi-
ples on which its electoral victory in 2004 was built (Torreblanca 2004 & Torre-
blanca 2004b). At the core of this platform one could easily identify such. First, 
the Alliance of Civilizations, deliberately designed as a way of framing Islamic 
radicalization which would contrast with the US’ view of a “war on terror” pro-
moted by George W. Bush. Second, the exponential increase of funding for offi-
cial development assistance policies so as to meet the 0.7% GDP goals set in the 
UN Millennium Declaration Goals and the subset of commitments thereby 
adopted which included important financial and policy commitments in relation 
to the fight against poverty and hunger. Third, a European policy which was sid-
ed by the Franco-German axis that the previous government had dismissed in 
order to built close ties with the US and the UK.  Fourth, a defense policy aimed 
at strengthening European security identity, to the detriment of NATO and the 
transatlantic relations. All these elements brought together, the Socialist govern-
ment has been at ease playing international politics at the multilateral level, 
channeling policies through both the UN and the EU rather than the US and 
NATO and placing a strong emphasis on global  governance, multilateralism and 
international law.
2 
                                                 
2 See: “Una España más fuerte en un mundo más justo”. Electoral Manifesto, PSOE, 2008; “En 
interés de España: una política exterior comprometida”. President of the Government Address at 
the Prado Museum on 16 June 2008; “Más gobernanza global”.Framework Paper at the 37 PSOE 
Congress, sections 229-242; “Alianza de Civilizaciones: iniciativa del Secretario General de Na-
ciones Unidas en 2005 a propuesta de los gobiernos español y turco (see http://www.unaoc.org/ y 
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To the opposition, foreign policy has been an attractive theme, too. Con-
servatives have found in the Socialist’s foreign policy an element helping them to 
further harden their identification with their voters. Zapatero’s foreign policy has 
been used by the Conservatives to exemplify the set of allegedly outmoded pro-
gressive values represented by the Socialists. The Conservative’s speeches have 
portrayed Zapatero as a negotiator with a weak character unable to represent or 
adequately defend Spain’s national interests. In contrast to Aznar, whom they 
portrayed as a leader with a world stature which led Spain to be among the coun-
tries which were at the helm of world politics, Zapatero’s decisions would have 
badly damaged Spanish international image and turned Spain into an irrelevant 
country whom few trusted anymore. Examples of this highly-charged rhetoric 
have included, among others: criticisms of the Alliance of Civilizations as a dov-
ish and counterproductive instrument in the fight against terror; the reluctance of 
Zapatero to accept that Afghanistan was a war scenario, not a development coop-
eration one, and therefore his resistance to change the set of very restrictive cave-
ats governing its participation in NATO ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan; the out-
cry about Zapatero government’s cooperation in paying Somali pirates the ran-
som which would allow the hijacked vessel Alakrana and its crew to be freed; 
and a weak negotiating position with Morocco when it comes to sovereignty and 
other burning issues (Bardají and Portero 2007 & Bardají, 2010).  
Both parties have used foreign policy to highlight the alleged radicaliza-
tion of the opponent as well as to make visible their supposed moderation, as if 
both represented the prevailing consensus or the central position of the political 
spectrum. Socialists have criticized the Conservative’s views on Afghanistan and 
Iraq as proof of how eccentric Aznar and the Spanish conservative policies were 
when compared with other conservative governments in Europe, like Germany 
and France. In particular, they have used foreign policy to highlight the alleged 
neocon tones dominating Conservative thinking on foreign policy. But, in a simi-
lar way, Conservatives have used the Socialist government’s withdrawals from 
Iraq (2004) and Kosovo (2009), together with the initial lack of commitment to 
the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, as proof of a government which had turned 
Spain into a marginal and eccentric ally. 
The bottom line of this debate is that, on almost every single issue, both 
government and opposition have claimed that they occupied the center, held the 
other party responsible for breaking an alleged pre-existent consensus, and ac-
cused the other party of having staged a U-turn and deviated from the consensus. 
Therefore, despite having found very little to agree on, both parties were framing 
foreign policy as if consensus was the preferred goal and bipartisan politics the 
ideal model. This represents a puzzle: in theory, both parties thought consensus 
to be a superior goal, but in practice a polarized model of competition in foreign 
policy has dominated Spanish politics at least since the Iraq war. Why would 
then the two main parties keep on advocating for something they were unable to 
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The answer to this lays in Spain’s transition to democracy. With a tragic 
historical record of divisions, conflicts and even a civil war, Spain’s transition to 
democracy glorified the concept of “consensus” as the ideal method of problem-
solving. This had the unintended effect of making legitimate policy differences 
hard to sell to public opinion, as if it was a failure of the political class to disa-
gree on some topics. As a consequence, rather than arguing that electoral majori-
ties gave governments the legitimate right to run policies in the direction they 
wanted (with the obvious limits set by the Constitution and Parliament), there 
was a strong incentive to represent one’s partisan preferences as neatly fitting 
with abstract national interests, state policies or consensual agreements when in 
fact they hardly were so. 
The discussion on consensus requires both a normative and an empirical 
approach. On the one hand, one can enquire whether there was any, or how much 
of it was there. On the other hand, one could discuss whether there should be, 
much or any at all. Despite the common perception there was much of a consen-
sus in foreign policy throughout its democratic period is in fact, arguable. True, 
there was consensus on the fact that the new Spanish democracy would break up 
with the country’s isolationist past. General Franco’s authoritarian regime had 
little else than a pariah status in the international community, especially among 
the Western ones due to its original links with Hitler and Mussolini. Spain had 
not been among the founding members of the UN, NATO, the EEC or the Coun-
cil of Europe, it had not benefitted from the Marshall Plan and it was only part of 
the Western security arrangements through the back door provided by the 1953 
agreements with the US. Naturally, democracy would and should automatically 
put an end to this (Espadas-Burgos 1988 &Portero 1989). 
However, one must drop a caveat when it comes to consensus and for-
eign policy in democratic Spain. To begin with, since there were no alternatives, 
accession to the EEC was not an “either / or” question but a simple must for any 
government. More so, one could easily picture Spanish accession to the EEC as 
something which clearly exceeded the realm of foreign policy or, alternatively, as 
something which had much more to do with domestic than with foreign policy. 
As represented by philosopher (Ortega y Gasset 1963: 521) Spain’s tragic XXth 
century meant that “Spain was the problem and Europe the solution”. In other 
words, the “Europeanization of Spain” was the driving force of Spain’s transition 
to democracy, so there could hardly be any disagreement about that goal. The 
fact is that, beyond the consensus on the need to join the EEC, an obvious move 
which made all political and economic sense and ran in parallel with Greek and 
Portuguese’s accession demands, one sees very little consensus on a number of 
key issues or rather, one big telling disagreement on the key issue of Spain’s 
insertion in Western security structures.   
To exemplify this, the first democratic President, Adolfo Suárez, attend-
ed the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Havana in 1979 and it was only 
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ship and subsequently joined it. This was done despite the opposition of the So-
cialist party, who promised a referendum to pull the country out of NATO if and 
when gained power (which occurred in 1982). (Mujal-León 1986, Powell 1995 & 
Zaldívar 1991). 
Thus, contrary to Central and Eastern European countries, which after the 
demise of Communism automatically applied for membership in both the EU and 
NATO, Spain took a long detour, flirted with different options and changed 
course on various occasions. This showed that whether its European identity was 
clearly delineated, this was not the case with its security identity. In that way, 
Spain compares with Ukraine, which is the only other European country where 
both public opinion and the political class has split in two concerning NATO 
membership and fiercely fought on it (Torreblanca 2001). 
A further qualification on the consensus allegedly running through Span-
ish democratic foreign policy has to do with Latin America and the Mediterrane-
an. For obvious reasons, these two areas have been a key priority of all democrat-
ic governments. However, they were also under Franco’s regime. Therefore, to 
the extent to which consensus survives regime change, one can legitimately ask 
whether in fact it is something whose merit has to be attributed to democracy. In 
a similar vein, when one looks closer to the European policies of different demo-
cratic governments, it is hardly possible to hide that beyond the consensus pre-
vailing about accession, Socialist and Conservative governments have in fact 
placed their policy focus on different issues, including foreign policy, which 
speaks of the existence of different visions of Europe. Generally speaking, on the 
one side, the Conservatives have centered on economic issues, closely looked at 
justice and home affairs, allied with the UK and the US when it came to foreign 
policy and adopted a rather intergovernmental approach to European treaty-
making processes. Meanwhile, at the other end, the Socialists have found them-
selves at ease with the Franco-German axis, defended federalizing changes in 
Treaties and set the emphasis on economic regulation, citizenship and redistribu-
tion policies. Therefore, behind the apparent consensus reigning in Spain’s Euro-
pean policy, the fact is that successive governments have pursued a quite con-
trasting set of goals and policies. 
As seen, a close look at Spain’s foreign policy shows substantive and 
structural differences between the two main parties. Is this really so important? 
One may argue that the fact that Aznar could so deeply deviate from the policies 
of González and closely align Spain with the UK, the US and other “rebel” EU 
members at the time of the Iraq war bears nothing extraordinary in itself. Equally 
so, that Zapatero could change course and adopt a U-turn once in power would 
not in fact spell a weak polity or a low quality foreign policy, but rather reflect a 
mature political system. Spaniards like to think of themselves as exceptional, but 
when one looks at the foreign policies of countries which are always considered 
as a model, one sees in fact a pattern of disagreement which can even exceed 
what would be considered acceptable in Spain. Take for example, the UK, where A Democratic Audit                                                                                  237 
 
   
EU membership is deeply contested; France, where Sarkozy broke with decades 
of Gaullism with its decisions to move France into NATO integrated military 
structure; Germany, where Schröder broke ranks with the US in a way which 
Helmut Kohl and the conservatives would have never dreamt of; or Poland, 
where the departure of the Kacyznski government meant a thorough review of 
one key element of its foreign policy, i.e. relations with Russia.  
One can thus discuss whether stability adds to the effectiveness of for-
eign policy, but the claim that change undermines the legitimacy of foreign poli-
cy has to be substantiated rather than just taken for granted. Otherwise one would 
be falling in the trap of going back in time to periods of history when a diplomat-
ic elite claimed to be the sole interpreter of a country’s national (and permanent) 
interests, and therefore the sole one able to design and execute foreign policy. In 
a democracy, diplomats are, just like the military, civil servants who obey gov-
ernments, which in turn are bound by law and accountable to the public through 
Parliaments and elections. Therefore, governments have a legitimate right to steer 
foreign policy and change it as they please.  
In a democratic society, there is not one national interest, but many inter-
ests, and the task of the political system is to represent them. Since politics is, in 
the classic definition of Lasswell (Lasswell 1963) about “who gets what when 
and how” or Easton’s (Easton 1953) “the authoritative allocation of values”, con-
flict and contestation are as legitimate as cooperation and consensus, provided 
that democratic procedures are used. So, interests can be accommodated, ex-
changed or directly ignored by government if they so wish.  
It thus seems necessary to put an end to the conceptualization of change 
and disagreement in the realm of foreign policy as the consequence of weak po-
litical system or a lack of loyalty and strategic vision of the government, the op-
position, or both. All countries’ foreign policies are based on a set of elements 
which are more or less given and variable (geography, economic size, culture, 
history, demography, etc). These are the building bricks on which governments 
must base their actions. In the particular case of Spain, no matter which govern-
ment is responsible for foreign policy, the stage is unchanged and remains the 
same: Spain is a European (and Europeanist), country, of middle-income and size 
and geography, whose history and culture makes it a relevant actor in the Atlan-
tic, Latin America and the Mediterranean. At the same time, Spain is also an 
advanced democracy, with a social welfare state, an ample definition of citizen-
ship and a number of pre-established international commitments in areas like 
human rights, security and development, among others. These political parame-
ters are also rather static, in that they cannot be completely changed or contra-
dicted by governments. Any change in this set of parameters is likely to take 
place slowly; therefore its impact on policies will be gradual (Torreblanca 2010).  
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The Efficacy Dimension 
 
In this section, the quantity dimension of legitimacy is examined, i.e. how much 
effective foreign policy is the government able to deliver? This is usually referred 
to as “output legitimacy”. This type of legitimacy leaves aside whether the pub-
lic, civil society or Parliament is fully involved in the policy-making process or 
in holding policy accountable. In other words, it adopts a utilitarian point of 
view: the more efficient policy the system is able to produce, the better. It is 
therefore quantity that the focus is placed on, not quality. 
Here, one must say, there are a series of shortcomings which both the lit-
erature and expert analysis have recurrently coincided in. To begin with, despite 
the commitments expressed in the 2004 and 2008 electoral platforms of the So-
cialist Party, once in power, the government has not been able to set in motion 
and satisfactorily conclude the much-needed reform of the Foreign Service. De-
mand for a thorough reform of the Foreign Service has not, as it could be thought 
of, only been a preoccupation of the academia and the expert community.  In 
fact, the issue has ranked first among government and foreign ministry concerns.  
Spain’s foreign policy structures have not been adapted neither to the 
changes in Spain’s international position (which in the last 30 years has moved 
from isolation and backwardness to a prominent international position) nor to the 
changing international context, where accession to the EU and the appearance of 
new actors, problems and dynamics at the international have made clear the need 
to both redeploy Spanish diplomatic missions abroad as well as to change the 
training, profile and careers of its diplomatic service. Already in 2004-2005, the 
Committee for the Reform of the Foreign Service described the reform as “im-
possible to postpone further”. However, despite the official White Paper on the 
Reform of the Service identifying “problems of coordination”, “lack of planning 
“ and “inadequate management procedures” as pervasive problems within the 
Foreign Service, the reform stalled upon intra-Cabinet disagreement and was 
subsequently dropped.
3 
With elections ahead in 2008, the government promised again to rescue 
the dossier, but then a new excuse was found to postpone the reform: with the 
Spanish rotating Presidency of the EU scheduled for the first semester of 2010, it 
was argued, the Foreign Ministry needed all the energy to concentrate in prepar-
ing the Presidency. Many hoped that, as it has usually been the case with unpopu-
lar domestic reforms, the government would use the EU as a much welcomed 
excuse for breaking domestic deadlock. In this case, however, the deployment of 
the European External Action Service (EEAS), which in theory provides for a 
fine justification to reappraise the structure and functioning of national foreign 
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policy systems, has been slower and much less contentious than expected, so it 
has hardly provided the justification which many believed the reform needed. 
With the project shelved, a minimalist reform of the Foreign Service was 
approved: this included an increase of the size of the diplomatic service and the 
attempt to revitalize the Foreign Policy Council, a dormant institution which had 
been of little use since its creation.
4 The first measure helped fill a historic gap, 
for Spain, despite being the world’s 12
th economy, had only a thousand diplo-
mats, fewer than the Netherlands. Yet, its effects would take some time to be felt 
for the Spanish system of diplomatic recruitment was not only slow but also too 
old-fashioned to produce in a short period of time the diplomats which the coun-
try needed. Moreover, since the Spanish system of recruitment did not value spe-
cialization but harmonization (meaning all candidates had, despite their origin 
and formation, to be competent in all subjects), it would hardly contribute to fill 
the expertise gap for regions or themes on which Spaniards have traditionally 
lacked the knowledge or the expertise.
5 
As for the second measure, it made sense on paper, but this did not guar-
antee that it would succeed. The Defense Ministry had its National Defense 
Council, chaired over by the King himself, to coordinate security policy, and 
even the Interior Ministry had approved its own Homeland Security Strategy 
without paying much attention to the Foreign Ministry. In fact, the truth was that 
the Foreign Ministry had not taken the time to produce a foreign policy strategy, 
so it had not assured itself an equivalent role in the policy process. Time would 
then show that it was just a mere sign of wishful thinking by the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs that it could take on the coordination of other ministries (such as 
Defense, Economy, Interior or Justice) which were much more powerful than it 
and which were staffed by political heavy weights from the Socialist party. In 
fact, as the various foreign policy crises which the Socialists went through 
proved, the only actor able to coordinate the different ministries was the Vice-
president of the government, Fernández de la Vega, who on the occasion of crisis 
like the surge in illegal immigration which the country witnessed throughtout 
2006-2008 (specially from small vessels originating in Subsaharian Africa and 
landing on the shores of the Canary Islands) and, later, at the time of the hijack-
ing of the Alakrana tuna trawler in the Indian Ocean, proved to be the only one 
able to coordinate the major ministries with foreign responsibilities. 
All of this pointed out to the growing marginalization of the Foreign 
Ministry, which was unable or unwilling to convene the Foreign Policy Council, 
and which, paradoxically, saw a further blow to its centrality with the entry of 
force of the Lisbon Treaty and the dominant role acquired by the G-20 financial 
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crisis. To begin with, the institutional changes adopted by the EU institutions 
following the Lisbon Treaty meant that the rotating presidency visibility and role 
in the realm of foreign affairs was suppressed in favor of the new EU High Rep-
resentative for foreign policy, thus relegating foreign ministers from the task of 
presiding the more political Foreign Affairs Council to the more technical Coun-
cil of General Affairs. More importantly, with the changes in the format of the 
European Council, the Foreign Ministers ceased to sit by the Heads of State and 
Government of the EU at Council meetings, thus losing one of the key strategic 
accesses they had to head of governments. And to make matters worse, as was 
the case of Spain, the key importance attached to the G-20 in the management of 
the financial crisis meant that Finance Ministers and Economic Advisers of the 
Presidents assumed the role of G-20 sherpas, thus further marginalizing foreign 
ministries.  
The overall impact of all these events was very marked: rather informal-
ly, Spain’s foreign policy has developed a two-pronged structure. For all im-
portant matters, generally dealt with by multilateral institutions and involving the 
Prime Minister, the Prime Minister Office assumed the lead. For the less relevant 
issues, mostly bilateral relations and the daily management of Spain’s commit-
ment in multilateral institutions, the Foreign Ministry was in charge. In principle, 
this division of labor should not be prejudiced and should not necessarily affect 
the efficacy of the government actions. In fact, one could even think of some 
potential gains and advantages. The problem, however, is that this division of 
labor was not the product of design but a fait accompli determined by both the 
agenda, the relative political weight of different actors and the coordination de-
mands which individual policy dossiers pushed for. Therefore, to the extent that 
these two tracks grow from each other and little attention was paid to the coordi-
nation of these two pillars, the overall coherence of the system was doomed to 
suffer. This, one can claim, is already the case when examining how the Foreign 
Ministry has crowded the foreign policy agenda with a set of priorities (from the 
Middle East to Cuba or Kosovo) which reflected more the freedom the Minister 
himself enjoyed to set his priorities and agenda rather than an overall strategic 
vision of the government as to which policies his time and energies should be 
dedicated to. 
In the absence of a clear set of priorities, foreign policy has lacked co-
herence, and thus efficacy. This has been seen in the simultaneous investment on 
the improvement of a series of bilateral relations (e.g. with China, Russia and the 
Obama Administration) which, taken one by one, can be considered quite ration-
al, and even successful, but which have seldom been perceived and graded in 
connection to one each other. Therefore, the government has tended to neglect 
the dissonances which its simultaneous attempt to seduce Obama, the Chinese 
authorities and the Russian government has produced, especially when it came to 
issues in which relations between them were tense (over, say, NATO expansion A Democratic Audit                                                                                  241 
 
   
and Afghanistan; the arms embargo and human rights issues with China, etc). 
(Areilza and Torreblanca 2009: 28-36).  
 
The Quality Dimension 
 
The next most obvious dimension to continue the foreign policy audit analysis 
has to do with the public’s approval. Is government’s foreign policy approved by 
the citizens? If so, this would mean that foreign policy is responsive to citizen’s 
demands in that it reflects their overall preferences for what sort of goals should 
be pursued. Overall approval indexes of the type “what is your overall satisfac-
tion with the governments foreign policy?” are not frequent, so in contrast with 
the availability of such type of indicators when it comes to other public policies 
(such as the management of the economy, health or education), one has to rely on 
the dedicated polls, when available; particular sections dedicated to foreign poli-
cy in nation-wide polls; or, even, in weaker proxies such as personal approval 
ratings for Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 
In the case of Spain, the three elements are available: the Elcano Royal 
Institute for International Affairs runs a quarterly poll dedicated to the issue 
(though it lacks an overall approval question); second, the state-funded Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociológicas, dedicated to public opinion research, which fre-
quently includes foreign policy related items in its polls; including questions 
about the approval rate of each minister, thus including the Foreign Minister.  
Taking these three sources together what can be seen is an overall satis-
faction of Spain’s public with the foreign policy conducted by the Socialist gov-
ernment. This of course includes Socialist party’s traditional voters but not only 
them. There are however three topics in which the public disapproves in the gov-
ernment’s foreign policy.  
The first one has to do with the deployment of the Spanish troops in Af-
ghanistan, in the framework of NATO’s ISAF. The mission is approved by only 
45% of the electorate, but it is precisely among government voters where its ap-
proval is lowest (28%). In fact, in polls conducted in 2009-2010, what was evi-
dent was that a majority of Spaniards (54%), even if they considered that were 
evident links between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban (72% thought so) were in favor 
of withdrawing the Spanish troops.
6 
The second has to do with Turkey’s accession to the European Union. 
This accession, which both the government and opposition have consistently 
supported throughout the last decade, lacks however resonance with the public 
preferences. Polls very seldom include this question, which cannot be seen as 
purely coincidental: in fact, the case seems to be that ever since polls on Span-
iards’ attitudes towards Turkey’s accession started to give negative returns, the 
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question has mysteriously disappeared from foreign policy polls. Evidence from 
2005 (CIS 2589, January 2005) already showed that the public was against, 
which was consistent with Eurobarometer and Elcano polls asking similar ques-
tions
7 (Chislett 2009 & Ruiz Jiménez and Torreblanca 2007). 
Third, a reference to Cuba is necessary. Despite the government’s quite 
visible commitment to normalizing relations with the Cuban regime and its con-
sistent support of the lifting of the EU’s 1996 Common Position on Cuba, which 
conditioned progress in trade and economic cooperation relations to political 
reform, the truth is that Spaniards are less enthusiastic about the Castro regime 
than what its government has consistently been. Accordingly, those in favor of 
increasing the pressure on the Castros’ regime are not only the majority (61 ver-
sus 23%) but also the majority among the leftist electorate (43 versus 31).
8 
Except for these three items, there is a overall high degree of satisfaction 
with the Socialist’s foreign policy. Throughout his term in office (2004-2010), 
rankings of popular approval have placed Foreign Minister Moratinos in fifth 
place compared to other members of government, which is no doubt remarkable 
given the degree of polarization which foreign policy has suffered.
9 
In peace time, foreign policy does not usually make it to the public as 
breaking news. So, occasions in which foreign policy permeates to the national 
debate and, in fact, polarizes public opinion, or at least discussions between gov-
ernment and opposition can provide good clues. In the case of Spain, leaving 
behind the Iraq war, the two issues which have probably attracted more attention 
between 2009 and 2010 have been, one, the withdrawal of Spanish troops from 
NATO’s KFOR mission Kosovo and, two, the hijacking of the tuna trawler 
Alakrana by Somalian pirates and its subsequent liberation after the owners (al-
legedly) paid a ransom.  In both occasions, the Conservative Party directed its 
criticisms at the government’s lack of capacity, coordination and management 
skills and consistently mobilized its press and policy apparatus to try to erode 
government. However, in both cases, the strategy of the opposition apparently 
failed because the public approved both the withdrawal of Kosovo (which the 
government presented as a natural consequence of its decisions not recognize the 
state which emerged of the unilateral declaration of independence of February 
2008) and the pacific liberation of the Alakrana’s crew (since only a minority 
approved the use of force to free the crew). 
Another key element in holding government accountable in any contem-
porary democracy is Parliament (Herranz 2008). Here, two elements have to be 
mentioned. The first deals with Parliamentary approval of military missions 
abroad. Here, it should be noted, that the Socialists introduced a legal modifica-
tion which required that the deployment of Spanish troops abroad should be de-
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bated and eventually approved by the Parliament.
10 With this, the government 
deliberately aimed at its predecessor, J. M. Aznar, whose decision to, first, sup-
port George W. Bush invasion of Iraq, and then, once the combat operations were 
over, to send troops to the country, did not only lack public support but was in 
fact never debated in Parliament. By amending Article 4.2 of the Law of National 
Defense so as to make Parliamentary approval compulsory, the government very 
clearly wanted to raise the accountability of government when it came to foreign 
policy and to prevent a repetition of instances like Iraq where decisions had been 
taken against the clear will of an overwhelming majority of citizens. With this 
amendment, Spain adopted the highest democratic benchmark for defense policy, 
one which only Germany and Italy (for historic reasons as well) have also adopt-
ed but which is missing in countries such as the UK, France, Belgium and Poland 
where government discretion when sending troops abroad is the norm (Arteaga 
2005).  
The second element in which Parliament exercises a role when control-
ling the government and holding it responsible for its actions is through the role 
of Parliamentary Committees. Here, the problems are varied, the result being 
mixed in terms of the democratic quality of Spanish democracy. To begin with, 
Spain is a Parliamentary democracy, which means that Parliament is less inde-
pendent from government than it is the case in systems with separations of pow-
er. Second, Spanish MP’s are elected on party lists, not on individual constituen-
cies, which means that they have strong incentives to act as a group and not to 
break party discipline, especially by adopting initiatives which can be sensitive to 
the government they support. Third, Chairs for the Committees are not allocated 
on a basis or merit or seniority, but on a system of party quotas and arrangements 
whereby parties distribute the Chairs according to overall criteria of balance and 
electoral strength. Again, this results in Chairs owing their position to their par-
ties and not to their individual expertise. Fourth, since the government’s party 
always enjoys the majority in the Committee, it is very seldom that it can openly 
challenge government policy opening enquires, calling individual experts, bring 
selected officials (such as Ambassadors) for testimony or commissioning inde-
pendent reports. Add to this a rather meager staff and the lack of a professional 
research office staffed with policy experts and academics, and the result very 
clearly reflects a Parliament whose capacity to truly control government is rather 
weak or limited. The last two bilateral crises between Morocco and Spain, the 
first on the occasion of the hunger strike held by the Sahrawian activist, Aminetu 
Haider, and the dismantlement of the Sahrawian camp at Al-Aaíun, have exposed 
the limitations of Parliament, and specially, its Foreign Affairs Committee, when 
forcing government to provide accurate, timely information as well as transpar-
ency about its actions and commitments. 
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Transparency is certainly an issue in the Spanish foreign policy system. 
Despite the manifold increase in official development cooperation funds which 
have taken place in the last years, experts tend to denounce how the money spent 
in development cooperation is still far from being fully and immediately ac-
countable. The result is that the Spanish development system has exponentially 
grown in quantity, but questions about quality and transparency remain. 
Apart from the public at large and Parliament, the third instance which 
has the capacity to exercise control or hold government accountable is the judici-
ary. In this realm, one must note, democratic standards have suffered quite a set-
back with the recent modification of the regulations on the so-called “Universal 
Jurisdiction”. Thanks to the reform of the Law on the Judicial Power, Spain had 
one of the most progressive legislations in this realm, allowing its judges to ac-
cept cases for events related with genocide or crimes against humanity even if no 
Spanish citizens were directly or indirectly involved. As a consequence, the 
Spanish Audiencia Nacional, already renowned because of the work of Judge 
Garzón, became one of the preferred destinations of advocates and legal activists 
in the realm of universal justice. The government, however, saw with embar-
rassment that Chinese or Israeli leaders were being prosecuted in Spanish courts 
due to their actions in Tibet or Gaza, while the Foreign Ministry was prioritizing 
Chinese investments in Spain and its role as a neutral broker in the Middle East 
conflict. Accordingly, the law was changed, which effectively led to the closing 
of all the pending cases. This was very clearly seen as a move changing the logic 
of foreign policy from the normative rationality of democracy to the so-called 
“realist” rationality dominating in international politics. The change in Spanish 
law showed its impact when Judge Moreno refused to open a case on the deporta-
tion of Aminetu when it was quite evident that under the previous legislation he 
would have had to accept the case. With the new law, however, even if Haidar 
was a Spanish resident deported from Morocco to Spain and holding his hunger 
strike in Spanish territory, nothing could be done in Court.
11 
In a similar way, the reading of the diplomatic cables of the US Embassy 
in Madrid facilitated by Wikileaks on matters like the Spanish inmates at Guan-
tanamo, the CIA rendition flights and the Couso Affair (the Spanish journalist 
shot by US troops during the Iraq war), have left quite an ample shade over the 
independency of the judiciary when it comes to international justice. Further-
more, it has showed that there are limits to its capacity to shield itself from politi-
cal pressures from either national or foreign governments and truly fulfill its role 
of defending the rule of law and protecting Spanish citizens or interests. 
All these examples reveal a consistent pattern of lack of transparency 
and, therefore, difficulties to hold the government accountable for its actions. 
                                                 
11 Carlos Espósito, “Una limitación de carácter furtivo”, El País Daily, 2 September 2009; “El 
fiscal de la Audiencia Nacional se declara incompetente para investigar las denuncias de Haidar”, 
El Pais Daily 3 December 2009. A Democratic Audit                                                                                  245 
 
   
This problem, which affects Spanish politics in general, is aggravated in the 
realm of foreign policy due to two concomitant reasons: that the public at large 
generally pays little attention to foreign policy, and, most importantly, the weak-
ness of Spanish civil society, which results in think tanks or NGOs which are 
often too small, too fragment and not independent enough as to effectively be 
able to control government actions (Ayuso and Cascante 2009). 
 
The Values Dimension 
 
The third and last dimension on which this democratic audit exercise sets it eyes 
on is the one related with the coherence between values and principles. This di-
mension is of course essential for a democracy, for it would be paradoxical that, 
as a general rule, a democracy would hold a different set of values when it ad-
dresses policies to its citizens and when it deals with other polities. Of course, 
one should not be naïve here and ignore than “ethical foreign policy” 
12 is more 
an aspiration than a ready-to-download set of policies, but precisely because of 
the tensions between the normative pull (which makes ethical foreign policy the 
only possible goal) and the practical push (which makes it rather difficult to at-
tain in practice), the need for coordination and coherence becomes quite evident. 
This is why one can speak of this dimension as the area in which, when it comes 
to Spain, the lack of coordination and overall strategic planning has had a major 
(and negative) impact thus leaving the observers with the puzzle of a sheer con-
tradiction between domestic and foreign practices. Why so?  
To the inside, Zapatero’s governments have quite heavily focused on the 
extension of rights. This extension has been quite consistent, especially in the 
realm of highly charged ethical issues related with sexual orientation (same sex 
marriage) or the right to abortion (which has been fully liberalized). But it has 
also been quite visible in social and economic realms by the government’s adop-
tion of progressive legislation dealing with gender issues, whether in the more 
public dimensions of balance and non-discrimination at work or the more private 
dimensions of gender-based violence. Beyond that, the Socialist government has 
approved a whole battery of measures aimed at extending welfare rights and to 
integrate immigrant populations. 
To the outside, however, the government has very seldom tried to ex-
plore ways of consistently exporting its human rights agenda. The National Ac-
tion Plan for Human rights, approved in December 2008, 
13 made a clear distinc-
tion between rights to be exercised in the national sphere and rights to be pro-
moted abroad. Crucially, this distinction largely neglected political and civil 
rights and mostly concentrated in less controversial rights (though still important) 
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like equality, water etc. As a consequence, the government has not been active 
abroad in defending same sex marriages and abortion rights it grants at home. 
This has been particularly visible in Latin America, where Spanish development 
cooperation has seldom imposed conditionality on countries whose practices 
related to sexual and reproductive health openly contradicted Spanish preferences 
and policies. Nicaragua is probably the best example of this policy, since the very 
punitive abortion laws passed by the Government of Daniel Ortega have not been 
protested or resulted in any sort of political action by Spain, which is one of the 
main international donors.
14 
A related topic which shows how little effort Spain has devoted to the 
ethical dimension of foreign policy relates to political asylum. Despite being one 
of the countries in the world with the fastest increase in immigration throughout 
the next decade, applications for political asylum have been deterred by a very 
restrictive framework. In doing this, Spain has refused to become the shelter or 
safe haven for activists from third countries.
15 
This problem sinks its roots in the strategic framework governing Span-
ish development cooperation (2009-2014). In the so-called Plan Director
16, de-
mocracy and human rights issues are not central, but rather hidden under the 
more politically correct label of “promoting good governance” and “institutional 
strengthening”. This emphasis can in fact be very problematic as one can possi-
bly argue that strengthening the institutional capacity of authoritarian states may 
not be the best and most direct way to promote political change. Rather, as the 
Tunisian case has recently showed, it should be the strengthening of civil society 
which should be the focus, not government capacity. Allegedly, attempts to link 
directly with civil society represent an insurmountable challenge because target 
governments are usually unhappy with these practices. But it is a legitimate ques-
tion to ask, especially if and when there is a well-founded suspicion that official 
development assistance is not neutral, but that in fact it may be contributing to 
the stability of the regimes it should want to change. 
To the neglect of democracy promotion in Spanish development coopera-
tion, one has to add the very low profile which this topic merits at the Foreign 
Ministry. This is difficult to understand because Spain has very intense (and 
tense) relationships which three former colonies which are not democracies (Cu-
ba, Morocco and Equatorial Guinea). Surprisingly enough, the Foreign Ministry 
                                                 
14  See: Amnesty International. Informe de Política Exterior y Derechos Humanos del Gobierno 
español 2006-2007. “¿Hasta dónde llega el compromiso con los derechos humanos en el exterior?” 
November 2007; also the chapter “Spain” in FRIDE, “Survey of European Democracy Promotion 
Policies 2000-2006, Richard Youngs (ed) http://www.fride.org/EuropeanDemocracy2000-06, pp. 
159-182. 
15 INFORME CEAR 2007 - CEAR denuncia la crisis del Derecho de Asilo en España. 
16 See: Plan Director de la Cooperación Española 2009-2012. Confirmed by the Council of Minis-
ters on the 13th of February 2009, Sección 8.3.1 “Gobernabilidad democrática”.Pp. 108.Plan Anual 
de Cooperación Internacional (PACI 2010), confirmed byt the Council of Ministers on the 12th of 
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lacks any specific reporting structure of procedure to assess and deal with the 
human rights situation in the countries where Spain has embassies. Therefore, the 
promotion of democracy and human rights are not central in Spain’s foreign poli-
cy, neither strategically or procedurally. True, there is a small unit at the Foreign 
Ministry taking care of human rights, but the unit deals more with international 
treaty-making negotiations than as a companion of country strategies. The result 
is that there is no integration with the overall policy-planning process and more 
importantly, no strategy or thematic unit whatsoever dealing with democratiza-
tion (Zulueta 2008).  
The fact that Spain, despite having had an authoritarian past, consistently 
refuses to incorporate criteria of democratic conditionality into its foreign policy, 
especially to development cooperation, is without doubt rather paradoxical. Even 
more so taking into account that Spain had itself benefited from a set of democ-
racy promotion policies put in place by other European democracies (Pinto-
Duschinsky 1991 & Powell 1994). In fact, some observers would argue, this can 
only be explained as an overreaction to the rather aggressive policies followed by 
the US government under the George W. Bush administration.  The challenge is 
not difficult to understand: the promotion of democracy and human rights has 
become quite a challenge for contemporary democracies. Over the last decade, 
this agenda has suffered heavily. This is both due to the double standards and 
hypocrisy which have dominated its management from the Western side as well 
as the combination of the rise of new emerging powers whose values and princi-
ples do not necessarily coincide with the dominant ones in Europe and the finan-
cial crisis, which has forced European countries to use a lower voice or even 
think twice before pointing fingers at regimes whose resources (be it financial or 
energy related) they crucially need. 
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Abstract 
 
I have written several articles and made presentations in English using primary 
source documents from the US, Spain and the UK. Given this background, I 
would like to contribute to the historical side of this transatlantic relationship. 
This paper analyses the interrelationship of the Spanish affiliation to the EC un-
der the PSOE (the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) and its membership of 
NATO from the American (Republican governments) point of view, considering 
the historical background of the US-Spanish political relationship. Concrete-
lyspeaking, in relation to NATO, we are trying to argue what kind of influ-
ence/pressure the US had to use to persuade EC countries to acquiesce to  Span-
ish entry into the EC, and why the US promoted this affiliation, even though it 
was not in its economic interest to do so. 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
When we analyze the U.S.- Spanish relationship, as Roy argues
1, we should trace 
it to “the substrate” of the disaster of 1898 and the 1953 Executive Agreements of 
Mutual Defense, Economic Assistance and Base Agreement (1986, 173).  Due to 
the Franco regime’s affiliation with the Axis powers during World War II, Spain 
was isolated internationally through a U.N. Resolution after the war, which led to 
the non-application of the Marshall Plan.  However, the importance of Spain was 
increased during the Cold War.  The Straits of Gibraltar were being used as the 
major transportation route for petroleum, and in 1953 the U.S. signed Executive 
Agreements with Spain while the U.K. and France were still firmly opposed to 
                                                 
1 This article analyzes the Spanish presence in the U.S. and vice versa. 
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Spain joining NATO.  These Executive Agreements were different from the 
North Atlantic Treaty in the sense that they were unilateral ones without any de-
fense obligation being imposed on the U.S with regard to Spain and also indicat-
ed a subordinate relationship with the U.S. Although the bases were recognized 
to be joint Spanish-U.S. bases remaining under Spanish sovereignty, the U.S. 
enjoyed complete freedom to activate them in the case of Communist aggression, 
emergency or a threat to Western security, while for other reasons, such as the 
Middle Eastern conflicts, the U.S. theoretically needed to consult with the Span-
ish government.  Gradually the over flight rights to the Middle East also gained 
importance.  
  In the Sixties Spain was firmly set in the international economic system 
and experienced rapid economic growth, due to American economic assistance 
and entrance into the IMF, the OEEC, and other organizations.  Nevertheless, its 
application to join the EEC in 1962 was rejected because of its authoritarian gov-
ernment.  The Franco regime could not construct a “normal relationship” with 
European countries and therefore had to continue its economic and military de-
pendence on the U.S.  In 1966, however, after B-52 planes accidentally dropped 
hydrogen bombs near Palomares, a small village in Almería, Spain’s Foreign 
Ministry under Fernando María Casiella decided to negotiate harder to conclude 
the renewal of the Agreements with the U.S. on an equal footing.  In conse-
quence, Spain requested U.S. support for its affiliation to the EEC, the NATO and 
also the Gibraltar issue as compensation for the base use and the over flight rights 
(Pardo 2007, 354-355).  In other words, the U.S. had introduced nuclear weapons 
and was flying over Spanish territory with them. 
During the Franco regime, there existed a censorship which limited the 
free expression of Spaniards.  Also, they had no control over diplomacy through 
the democratic system. Finally, under the Constitution in 1978 the Parliament 
gained control of government’s foreign policy through the authorization of trea-
ties, debates and its commissions; Pereira argues, however, that the final stage of 
the democratization process of Spanish diplomacy was in 1986 when the major 
pending issues of the country’s foreign policy were resolved, such as access into 
the EEC, the NATO referendum, the universalization of international relation-
ships, the recognition of Israel and the visit of the King to the U.K. (Pereira 2008, 
1002).   
Since its inclusion, Spain had received more subsidies from the EEC than 
its payment to the budget, mostly through the Structural and Cohesion funds.  
However, the EU has gradually shifted its focus following enlargement in Eastern 
Europe.  After the EU expanded again in 1995, member states’ interest began to 
focus on Eastern Europe, and the Popular Party’s (PP) government under Prime 
Minister Aznar (1996-2004) felt that Spain’s security interests would be tended to 
more effectively by the U.S. than by Europe (Arenal 2008).  The PP intended to 
ensure the presence of Spain among the great powers and to maintain a defensive 
attitude against enlargement by the addition of 10 new members; here Aznar Spain-U.S. Relations                                                                                253 
 
   
became more Euro-skeptic than Europeanist (Pereira 2008, 1023). This had al-
ready been pointed out by American Ambassador Horacio Rivero in 1974: “The 
Spanish were inclined to give even greater importance to their relationship with 
the U.S. as a fundamental foreign policy reference point as the European option 
comes into question” (AAD 29.03.1974).  In this way, when we examine Spanish 
foreign policy, it must be studied both from the Atlantic and the European side, as 
well as from both the political and the economic aspect. Studies of Spanish rela-
tions with the EEC and also the Spanish political and military relationship with 
the U.S. have advanced (Marquina 1986; Viñas 2003; Chislett 2005); however, 
studies of the U.S.-Spanish relationship pertaining to the entrance into the EEC 
around 1986 have yet to be developed. 
This study shows how the U.S., who was initially inactive regarding 
Spain’s entrance into the EEC, became involved.  Torreblanca argues that 
through its entrance into the EEC, Spain united her foreign policy with that of the 
EEC and multi-lateralized a relationship which would have otherwise become 
problematic, such as the bilateral conflict with Morocco, or rhetorical like the 
relationship with Latin America.  In short, they are “the convergence of policies” 
and “the transference of problems” (2001, 484).  Then we examine if Spain tried 
to apply these to the bilateral relationship with the U.S. and if it utilized military 
advantages to gain U.S. support for its entrance into the EEC or vice versa, if the 
U.S. forced Spain to stay in NATO.  We make use of American side documents, 
especially less-used primary documents from the Reagan Library, while the 
Spanish documents are still classified.  Hereafter, we will study the background 
of the bilateral relationship from the seventies up to the entrance into NATO in II; 
then in III, we study the U.S.-Spanish relationship under the PSOE (Spanish So-
cialist Workers’ Party) government in 1982-83; in IV, the “protagonismo” of Fe-
lipe González in 1984-85; in V, the linkage seen from the political side; in VI, 
linkage seen from the economic side, and in VII, González vs. the U.S. in 1985-
86 and how he negotiated more determinedly against the U.S.   
 
II.The U.S.-Spanish Bilateral Relationship from the Franco Era  
in the Seventies to Spain’s Entrance into NATO 
 
In 1970, Spain was able to sign the Preferential Trade Agreement with the EEC 
for mutual tariff reductions. The U.S. government was “sympathetic with Spain’s 
objective of full integration into the European Community”, although it was con-
cerned about these preferential trade agreements because “they create problems 
of consistency with GATT and discrimination against the U.S.” (NPMP 02-
03.10.1970).  In January 1976, shortly after the death of Franco, the U.S. signed 
the Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship with Spain, instead of the mere renewal 
of the existing executive agreement, to show its support for the democratization 
process of the new King, Juan Carlos I.  However, during the Yom Kippur war in 
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Worrying about further denial of use of these bases on similar occasions in the 
future, the U.S. started to consider putting Spain into a multilateral security 
framework (NATO) and moving away from the bilateral one (the U.S.-Spanish 
Treaty).  The Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) governments placed more 
emphasis on domestic than on foreign policy because of their own democratic 
transition period.  While Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez developed a pro-Latin 
American and pro-nonalignment policy, Foreign Minister Marcelino Oreja cher-
ished a pro-European policy, and Spain once again applied for EEC membership 
in 1977.  European countries were better informed than the U.S. about the Franco 
era through Spanish immigrants, tourism, contacts with illegal labor movements 
and opposition to the regime.   
  The EEC member countries had a negative opinion of the link between 
membership of NATO and the EEC for Spain, or felt that it was impossible to 
combine the two.  For example, in 1977, the U.K. found a clear Spanish intent of 
this link.  In July 1977, Spanish Foreign Minister Oreja said that the Spanish 
government could have “some link” between membership of NATO and the EEC 
because if Spain still had difficulty in its accession to the EEC, “public opinion 
might swing against NATO”; that is, while Spain was being excluded from eco-
nomic partnership, it nevertheless had to contribute to European defense so that 
this state of affairs could prove not to be tolerable for Spaniards 
(TNA14.06.1979).  As the U.K. preferred not to link the two, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Secretary made it clear to Spanish Prime Minister Suárez that 
the entry into NATO and entry into the EEC were “a totally different issue” 
(TNA15.09.1977), but Spain at the time tried to link them, in spite of European 
opposition.  The U.S. insisted that “the inclusion of Spain in NATO would im-
prove the security of the entire alliance” and “preserve democracy in Spain”.  
Both the U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig and West German Ex-
Chancellor SPD Chairman Willy Brandt agreed that it would be better to “com-
plete EEC entry before moving on to NATO entry”; however, the Italians and the 
French “would slow down the EEC process” and the link of the two steps would 
be impossible (FOIA09.10.1981).  Finally, after the coup of 23-F in 1981, Spain 
became the 16th NATO member country in May 1982 but did not join the inte-
grated military structure.  
 
 
III. The U.S.-Spanish Relationship under the PSOE Government in 1982-83 
 
While European Leftist parties maintained contacts with the illegal PSOE and the 
Spanish Communist Party (PCE) during the Franco period, the U.S. government 
priority was to maintain use to their bases in Spain and over-flight rights, and 
showed little interest in the democratization process of Spain.  However, after 
Ambassador Wells Stabler took up his post in Spain in 1975, they changed their 
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on the advice of the British Ambassador.  At first, the U.S. worried about the 
difficulties involved in renewing the bilateral treaty due to the opposition of 
Spanish leftists, but gradually perceived that they were also “more nuanced, more 
flexible and more realist” than they had thought (Morán 1980, 90).  The PSOE 
opposition party under Secretary General Felipe González had promised to hold a 
referendum related to NATO membership, and won the general election in Octo-
ber 1982.  After that, the PSOE started to display a vague attitude toward NATO; 
it was denominated as “calculated ambiguity (ambigüedad calculada)” (Yáñez-
Barnuevo 1992, 97).  González, who took a leadership stance in the pacification 
of Central America and opposed President Reagan’s policy, realized that confron-
tation with the U.S. should be avoided and that cooperation as a member of Eu-
rope with the U.S. be “not only necessary but also desirable” (Mujal-León 1989, 
28-29).  He made clear his vision of “the Spanish Europeanist vocation” at his 
investiture on November 30, 1982 and “the Socialists started to link the integra-
tion of Spain in the European Community with their permanence in NATO” (Pe-
reira 2008, 1013).  Spanish accession to the EEC was the most important issue 
because it meant for González “the termination of a process of overcoming of our 
secular isolation and the participation in a common destination with the rest of 
the Western European countries” (Prego 2000, 238).  Therefore, he tried to make 
his posture in foreign policy independent of that of the U.S. 
  In an interview with Professor Folguera, chief negotiator for Spanish ad-
mission to the EEC and former Vice-President of the European Commission Ma-
nuel Marín stated that the files of the Common Market and that of NATO were 
“never on the same negotiation desk”, but were nevertheless linked by Spain “in 
an implicit way”, especially after the Euro missile crisis in 1983 when the rela-
tionship between the U.S. and Europe was being tested (1998, 4)
2.  In sum, once 
West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl gained the support of González about the 
Euro missiles
3, he started to support González in his quest for EEC entrance and 
to hope for a successful conclusion to his referendum on NATO, although some 
cabinet members, such as Vice-Prime Minister Alfonso Guerra and Minister of 
Education Javier Solana, opposed permanence.  On the other hand, the U.S. tried 
to utilize another channel to “encourage a favorable resolution of Spain’s NATO 
status” through King Juan Carlos I, who exerted “a moderating influence on the 
government’s policies” (RRL 27.07.1983)
4.  To stabilize Spain’s democracy and 
                                                 
2 On the other hand, according to Soto, Marín affirmed the linkage of the negotiations with the EEC 
with the theme of joining NATO, adding that there “existed American pressure for Spain to join the 
EEC”, because for the U.S., this would fortify Spain’s presence at NATO (2005, 248-49).  
3 González stated that “a privileged relationship” with Kohl started to function from 1983 (Cebrián 
2001, 143). 
4 During the Transition period, since 1975, Juan Carlos sent a special emissary to the U.S. and had 
meetings with Kissinger and the President of the AFL-CIO, George Meany (Hosoda 2010). In 
1983, King Juan Carlos requested “the agreement of the U.S. government to the accreditation” of a 
new Spanish ambassador to the U.S. (RRL 24.01.1983). He met with Reagan in New York in Sep-
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help create a positive Spanish decision on NATO, the U.S. accentuated its sup-
port for “Spanish accession at the earliest possible date” to the EEC, although the 
U.S. would not try to “inject itself into EEC internal affairs” (RRL17.06.1983).  
The U.S. was also concerned by the “negative impact” on Spanish full participa-
tion in NATO caused by the delay in the accession to the EEC (RRL17.06.1983).  
Both sides tried to link the EEC and the NATO issues, but in an ambiguous man-
ner.  
 
IV. The “Protagonismo” of González in 1984-85 
 
Spain outside of the EEC was economically underdeveloped as well as unstable.  
The PSOE intended to join the EEC to resolve its complex vis-à-vis Europe and 
to obtain subsidies for development.  At that time, only Ireland was not a member 
state of NATO among the 10 EEC member countries.  In 1984, González com-
municated to the European heads of State and Government that the slow pace of 
the negotiations could make Spain not just imply, but actually establish “an une-
quivocal link between the EEC and NATO applications” (Yáñez-Barnuevo 1992, 
101).  As Powell argued, “the lack of popular support for continued membership 
of NATO was the Spanish government’s strongest card in its EEC accession ne-
gotiations” (2003, 150).  The State Department thought that Foreign Minister 
Fernando Morán, “who has been personally opposed to Spanish membership in 
NATO”, has begun to argue its permanence; therefore, the visit of Secretary of 
State Shultz would be an opportunity to develop his thinking (FOIA07.01.1984).  
In October, at the Cortes, González stated “the Decalogue” for peace and security 
policy for Spain, which included non-participation in NATO’s integrated military 
structure, the ban in introducing nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of 
American troops in Spain.  At the opening of the PSOE congress in December, 
González “called for acceptance of NATO membership and the abandonment of 
the statist economic approach”, and the report on the government’s performance 
was approved by 95 percent (CIA-FOIA15.12.1984).   
  In sum, González tried to persuade his party and took a rather “conserva-
tive” policy stance.  González wanted to reduce the American troops’ presence in 
Spain, as he had stated in the Decalogue.  He started these negotiations with the 
U.S. during the time between Spain and Portugal’s signing of the treaty of their 
accession to the EEC in June 1985 and the referendum on NATO in March 1986 
(Prego 2000, 248).  The journalist Cebrián told González that there existed a 
theory that the Spaniards were required to stay in NATO in order to gain admit-
                                                                                                                         
once because of the President’s tight schedule but the Spaniards continued to push 
(RRL16.09.1986). It is not strange that they would have talked of hot issues like those of NATO 
and EEC membership.  
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tance into the EEC, but González denied it, explaining the chronological order of 
the issues and saying that the Americans were anxious about the possible failure 
of the referendum, and this was done on his personal decision (2001, 139).  Fur-
thermore, according to Prego, González said “no European leader has even insin-
uated to me that a link might exist between the EEC and NATO memberships” 
(2000, 244).  González’s statements were quite vague, and here we would like to 
clarify; it was the Spanish party, or González, and not the U.S. or the Europeans 
who wanted to link the permanence at NATO and the admittance into the EEC.  
Gonzalez required the U.S. to understand that support for Spain’s admittance into 
the EEC was a condition of its permanence at NATO, and also of successful bi-
lateral negotiations concerning the bases in Spain.  Hereafter, we see the details 
of this linkage.   
 
V. The Linkage Seen from the Political Side 
 
In March 1985, the U.S. obtained the information that, while Portuguese mem-
bership was “virtually complete”, Spain’s membership remained problematic due 
to disagreements on positions regarding fishing rights, agriculture and social 
affairs.  Therefore, the U.S. foresaw the possibility of the delay of Spanish acces-
sion until 1987.  One year’s delay would create another budget crisis for the 
EEC, causing the Spanish government difficulty in gaining public support for 
NATO.  By taking advantage of this situation, Spain “has linked EEC member-
ship to its continuing support for NATO” by applying unstated coercion to the 
member countries of the EEC in its implication that “a delay in EEC entry could 
have a negative impact on Spain’s commitment to NATO”.  Concretely, Spanish 
officials had told US diplomats that an accession agreement could ensure Spanish 
public support for NATO in a referendum (CIA-FOIA 15.03.1985)
5.  Namely, 
Spain used public opinion to pressure the United States.  Finally, Spain signed the 
Act of Accession to the EEC in June 1985. According to Foreign Minister Morán, 
at that moment there was no pressure for permanence at NATO or for Spanish 
participation in its integrated military structure as a condition for EEC member-
ship (1990, 311). 
  Morán was a diplomat and had opposed permanence at NATO and disa-
greed with González, who announced a cabinet change the very next day (Morán 
1990: 248-257; 480).  There had been negative campaigns conducted and Fer-
nando Ordóñez, an economist who had studied the “International Tax Program” 
at Harvard Law School in the Sixties, was nominated as his successor.  He want-
ed Spain to have a leadership role in the process of the European construction.  It 
is possible that his experience in the U.S. influenced González, who came to 
                                                 
5 Later, in 1988 Spain also utilized public opinion to “exaggerate public pressure for a referendum 
on the U.S. military presence in Spain to try to get concessions in the ongoing talks on U.S. bases” 
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understand the importance of “occidentalization of Foreign Policy” and of the 
merits of permanence at NATO (Delgado2007, 96, 294-95, 302).  However, 
Ordóñez, rather Atlantist, was the former Minister of Finance and of Justice, and 
not from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Meanwhile, the International Depart-
ment was created inside the Presidency. Its director, Juan Antonio Yáñez-
Barnuevo, was a diplomat who assisted international conferences like those of 
the EEC and NATO.  In other words, González now tried to execute foreign poli-
cy from the Presidency. 
 
VI. The Linkage Seen from the Economic Side 
 
According to the U.S. Information Agency’s survey in November 1985, the Span-
ish “tend to think that the economic policies and actions of the European Com-
munity have been more helpful than harmful to Spain, but that U.S. policies have 
been more harmful than helpful” (RRL 23.01.1986).  In reality, for the Spanish 
economy in the Eighties, apart from that with the EEC, the relationship with the 
U.S. as its commercial partner was its most important one. “Spanish industrial 
ambitions in the EEC depended on American investment, such as Ford, IBM and 
General Motors.” (Gillespie 1988: 436-437). 
  As for economic issues within the bilateral relationship, the U.S. saw that 
Spain was “concerned about its trade imbalance with the U.S., especially in the 
military area” (RRL November 1986).  Therefore, González offered a credit to 
the U.S. with the same condition for purchase of military materials, such as 
planes produced by the Spanish company CASA (Prego 2000, 250).  The U.S. 
concluded that Spanish EEC accession would be “ultimately positive, but nega-
tive in the short term”, and Spain seemed to think that “capital investment is the 
ideal long-term solution to its economic problems” (RRL05.11.1986). In fact, 
“since the Spanish accession to the EEC in January 1986, overall U.S. exports to 
Spain have decreased by 13 percent” due to a strong dollar, the peseta devalua-
tion and the increase of Spanish trade with EEC partners (RRL November 1986).  
In the long run, EEC membership required policy and institutional reforms like 
monetary and exchange rate stratagems, which would lead to structural reforms 
for “macroeconomic stability and the strengthening of competitiveness of the 
productive sector” and to give an incentive to non-EEC investors including the 
U.S. (Royo 2005, 66-67).  
  In sum, the U.S. thought that Spanish accession “has removed many trade 
issues from the bilateral relationship” (RRL November 1986).  Trade is an exam-
ple of some of the issues that were pending for both countries and that were nec-
essary to resolve in order to create a better military relationship.  On the other 
hand, for the Spanish, entrance into the EEC would alter the dependence on 
American investment, which would be conducive towards a more independent 
foreign policy. 
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VII. González vs. the U.S. in 1985-86 
 
For the U.S., Spanish withdrawal from NATO would constitute a considerable 
adversity to American interests which would cause damage “not only to the bilat-
eral relationship but also to the prestige and the credibility of NATO itself” 
(Powell 2001, 362).  To maintain access and operating rights in Spain and seek-
ing expanded rights, particularly in out–of-area operations, was significant to the 
United States (RRL 04.04.1986; RRL 24.10.1986).  For the U.S., a good bilateral 
relationship was indispensable for the bilateral treaty that involved bases, namely 
base rights, and in the Eighties, for the development of its troops outside of 
NATO territory.  The negotiation of the Agreement on Friendship, Defense and 
Cooperation, including the reduction of American troops, was accorded in De-
cember 1985 to start from the first quota of 1986; however, the negotiations did 
not have a clear direction until July 26, after the referendum (Delgado 2007, 
321).  Since the Franco era, the U.S. had seen Spain’s strategic position as its 
connection point toward the Middle East; meanwhile, Spain intended to negotiate 
using this as a bargaining piece. 
  González considered that the EEC countries would ultimately develop 
closer cooperation in security areas, reinforcing collective security even within 
the Atlantic alliance.  Furthermore, he was confident that the Spanish would ac-
quiesce to remaining in NATO because as a member of the EEC, NATO would 
“constitute another way in which Spain can, and must, make its contribution to 
the solidarity of the democratic nations of Europe” (González 1987, 187-188).  
Surprised by the decision of González to hold the referendum in 1986, the U.S. 
was always against this and tried in vain to persuade Manuel Fraga
6, the con-
servative opposition leader, “to call for a “Yes” vote, or, having failed to achieve 
this, to minimize the number of his supporters who would vote “No” (RRL 
01.03.1986; RRL12.02.1986; 25.01.1986).  After that, the U.S. contacted other 
allied leaders like West Germany, Italy and the U.K. and tried to persuade Gonzá-
lez, who was going to denounce the treaty in case of defeat in the referendum 
(RRL 07.03.1986).  Finally, the referendum took place in March 1986 and the 
government received 52.94% in favor of permanence while 39.85% voted against 
it.  There was a voter turnout of only 59.42%, meaning that 40.58% abstained. 
With respect to the U.S.-Spanish relationship, González was concerned 
about the trade imbalance, supported an increase in technological cooperation 
and educational and cultural friendship, and stated the need for mutual respect 
and friendship.  Furthermore, as the U.S. policy toward Central America demon-
strated, Spain did not always agree with U.S. policy and he hoped to “speak out 
                                                 
6 Fraga himself was in favour of entrance into NATO, however the general election was going to be 
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in the European Community in order to make our opinions known” (González 
1987, 187-189).  He wanted to have Spain enjoy the same status as the U.S. when 
it acted in the international arena; for Spain’s voice to be heard, it must be a 
member of the EEC, based on his fortified position after his referendum victory.  
In July 1986 at the pre-investiture debate, González stressed “the primacy of 
Western Europe for Spain’s economic well-being and national security” in its 
foreign policy.  Citing EEC entry and NATO membership, he argued that 
“Spain’s future was inextricably linked to its European allies,” and spoke little of 
U.S.-Spanish relations (RRL23.07.1986).  American Ambassador to Spain 
Thomas Enders, who was considered a friend of González, presented his resigna-
tion in the summer of 1986; his successor would prove to be a tougher negotiator 
(Palomares 2005, 338; RRL07.08.1986). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Historically speaking, Spain’s priority in its foreign policy has been toward Eu-
rope.  Due to international isolation after World War II, Spain was involved in the 
bipolar system in the Cold War through the American Executive Agreement and 
had to take a pro-American policy.  In the Sixties, some national pride emerged 
in a stance against the U.S. troops and a demand for the return of Gibraltar under 
Foreign Minister Castiella; in the Seventies, under Oreja, the Ministry looked for 
a framework denoting it as an equal status negotiator.  In other words, Spain uti-
lized the base agreement to ask for support for EEC entrance.  In the Eighties, 
while the EEC negotiation process was delayed by the opposition of Italy, France 
and others, the PSOE government and Prime Minister González tried to use the 
linkage in the base negotiations.  For the U.S., Spain was important militarily for 
its bases en route to the Middle East. There was a risk of Spanish withdrawal 
from NATO if the EEC accession did not proceed because the Spanish felt that 
they were obligated to tolerate the military burden while they could not take any 
economic advantage from NATO.  Therefore, it was necessary for the U.S. to 
suspend the referendum or for it to have a successful outcome. 
  Spanish accession to the EEC would negatively affect the U.S. in the short 
term from the economic point of view; in the long run, however, it would have a 
positive impact.  For the U.S., the most important thing would be Spanish per-
manence at NATO; therefore, accession to the EEC would integrate Spain into 
Europe and make a withdrawal difficult.  Secondly, this accession would resolve 
the trade surplus to Spain, which would signal less trade with the U.S.  For the 
Bilateral Base Treaty renewal negotiations, the U.S. preferred to have fewer neg-
ative conflicts with Spain.  For the U.S., the most important point in the bilateral 
relationship was strategic: to maintain the right to use the bases in Spain for the 
Middle East, considering possible NATO out-of-area operations. 
  On the other hand, Spain’s priority in its foreign policy at the time was 
entrance into the EEC and, as Viñas argues, the U.S.-Spanish relationship would Spain-U.S. Relations                                                                                261 
 
   
be rebalanced through adhesion to NATO and the EEC and through Europeaniza-
tion of its foreign policy (2005, 298).  With accession to the EEC, Spain had ob-
tained economic benefit; the subsidies it received surpassed its contribution.  In 
addition, Spain could gain a political voice in the international community as a 
member of the EEC, an equal status to negotiate with the U.S., which had been 
its quest since 1898, and an independent foreign policy.  González recognized 
and foresaw the importance of accession to the EEC not only for economic rea-
sons, but also for collective security in the future, which would as a matter of 
course have to include the U.S. 
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Abstract 
 
In the recent 25-year period of European integration, Spain has consolidated its 
pro-active role in the selected club of leading member states. Along this time, 
Spain has also contributed to the development of a European foreign policy vis a 
vis global actors, by shaping in many ways the relations of the EU with the US 
and the Latin American region (LA).   
  Traditionally, the Europeans have placed the US at the top of their geo-
political and economic priorities, and viceversa. To this respect, Spain has played 
a pivotal role of “stabilizer” with the US since its incorporation to NATO in 
1982, through its participation in numerous US-led missions, from the Balkans to 
Afghanistan, with the sole exception of the withdrawal of its troops from Irak in 
2004. The growing influence of the Hispanic community in the US, coupled by 
the development of common projects in renewable energies or infrastructures, is 
giving a new impetus to the bilateral ties. Despite these achievements, however, 
Spain has not had a major role in building a single EU voice vis a vis the US.   
On the other hand, as a consequence of the accession of Spain to the European 
Communities in 1986, an engineering of an EU-LA relation took place, with 
Spain leading the process. During the last two decades of the 20’s century, as the 
Spanish largest companies massively invested on the LA region, the Spanish 
governments gave shape to the Ibero-american community; kept the European 
focus on the region alive, by pushing forward the bi-regional Strategic Associa-
tion Agreements: acted as mediators in regional conflicts; and were also able to 
set up the main criteria for the EU position on issues like Cuba, Venezuela, or the 
MERCOSUR.  
At present, the emergence of Brasil as a regional leader is changing the strategic 
scenario and will have deep implications for both Spain and the EU, as well as 
for the US. Current economic, social and demographic trends suggest that the 
Europeans should reinforce the bi-regional ties with LA emerging markets, as G-266                                                                                                    Palacio 
 
 
20 economies like Brasil, Mexico and Argentina keep growing at a faster rate 
than the European’s.            
  Looking towards the future, Spain could help to reset the EU approach to 
the LA region by changing the ways of managing development assistance, trade, 
and financial flows and, overall, by launching a new political, strategic dialogue 
with the region. The EU as a whole – and not only countries like Spain or Portu-
gal - would benefit enormously from massive investment in LA infrastructure 
and innovation networks. And last but not least, the EU needs to coordinate poli-
cies in all these areas vis a vis the United States.  
 
 
Introduction: Spain’s Re-discovery of the Americas 
 
In the recent 25-year period in the development of European integration, from the 
European Communities to the European Union, Spain has pursued a pro-active 
role in the relatively select club of leading member states. Throughout this time, 
Spain also contributed to the development of a European foreign policy with 
regard to other international actors, shaping in many ways the relations of the EU 
with the Latin American region (LA). Spain retains a special identification with 
Latin America through the concept of the “Latin” or the “Hispanic”: a mixture of 
linguistic, religious, ethnic, cultural, and historical ties binding Spanish-speaking 
America to Spain. The Hispanic heritage has also been used as a bridge for deep-
ening the relations with the US. 
In the eyes of its LA partners, Spain has been an effective example of 
transition from authoritarianism to democracy, as shown by the many trips that 
Spain's King and Prime Ministers have made to the region. Throughout this time, 
Spain has developed economic and technical cooperation programs and cultural 
exchanges with Latin America, both bilaterally and within the EU – to the point 
of largely imposing the Spanish point of view on LA issues like Cuba–while it 
has achieved a more balanced bilateral relationship with the US, not least due to 
the cover offered by the European umbrella.   
My purpose here is to explain the way in which Spain’s approach to LA 
has been positive in shaping both Spanish and European foreign policy vision for 
the LA region. Yet relations with the US regarding LA issues have followed dif-
ferent, if not diverging, paths. Due to this and other factors, such us the multiple 
historical dividing lines at the core of the continent – between North and South 
and between neighbors –, or, more recently, the changes associated with the 
emergence of BRICs like Brazil, those integrating efforts have fallen short, partly 
because of the absence of a more comprehensive economic and political policy 
with regard to the US for the whole of the Americas.  
This paper also conducts a brief review of these gaps and argues that for 
Spain to keep its leverage on future LA political and economic processes, as well 
as on its EU position, the relations with both LA and the US need to be mutually Spain’s Contribution                                                                                267 
 
   
reinforced through a new, long-term strategy. That strategy would go beyond the 
“Ibero-American” and the “Euro-Latin American” vision, by emphasizing broad 
Euro-American synergies on common interests, where the best of the western 
political tradition would serve as a sound network to deal with the challenges 
posed by globalization.  
 
Spain, Europe, and ‘the Two Americas’ 
 
Traditionally, in theory and in practice, there have always been “two Americas” 
from both Spain’s and Europe’s perspectives: the Anglo-Saxon North America 
and Spanish-speaking Latin America. After General Franco’s death in 1975 and 
the inception of the Spanish democracy, these two approaches remained uncon-
nected until very recently, despite the deeply positive changes that the LA region 
has experienced. 
Before the end of the eighties, Europe did not begin to emerge as a more 
unified international actor, nor did the so often domestically ravaged LA coun-
tries abandon a rigid “national” paradigm. It was the conjuncture of these two 
factors that allowed Spain to “invent” Latin America as a political and economic 
regional partner after its incorporation into the European Communities. From that 
perspective, insofar as it at least made the current bi-regional approach possible, 
Latin America is, in a certain sense, a “Spanish invention”, (Arenal, Celestino 
2006, 2008; Palacio, 2010b). Two main visions or periods of the role that Spain 
has played over the last three decades can be distinguished.  
 
First Vision: The Ibero-American Community  
 
A first stage was the shaping of the Ibero-American vision, according to which 
Spain and Portugal led relations and acted as a bridge in a relatively isolated and 
impoverished LA. As a result of Spain's entry into the European Communities in 
1986, a forging of a relationship with LA took place, with Spain leading the pro-
cess. From that date until 1993, with the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht that 
gave rise to the political union of the EU, Spain took full advantage of the oppor-
tunities that membership of the European club offered. The success of the Span-
ish governments in the European arena facilitated the shaping, together with Por-
tugal, of the Ibero-American community, keeping alive the focus of countries 
like France, Germany, Italy, the UK or Sweden on the region.   
The Ibero-American initiative had its origin in a visit by the King and 
Queen of Spain to Mexico in January 1990. The proposal by the then president, 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari, to institutionalize an annual meeting of the entire 
Ibero-American family meant for Madrid unifying and multiplying its relations 
with the countries of Central America and the Southern Cone, which were 
emerging from civil wars and military dictatorships. The summit of Guadalajara 
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impressive run of Ibero-American summits held to date – they reached 20 in 
2010 – is due to the interest of the Spanish crown and a democratic Portugal in 
bringing their own heritage to the European club following their entry in 1986 
(Powell, 1993). That allowed Spain to open the way to Latin American govern-
ments that were returning to democracy, in a process of mutual rediscovery. 
Flags and companies went at the same time, although without a political 
“grand design” or coordination. During the last two decades of the 20th century, 
Spain's largest companies invested massively in the LA region. Very early in the 
nineties, the “new conquistadors” - Spain's largest companies such as Telefonica 
or Repsol, or Banks like BBVA or Santander - took positions in strategic sectors 
of LA economies – in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico or Venezuela. Spanish 
economic development and the enormous profits of the multinationals on Latin 
American soil contrasted, however, with the "lost decade" on the continent due to 
macroeconomic chaos and in spite of the development aid allocated to the region. 
The summits were conceived as a forum of political coordination to 
promote the cooperation and solidarity of 22 countries and in spite of the grow-
ing extension of the issues on the agenda to technology, health or migrations, 
inevitably they have given priority to the inherited identity factor of a common 
history: the vast community of Spanish and Portuguese language and culture
1. 
Some outstanding results have been obtained: dozens of political statements, 
debates and programs under way in education, immigration, technologies or for 
young people. There is no doubt that the Ibero-American community has pro-
duced results.  
The increasing overlapping of the Iberian Peninsula with the ups and 
downs of the process of construction and enlargement of Europe has had a lot to 
do with this process. Also, at the end of the 1990s, events took place which 
changed the scene considerably: the establishment of populism in the Andean 
countries, the unstoppable rise of Brazil or the new economic relations of the 
countries of the region with China. The mediating, pacifying and democratizing 
role, in short, the factor of social and economic progress represented by the Span-
ish, and to a lesser extent, the Portuguese presence for the countries of Latin 
American has entered into decline since the middle of this decade (Del Arenal, 
2009). 
Today, there is an element which exerts great pressure for change: a re-
gionalization which did not exist in 1991 but which now occupies the energies of 
governments. UNASUR is a particularly pertinent example, with Brazil at the 
head. There is the seed of an unstoppable south-south alliance and in Cancun in 
February a community of Latin American and Caribbean states was put forward. 
In addition, China has just joined the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
                                                 
1One must take into account, however, the wide range of terms of identity in contrast to Ibero-
American, often competing with one another: Hispanism, Latin Americanism, Pan-Americanism, 
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as a provider of funds, which will bring political consequences.Countries such as 
Ecuador, Guatemala or Bolivia certainly require bilateral development aid and 
the Ibero-American framework can keep them relatively satisfied. However, this 
Ibero-American framework is no longer enough for most. Brazil, which plays on 
a global stage with the BRICs; Argentina, Chile or Mexico, with ties to China, 
North America or Africa, need Ibero-America to serve as a lever to scale posi-
tions, connect to other forums and create very visible synergies: a driving force 
of political agenda (Palacio, 2010b). 
 
Second Vision: The Euro-Latin American   
 
As Spain grew richer and became more integrated into Europe, a second, more 
ambitious and far more sophisticated vision developed through the second half of 
the nineties. The Euro-Latin-American vision belongs to this (Sanahuja, 2006). 
This period had its landmark in 1994, when a plethora of overlapping integration 
projects was launched: FTAA, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and its first contacts with 
Spain. In this new period, Spain pushed forward the bi-regional Association 
Agreements as we know them to date; offered to mediate in regional conflicts; 
and was also able to establish the main criteria for the EU position on issues like 
Cuba, Venezuela, or MERCOSUR. In this respect, six bi-regional, bi-annual 
Summits held in one decade, from Rio de Janeiro (1999) to Madrid (2010) should 
not be ignored. Spain has used its prestige in LA as a letter of introduction for its 
European partners. It has been a two-way process: Spain’s European membership 
has revamped its old image in relation to the Latin Americans.  
Spanish mediation and pressure on other governments has been key in 
the evolution of LA politics since 1994 and notably after the first bi-regional 
Summit in Rio in 1999, where an ambitious goal of a Bi-regional Strategic Part-
nership was presented. Spanish government and Spaniards at the European insti-
tutions (COREPER, European Parliament and Committees) played a prominent 
role in boosting initiatives and bargaining processes. The Spaniards were often 
more sensitive to LA demands on balanced trade, or the intrinsic particularities of 
the democratization processes in the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) and 
Central America (Salafranca, 2003).  
Yet, despite the Spanish impetus, relations between the EU and Latin 
America have entered a worrying stalemate since the second half of the 1990s 
(Del Arenal, 2010). Paradoxically, as the respective EU and LA integrations were 
consolidated, no significant progress on bi-regional trade bargaining was 
achieved. This is the case of negotiations between the EU and MERCOSUR to 
reach an Association Agreement, which were deadlocked until the Madrid Sum-
mit of 2010. In contrast, further bilateral Association Agreements have followed, 
e.g. with Mexico in 2000 and Chile in 2002, and Strategic Partnerships with Bra-
zil in 2007 and Mexico in 2008. This model for bi-regional relations was valid in 
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the profound transformations seen on the global, European and Latin American 
stages. It is unclear whether the bi-regional strategy, based on an asymmetrical 
scheme, will satisfy European and Latin American realities and interests in the 
future (Freres & Sanahuja, 2006, p. 26-29). That has become even more unclear 
since 2009, when the financial and economic crisis hit Europe much harder than 
the Latin American region. The financial crisis and the new challenges posed to 
bi-regional relations by the emerging role of Brazil or China are factors that will 
shape the immediate future of the Summit achievements.  
In short, these two patterns of relationship - Ibero-American and Euro-
Latin American - need to be revisited. In this context, the re-emergence of a new 
Spanish leadership seems necessary. Current challenges include greater monitor-
ing of the agreements signed; simplifying their final political declaration; creat-
ing more synergies with sub-regional organizations – UNASUR and the Rio 
Group – and with bodies such as the United Nations, the IDB or the ECLA; or 
connecting the EU-Latin American and Caribbean summits to the Ibero-
American summits. 
 
Spain, the U.S., and the Hemispheric Integration   
 
Traditionally, the Europeans have placed the US at the top of their geopolitical 
and economic priorities, and vice versa. In this respect, Spain has played a pivot-
al role as “stabilizer” of transatlantic relations since its incorporation into NATO 
in 1982, through its participation in numerous US-led missions, from the Balkans 
to Afghanistan, with the sole exception of the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq 
in 2004.  
Yet Spain has not had a major role in building a single EU voice with re-
gard to the US on the so-called “hemispheric” issues. This is partly due to the 
existence among the Spanish political elites of a sense of historical dependence 
on Washington since the times of the Defense agreement of 1953 between Eisen-
hower and the General Franco (Viñas, 2003). This dependence persisted, in spite 
of the review of the bilateral agreement in 1998 following arduous negotiations 
which progressively reduced the US presence on Spanish soil and rebalanced the 
bilateral relationship (Cajal, 2010, chapters 7 and 8).  
Spanish governments subsequently forged a more positive relationship with the 
USA. Thus, during its second rotating presidency of the EU, Spain promoted the 
EU-USA relationship, attaining its greatest success to date in this field: the sign-
ing in Madrid in December 1995 of an ambitious Transatlantic Agenda which 
took in issues of democratization, the deregulation of markets, security or bridges 
with civil society. The process was led by President Bill Clinton, the President of 
the European Commission, Jacques Santer, and the Spanish Prime Minister Fe-
lipe Gonzalez. It could be said that this is another "Spanish invention", this time 
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Both the shadow of the past and the realities of the US superpower have 
not prevented Spain from developing ties with the Latin American and Caribbean 
region (LAC). However, these factors did make the emergence of a unified, stra-
tegic Spanish and European vision for the “two Americas” more difficult. In this 
respect, it must be recalled that during the 1980s there had already been a clash 
with the US Administration, which considered the conflicts in the region from a 
Cold War perspective (East-West), while Europe - with Spain at the head - saw 
them as a product of underdevelopment (North-South).  
A review of a few examples would show that a common, strategic view 
linking all of these actors has been absent in the past. That is the case of clashes 
involving alternately Spain, the EU, the US and certain Latin American coun-
tries. Four cases will suffice to reveal deep differences of perceptions and inter-
ests and, as a result, an absence of coordination. The first is the clash with the 
Reagan Administration over the Spanish initiative of the Contadora Group in the 
Central American peace processes of the mid-1980s (Nicaragua in particular). 
This revealed conflicting views on the way of tackling the lack of security in the 
region and its condition as the USA's "back yard". Secondly, there is the EU's 
Common Position on Cuba, established on Spain's initiative in 1996 and which 
has led to a distancing of Europe from other Latin American countries as well as 
from the USA as said position also condemned the US embargo of the island. 
Thirdly, there is the vote in the Security Council to authorize military interven-
tion in Iraq in 2003. The government of Aznar clashed with Mexico and Chile, 
which were firmly opposed. Fourthly, Spain and the USA clashed in 2005 over 
the sale of Spanish arms to Chavez's Venezuela, revealing the difference of per-
ception of security in the Andean region. In a certain sense, all these cases reveal 
an old intrinsic difficulty of Spanish foreign policy: how to reconcile Atlanticism, 
Europeanism and Ibero-Americanism (Niño, 2003).   
Finally, as far as the US is concerned, previous major projects for hemi-
spheric integration have been rejected from the outset. A case in point is Presi-
dent Clinton's Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) of 1994 for a single free 
trade market area from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. The idea was immediately 
blocked by Brazil or Argentina, as a neo-imperialist assault on free markets. No 
fewer difficulties have been experienced by sub-regional processes throughout 
this time which were blocked either for ideological or technical reasons. Under 
the George Bush Administration, the political climate in the Americas took a turn 
for the worse and partial, bilateral agreements were signed with small Central 
American countries (Hakim, 2006). This blockade closed the door for more than 
a decade to joint approaches to the LA region from the EU and the US.  
The new Obama Administration’s approach not only opened up pro-
spects for agreement with Latin America itself
2, it also raised the possibility of 
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the EU paying more attention to Latin America. Although the results have been 
disappointing after two years of Obama’s mandate, there is room for improve-
ment. Obama has opened up a new era of mutual political understanding and 
cooperation with Brazil (energy), Mexico (narcotics, immigration), and has de-
fused tensions with Venezuela and Cuba (Hakim, 2010). This attitude of rap-
prochement and understanding towards Cuba reinforces Spain's bilateral policy 
with Cuba and its proposal of dropping the “Common Position” of 1996.  
 
The 2010 Spanish Presidency of the EU and Beyond   
 
Spanish influence on Europe's agenda towards the (two) Americas was made 
clear during the Spanish presidency of the European Council in the first half of 
2010. Certainly, the economic context in which the EU-LAC Summit took place 
in May 2010 was not an easy one.Notwithstanding, the Spanish EU Presidency 
managed to re-launch Latin America-EU relations in the political and economic 
spheres
3. Paradoxically, European economic stagnation helped the Spanish gov-
ernment to put pressure on its Europeans partners to reinforce bi-regional ties 
with LA emerging markets, just as G-20 economies like Brazil, Mexico and Ar-
gentina keep growing at a faster rate than Europe. Among other achievements, 
the summit gave fresh impetus to the EU negotiations with MERCOSUR by reo-
pening trade negotiations with a market of more than 700 million people; estab-
lished a Latin America Investment Facility (LAIF); and concluded negotiations 
on an association agreement with Central America, the EU’s first such regional 
deal. Madrid also managed to seal a deal with Peru and Colombia, while Ecuador 
engaged in talks to become involved as well. From now on, a major challenge is 
to contribute with its heritage, ideas and resources within the framework of the 
future Euro-LAC Foundation.  
As for relations with the USA, the Spanish presidency meant, if not its 
putting into practice, at least the presentation of a "doctrine of triangulation" that 
constitutes the basis of a Euro-American vision, mainly on the part of the office 
of the secretary of state for Ibero-America. This doctrine, which gathers intui-
tions of previous Spanish governments, proposes a different framework to the 
FTAA, to closed sub-regional frameworks, and also to an EU-US transatlantic 
relation disconnected from the Euro-Latin American relation
4. Basically, it pro-
poses establishing an equal relationship between Spain/Europe and the USA with 
regard to the Latin American countries, based on fluid dialogue and transparency. 
This way of approaching relations would be a better response to the new reality 
                                                 
3See the report of the European Comission “La Unión Europea y América Latina: Una asociación 
de actores globales”, Comunicación al Parlamento Europeo y al Consejo, COM (2009) 495/3. 
4See Vicente Palacio, “El Nuevo Hemisferio Occidental”, in El País, June 11, 2009. 
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of these countries, which in most cases are no longer merely recipients of aid, 
rather democracies in the process of consolidation or emerging economies that 
are fully aware of their autonomy.   
Undoubtedly, the reinforcement of this triangular vision of the "New 
West", or Euro-Americana, was heavily influenced by the high hopes on the part 
of Rodriguez Zapatero's government of developing a fluid dialogue with the 
Obama Administration, with which there was greater affinity than with Bush Jr. 
The cancellation by President Obama of the summit with the EU to be held in 
Madrid in May 2010 deprived Spain of the chance to make the relevance of Latin 
America to the Transatlantic Agenda more visible. However, that has not pre-
vented the seed of that "triangulation" from developing - albeit often in parallel 
with bilateral cooperation in relation to third countries - and today we can speak 
of a major advance in joint cooperation with the US and LAC countries or sub-
regions, with a specific agenda. Currently, work is being done in two main areas: 
security and development and humanitarian aid policies, both largely in the Cen-
tral American and Caribbean region (Haiti). This cooperation among three or 
more actors constitutes a kind of laboratory in which advances are made by shar-
ing information and rationalizing resources.   
For example, in the field of security for the Central-American region (the 
fight against drug-trafficking, guerrillas and social violence) there is a conver-
gence of the Spanish and European view with that of the Central American coun-
tries and of the USA. Security is now understood as a multiple phenomenon 
which requires reinforcement from development policies. Progress in this field is 
being made on several fronts. On the one hand, in the bi-regional area EU-CAIS 
(Central American Integration System) work is being done on these matters fol-
lowing the signing of the Association Agreement under the Spanish presidency. 
In addition, there is the structured work of the Cooperation Group for Central 
America set in motion bilaterally by Spain and the USA on the initiative of 
Spain's secretary of state for Ibero-America, Juan Pablo de Laiglesia, and the 
deputy secretary of state for the Western Hemisphere, Arturo Valenzuela (Moltó, 
2010). This group has expanded progressively to include Canada, the European 
Commission, Mexico and Colombia and multilateral bodies such as the IDB and 
even CAIS, which could end up managing these programs independently, reori-
enting national security plans towards a regional perspective. Spain and the EU 
have a lot to offer in terms of police, customs, technical assistance or joint infor-
mation systems (EUROJUST, EUROPOL). All these issues are the subject of the 
Central American Security Conference of June 2011.    
Also noteworthy is the humanitarian coordination in Haiti following the 
earthquake in January 2010, with very committed actors such as the USA, Brazil 
or Spain. The EU-USA Development and Humanitarian Aid Council, established 
at the summit of December 2009 under the Swedish presidency is another chan-
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take place regularly in Brussels reflect a growing agreement on the diagnosis of 
many issues between North Americans and Europeans. 
 
Looking to the Future: Towards a Euro-American Approach? 
 
The failings of the Ibero-American and Euro-Latin American approaches suggest 
the convenience for Spain (and Portugal as well) of complementing these frame-
works with a broader Euro-American one, by incorporating new partners such as 
the US and Canada. The region covering the Americas and Europe shares not 
only a common heritage - history, values and institutions - but also the elements 
on which to build a broader Transatlantic Community: trade, investment, immi-
gration and dynamic cultural and social exchanges. Furthermore, high "political 
expectations" are common to citizens from the entire transatlantic region (Pala-
cio, 2010a). On the LA side, significant improvements in democratic standards 
coupled with sustained economic growth over the last decade suggest that a 
broad, interwoven, multi-directional hemispheric cooperation initiative is possi-
ble.  
For instance, the Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB) is the only 
institution that acts as an observer in the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary 
Assembly (EuroLat). However, relations with Brussels have to become much 
more institutionalized. A rationalization of time and resources between the Ibero-
American summits and the EU-LAC summits has also been suggested. In any 
case, it seems clear that there should be moves towards joint work groups in co-
ordination with other summits (of the Americas, the Rio Group), from a more 
transversal perspective, in line with globalization. Another channel worth explor-
ing is the global agenda and to do so requires more connection with the United 
Nations and galvanizing resources and new tools from the European Investment 
Bank and from the Inter American Development Bank (IDB) towards the region. 
In addition, the Ibero-American and Euro-Latin American arena could foster 
consensus on global governance with a view to G-20 meetings (Palacio, 2010b). 
The way ahead will not be easy: this map of connections in the Euro-
American area is characterized by two contrasting features. One is an intense 
flow of trade, investment, migration, and institutions. The Euro-American Area 
accounts for almost one third of the world's states, and 70% of world GDP. No 
less crucial to the prosperity and stability of the continent is the prominent, grow-
ing role of a ‘BRIC’ nation: Brazil
5. Also, demographics are important as a quali-
tative factor: almost all immigration flows (most of them originating in LAC) 
                                                 
5Brazil alone accounts for 40% of the LAC's GDP and has more than a third of the LAC population 
(190 million people). Brazil and the EU have launched a Strategic Partnership and the US is devel-
oping a dialogue with the Brazilians on similar issues: clean energies, climate change and invest-
ment. At present, the emergence of Brazil as a regional leader is changing the strategic scenario and 
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have the US and the EU as the main destination. However, tough visa constraints 
remain as barriers to labor and exchange of human capital in the area between 
LAC and the US and the EU, respectively. The second feature is fragmentation 
and overlapping - existing regional and sub-regional frameworks (FTAA, ALBA, 
MERCOSUR, UNASUR, CAFTA etc) and forums (Organization of American 
States (OAS), Rio Group) - and lack of coordination of frameworks of action, 
specific programs or institutions among the main actors (Roy, Joaquín, et al., 
2005). Also, there is the reluctance of the main actors: US, Brazil and other LA 
countries. And there is a temptation to exclude the US and the EU with a vision 
of “America for the Latin Americans”, led by countries such as Venezuela or 
Bolivia. In this respect, the position of Brazil, which leads the Rio Group, re-
mains ambiguous.   
It could also be argued that there is no momentum for the Euro-American 
project, since Spain has lost part of its leverage on Latin American politics, and 
the euro debt crisis undermines the economic power of the EU. However, Spain 
should look to the future and help to redefine the EU approach to the LA region 
by changing the ways of managing development assistance, trade, and financial 
flows and, overall, by launching a new political, strategic dialogue with the 
Americas together with sectorial work. On the one hand, bilateral ties have im-
proved: the growing influence of the Hispanic community in the US, coupled 
with the development of joint projects in renewable energies or infrastructures, is 
giving fresh impetus to the US-Spain relation. On the other hand, the EU as a 
whole – and not only countries like Spain or Portugal – would benefit enormous-
ly from massive investment in LA infrastructure and innovation networks. 
The new attitude of the US should open the way for the Europeans to forge that 
structured, joint dialogue on LA, one that is built on collaborative foundations 
and which makes competitive approaches a thing of the past. Also, the shared 
perception of “external threats” could help to develop a common view: China, 
which in 2010 replaced the US as the main trade partner of Brazil, could also 
surpass the EU in less than a decade.  
The EU is trying to put into practice the institutional machinery of the 
Lisbon Treaty, while it tries to consolidate itself as a global actor. Spain still has 
a major role in preventing central and northern EU countries from perceiving the 
Euro-American vision as competing for the programs of the Eastern and Mediter-
ranean Neighborhood. A long-term political vision to make Euro-American in-
terests converge would be beneficial not only for a few southern European coun-
tries (Spain, France or Italy), but mainly for the US and the rest of the members 
of the American region.  
Common action is open to areas like energy and climate change, devel-
opment, humanitarian assistance, security, the fight against organized crime, or 
migration. The Euro-American area could work merely as a political umbrella of 
actions that share common objectives and that are channeled through a wide ar-
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could be reoriented in order to simplify the existing, overlapping mechanisms 
and programs. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Firstly, the incorporation of Spain into the EC in 1986 brought the beginning of a 
European vision for Latin America and the beginning of a process leading to the 
present, complex Euro-Latin-American network of regional and sub-regional 
agreements. The Spanish governments gave shape to the Ibero-American com-
munity; kept the European focus on the region alive by pushing forward the bi-
regional Association Agreements; acted as mediators in regional conflicts; and 
were also able to establish the main criteria for the EU position on issues like 
Cuba, Venezuela, or MERCOSUR. From that perspective, Spanish membership 
has provided the EU with an indispensable conceptual, political and economic 
machinery to deal with an emerging region in the 21st century.  
Secondly, the Ibero-American community should be reinvented in the 
light of the new challenges that the Euro-Latin-American framework is facing 
today in the wake of the financial crisis. The 2010 Spanish EU Presidency 
pushed forward Latin America-EU relations in the political and economic 
spheres, but old schemes of bi-regional cooperation and trade should be re-
vamped.  
Thirdly, due to historical, political and geostrategic reasons, Spain has 
not matched its leverage on LA to its bilateral ties with the US - probably with 
the sole exception of the Transatlantic Agenda signed in Madrid in 1995 - nor has 
it been able yet to forge a renewed US-EU dialogue on LA. The task ahead is one 
of complementing the Ibero-American and Euro-Latin American framework of 
agreements with a new creation: the Euro-American vision. This is challenge that 
requires patient diplomacy and the investment of resources in bilateral Spain-US 
and EU-US dialogues.  
Fourthly, Spain and Europe, the US and the LA region share strong his-
torical, political, economic ties and common values. A seed of “triangulation” is 
developing in parallel with bilateral programs, and today we can speak of a major 
advance in joint cooperation, with a specific agenda. But the centrifugal forces 
put in motion by globalization suggest that the Euro-American project cannot be 
taken for granted and needs political will. Spain should work for the backing of 
not only the Europeans interested in LA, old and new, but rather it also has to 
work hard to coordinate EU policies with the US.  
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Abstract 
 
Until the 2007-2009 Great Recession, how could authoritarian Spain become the 
European Union (EU‘s) shining star? What did it do to defy the demeaning con-
notations of the PIGS acronym reserved for the EU’s Mediterranean members? 
Central to Spain’s transformation from authoritarianism to democracy, 
and from a command economy to a market economy, have been political and 
economic reforms, not just at three level of analysis (national, European, and 
international), but also favoring Spain more than Greece, Portugal, or other sub-
sequent and extant members: (a) nationally where the political stability inherited 
from authoritarianism, the low-cost transition to democracy, and inspiring leader-
ship; (b) at the European level where the easy adjustments to various fiscal, mon-
etary, and currency changes; and (c) globally where the unprecedented U.S. 
growth rate of the 1990s favoring tourism and trade as well as a revival of Latin 
Investment interests. 
  The net results were that Spain’s star shone brighter than that of other 
EU members until the Great Recession, while after that, Spain’s relapse is not far 
worse than other EU members: Unlike Greece and Portugal, Spain’s head-start 
reduce EU’s not-south economic gap, but also unlike the stalled growth of extant 
members, Spain was able to demolish the PIGS caricatures.  
 
 
Puzzle 
 
In December 2010, Spain completed 25 years of being a European Union mem-
ber. It also marked the twentieth summit of the “Iberoamerican Community of 
Nations,” as Spain’s leaders had envisioned from as early as 1981 (Baklanoff, 
1996, 105, but see 105-27). Even as its European and Ibero-American identities 
were maturing, Spain began exploring Asian connections, raising some sort of a 
puzzle as to what mixture of national, European, Latin, or global interests was 
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  The post-Franco Spain that returned to Latin America might be com-
pared to the post-World War I U.S. expatriates in Spain that Ernest Hemingway’s 
The Sun Also Rises highlighted in 1926. Just as the impotent hero of the novel, 
Jake Barnes, compensated for his impotency by finding other lovers for the 
woman he loved (Brett), so too Spain, handicapped by U.S. domination of con-
temporary Latin America, seeks relief through a string of multilateral arrange-
ments with its own Brett—each Latin country. Just as Spain once challenged 
Great Britain in having an empire where the sun would never set, its post-Franco 
Latin indulgences (much like Barnes’s sacrifices for Brett), seek another spot in 
the sun for Spain. Is a “second rising” underway? 
My study explores the balance between the promises (catalysts for a Lat-
in return) and pitfalls (constraints), before drawing some conclusions. Central to 
those conclusions is the idea that, just as Spain sought to look “beyond the nation 
state” in the immediate post-Franco years (Haas, 1964), its search “beyond the 
region” (European Union) today better connects its history with its aspirations 
without sacrificing its europeanness. 
 
Promises: Catalyzing Latin interests 
  
At least seven catalysts of unequal value demand attention. Profiled in Table 1, 
they include: 
 
Table 1: Catalysts of Spain’s Latin return 
 
Explanations:  Promises:
 
1. Showcasing 
Spain’s democratic 
transition 
*Regime-change: democracy for dictatorship; political 
openness (even with its warts), and partisanship 
*Private sector displacing public 
*“Consensus” in exporting partisanship: statism elevated 
2. Responding to 
Latin America’s 
apertura: 
 
3. Exporting eco-
nomic magic: 
*1990s: Golden decade of Spanish investments: largest 
EU investor in 1990s, largest world investor in 1999, 
2000 
*Telefónica, numerous banks, Repsol, Endesa España 
4. Safeguarding 
against domestic 
recessions through 
external engage-
ments: 
 
*1993: catalyzed Spain’s golden decade in Latin invest-
ments 
*2007-10: globalizing Spain’s vision 
5. Leading the Euro-
pean Union into 
*Ibero-Americana summits from 1991
*Madrid May 2010 EU-LAC Summit breaks deadlock in The Sun Rising Twice?                                                                             281 
 
   
Latin America:  farm trade:
*Central American-EU Association Agreement, resump-
tion of EU-MERCOSUR free trade agreement, and EU-
Colombia-Peru comprehensive trade agreement 
6. Challenging the 
United States: 
*Challenge is friendly, not antagonistic
*Became second LA investor after the United States 
*Cuba utilized as a wild card
 
7. Triangulating 
Latin relations: 
*Montobbio’s  Triangulando la Triangulación (2004) 
seeking Spain/EU-Latin America-Asia-Pacific frame-
work 
*Spain as platform for Asian countries and corporations 
keen on La and EU investments and trade
 
 
a.  showcasing Spain’s successful democratic transition; 
b.  responding to Latin America’s apertura; 
c.  exporting Spain’s domestic economic magic; 
d.  seeking external economic safeguards against domestic recessionary 
dips; 
e.  leading the European Union (EU) into Latin America (LA); 
f.  challenging the United States for Latin leadership; and  
g.  triangulating Latin interests with China. 
 
Showcasing Spain’s Successful Democratic Transition 
 
Two political dramas within Spain had LA relevance: regime-change (in Spain’s 
case the shift from Franco’s dictatorship, and the closed system this entailed, 
towards democracy); and private enterprises displacing the public sector to high-
light market-based reforms. Spain’s 1986 EU entry unofficially confirmed that its 
democratic and market-based transitions were proceeding successfully and irre-
versibly. The timing mattered, since Latin countries were simultaneously throw-
ing off authoritarian yokes. Spain found another chance to influence a continent 
it once ruled. 
Consensus displaced partisanship in this outreach. Though the conserva-
tive People’s Party (PP) and the Socialist Party (PSOE) were bitterly divided 
over a wide variety of policy preferences on the domestic front, they did not ro-
bustly or consistently push their positions across Latin America. Leaving parti-
sanship at the water’s edge opened up other opportunities.  
  Spain’s “democratic transition,” Carlos Malamud argues, displaced such 
worldviews as La Hispanidad (the Hispanic world) and Cultura Hispánica (His-
panic culture) of the Franco regime for an “Ibero-American community” (based 
on “history, language, culture and even religion”) (Malamud, 2006, 2). Though 
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“softer” tone meshed with advertising democracy to a continent similarly struc-
tured by dictatorial institutions. From Felipe González, who developed the idea 
of an Ibero-American annual summit in 1981, to the present Prime Minister José 
Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who believes in Latin “democratic consolidation,” 
Spain’s political parties have abided by that consensus, promoting instead a more 
comprehensive  noblesse oblige policy approach. PP’s Jorge Moragas, for in-
stance, spoke of Spain’s foreign policy being “impregnated with Ibero-America,” 
while PSOE’s Miguel Angel Moratinos likewise believed Ibero-Americana “to 
be the natural sphere of [Spain’s] foreign policy” (Malamud, op. cit., 3). This 
orientation was pitched multilaterally (treating all Latin countries symmetrically), 
rather than on a bilateral basis, at least in Malamud’s interpretation. Susan Grati-
us, on the other hand, saw it reflecting a no-policy approach: “. . . Spain does not 
have a Plan for Latin America” (as it does for Africa and Asia), she contends, 
“because Spain thinks of itself as being part of the region” (Gratius, op. cit., 2). 
While the conservative PP Prime Minister José María Aznar “conditioned” his 
approach towards socialist Cuba and PSOE’s Zapatero prefers “unconditional 
engagement,” Aznar showed no qualms meeting Venezuela’s radical Hugo Chá-
vez while Zapatero refrained from pushing fellow socialist traveler, Brazil’s Luíz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, “to forge a bilateral alliance with the aim of bringing stabil-
ity to South America” (ibid., 4). 
  The state benefited more than the party in returning to Latin America, 
and appropriately so: Successful democratic transition as a model and economic 
support as an instrument should ultimately characterize the state rather than the 
party. Although the multilateral Ibero-American view has never been abandoned, 
Spain also concluded sixteen bilateral agreements after 1988—indicating how 
easily sentimental attachments blend with self-interests. Other catalysts of 
Spain’s Latin rejuvenation reaffirmed this. 
 
Responding to Latin American Apertura 
 
Latin America’s simultaneous but independent democratic drift resonated with 
Spain’s interests after its EU entry. In addition to justifying Spain’s role as a 
democratic transition model, as just discussed, and opening economic opportuni-
ties within a neoliberal context, thus cultivating that shared community spirit 
inherent in the Ibero-Americana movement, Spain also capitalized upon an unex-
pected vacuum its EU membership brought: The collapse of the Berlin Wall not 
only shifted Germany’s attention to East Europe at the expense of its new Medi-
terranean members, but also shifted EU attention east to a geographical area 
Spain had less interest in than Latin America. With the momentum of its EU 
membership, Spain almost threw in its lot with Latin America. Fortunately for 
Spain, Latin countries were in the mood to listen. 
  Sebastian Edwards, who has studied Latin America’s opening very close-
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decade) was uniform and deep (Edwards, 1995, ch. 5). In part this was necessi-
tated by the conditions of borrowing bail-out money: the 1982 Brady and 1989 
Baker plans made privatization, liberalization, and multilateral membership the 
sine qua non of the bail-outs. Table 2 conveys the nature and degree of the Latin 
opening that awaited Spain: With the exception of Mexican non-tariff barriers, 
there was a wholesome reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers for all coun-
tries. Meant to promote trade within the Americas, these reductions opened space 
for post-Franco Spain to explore, but as would transpire, with investments spear-
heading this LA penetration over trade, Spain ended up losing a stride or two in 
any leadership competition with the United States. 
 
Table 2: Latin openness, 1980s-90s 
 
Countries: Tariff  Protection: 
           1985                      1991-2  
Non-tariff Protection: 
          1985-7                       1991-2 
1. Argentina:              28.0                         15.0               31.9                            8.0 
2. Bolivia:              20.0                           8.0               25.0                            0.0 
3. Brazil:              80.0                         21.0               35.3                          10.0 
4. Chile:              36.0                         11.0               10.1                            0.1 
5. Costa Rica:              92.0                         16.0                 0.8                            0.0 
6. Colombia:              83.0                           6.7               73.2                            1.0 
7. Guatemala:              50.0                         19.0                 7.4                            6.0 
8. Mexico:              34.0                           4.0               12.7                          20.0        
9. Nicaragua:              54.0                            ---               27.8                             --- 
10. Paraguay:              71.7                         16.0                 9.9                            0.0 
11. Peru:              64.0                         15.0               53.4                            0.0 
12. Uruguay:              32.0                         12.0               14.1                            0.0 
13. Venezuela:              30.0                         17.0               44.1                             5.0 
 
 
Source: Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America: From Despair 
to Hope (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, for the World Bank), 126. 
 
Latin America not only bristled with free-trade agreements at this juncture, but 
also flirted openly with the United States. Table 3 indicates 16 of them, while 
Table 4 points out how intra-regional trade expanded for all countries except 
Chile (which traded more with Europe), Costa Rica (also a high European trade 
partner), Mexico (trade increasingly concentrated on the United States), and 
Venezuela (petroleum exports to diversified markets). For more than a majority 
of these countries, the United States was the largest trading partner, complicating 
Spain’s return, especially when the United States vigorously sought Latin free 
trade agreements (ultimately to converge into the Free Trade Area of the Ameri-
cas whose origin lay in President George H.W. Bush’s June 1990 Enterprise for 
the Americas Initiative, through which he hoped to bring all of the Western Hem-
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Table 3: Free trade agreements by Latin countries 
 
 
 
Agreements: Year: 
*Andean Trade Preference Act: 1991 
*Chile-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: 1993 
*Chile-Mexico Free Trade Agreement: 1991 
*Chile-Venezuela Free Trade Agreement: 1993 
*Colombia-Venezuela Free Trade Agreement: 1992 
*El Salvador-Guatemala Free Trade Agreement: 1992 
*North American Free Trade Agreement: 1992 
*Group of Three (Colombia-Mexico-Venezuela Free Trade 
Agreement): 
1993 
*Costa Rica-Mexico Free Trade Agreement: 1994 
* Mexico-Central America Free Trade Agreement: 1992 
*Venezuela-Central America Free Trade Agreement: 1992 
*Nueva Ocotepeque Agreement (El Salvador, Guatemala, Hondu-
ras): 
1992 
*MERCOSUR:  1991 
*CARICOM:  1991 
*CARICOM-Venezuela Free Trade Agreement: 1993 
* Colombia-Central America Free Trade Agreement: 1993 
 
Source: Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America: From 
Despair to Hope (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, for the World 
Bank), 143-7. 
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Table 4: Latin intra-regional trade 
 
Countries:  1970: 1980: 1993: 
1. Argentina:  21.1  23.8 37.3
2. Bolivia:  9.7  36.7 44.6
3. Brazil:  11.8  18.1 22.9
4. Chile:  12.2  24.3 18.5
5. Colombia:  10.5  17.6 24.8
6. Costa Rica:  23.9  35.0 16.5
7. Mexico:  9.8  6.9 4.9
8. Peru:  6.5  21.2 21.7
9. Uruguay:  12.8  37.3 45.7
10. Venezuela:  33.5  22.2 30.3
 
Source: Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America: From Despair 
to Hope (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, for the World Bank), 148. 
 
 
Spain, instead, concentrated upon demonstrating (a) democratization; (b) liberali-
zation; and (c) regionalizing arrangements, emphasizing culture and investment. 
Only the United States could match Spain in each of these at the least. While 
another section addresses Spain’s U.S. challenge in Latin America, suffice to say 
here Spain’s LA re-entry (a) offered an alternative to the United States in case 
any Latin country was interested; (b) diluted U.S. presence and influence some-
what, and particularly since, until then, the Organization of  American States 
(OAS) was the monolithic multilateral platform for Latin countries, whether they 
sincerely believed in its mission or not; (c) gave Spain a frontal exposure to hard-
core competition at the individual level, rather than as part of a group, such as the 
European Union; and (d) paved the way for the subsequent EU entry into Latin 
America. Obviously not filled with roses, Spain’s LA return nevertheless (a) 
elevated its stature as an economic and democratic model; (b) exposed it as the 
gatekeeper of Europe and EU’s entry into Latin America; (c) placed it on track to 
become a global player; and (d) clarified both its role and mission in a new era. 
For a vast majority of countries, and certainly for Spain during the Franco inter-
regnum, these were simply impossible expectations. 
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Exporting its Domestic Economic Magic 
  
Even though Spain embraced a market economy through its 1979-82 economic 
plan and benefited hugely from the EC’s “harmonization fund,” it still took three 
devaluations during 1992-3 to put growth on an irreversible track (“Spain . . . ,” 
n.d.). As if complementing its successful democratic transition, Spain began what 
became a prolonged spell of growth backed by a construction boom (helped no 
less by government deregulations permitting vast public sector communications 
infrastructures, such as the high-speed Madrid-Seville railway, airports, and 
highways). As Table 5 shows, between 1980 and 2010, Spain’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth rate turned negative only in the recession years (1981, 
1993, 2009, and 2010), and though unemployment increased in 14 of the 30 
years, the three prolonged spells of unemployment decrease (1986-90, 1995-
2001, and 2004-7) encouraged foreign adventures: It was during the 1986-90 
period, when Spain joined the EU, that the details of the 1991 Ibero-Americana 
Summit were finalized; the 1995-2001 phase coincided with what Ramón Casilda 
Béjar called the golden decade (Casilda Béjar, 2002), when Spain became “the 
foremost European investor [in Latin America] during the entire decade of the 
1990s” and “the world’s largest foreign investor in Latin America during both 
1999 and 2000” (“Was . . . ,” 2003); and the 2004-7 phase conveyed how Spain’s 
European/Iberian economic circumference was broadening to the global level 
through a China-based triangulation. 
 
Table 5: Spain’s G.D.P. growth & unemployment rates, 1980-2010 
 
 
Year: 
GDP 
growth (in 
constant 
prices) 
 
% change 
 
Unemployment 
 
% change 
1980  1.203    11.011  
1981  -0.408  -133.92 13.755 24.92 
1982  1.239  -403.68 15.77 14.65 
1983  1.652  33.33 17.215 9.16 
1984  1.698  2.78 19.937 15.81 
1985  2.362  39.1 21.305 6.86 
1986  3.432  45.3 20.907 -1.87 
1987  5.709  66.35 20.223 -3.27 
1988  5.285  -7.43 19.238 -5.81 
1989  5.004  -5.32 17.24 -10.39 
1990  3.847  -23.12 16.238 -581 
1991  2.525  -34.36 16.313 0.46 
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1993  -1.314  -254.41 22.118 23.36 
1994  2.335  -277.7 24.118 23.36 
1995  4.122  76.53 22.9 -5.05 
1996  2.421  -41.27 22.08 -3.58 
1997  3.865  59.64 20.61 -6.66 
1998  4.469  15.63 18.605 -9.73 
1999  4.745  6.18 15.64 -15.94 
2000  5.053  6.49 13.873 -11.30 
2001  3.645  -27.86 10.553 -23.93 
2002  2.704  -25.82 11.475 8.74 
2003  3.098  14.57 11.48 0.04 
2004  3.267  5.46 10.97 -4.44 
2005  3.615  10.65 9.16 -16.5 
2006  4.017  11.12 8.513 -7.06 
2007  3.572  -11.08 8.263 -2.94 
2008  0.864  -75.81 11.327 37.08 
2009  -3.7222  -530.79 18.01 59.00 
2010  -0.345  -90.73 19.9  10.49 
 
Sources: Central Intelligence Agency, “Spain GDP: Real growth rate,” World Factbook,  December 
2010, from: http://www.indexmundi.com/spain/gdp_real_growth_rate.html; and ----------, “Spain 
unemployment rate,” December 2010, from: 
http://www.indexmundi.com/spain/unemployment_rate.html 
 
One consequence of externalizing Spain’s domestic economic growth was the 
scramble of many corporations to expand foreign assets. Latin countries fell in 
line almost automatically, indicating, from the bilateral nature of corporate ac-
tions, that, though multilateral Ibero-America was a useful and integrative politi-
cal slogan, to really tango, bilateral deals were better. Telefoníca led the way. 
Even before the golden decade ended, it purchased large shares in Argentina 
(Sintelar=25 per cent and Telefónica de Argentina=19.38), Brazil (CRT=35, Em-
bratel=20, Telesp=65, Telesp Celular=38, and Tele SudesteCelular=75), Chile 
(CTC=43.6 and Publiguías=51), Colombia (Codelco=31), El Salvador (IN-
TEL=51), Guatemala (Telefónica de Guatemala), and Peru (CPT=35, Entel Pe-
ru=35) (Toral, 2001, 20). Robust and sustained deregulation permitted this out-
reach while also rejuvenating a neophyte private sector. 
  Banks from Spain also sought Latin partners, such as Bank Argentaria 
(in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and across Central America), 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Pana-
ma, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela), Banco Central Hispano-Americano (in Ar-
gentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay), and 
Banco de Santander (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uru-
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borrowed by the Anglo-Australian BHP Billiton mining company, while Banco 
Bilbao Vizcaya (BBV) Argentina is one of the financiers of a liquid natural gas 
plant in Mexico for firms from Japan, South Korea, and Mexico (Schaefer 
Muñoz & Bjork, 2010). Out of nowhere, BBVA now ranks 34
th in global debt 
capital and 77
th in global deal-advisory. 
  Other corporations also sought Latin subidiaries: Endesa (in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela) and Repsol (in Argentina, Chile, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, and Venezuela) (Toral, op. cit., 22). Endesa, for 
instance, purchased a majority shareholding of Chile’s Enersis in 1999, while 
Repsol, Spain’s oil giant, swallowed Argentina’s YPF for U.S.$13.5 billion—
Spain’s largest Latin investment until that time. Though Argentina’s financial 
collapse doomed this investment, other franchises from Spain were still attracted, 
including Zara, the clothing company, while LA infrastructural developments 
also wooed investors in Spain (for example, port construction in Chile, and the 
U.S.$320 million IberdrolaIngeníera co-generation power plant in Salamanca 
City, Mexico). In short, Spanish investment exploded in the golden decade, aver-
aging U.S.$9.7 billion each year until 2000, when it actually hit $20 billion. Just 
two years earlier, whereas U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America 
was $14.3 billion, Spain’s was $11.3 billion. Not only that, Spain also sought to 
diversify its investments beyond former colonies. Brazil fitted in, and invest-
ments there spiraled from $112 million in 1996 to $6 billion in 1998 (Faiola, 
2008). 
 The  latinization of Spanish capital was incredible. For example, 51 per 
cent of BBVA’s investments was in Latin America, 46 per cent for Repsol, 43 per 
cent for Santander, 35 per cent for Telefónica de España (which spent $100 bil-
lion in Latin America), 23 per cent for Endesa, and 16 per cent for Iberdrola. 
Argentina’s financial collapse at the turn of the century dented Spain’s 
presence and investments, but did not result in any large-scale retreat. In fact, 
since it coincided with Spain’s Asian shift, it lubricated that shift. Spain contin-
ued to make Latin financial waves (with short-term interests driving out long-
term considerations). 
  On the basis of its Latin inroads, Spain also qualifies as a “surrogate 
market.” Rajarshi Aroskar, who posits this argument, explains Spain to be “an 
excellent alternative to investment in Latin American markets” because (a) the 
reduced costs of investment since the number of investments is fewer; (b) Spain’s 
developed market reducing risks; (c) market accessibility due to the reduction of 
restrictions; and (d) the opportunity to diversity operations (Aroskar, 2007, 99). 
Not only have Spain’s Latin investments begun to boomerang back on Spain, and 
positively at that, but they have also weathered financial storms, like the Argen-
tinian crisis. As the second largest foreign investor in Latin America by the mid-
1990s, after the United States, Spain found a foothold many other EU members 
have vainly sought for far longer. 
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Seeking External Safeguards against Domestic Recession 
 
Since Spain’s Ibero-American adventure began in the early 1990s, the country 
has faced two fairly significant recessions. The first was in 1993, the second be-
ginning in 2007 and still ripe in 2011. One can easily contend that the first reces-
sion dovetailed Spain’s Latin interest, at the least, and in fact, catalyzed engage-
ment in that playground, at the most. The second only intensified Spain’s Ibero-
American search for a Latin solution to its domestic problems. In both instances, 
paraphrasing E. H. Carr, the “new world” came in to salvage the “old” (Carr, 
1965).  
  Returning to Table 5, we note the deleterious effects of the two reces-
sions. The negative 1993 growth rate (-1.314 per cent) led to the sharpest GDP 
decline (-254.41) since the 1981-2 recession (-403.68), only to be overtaken by 
the 1994 tumble (-277.7). We also note how unemployment for the two years 
was among the worst for Spain (22.118 per cent and 24.118) since Franco’s ten-
ure. Similarly for the ongoing recession: Though 2007 registered a respectable 
3.57 per cent growth rate, the free-fall from 2008 (0.864 in 2008, -3.722 in 2009, 
and -0.345 in 2010 GDP) was mirrored by unemployment figures climbing rapid-
ly from 8.263 per cent in 2007 to 11.327 in 2008, 18.01 in 2009 and 19.9 in 
2010. 
  Latin America came to the rescue, but not necessarily through a Latin 
initiative. We observed previously how exporting Spain’s economic miracle to 
Latin American countries had taken off at about the time of the first recession. 
Though Spain’s golden decade of overseas investment did not alone bring the 
country out of its recession, it softened the pain. This is not to argue the recession 
alone catalyzed Spain’s renewed Latin interest: the Ibero-American summits 
serve as a more credible catalyst. Nevertheless, the 1993 recession, more than the 
2007-10 counterpart, indicated how looking beyond the EU has its advantages for 
member countries: Without Latin engagements, Spain’s recovery might have 
been seriously slowed. 
  This lesson proved useful during the 2007-10 recession. Even though 
Latin America is no longer as fertile for Spain’s engagement as the 1993 reces-
sion found it to be, Spain seems to be looking beyond not just the European Un-
ion but also Latin America today: It has plans in Asia which were hardly there in 
1993; and as a subsequent section will elaborate, some of those Asian plans bear 
directly upon Latin America, with Spain serving, in the words of its current 
prime minister, Zapatero, as a “bridge” (for Asian agencies not just to Latin 
America, but also the European Union)  
  Fortunately for Spain, many of the major Latin countries did not face 
recessionary pressures of the same degree on both occasions: In 1993, with the 
possible exception of Mexico, they were heaving a sigh of relief from exiting the 
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verity of recession faced in many parts of West Europe (and North America). 
Here again, Carr’s comment of the “new world” rescuing the “old” applies. 
 
Leading EU into Latin America: 
 
Spain has endeavored “to bring Latin America back to the forefront of the EU 
foreign affairs agenda,” even though Latin America is generally “not a priority of 
the EU” (Gratius, op. cit., 1). Nevertheless, as Malamud succinctly observes: 
“Having European ties and a European identity strengthens Spain’s role in Latin 
America, while having Latin American ties and a Latin American identity 
strengthens Spain’s role in the EU” (Malamud, op. cit., 4). 
  Through the Ibero-Americana summits, advertised no less through King 
Juan Carlos’s 1991 encuentro  reference (Blázquez Vilaplana, 2004, 109-32), 
Spain dragged the EU into Latin America; and though the interests of both varied 
(oftentimes sharply), major institutional innovations were made. Table 6 profiles 
these. 
 
Table 6: Ibero-American summits & institutional innovations 
 
Phases:  Institutional Innovations of the Ibero-American Summits: 
Phase 1 
 (1991-5): 
*Heads-of-government meetings
*5-country coordination committee
Phase 2 
(1995-9): 
*Cooperation Convention (Bariloche Convention) 
*National Coordinators meetings institutionalized 
*Cooperation managers meetings institutionalized 
 
Phase 3 
(1999-2003): 
*Permanent Coordination body established at Havanna 
(1999) 
*Protocol to the Cooperation Convention signed (creating 
Secretariat for Ibero-Americana summits—SECIB, with 
Spain providing 80 percent of the funds)
Phase 4 
(2003-7): 
*General Secretariat for Ibero-Americana (SEGIB) estab-
lished, an Aznar initiative, and headquartered in Madrid 
Phase 5 
(2007- ): 
*EU-Central American Association Agreement
*EU-LAC (Latin American and Caribbean) summitry 
*CAN (Andean Community of Nations) summitry 
  
Source: Carlos Malamud, “Spain’s policy and strategies towards Latin America,” FOCAL: Cana-
dian Foundation for the Americas (June 2006): 10. 
 
Spain’s golden decade in South America proved to be some sort of a nadir for the 
European Union in Latin America. At stake was the EU’s Common Market Or-
ganisation for Bananas (CMOB) preferences for bananas from, among others, 
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American exporters (which are). Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, on 
the one hand, and Colombia, Nicaragua, and Panama, on the other (in chronolog-
ical order of expressing concerns), lodged complaints against the European Un-
ion at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1993 and 1996. The United States 
became involved since some of the largest banana companies, such as Dole, were 
from the United States. In September 1997, the WTO charged the European Un-
ion for being “inconsistent” with its tariff applications, and authorized the United 
States in April 1999 and Ecuador in May 2000 to apply sanctions, prompting the 
European Union to withdraw its quotas in April 2001, leaving only tariffs in 
place. As the European Union added more tariffs in January 2005, inter-regional 
relations soured, producing more WTO complaints and WTO rulings against the 
EU (twice in 2005) (“EU-Latin . . . ,” n.d.). 
Spain’s intervention helped. Its EU State Secretary, Diego López Gar-
rido, announced a “strategic association” between the two regions on May 14, 
2010, with four components: (a) enhance relations with Mexico; (b) develop 
innovation and development plans with Chile; (c) formulate an Association 
Agreement with Central America; and (d) resume relations and negotiations be-
tween the European Union and MERCOSUR. At the Madrid May 2010 EU-Latin 
America-Caribbean (EU-LAC) summit lowered banana tariffs and led to the first 
inter-regional agreement—between the European Union and Central America. 
Although EU quotas were introduced for Central American rice and beef, EU and 
MERCOSUR countries, encouraged by the agreement, resumed negotiations that 
had sputtered from 1999 (even though MERCOSUR strongly opposes beef quo-
tas) (Sutter, 2010). Although the Central American-EU deal is an Association 
Agreement, it “relaunched” EU-MERCOSUR free trade agreement and the EU-
Colombia-Peru comprehensive trade agreement talks. 
These were not surprising elements. In 2008, the European Union was 
MERCOSUR’s largest trading partner, accounting for 20.7 per cent of MER-
COSUR trade and MERCOSUR accounting for 2.7 per cent of EU trade in 2009. 
While the European Union was the largest farm market for MERCOSUR, it was 
also the largest MERCOSUR investor. Broader still, during 2009, Latin America 
exported Euro71 billion of goods to the European Union and imported 63.4 bil-
lion of goods from the European Union, while Euro19 billion of services were 
exported and 28 billion were imported in that same year—doubling the 21
st Cen-
tury trade value almost overnight (European Commission, 2010). 
The Ibero-American summits, though focused on Latin America, also 
look beyond. They are organized by the Ibero-American Community of Nations, 
an institution evolving from 1981. On the one hand, this Spanish initiative, in-
vites Portugal and thereby its prize Latin claim—Brazil. On the other, Spain’s 
non-Latin historical claims, such as Equatorial Guinea and the Philippines, joined 
as “associate” members in 2009, while Belize and Timor seem keen on joining. 
Other than Spain and Portugal, there are 20 Latin countries, and of the 20 annual 
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(twice for each), while Spain is set to host its third—the 2012 summit in Cadiz—
indicating its serious leadership search. Even though Zapatero was absent in the 
2010 Mar del Plata Ibero-American Summit (as too Hugo Chávez for reasons of 
a national weather-related calamity, and not for being scolded by King Carlos 
two years earlier), there was no denying a robust Ibero-American platform had 
emerged: Together, the various countries supported Argentina in the Malvinas 
dispute with Great Britain, and urged the United States to comply with the 19 
U.N. General Assembly resolutions to end its blockade against Cuba, reaffirming 
Spain’s 1999 Havanna initiative of resolving the Cuba-U.S. dispute. 
Through these summits, the Ibero-American movement is being steadily 
institutionalized, as Table 6 had indicated. While a Permanent Coordination body 
was established in Havanna in 1999, Spain’s Prime Minister Aznar’s proposal to 
establish a General Secretariat for Ibero-Americana (SEGIB) was accepted, with 
it being headquartered in Madrid. Earlier a Secretariat for Ibero-American Sum-
mits (SECIB) was also created by the Protocol to the Cooperation Convention. 
While Spain provided 80 per cent of the funds for these summits, regional offices 
opened up in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Spain, Mexico, and Peru, 
there are field offices in Chile, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. 
In turn, the Ibero-Americana summits spawned yet other regular sum-
mits: EU-LAC, CAN (Andean Community of Nations), while concerted efforts 
were made, unsuccessfully thus far, at aligning the European Union with MER-
COSUR.   Ultimately, none of these institutions and interests would have 
evolved without Spain’s intermediary role. Even as EU expansion shifted atten-
tion to Central and East Europe, Spain’s relentless Latin engagements eventually 
culminated in the May 2010 Madrid Summit of the Latin and European worlds. 
  At least three factors stand out: the European Union’s preference for 
bilateral agreements as opposed to Spain’s multilateral; its more rational LA 
approach than sentimental; and its greater toleration of Brazil, as opposed to 
Spain’s rivalry with a country that was not only not a part of Spain’s colonial 
system, but also a keen competitor in becoming the eighth largest economy in the 
world. 
 
Challenging the United States in Latin America 
 
Spain’s Latin interests may be responsible for its mixed relations with the United 
States: On the one hand, it coat-tails the United States into Latin America, free-
riding on the security created and defended by the United States during the Cold 
War and through the OAS; and on the other, it competes with U.S. investments in 
the continent, while also challenging, through the Ibero-Americana system, the 
OAS pre-eminence as the most representative LA forum.  
That domestic partisanship did not feed into, and has not exploited, 
Spain-U.S. relations suggests the challenge to be more friendly than antagonistic. 
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ment in the war on terrorism (such as sending combat troops to Iraq) was not 
popular in Latin America, but since it was only to be expected of the PP philo-
sophical orientation, Latin countries could live with it. Zapatero’s retreat from 
the Iraq war, similarly, neither disrupted relations with the United States nor was 
it utilized to win political capital in Latin America. 
  Nevertheless, Zapatero has not shied from playing into typical Latin sen-
timents about the United States. His usage of the Ibero-American summits as a 
vehicle of explicit anti-U.S. positions curries well with the socialist countries in 
Latin America, in turn, taking him closer to unifying Latin American countries 
than Aznar could. Like Aznar, however, Zapatero remains a stout supporter of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, even while playing the Latin sentimental 
card. 
  In the final analysis, with Spanish threatening to become a second U.S. 
language, in addition to the growing Hispanic influences in that country, Spain 
has no reason to shy from the implications these entail: They would feed into the 
idea of world leadership that Spain was divorced from in the 1898 defeat to the 
United States, resulting in the loss of two key colonies: Cuba and the Philippines. 
  This defeat is a more recent Spanish memory than Spain’s loss of its 
Latin American colonies to independence movements earlier in the same century. 
Its LA return provides an opportunity, under more favorable circumstances, of 
keeping up that friendly U.S. challenge. In addition to slowly inducing Cuba to 
eventually democratize by virtue of its Ibero-American summit participation, 
Spain hopes to use Cuba as an instrument not only against the United States, but 
also one pried back from the United States. 
 
Triangulating Latin America with China: 
 
China increasingly intertwines with Spain’s post-EU and extra-EU interests: It 
provides that global context within which memories of Spain’s lost leadership 
becomes meaningful, while at the same time adding another instrument in nar-
rowing the gap with the United States. Above all, it is willing to let Spain be the 
“bridge” to Latin America, if not to the rest of the European Union. Triangulation 
is the name of the game: a China-Spain-Latin American triangular framework to 
displace a China-U.S.-Latin American counterpart. Though a Chinese insistence 
today, the term originated in Spain and reflected Spain’s interest and inclinations 
from much earlier. 
Klaus Bodeman, who has researched the triangulation policy approach 
thoroughly on behalf of the European Union, traces the term’s intellectual origin 
to Spain’s Special Ambassador Manuel Montobbio’s December 2004 Triangu-
lando la Tringulación: España/Europa-América Latina-Asia Pacifico. In terms 
of policy-making, Spain had adopted an Asia-Pacific Framework Plan in 2000, 
while Casa de América in Madrid and Casa Asia in Barcelona had triangulated 
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Bodeman posits six global-level changes necessitating a triangulation policy for 
Spain: (a) increased dynamics of multilateral cooperation at the regional level; 
(b) LAC diversifying its foreign relations to Asia, creating a South-South frame-
work bypassing Spain; (c) the end of the Cold War inducing a phase of self-
assessment in both Europe and Latin America; (d) Europe not having a counter-
part to the Washington Consensus; (e) the growth of trading blocs in both Europe 
and the Americas; and (f) the LAC inability to enter any European foreign policy 
priority list (Bodeman, 2008, 15-23). 
  That Spain could respond to these, and thereby induce the European Un-
ion to shift its own policy orientation, propelled Montobbio to cast his triangula-
tion thesis in terms of three environments and two contexts, as Table 7 indicates. 
 
Table 7:  Dimensions behind Spain’s triangulation policy approach 
 
Dimensions: Relevance for Spain:
Environments: 
a.  economic 
b.  political 
c.  cultural 
 
Contexts: 
a. development coopera-
tion: 
b.  communication me-
dia 
 
a.  invite Asian companies targeting EU and 
LAC to Spain 
b.  pursue both bilateral and multilateral tri-
angulation strategies 
c.  spread the Spanish language in Asia-
Pacific 
 
 
a.  Spain’s infrastructure in LA could help 
Asian companies 
 
b. prevent market failures for Asian corpora-
tions through insufficient information: Spain 
could bridge that gap
 
Spain serves not only Chinese interests and inclinations, but also Korean. Given 
China’s long-term attraction to Latin American raw materials and markets, Spain 
finds the opportunity to lubricate the pathways. On the one hand, it helps the 
Chinese to learn the dominant Latin language: Spanish. On the other, it makes 
available all kinds of capital Chinese and Korean firms might need in Latin 
America. On a third front, Spain also becomes the platform for Chinese, Korean, 
and other Asian countries and corporations keen on EU investments and trade. 
  In addition to making Spain more of a necessary Latin player, this trian-
gulation is also helping Spain look more closely at other distant parts of the 
world, such as Asia. In 2002, Zapatero developed an Asia Policy Framework, 
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than the value it represents: It provides Spain a viable alternative, not just to the 
European Union of which it is a salient member, but also to the Latin continent 
with which its sentimental attachment is turning materialistic. Asian connections 
help reincarnate Spain as a global player. 
 
Pitfalls: Speed-bumps rather than road-blocs 
 
Though Spain went charging into Latin America from the 1990s, have two dec-
ades of experiences tempered the initial enthusiasm? The answer cannot be “no” 
since Spain is still intensively and extensively engaged in 2011. The original 
glamour is not there as hopes mesh with realities, but the apparent shortcomings 
represent speed-bumps more than road-blocs: They both double-check against 
hasty and imprudent action and also alert the country of other possibilities. Table 
8 profiles them, with discussions below in the same order. 
 
Table 8: Pitfalls complicating Spain’s Latin return 
 
Explanations:  Pitfalls:
1. Showcasing 
Spain’s democratic 
transition: 
*The United States was more influential on this front 
since it was associated with the bail-out programs: 1989 
Enterprise of the Americas Initiative of George H.W. 
Bush
2. Responding to 
Latin America’s 
apertura: 
*Involved exposure to Latin economic fluctuations, such 
as Argentina 
*Public perception of a Spanish “reconquest”  
3. Exporting eco-
nomic magic: 
*Developed-developing country syndrome activated 
*Trade too low 
4. Safeguarding 
against domestic 
recessions through 
external engage-
ments: 
 
*Could run  into boom-bust cycle given Latin America’s 
more frequent business fluctuations 
5. Leading the Euro-
pean Union into 
Latin America: 
*Agriculture the Achilles Heel
*Harmonizing Spain’s interests with the EU’s 
6. Challenging the 
United States: 
*Lose-lose possibility if pushed too far
7. Triangulating 
Latin relations: 
*Slippery slope given China’s self-help foreign economic 
policy approach
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Showcasing Spain’s Democratic Transition 
  
Two problems may have arisen with Spain’s democratic demonstration effect: (a) 
the United States makes an equally valid claim, if not more, as the source of Lat-
in democratization, thus unnecessarily compounding a stable bilateral relation 
with Spain; and (b) not many Latin countries have been able to replicate Spain’s 
more fluent transition, and those that have (Costa Rica) do not trace the transfor-
mation to Spain. 
  On the one hand, as part of his New World Order, President George 
H.W. Bush not only raised the democracy banner for Latin countries, but also 
witnessed the independent growth of democracy-minded, technocratic, and 
youthful leaders seeking regime-change. Noticing this at the 1989 Cartagena 
Summit to discuss drug-trafficking problems, he was motivated in June 1990 to 
propose the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative on that basis, getting the ball of 
democracy promotion rolling even before the first Ibero-American summit had 
convened. This is not to say his vision prevailed; but that it modified Spain’s 
approach there can be no doubt. If Latin democracy persists a generation or more 
(the time generally needed for institutions to mature and become irreversible) 
(Huntington, 2006), both Spain and the United States can share, rather than seek 
individual, credit. In fact, since only a democratic regime can meet the Washing-
ton Consensus expectations, the instrumental edge belongs to the United States. 
  On the other hand, over those two decades of Ibero-American summitry, 
some Latin countries have deviated, not just from Spain’s trajectory, but also 
U.S. expectations. It is not the antipathy of the leftist resurgence in Bolivia, Bra-
zil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, among other countries, but the underly-
ing issues of indigenous accommodation, inequality reduction, or environmental 
protection are not the issues Spain (or the United States) can serve as a model for. 
Indeed, that democracy still remains fragile in some Latin countries (all Central 
American countries, except Costa Rica, for example) or threatens governmental 
breakdown (Argentina or Mexico), suggests Spain’s irreversible experience did 
not go the full circle across Latin America. While a “democratic clause” was 
adopted at Mar del Plata (no membership without democratic credentials), Zapa-
tero’s absence was significant since the kind of democracy viable in Latin coun-
tries may be an issue better left to Latin Americans than Spaniards. The OAS’s 
democratic clause carries more mileage, at least by virtue of precedence. 
 
Responding to Latin America’s apertura: 
Two problems related to Latin America’s apertura bedevil Spain’s Latin return: 
(a) Spain could itself get infected by economic fluctuations, and thereby instabil-
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sistance than welfare among the public, since this time around, democratic Latin 
countries have more of a voice to express perceived concerns. 
  Argentina’s post-2000 economic free-fall first indicated how Spain could 
be negatively impacted: Investors responsible for Spain’s golden decade in Latin 
American were sufficiently hit by this meltdown as to think twice before continu-
ing with open-ended, cut-throat operations, and this could become contagious if 
other Latin countries were similarly disposed. In the final analysis, such an out-
come would compel Spain to bail sinking Latin economies out the way the Unit-
ed States did in the 1980s. Would Spain be able to follow through given its own 
current recession and EU obligations/constraints? It is hard to say for sure, but 
conventional wisdom suggests that only the United States would do it again since 
Latin American has been more a vital interest of the United States for far longer 
than it has been for Spain. Consciously aware of this, Latin countries do not have 
any plans to sever U.S. relations. 
  Besides, if bad turned to worse, and Latin countries cannot deliver ele-
vated expectations, the fall-out would damage Spain’s presence and pre-
eminence across the Western hemisphere. Of course, this is also true of the Unit-
ed States, but the United States seems to have weathered more unfavorable Latin 
weather and survived. Whether Spain can do the same when it is not a contiguous 
Latin neighbor is to open a question eliciting only negative answers. 
  Simultaneously, the public has not been swept by Spain’s resurgence. 
Protests in Chile accompanied the huge Spanish investments during the late 
1990s. Disputes have also arisen which could shift from the legal domain into 
nationalism-generating excuses. For example, Spain complained in 2009 to the 
International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) over 
Mexico stalling the inauguration of the toxic waste disposal plant in Zimapán 
funded by Spain. Public protests became nationalistic very rapidly, as one might 
expect when a developing country confronts a developed counterpart, thus 
thwarting legal procedures, souring relations, and leaving poor taste behind. The-
se long-term possibilities of short-sighted current action may form the basis of 
the most underlying lesson Spain can learn from Latin countries if it seeks to play 
for the long haul. 
 
Exporting Economic Magic 
  
Spain’s golden decade blatantly exposed two evergreen problems: (a) the asym-
metrical developed-developing country syndrome just mentioned, constraining 
the expected benefits from routine transactions; and (b) overemphasis on invest-
ment at the expense of trade. 
  Being located in the U.S. sphere of influence has made Latin countries 
very sensitive about developed-developing country dynamics (as the emergence 
of the dependencia school of thought in the 1950s indicated) (Prebisch, 1950; ----
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could easily spark public reaction, as just alluded to, but an outcome Spanish 
firms (like any other firms) can only know a posteriori. Since constructing social 
capital in a competition-based free-market economy typically falls behind con-
structing economic capital, Spain’s LA investors may need to measure LA social 
temperatures more seriously, both before and during their engagements.  
  What has been equally hard in Spain-LA economic relations is the rela-
tive absence of trade as a determining factor—even as a routine factor. Trade 
exchanges between Spain, on the one hand, and the typical Latin country, on the 
other, have been pathetically low, as too the European Union’s aggregate trade 
exchanges with Latin countries. Although the proportion of trade between 
Spain/EU and LA countries is increasing, many countries have too sticky policy-
making feet to drift from the United States (such as Mexico), which remains the 
largest trading partner for many Latin countries, and especially in the wake of the 
several free-trade agreements concluded. Trade exchanges have the capacity to 
soften the developed-developing investment asymmetry: They add more to the 
national pie than they subtract, and the vested groups generated can play a more 
positive role than negative. Since a lot of Latin exports remain primary products 
while imports tend to be secondary products—itself the source of what the de-
pendencia school called structural inequality—the trade arena contains automatic 
thorns that must first be blunted. 
 
Safeguarding Against Domestic Recessions 
 
Safeguarding against domestic recessions is not a sufficient reason for Spain to 
renew its Latin interests. As previously observed, the tendency of more economic 
fluctuations across Latin America (or in any one Latin country) does not augur 
well for Spain: It could end up exchanging its investors for those fluctuations. 
Opening foreign investment to safeguard against domestic downturns necessi-
tates safeguarding those investments themselves—not so much against local 
opposition to those investments per se, but from local problems generated by 
those investments, such as environmental insensitivity (which would then rico-
chet back home), or not building up social capital.  
 
Leading the European Union into Latin America 
  
As was obvious over the past two decades, leading the European Union into Lat-
in America spawned at least two problems: (a) reconciling agriculture; and (b) 
harmonizing Spain’s interests with the European Union. 
  One yardstick to measure the success of leading the European Union into 
Latin America could be the adoption of an EU-MERCOSUR free trade agree-
ment. This has been stalled/stumped from the late 1990s by agricultural trade: 
Led by France and several East European countries (and sometimes also Spain), 
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tionalized. Rice and beef have become the key impediments, but until May 2010, 
Central American bananas also faced the same deadlock. Though this Central 
American dispute was somehow resolved (even then patchily, since Central 
American beef and rice continue to face EU quotas), settling similar disputes 
with MERCOSUR could prove more uphill, especially when Spain and Brazil 
have behaved more adamantly against each other (as global competitors). 
  Until the May 2010 Madrid EU-LAC Summit, Spain also had a difficult 
time getting the European Union on board its LA interests, or at least get on the 
same LA wavelength. Spain cannot assume EU interest convergence since the 
European Union has multiple interests and spheres of influence, all of them in 
constant flux, and tides may flow as much away from Spain (as they did in the 
1990s) as toward it (as in 2010). 
 
Challenging the United States in Latin America 
 
Spain can chip away at U.S. advantages or U.S. search for LA leadership, but to 
challenge the United States more formally could prove disastrous for both, more 
so for Spain than the United States since it carries far less economic weight and 
is geographically less diversified. Though Spain’s presence eases Latin depend-
ence on the United States, it would be a leap of faith to expect Spain to become 
an alternative to or a replacement for the United States: One reason why Spain 
could come so close to matching U.S. foreign direct investment in Latin America 
was not so much U.S. rivalry as the emigration of U.S. FDI, particularly to Chi-
na, at the end of the 20
th Century. 
  In addition, U.S. franchises (from McDonald’s to Walmart, Starbucks to 
MGM) are so ingrained in Latin societies (from food to clothes to movies to au-
tomobiles) as to be so easily dislodged. There is also little space for U.S. compet-
itors: Spain does not have iconic counterparts (like Starbucks) to attract increas-
ingly eclectic customers, and indeed, Spain has thrived in areas where giant pub-
lic sector industries were privatized (oil, communications), thus remaining be-
hind in the learning curve. Though Spain’s corporations are making strides in 
virgin sectors (clothing, for example), by gobbling up entire markets, or large 
proportions of them, U.S. franchises may be too insulated from serious challeng-
es. Without reinventing its own industrial wheel (necessitating costly R/D and 
innovation), Spain would become second-best in a game of only two players. 
 
 
 
Triangulating Latin Relations 
 
Triangulating Latin relations with China could be costly: China’s interests have 
been such that, when bad turns to worse, China abandoning Spain could become 
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relentlessly exported inexpensively priced products on the basis of low wages 
(thus pauperizing even less developed countries by taking critical markets away 
from them, such as in textiles), or imposed import controls (on exports of com-
petitive products from developed countries)—not to mention exchange rate ma-
nipulation—China can easily profit from using Spain as a platform into Latin 
America and the European Union, but once China establishes a foothold in either, 
it would not need a “bridge.” Further, direct Latin attempts to engage China (or 
other Asian countries) could leave Spain out in the lurch. 
 
Balance sheet: Roads less traveled still 
 
What, then, is the balance? One way to respond to this question is to interpret all 
seven catalysts through levels-of-policy-making-analysis to get a sense of where 
Spain is more or less rooted, and in which direction is its trajectory headed. Table 
9 does this. At least four comments may be made from the four levels suggested 
in the discussions: national, European, Latin, and global. 
 
Table 9:  Spain’s externalization catalysts & levels-of-policy-making analysis  
 
Levels-of-
policy-making-
analysis/→ 
Externalization 
Catalysts: 
↓ 
 
 
State: 
 
 
European: 
 
 
Latin: 
 
 
Global:  
1. Showcasing 
its Democratic 
Transition: 
 
X 
  
X 
 
2. Responding 
to Latin Ameri-
ca’s apertura:  
 
X 
  
X 
 
3. Exporting its 
economic mag-
ic: 
X   X  
4. Safeguarding 
against domes-
tic recessions 
through exter-
nal engage-
ments: 
 
 
X 
  
 
X 
 
5. Leading the 
European Un-
ion into Latin 
America: 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
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the United 
States: 
7. Triangulat-
ing Latin rela-
tions: 
X X  X X 
 
 
First, though Spain’s interests have been more national and Latin than European   
and global, the European and global levels of analysis, as this study shows, have 
been more recent, reflect greater growth potential, and serve as springboards of 
those other interests: Without a European platform, the Latin interests would 
diminish in scope and value; and without a global connection today, Spain’s na-
tional and Latin interests could very easily be made irrelevant. It is this inter-
mingled setting that gives Spain the weight it can demonstrate at each of the four 
levels—and which is not automatically available for other countries wishing to 
survive today’s cut-throat competitive climate. So far it has worked out well for 
Spain, but does not predict smooth future sailing given the increasingly tumultu-
ous global political economy.  
  Secondly, such an enviable positioning reaffirms how Spain’s enormous 
and irreversible domestic transformation proved pivotal: Under Franco, Spain’s 
interests were nationalistic first, foremost, and as the final word. European and 
global interests or obligations were irrelevant, while those with Latin America 
were subordinated, carried more of a colonial imprint than reflective of the sov-
ereignty claims of Latin countries, and served silently behind domestic and na-
tional interests. Whereas EU membership opened the external door, the end of 
the Cold War came as a blessing for Spain: It made Latin America Spain’s vital 
interest when European attention shifted to the eastern frontiers rather than to the 
Mediterranean. Ultimately, Spain’s Latin connections salvaged the country when 
globalizing forces unleashed such powerful waves, as China rocking the interna-
tional market. Very, very few EU members can match this globally adventurous 
and diversified track-record of Spain, in part because they may have put too 
many of their policy-making eggs in the EU basket to be able to directly face 
those global forces. Spain’s latinization and globalization was not perfect and, 
least of all, a model for others to follow—but by spreading out its interests and 
preferences, Spain did what many EU members either could or would not do. 
  Third, even as the concentric circle of Spanish interests broadens, the 
European level remains indispensable: It became the sine qua non of Spain’s 
Latin and global interests, but to succeed in both arenas, Spain must ultimately 
offer strong EU (market) credentials. Here its record is not quite as robust as it 
should be: European Union membership might have been Spain’s external 
springboard, but to continue being relevant, it needs a lot more substance (trade 
and investment) in its own backyard. After all, it is here, more than elsewhere, 
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  Finally, when all of the above factors converge, a more profound feature 
begs attention: history matters. Spain can claim to be the eighth largest economy 
in the world today, but during the Franco years no one would have believed so. 
Hemingway’s sun was either sleeping or sinking. How Spain adjusts its historical 
leftovers to fast-moving contemporary dynamics remains one of the country’s 
policy-making and mood-building challenges today. 
 
Conclusions 
 
At least three concluding comments follow. First, Spain’s pathway is not replica-
ble: not every country had a similar history that bestows the potential of large 
market-access today as Spain did, with market-access becoming the defining 
element of future salience in our materialistic contemporary world. Similarly, 
though it carries the potential of the world’s eighth largest economy (as too does 
Brazil), Spain is more likely than Brazil to slip since it may be over-emphasizing 
its former colonies than exploring new markets and investment opportunities 
(with Brazil emphasizing more market access and investments than historical 
attachments). 
  Second, Spain’s linear externalization (from nationalism towards global-
ism by way of Europe and Latin America) is not as irreversible as its domestic 
transformation has been: Though its growth has been remarkable, Spain is not at 
the frontiers of innovation, nor is it competitive enough in global markets to 
stand alone; but because it easily ranks among the front-runners in two transi-
tions—from a dictatorship to a democracy, and from a statist to a market econo-
my—it carries ample future  mileage potential. To go further, as any leader 
would be expected to, Spain would have to tap many other resources. This re-
quires looking outside the box (if not the European Union, then Latin America; 
and if not the large Asian economies, then certainly other emerging ones). 
  Third, while these accomplishments give Spain an extra 25
th EU anniver-
sary glow, Spain may also be proof the European Union is not (and can not) be 
an end in itself:  Regional-level intentions can be contained and their expected 
outcomes be altered by forces both exogenous (China’s entry into the global 
market; business cycle movements from growth to recession, and vice versa) and 
endogenous (Germany’s unification twisting and turning EU’s pathway). Spain’s 
EU history has been a history of how, by adjusting to those changes, EU mem-
bership becomes a subset of larger and more inevitable forces. The next 25 years 
could glow more for Spain if it directs its interests and resources against the more 
inevitable global forces. If it does, the sun might uniquely rise a third time. If it 
does not, another Franco-like interregnum could beckon. For one of the largest 
world economies with a prodigious history and potential to climb higher, that 
would be a pill too bitter for even a Franco to swallow. 
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Abstract 
 
In the European Union (EU) circles of the Spanish government, the year 2010 
will be remembered as a crucial milestone regarding the role of Spain. From Jan-
uary to June 2010, Spain held the Union presidency, as has been done through 
the rotating process since the inception of the EU’s predecessor, the European 
Economic Community (EEC). Furthermore, on June 12 Spain celebrated the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of its adhesion (along with Portugal) to the European 
integration experiment, recalling its accession to the European Community (EC) 
on January 1, 1986 with the signing the treaty. While all of this was set to occur, 
however, the new reform treaty (‘of Lisbon’) was being planned as a substitute 
for the failed constitutional text that had been floated during the early years of the 
2000s. Moreover, these spectacular events happened in the middle of one of the 
worst economic crises of the world, with considerable impact on the evolution of 
the EU and, most especially, Spain. This essay reviews the background, context 
and impact of particular novel aspects of the new treaty governing the EU, as 
well as several milestones in Spain’s experience of the European process. The 
actions and events referred to constitute the closing chapter of the 25-year expe-
rience of Spain in the EU. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
This chapter was presented in a summarized version in the conference of the European Union 
Studies Association (EUSA), held in Boston, MA, March 3-5, 2011. This paper is an update and 
reduction of a previous work presented at the EUCE Conference on the Treaty of Lisbon, organized 
by the EU Center of Excellence and Jean Monnet Chair at Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova 
Scotia, Canada, on June 7-8, 2010. Gratitude for the generous invitation is due to Finn Laursen. For 
the elaboration of the text, a handful of Spanish government officials and EU staff members have 
provided commentaries and data, as well as access to EU events. All elected to remain anonymous.  
Francesc Granell offered perceptive comments on the latest draft. All errors in analysis are only 
attributed to the author. Bibliographical adjustments, editing and technical assistance were provided 
by James Aggrey, Adam Bisaccia, Astrid Boening and Maxime Larivé.      
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I 
 
Rescuing the EU Constitution
1 
 
 
1. Spain at the Helm 
 
The year 2007 was considered to be decisive for the EU even for the coincidental 
reason that half a century earlier the EU took its second daring step and approved 
the Rome Treaty of March 1957. This decision complemented the initial Europe-
an Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), officially born in 1951, by incorporating 
the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EUROATOM). 
More recently, the EU was considerably strengthened by two bold 
moves. First, during the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the EU 
decided to adopt the euro as the common currency. The impasse of the constitu-
tional process marked its presence five years after the effective adoption of the 
euro by the 300 million citizens in thirteen countries of the EU, as well as a by 
handful of mini-states that had previously used the currencies of EU member 
states. The euro has been a success in all basic monetary operations.
2 
Second, since the end of the Cold War in 1998, the EU proceeded to exe-
cute the most spectacular broadening in its history – nearly doubling in popula-
tion and size. However, the need for institutional reform of an organization that 
was used to interacting through fifteen collegial member states had to be ad-
dressed. The EU proceeded to complete its legal framework with the approval of 
a ‘constitutional treaty.’ Unfortunately, the planned constitution was derailed 
halfway through the ratification process with the rejection by Dutch and French 
voters. With the project put on hold, alternative plans were considered. The EU 
was seen as a ship running into an iceberg, much like the Titanic. An alternative 
to the rescue plans was the preservation of the basic load of the ‘failed ship’ 
combined with a method of selecting most special aspects of the EU text.                                       
Within the context presented by the shocking rejection of the EU consti-
tutional treaty in 2005, Spain considered several options and scenarios; each im-
plied risks and opportunities by rescuing of the spirit of the original text. More 
than anything else, Spain wanted to show the same loyal commitment it had 
demonstrated since 1986. Spain had long since ceased to walk alone in both Eu-
rope and the world. Since 1986, all sectors had embraced the trendsetting lectur-
ing of philosopher José Ortega y Gasset: “Spain is the problem; Europe is the 
                                                 
1 This part of the essay draws on the logic, content and scope from previous work (Roy 2008). 
2 For a review of the performance of the euro, see Lorca 2007 and 2009. 
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solution.” Development and democracy meant to be inserted in Europe. From all 
angles of analysis, the balance of this obsession has been positive.  
As this volume demonstrates, the record of Spain’s membership in the 
European Union has been truly impressive. History shows that even during the 
second part of the Franco regime, the Spanish dictatorial leadership tried to cope 
with requirements that were politically impossible to meet. When Spain became a 
member of the EC, numerous experts and scholars were ready to strengthen the 
resources available in Spanish universities and publishing net-
works.Simultaneously, the best and the brightest of Spain’s governmental cadres 
joined the expanded institutions, taking on positions of responsibility in decision-
making bodies (Viñas 2006; Granell 2002). Spain, in sum, “was not different,” as 
a redrafting of a popular tourism slogan crafted by the Franco regime said. It was 
a European country like any other that was returning to its natural home after a 
long exile. Against the background of successful EU Spanish presidencies, prom-
inent Spaniards had chaired the EU institutions. When the process of drafting the 
constitutional treaty was announced, Spain embraced this mission, rather than 
regarding it as a standard duty. 
Spain, in turn, received considerable benefits through regional policy 
funds, development aid and financing of infrastructure. Spain’s income rose from 
an index of 60% of the European median in 1986 to about 105% today, with 
some regions surpassing 125%. From being a country that was a net receiver of 
aid, Spain is today a net payer, with traditional funds vanishing, resulting in the 
considerable alarm of public works officers in the middle of the financial crisis 
that began in 2007. 
Successive PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) governments from 
1982 to 1996 distinguished themselves by building fruitful alliances with their 
influential European partners, especially the Franco-German duo. In 1996, when 
the Popular Party, led by José María Aznar, won the elections, Spain’s European 
commitment was nonetheless maintained – the country was early in the lead of 
the constitutional project. However, as a result of the events of 11 September, the 
government decided to change its loyalty towards a Euro-Atlantic alternative. 
Madrid elected to join the so-called “new Europe,” disdainful of the “old Eu-
rope,” following the terminology coined by the U.S. secretary of Defense, Don-
ald Rumsfeld. The change of government in 2004 returned to the traditional 
priming of Europe, but by then the EU itself had changed in profile and attitude.
3 
When the PSOE came back to power in 2004, the government wanted to send a 
message of unconditional loyalty to – and efficient leadership in – European in-
tegration. First, the new government decided to be the initial member state to 
submit the ratification process of the constitutional treaty to a public referendum. 
                                                 
3 For a sample of analysis on the change of Spanish attitude from the policy of the Partido Popular 
to the performance of the PSOE when elected, see Roy 2005. 
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Of participating voters, 76.73% (42.3% of the actual electorate) said ‘yes’ to 
ratification, setting the pace for the remaining states to emulate.  
However, Spain’s recent path through the EU labyrinth offers a percep-
tive oscillation. On one hand, it is important to note the enthusiasm with which 
the successive administrations, starting with Felipe González in 1982, ap-
proached the process of European integration and priming the supranational path. 
On the other hand, this pattern subtly contrasts with the fractious ambivalence 
expressed at times by the government of José María Aznar (1996-2004), which 
was more inclined towards an intergovernmental approach – especially during 
Aznar’s second term, from 2000 to 2004, when he was supported by an absolute 
majority (Pipes, Roy 2005). Due in part to his support for US president George 
W. Bush in Iraq, Aznar pushed the ‘New Europe’ towards a neo-Atlantism, dam-
aging the deepening of the EU.  
  Nonetheless, the Spanish government, the academic community, and the 
media exerted impressive influence in making Spain a model of participation in 
the convention process. The government (and the representatives of the Popular 
Party, delegated by Madrid) actively participated in the elaboration of the text of 
the constitution.
4  However, in the last stages of the proceedings of the intergov-
ernmental conference (IGC) that took on the task of the convention, the govern-
ment of Spain, led by Aznar, left the process frozen when it refused to accept the 
new double majority voting system that modified the line up that had been in 
effect since the Treaty of Nice.
5 This decision retarded the process and produced 
further doubts in other electorates and governments, which were eager to obtain 
last-minute advantages from dubious power results.  
The victory of the PSOE in the 2004 elections removed this obstacle.
6 
The new government diplomatically consented to a new modification of the dou-
ble majority, opening the way for the ratification process that proceeded through-
out much of 2005 and getting ready for completion at the end of 2006. This was 
viewed as one of the milestones of the new Spanish foreign policy (León 2004). 
  The Spanish government then dutifully contributed to the promotion of 
the project,
7 and it was for this reason that, when the period of ratification was 
announced, Spain decided again to lead the pack. Interpreting the internal consti-
tutional mandate with a sense of extreme dignity and importance, Madrid not 
only submitted the approved text to a national referendum in February 2005, but 
it also scheduled several similar polls, setting a precedent and an example for the 
rest of the member states. Despite a disappointing referendum turnout, an over-
whelming majority of the participants voted ‘yes’ and Spain was on record as 
                                                 
4For selected books authored by Spanish protagonists: Borrel/Carnero/López Garrido 2003, López 
Garrido 2005, Méndez de Vigo 2005. 
5 For details, see Chari/ Benoit/Laver 2004. 
6 See Roy 2005. 
7See Valcárcel 2005; Navarro 2005; Política Exterior 2005. 
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being ready to maintain its status of good European-ness.
8 It was then that the 
shock came from France and the Netherlands.        
  In spite of some bad omens from experts (Closa 2004), polls, and surveys 
held in France and the Netherlands, the initial reaction to the results of the refer-
endums was one of disbelief. Then doubt about the European process set in. 
When the initial trauma was overcome, the sentiment about the overall picture of 
the EU and its constitutional process was a resigned feeling that ‘no one is per-
fect.’ This was followed by a mission to pave the way towards a ‘resurrection’ 
solution, which was propelled by a counterattack strategy.   
 
 
2. The Salvaging   
 
Few sectors of Spanish society, government, political parties, media, and scholars 
remained absent from the debates on the constitutional process.
9 This activity 
included viewpoints that were expressed through the production of key official 
documents by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a set of analytical papers generat-
ed by the Real Instituto Elcano, commentaries that appeared in policy-oriented 
journals such as Política Exterior, and a wealth of scholarly products in the form 
of books and journal articles.
10 
  In September 2005, a congressional commission entrusted the Spanish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to draft a report (Secretaría de Estado 2006). It 
stressed that Spain had ratified the constitutional treaty twice, both in a public 
national referendum and through parliament. Therefore, Spain was obliged to 
maintain its position for the continuation of the agreement as expressed in the 
text. Spain and the other 17 countries (already a majority of the EU population) 
that had approved the text had the moral obligation to insist that the essence of 
the treaty be preserved. Hence, a limited implementation could not be accepted as 
sufficient. In any event, Spain was in a comfortable position. It had fulfilled its 
obligations and it had no interest in opening a negotiation in which it could lose. 
The burden of opening the treaty was on the countries that had rejected it or were 
dubious about it. In sum, the initiative taken in Madrid both set an example and 
sent a strong message of leadership. 
  Facing an array of alternate scenarios, the Spanish government wished to 
send a clear message that the option of proceeding towards the completion of the 
referendum process, while considering the text still alive and useful, was a valid 
card to be played. Consequently, in a repeat of the Spanish initiative two years 
earlier that led to the ratification process, the representatives of 18 European 
                                                 
8 For selected detailed analysis of this exercise, see Ruiz Jiménez/ Noya 2004; Ruiz Jimé-
nez/Sanpedro 2005; Torreblanca / Sorroza 2005; Torreblanca 2005; Font 2005.  
9 For additional detailed analysis, see Kurpas 2005; Torreblanca 2005a. 
10 As samples of recent analytical works on the constitution, see Aldecoa 2003, 2006; Mangas 
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countries of the EU (with the moral support of two others) met in Madrid on 25 
January 2007. These 20 member states had already approved the constitutional 
project (or had promised to do so, in the case of Portugal and Ireland). Only 
Spain and Luxembourg had ratified the complicated code in popular referendum; 
the rest had prudently bestowed their seal of approval through a parliamentary 
process (Torreblanca 2007). 
  The majority of the Europeanist and federally inclined population con-
sidered that the result, in the first place, was not fair. Second, it damaged the 
general welfare of the EU in a complex and uncertain world that needs the effec-
tive action of political blocs and economic conglomerates, equipped with impact-
ing influence and political vision. A European Union halfway finished, with in-
stitutions designed for 12 members and now enlarged for 27, is not the way to go 
forward. 
  Faced with this situation, the Spanish government took the initiative and 
convoked the Madrid meeting in order to exchange ideas that would help the EU 
get out of the constitutional trap. The government of Rodríguez Zapatero took a 
similar risk after its entry to power in 2004, when it planned the early referendum 
to launch its Europeanist example. Spain delivered magnificently, with more than 
two thirds of the voters saying ‘yes’ to the text. 
  Many Spanish experts chose an optimistic attitude; some selected a real-
istic analysis, while others pressed for the strategy that would prove most advan-
tageous for Spain.
11 One sector (see Aldecoa 2006) pointed out that Spanish 
opinion had evolved from a decisive backing for the constitutional project to 
considering the constitution as dead, then finally opting to resurrect it. The public 
had come to the conclusion that the problem resided in the political path taken, 
not in the constitutional details, and that the treaty was reinforced by democratic 
legitimacy provided by the convention. The key was to find a political solution 
for what is essentially a combination of European and national dilemmas. Other 
reports (see Rodríguez-Iglesias, Torreblanca 2006) considered the various sce-
narios and concluded there was a separation between the citizens and the elites, 
as well as a difficult consensus among the states that led to a freezing of the deci-
sion-making process, making future enlargements doubtful and cumbersome. 
Furthermore, the existing veto power made revision and ratification procedures 
doubtful, which earmarked the creation of a more efficient institutional frame-
work as a mandatory task. A more decisive leadership role was called for. 
  While considering these needs and recommendations, experts and gov-
ernment officials contemplated a series of scenarios.
12 The option of isolating 
some of the most fundamental items of the constitution, as candidates in the for-
                                                 
11 The Real Instituto Elcano had earlier issued a study with a much wider scope on the general 
European policy of Spain (Powell 2005). 
12 Earlier, Closa 2005 outlined six options that could be detected as a base.    
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mation of an acceptable document for approval, was considerably attractive. 
Whatever the Spanish calculations were regarding the different scenarios, the 
reality was still that resistance to the approval of the constitutional treaty, if 
pushed as an alternative to save face, would make ‘cherry picking’ a difficult 
task. 
  Expanding on the Titanic metaphor mentioned earlier, an independent 
academic expert (Mangas 2007) offered a useful conceptual parallel between the 
constitutional proceedings and the process of salvaging ships and merchandise 
after accidents, particularly those that are at risk of sinking. The most feasible 
option was based on salvaging the ship, in its entirety – in other words, not only 
its ‘contents’ but also its ‘container.’ It should be composed of a fundamental 
“Framework Treaty” (abandoning the term ‘constitution’), which should be an 
agreement emphasising synthesis, supplemented by a “General Treaty.” This 
would be backed by the conviction that the ‘hull’ (the framework treaty) was in 
good condition, that the overall philosophy was still unique in its class, and that it 
would be beneficial to remove unusable items. The internal elements included 
those essential policies that enable the Union to work effectively, and these were 
clearly outlined in the general treaty (specifically in part III and in various sec-
tions of other parts).                                                         
  On the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, the German 
presidency was mandated with the issuance of a declaration. It was to be a short 
address, easily understood by common citizens, but due to its background it 
risked being presented as a convoluted document that had encountered difficul-
ties while stakeholders developed a consensus. Observers (see Torreblanca 2007; 
Granell 2007a) accurately pointed out that the EU had previously missed the 
opportunity to define itself both at the fiftieth anniversary of the Schuman Decla-
ration and when the Treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community’s half-
century term expired in 2002.  
 
 
3. The Final Stretch 
 
Following the constitutional gathering in Madrid, processual difficulties became 
increasingly evident. The declaration was finally issued – however, it reflected a 
minimal consensus and the strategy developed by the presidency had limited 
success. Although the word ‘constitution’ was dropped from the text, it still read 
as having the intention of a documentary commitment to the spirit and purpose of 
the constitutional treaty. The time frame provided a temporal context for the 
‘road map,’ which was supposed to be issued at the end of the German presiden-
cy in June of 2007. Sceptics evaluated this compromise simply as a postpone-
ment of the thorniest issues, such as those detected by the Polish government 
regarding the voting system. The same can be said about the diplomatic com-
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ing interpretations during the disastrous ratification process in France and the 
Netherlands.                                       
  In anticipation of this procedurally uncertain scenario, Spanish experts 
and government officials recommended taking a more aggressive position, send-
ing warning messages, and waiting for a possibly unconvincing or very contro-
versial declaration, or for a call for a subsequent IGC (with unknown results). 
The worst-case scenario could be a “rupture of the system or selective demolition 
of the process” (Torreblanca 2005b). 
  In the Spanish domestic context, two issues might, both in theory and 
practice, pose obstacles for the development of an effective strategy towards this 
goal and erode the future energy of the Spanish government. Oneis the potential 
lack of consensus, fuelled by the two main political parties, on the nature of the 
European mission. Considering the continuous harassment by the Popular Party 
against the PSOE, the temptation to use the EU stalemate to attack the latter and 
to show a lack of support remains a possibility. This confrontation would then be 
staged within the context of the elections to be held before March 2008 (a limit 
according to the electoral law). However, the benefits to the Popular Party of 
executing such a risky policy were considered negligible in comparison with the 
potential to develop a minimal level of support.  
  The second source of danger was reflected by the pressure of a new wave 
of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), a Basque terrorist group, which derailed an 
announced truce with the bombing of the Madrid airport parking lot. Although 
the attention given by the Spanish government to this problem is paramount, 
expert opinions indicate that it can still be achieved with a strong commitment to 
the European project.  
  In terms of the constitutional process and its possible outcomes, what did 
the above alternatives represented for Spain? Both sets of scenarios (that is, the 
catastrophic as well as the options for action) were favorable for Spain. The 
country did not have anything to lose by applying pressure and insisting on the 
continuation of a positive process that called attention to the spirit of the constitu-
tional path and its most necessary ‘container’ (the ‘ship’). By abandoning the 
strategy and tactics it had followed until then, Spain would receive either a less 
favorable position in the future of the EU or be labelled as a supporter of a poten-
tially dying dream. While still seeking to maintain a strong leadership position, in 
the event of a catastrophe the Spanish government and its collaborators could 
simply point to the fact that they did their best. 
  For the aforementioned reasons, the Spanish government maintained a 
solid commitment chiefly to the salvaging of the letter and the spirit of the consti-
tutional treaty. A basic consensus, developed at the end of the German presiden-
cy, showed that a strong majority of member states favoured supporting a script 
presented by Chancellor Angela Merkel regarding the complete abandonment of 
the constitutional path. The choice then was to approve the skeleton of a reform 
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the spirit of the constitutional treaty that should be respected. It then acted as a 
loyal partner in supporting the German initiative and leadership, which was 
praised by Spanish commentators and then forming a practical coalition with the 
new French president in convincing the hardliners (Poland and the United King-
dom) that a compromise was in order. 
  A majority of experts expressed general satisfaction and stressed the 
positive dimensions of the solution based on the fact that it included most of the 
fundamental institutional reforms envisioned in the defunct constitutional text 
(Martín and Torreblanca 2007; Mangas 2007). However, some observers and 
media editorials pointed out areas of concern. A strong minority expressed dis-
pleasure for the path taken by the Union, casting doubts over its prospective fu-
ture regarding the limitations of the supranational aim and the perceived return to 
the intergovernmental logic. Overall, government and analytical sources targeted 
the negative role of the Polish government in resisting a deal over the final text, 
expressing fears on the impact of drafting of the reform treaty (of Lisbon) and its 
ratification process in 2008, on time for its implementation in 2009.    
II 
The Implementation of the Treaty 
 
1. Old and New Challenges for the EU and Spain 
 
The implementation of the Lisbon treaty represented the dawn of a new era of 
EU history and had a triple effect on Spain. First, implementation coincided with 
the height of the economic crisis, which has affected many corners of the world 
financial network and especially its epicenter, the cradle of democracy, Greece. 
Second, Lisbon was set to be enacted during the decisive moments of the begin-
ning of the rotation presidency of the European Union, although the system was 
modified with the founding of the new semi-permanent position of president of 
the European Council. Third, near the close of its,termSpain had begun com-
memorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of its signing of the adhesion process, 
on June 12, 1985. However, while this appeared to simply be a pleasant celebra-
tion to some casual observers and specialized scholars a few years earlier, it actu-
ally had a notable impact on the time frame of the subsequent treaty proceed-
ings.
13 
  Spain had just been invited by the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, to 
share his country’s permanent seat in the G-20 summit, in recognition of Spain’s 
expanded global role. Spain has been ranked as the eighth largest world donor of 
development aid (the leader in key regions like Latin America), backed by the 
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eighth largest global economy in total volume. In 2009, Spain still enjoyed the 
tenth position in the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index. In this context, 
Spain needed to confront a series of challenges. 
  In a strictly economic sense, Spain was immersed in its most grave fi-
nancial crisis in recent history. Its economy suffered the consequences of the 
worsening international financial system head on, and the explosion of the build-
ing bubble revealed itself as the beachhead of the Spanish crisis.
14  Moreover, 
Spain arrived at the quarter century of its EU membership with some worrisome 
socio-economic indicators that have clouded its previous enjoyable image. Its 
budgetary deficit has grown to over 11%. The official unemployment rate has 
reached 20%, double the European average. Alarmist predictions call for a 30% 
unemployment for 2012. While some years ago the growth rate was over 3%, in 
2008-2009 it was flatly negative. Plans to rectify these conditions were far from 
implementation in the short term. The worst problem seemed to be that the total 
debt volume (when adding government and private figures) was estimated at 
400% of the GDP.  
  Spain faced challenges at the same time that there was a notable divorce 
of its political sectors. While the social-democrat government of the PSOE had 
been widely judged in the general public as incapable of solving the current prob-
lems, the conservative congressional opposition opted for a strategy of frontal 
harassment devoid of the spirit of cooperation. From out of Spain, numerous 
voices (prudently coming from governments and in a striding fashion from the 
media) attributed the absence of remedies to the indecision of the PSOE govern-
ment of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. The sudden (but expected) decision of 
implementing drastic economic measures and budget cuts in mid-May 2010 par-
tially muffled the demands. 
  Just before these major cuts (which, according to high financial sources, 
saved Spain from defaulting), international media polemics adorned themselves 
with special features, including the direct intervention of key members of the 
Spanish government, when answering critics of the Anglo-American press. For-
eign journalists recalled that Zapatero had captured power as a result of the disas-
trous response of the government of José María Aznar to the grave terrorist at-
tack of 11 March 2004, which was labeled as the Spanish equivalent of the US’ 
11 September 2001. Re-elected in 2008, Zapatero appeared to be overwhelmed 
by the confluence and magnitude of problems derived from the crisis, while 
maintaining a cold attitude and delaying major economic decisions.  
  In spite of all this, the fact remains that Spain is still a country with im-
pressive cultural, geographical and social resources that together should balance 
the weight of purely (and hopefully transitory) economic arguments. Spain is still 
the third most sought tourist destination in the world (only outranked by the 
United States and France). Barcelona and Madrid are ranked as fifth and eleventh 
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in the European cities with brighter futures;Catalonia is eleventh in the list of 
regions. However, in mid-May 2010, the government, under the shadow of 
Greece on the road to default, caved to pressure from the EU and the United 
States. Zapatero decreed the first important cut to the government budget in 
democratic times, with the consequent reduction of many emblematic welfare 
state services (pensions, family subsidies) and the threat of impacting others (free 
medical care). The result of all this deterioration is that the foreign image of 
Spain has been seriously damaged. In certain countries, Spain has ceased to be 
considered as a ‘serious’ partner.      
  Pessimistic leaders and cynic observers of the European Union’s evolu-
tion could have easily predicted the (provisional?) derailment of the European 
constitutional process. When the French and the Dutch electorates rejected the 
new treaty in 2005 (branded as a constitution) to reform the institutional frame-
work of the Union, opponents of the project certified the death of that new bold 
step. The ‘stealth and action’ methodology that Schuman and Monnet plotted so 
well in 1950 had failed. Commentators since then have warned that with the 2005 
rejection, Europe lost confidence in itself and its future, which was exacerbated 
by the worsening of the financial crisis that exploded in 2008 (Esparza-Ruiz 
2009). Federalists and common-sense leaders tenaciously went back to the draw-
ing board, facing a period of reflection. Germany felt the pressure during its pres-
idency in the first part of 2007 and reacted to the responsibility. The relay baton 
was then passed to the Portuguese presidency for the rest of the year.  
  The governments of the member states and constitutional experts then 
rolled up their sleeves and rushed to salvage the precious load, which was still 
stored in the bowels of a sinking ‘Titanic’ (Roy 2007 and 2008; Mangas 2007). 
Drafters produced a new document that was, in essence, a smaller clone of the 
constitution. It was a shorter text, but not so much to appease the many process 
observers (Granell 2007b). On 13 December 2007, the European Council signed 
the new Treaty of Reform, justly re-baptised as the Treaty of Lisbon for the site 
of its official birth. As in other stages of European history, scholarly production 
was set in motion even before the legal birth of the treaty (Bertocini/Chopin 
2007; Hynková-Dvoranova 2008;Roy and Domínguez 2009; Piris 2010). Media, 
governments and think-tanks all felt that some degree of summarizing the basic 
aspects of the treaty was needed for the common citizen. However, while EU 
documents can be amended, each treaty step needs to be ratified by all of the 
states. Sceptics were lurking behind the light fog that rarely disturbs Lisbon’s 
perennial blue skies. Then the Irish electorate said ‘no’ to the Lisbon treaty on 12 
June 2008, just at the end of the Slovenian presidency.  
  This ‘accident’ was nothing new in the recent history of the EU. In fact, 
it happened in other occasions with the same actors. The Irish electorate is a no-
torious re-incident. It earlier rejected the Maastricht Treaty, which needed a se-
cond ratification referendum. This seemed to be the alternative – perhaps the last 
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2. Lisbon, the Spanish presidency and the new EU 
 
As a paradoxical and cruel reward for leading the process of constitutional ratifi-
cation, the dream shattered in front of the Spanish government’s disbelieving 
eyes when the Dutch and French electorates rejected the text in referendums. A 
decade after the beginning of the constitutional treaty design process, the falter-
ing project was resurrected through its substitute, the Treaty of Lisbon.
15 But the 
whole scene seemed to have changed again – and badly, according to numerous 
analysts. Other commentators said they did not believe in the eventual dissolution 
of the European project or in the abandonment of the euro because of its prob-
lems. They recommended instead the rescue of the EU foundational mission.
16 In 
any case, the historical register shows that Spain was loyal to the reinforcing of 
the enterprise of integration (Roy 2007). Spain fulfilled Ortega’s discourse in 
reverse: “Europe is the problem;Spain is the solution.” 
  The first steps taken by the reformed institutions during the first quarter 
of 2010 did not seem to be very impressive. The governments and the EU Coun-
cil, under the pressure of the parliament, insisted on having a say regarding the 
functioning of the External Service, which was still in its drafting stages and 
subject to turf battles between governments and the commission (Fernández Sola 
2009). Until the end of 2009, under the command of HR Javier Solana, the re-
creation of the new post of High Representative did not seem to be effective un-
der the lead of Baroness Catherine Ashton, former EU Commissioner of Trade, 
doubling as one of the vice presidents of the commission. For Spanish interests, 
the creation of the innovative position of a more permanent presidency of the 
European Council (for a once-renewable period of two and a half years) muffled 
slightly what was sold by the Madrid government as an effective Spanish presi-
dency. This expectation was logical, especially given that preparations were im-
plemented during the previous year, 2009, when the passing of the second Irish 
referendum was not yet known. The fact that the EU Commission was not named 
nor set to work until mid-March also allowed Spain to execute certain missions 
in preparation. 
The protocol theatrics of press conferences involved business as usual as 
well as some novel aspects. On the one hand, individual press conferences were 
simply presided over by a national figure that dealt with the media on a variety of 
domestic and EU-related subjects. Other EU officers, Spain’s leaders, and repre-
sentatives of the institutions of the EU and the units dealing with Latin America 
and the Caribbean were absent. However, the top leadership reappeared in full 
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regalia when global issues were discussed and declarations on the progress of 
sub-regional negotiations were announced.  
  In a press conference to make announcements on MERCOSUR, the po-
dium was composed of President Cristina Fernández of Argentina (term president 
of the sub-bloc), Herman Van Rompuy (as president of the European Council), 
José Manuel Barroso (as president of the commission) and Spain’s prime minis-
ter, Rodríguez Zapatero (as semester rotating president of the EU Council, dou-
bling as host of the conclave). Absent of this impressive line up was EU HR 
Catherine Ashton, as well as the president of the European Parliament – the latter 
having strengthened its power with the implementation of the Lisbon treaty.  
  Cynical observers would point to Henry Kissinger’s (unconfirmed) en-
quiry on the ‘telephone number of Europe’ and say that the correct answer has 
become even more complicated than when the EU created the position of high 
representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which was held by 
Javier Solana until the end of 2009, when the new machinery of the Lisbon treaty 
was set in motion. Kissinger can now call five telephones: a joke emanating from 
Brussels depicted a fictitious phone call made by a non-EU leader about an im-
portant issue of foreign affairs. A recording then said: “If you want to know the 
assessment of the President of the European Council, press 1. If you want to 
speak to the HR, press 2. If you want to know […] the attitude of the President of 
the Commission, reflecting issues of shared sovereignty, press 3.” 
  During the rest of 2010, universities and think-tanks engaged in the usual 
round of conferences, symposia and other meetings to analyse the results of the 
Spanish presidency under the new Lisbon system. Insiders in the Brussels institu-
tions and independent observers agreed that the new EU structure and decision-
making mechanisms, especially those overseeing the exterior face of the organi-
sation, have been very fortunate to have had Spain holding the rotating presiden-
cy in a sensitive time of shifting roles. A consensual agreement was offered by 
Madrid: Van Rompuy was going to be in charge of the exterior representation of 
the EU, as well as piloting the decision-making structures of the Union. Spain 
would still coordinate and preside over the General Affairs Council (as detached 
from the old General Affairs and Foreign Relations cluster), keep the responsibil-
ity of coordination of the rest of the EU councils, and host the series of summits 
and ministerial gatherings.  
Observers with a degree of witty humor wondered what the result would 
have been if the presidency had been held by a European heavyweight, such as 
France, Germany or the UK, or, conversely, a small country, instead of Spain, a 
median power. The powerful would not resist the temptation of making a show of 
the hinge presidency. The weak could be tempted to enjoy the last of the lime-
light exposure given by the rotating honor and responsibility. Spain – despite 
being burdened by the economic crisis, which was worsened by political internal 
pressures – performed in an impeccable way from the viewpoint of protocol and 
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first peculiar EU presidency (a sort of guinea pig experiment) against the four 
previous experiences (Granell 2010; Fernández Sola and Blanco 2010). Interna-
tional media based in Brussels pressed Spain to make a show in executing the 
presidency. The script of the Spanish semester was expected to be offered as a 
learning mechanism for future implementation. The process became even more 
complex with the trio composed of the current, the past and the next presidency 
(Closa 2010). 
  However, the actual performance of the new framework institutions will 
be subject to the personal savvy and behavior of the holders of each position. The 
relationship between the president of the European Council and the prime minis-
ter of the country holding the rotating presidency could learn a lot from the im-
peccable cooperation shown by Javier Solana and Chris Patten, the latter a pow-
erful UK commissioner supervising the external operations of the commission. 
The same can be said about the sharing of foreign representation between HR 
Ashton and Van Rompuy. Regardless of the role that the personalities of repre-
sentatives will play in the future functioning of the EU, the fact is that there will 
continue to be changes in the future regarding those two posts and the establish-
ment of the External Service.    
  Some attention should be given to the shifting of responsibilities and 
power among the different institutional pieces of the EU, as there will be consid-
erable impact on Spain. Who lost? Who appeared at the time to be winning? Re-
cent history shows that when the Parliament managed to force the resignation of 
the EU Jacques Santer Commission, the legislative body claimed an early victo-
ry, but the real winner was the Council. Its overwhelming control has not only 
been maintained, but it has grown with the recent changes that culminated in the 
Treaty of Lisbon. While the Parliament can justly claim that its powers have in-
creased with the reinforcement of the traditional co-decision procedure, a new 
entity has been elevated to the category of full institution – the European Coun-
cil. And the council is headed by the semi-permanent president, who can stay at 
the helm for five years. The loser of this institutional surgery has been the com-
mission, although it is true that the right of legislative initiation has been kept by 
the commissioners, each one conserving special turf prerogatives backed by col-
legial power. It is too early to know how the new role of the high representative 
will function practically, considering her dual loyalty and control. While the HR 
continues to be appointed by the council, a basically intergovernmental body, it 
depends on Catherine Ashton’s actions as to how she can act as part of the com-
mission, which is by definition a supranational entity. 
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3. A Learning Experience 
 
How could this enigma and uncertainty impact Spain and its successors? For a 
member state such as Spain, which is by record considered a ‘federal’ sharehold-
er and a solid backer of expansion towards a more supranational EU, the appear-
ance of a more inter-governmental Europe is not particularly good news. In a 
framework of re-nationalizing policies and power struggles among leaders in 
Paris and Berlin, plus the ever-present brake applied by London, Madrid cannot 
do too much to build alliances in a complex, expanded EU.                      
  The new system and external representation did not seem to impress 
certain world powers and important regional networks. The first ‘report card’ 
came from Washington. Early in the semester of the Spanish presidency, the 
White House announced that the expected high level EU-US summit that regular-
ly takes place in alternating cities across the Atlantic would not have the partici-
pation of US president Barack Obama. The official explanation was that his in-
ternational travel agenda was too full and he needed to concentrate on domestic 
issues. Off-the-record remarks made by US officials, which were confirmed by 
think-tank observers and well-informed media, stated that the real reason was his 
negative experience when he attended the 2009 gathering in Prague at the height 
of the Czech political crisis (the country was holding the EU presidency). Obama 
did not seem to know exactly who was in charge on the EU side.  
  This decision was a major disappointment for the Spanish government 
because President Zapatero was eager to round up the series of fast meetings with 
diplomatic visits to the White House and his US counterpart. Since its electoral 
triumph in 2004, the Spanish socialist administration had lost the attention of the 
American presidency, as was bestowed to Zapatero’s predecessor, José María 
Aznar, for his support of the Iraq War effort. As soon as he was elected, Zapatero 
bluntly withdrew the small number of troops that Aznar had sent. Only when 
Bush left the office could the Spanish government engage in rebuilding the rather 
good relations between the two countries since the reestablishment of Spanish 
democracy in 1976. Although Obama’s absence was interpreted as a dual rebuff 
to Spain and the EU, the Spanish government hoped to salvage the high level 
meeting agenda by holding two other summits in Spain. Both were traditionally 
very important regions – Latin America and the Mediterranean.  
  The EU-Latin America/Caribbean biannual conclave, held in Europe and 
Latin America on alternate occasions since 1999, was supposed to offer space for 
progress in the negotiations between Brussels and the different Latin American 
subregional networks.
17 The most positive result was the closing of an associa-
tion deal with Central America. However, the zone did not show any proof of 
                                                 
17 For a current state of regional integration in Latin America, see the content of Roy and 
Domínguez 2010). 
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deepening its integration, which was a standard precondition from Brussels. Se-
cond, individual free trade agreements (which were taboo until a few years earli-
er) were signed with Perú and Colombia; this was a substitute for the halted ne-
gotiations with the Andean Community, which was in a state of convulsion after 
the exit of Venezuela and the antagonism of Bolivia. Third, confirmation of a 
path towards an agreement with the ever-shaky group of MERCOSUR was an-
nounced, but details seemed to be clouded.   
  But the most significant disappointment was the postponement (and pos-
sibly cancellation?) of the summit between the EU states and their Mediterranean 
neighbours scheduled for June 2010. That was meant to showcase the consolida-
tion of plans for the ‘Union for the Mediterranean’ (UfM), an ambitious entity 
originally proposed by French president Nicolas Sarkozy as a successor to the 
Barcelona Process set in place in 1995.
18 The General Secretariat of the new net-
work was already in place in Barcelona, due to the efforts of successive Spanish 
governments giving attention to this strategic area. It is important to state that the 
UfM cancellation (and Obama’s no-show plans) could not be attributed to the 
faulty implementation of the Lisbon treaty’s new mechanisms by the Spanish 
government. Spain was not the culprit, but the sorry victim. 
All the debate on the institutional impact of the Lisbon treaty was de-
voured by the gravity of the economic crisis. Spain and the EU collided with an 
iceberg even larger than the one represented by the negative referendums. The 
Spanish government seemed to be working solely on one issue – what to do with 
the warnings coming from Brussels and Washington. The office of the prime 
minister ceased to give priority to important foreign affairs issues, such as the 
cancellations of summits and the usual confrontations between Israel and its 
neighbors.          
  What would be the impact of the new External Service on the ranks of 
Spanish diplomacy? It is too early to say and distribution plans have been subject 
to arguments between the parliament, the council and the commission. Figures 
mention that the total number of new positions will be 5,000 and the number of 
applications is predicted to be high. One third of the positions would come from 
the member states and another third from the commission. The number of Span-
ish diplomats that would receive appointments, however, would only be 100. 
Considering that the new position costs will be covered by the EU, there could be 
further yearly rounds of concourse in Madrid. However, inside estimates revealed 
that a number of the approximately 1,000 Spanish diplomats are not assigned to 
effective Foreign Service positions in the field and wait in Madrid for the proper 
occasion. There are no plans to consider the incorporation of members of the 
trade ranks that are attached to embassies but maintaining their own status (Fer-
nández Sola 2009). Some post-Spanish presidency period measures were taken to 
redress the perceived lack of ambition and means in Spain’s diplomatic front. For 
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example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs abandoned the possible disestablish-
ment of the State Secretariat for European Union Affairs (the level of vice minis-
ter) as part of drastic budget cuts. A second strategy was developed to capture 
important future EU ambassadorial posts in key capitals considered to be sensi-
tive for Spanish interests.                   
  Despite a possibly negative evaluation on the role and influence of Spain 
in the EU network as a result of the implementation of the Lisbon treaty, one 
should consider other reasons beyond the weakening of Spanish weight in certain 
areas. Furthermore, this problem cannot be chiefly attributed to the effects of the 
economic crisis. A more durable explanation is the inexorable reconfiguration of 
the EU itself as a consequence of the huge enlargement that took place in 2004 
and 2007. With less perceived interest in the Latin American continent (the ab-
sence of key Latin American leaders in the Madrid EU-LA/Caribbean summit 
was a notorious signal); the next geographical region of interest to Spain – the 
Mediterranean – is nonetheless strained by both confrontations with its southern 
neighbors and double talk performed by some unavoidable European players 
such as France. 
 
 
III 
 
Conclusion 
 
Once the semester was over and summer vacation was on the horizon, the Bel-
gian presidency succeeded Spain’s, forming a triad with the following presiding 
member state, Hungary. It then became more feasible to construct an evaluation 
of the experience and the implementation of some of the novelties of the Lisbon 
treaty. The report card on Spain’s performance varied according to the source 
but, roughly distributed, the assessment included negative comments, positive, 
self-bestowed marks, and middle-of-the-way, more realistic analyses.  
  In response to Spanish opposition interests, some media networks used 
the occasion to blast the overall performance of the government. Reports filtered 
the opinion of the leadership of the Partido Popular and blamed the office of 
president Zapatero not only for its shortcomings at the helm of the EU, but also 
for the effects of the grave economic crisis. This was further evidence of the lack 
of national consensus regarding Spain’s role in the EU. On the other side, gov-
ernment officials rushed to positively justify their performance. Briefings and 
media presentations stressed the fact that the main work in EU affairs is not done 
under the limelight of summits but through daily routines behind the scenes. 
Among the positive accomplishments, they included the fundamental aspects of 
the Lisbon treaty, the implementation of the 2020 Economic Strategy, and the 
fight against the financial crisis through macroeconomic measures such as stress 
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  Other commentators produced more balanced and objective reports in 
which they offered points of criticism for the lack of timely decisions on tackling 
the economic crisis, and for not delivering spectacular results in the foreign af-
fairs area. At the same time, they recognized that the financial scene diminished 
the number of alternatives in which to exercise an effective leading role. It was a 
fact that certain priorities in the program of the presidency were not successful, 
but the balance largely confirmed the innate limitations of the EU system of gov-
ernment based on a give-and-take approach. 
  Still other media reports dealt with the effects from the ending of EU 
funds (and their attached benefits) produced by the ascent of Spain in economic 
status, the impact of the country’s damaged image as a victim of the economic 
crisis, and the internal depressing self-image as a result of the above factors’ 
confluence. Overall, most observers expressed a kind of nostalgia for the more 
successful presidencies of 1989 and 1995 under the socialist government. As 
mentioned above, the 2002 presidency happened during the serious confrontation 
over the war in Iraq.  
  Nonetheless, experts will easily agree that the institutional practical exer-
cise will be a topic of research to follow in the future. It will, moreover, be inter-
esting because, as mentioned above, the semester term was followed by the 
commemoration of the twenty-five years of Spain’s and Portugal’s membership 
in the EU. 
  However, a major factor that was not considered when the EU decided to 
initially proceed down the constitutional path – both in its failed attempt, then 
through the substitute method of the Lisbon treaty – was the looming economic 
crisis that affected all corners of the EU structure and each one of its member 
states. Any evaluation of the experience of Spain in the new Lisbon system will 
have to take into account the resolution of the financial disaster, because, among 
other reasons, it certainly occupied the attention of government officials, making 
the institutional process secondary. Observers should also be advised to pay close 
attention to the internal evolution of politics in Spain, both in the case of the ex-
haustion of the congressional term (until March 2012) and in the event of a call 
for new elections and potentially drastic changes in the top government structure. 
  No matter what the result is regarding the evolution of these uncertain-
ties, it was expected that Spain will remain a loyal member of the EU, with the 
same Europeanist zeal as in the past. It can also be predicted that the economic 
crisis will serve to strengthen the deep implication in the reformatted institutional 
network. As a median power, Spain could be one of the winners in the implemen-
tation of plans for the External Service of the EU, both in the case of closing 
some unneeded embassies and in the strengthening of European representation in 
places where Spain’s diplomats can be more useful. Rephrasing once more the 
statement by Ortega y Gasset, neither Spain nor Europeare the problem, but both 
are the solution in the global crisis.                             
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